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
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS.

I.

The old controversy between the moralists and the economists may be said to have died out. It was due to misunderstanding, and it would hardly be worth while to ask which side was more to blame for the misunderstanding. No one, any longer, has to fall back upon the language of Ruskin or of Carlyle in discussing economic doctrine. The keener criticism of the socialists also is usually directed to something more vulnerable than a body of scientific doctrines. It is possible that neither Ruskin nor Carlyle nor Marx was ever justified. But the reason why their denunciations of political economy are not repeated now must be sought in the attitude of the economists themselves. Either their pretensions have been reduced from those of Ricardo and his followers, for example, or the limitations which these pretensions always implied have been made clearer. These limitations are chiefly the following:

1. It is recognized that, even in matters of industry and commerce, a man's motives may be complex and not simply of the kind conveniently or inconveniently called economic. Desire of wealth and aversion to labor—in other words, greed and laziness—do not altogether determine his action. As Marshall says:¹ "Ethical forces are among those of which the economist has to take account." Ties of kin, custom, and duty, as well as regard for the law of the land, have some

¹ "Principles of Economics," ed. 1, pref.

effect upon everyone; and besides this each man's conduct is colored by his own individual preferences and ideals. Man is neither so rampant an egoist nor so callous an embodiment of reason, as some of the older economists supposed—or led the moralists to imagine that they supposed. "The older economic man," as Lord Goschen admits, "was an hypothesis,"² and, we may add, an hypothesis which was no nearer the truth because it was so far removed from beauty and from goodness. So far as economics involves a study of motives, it has to be recognized that these motives vary in different individuals, in different social surroundings, and also in different departments of economic activity. In some departments—in the stockbroker's business, for example—the "economic" motive of desire of wealth may be hampered and modified to a very slight extent only by conflict with other motives; though, even here, the desire of wealth is effectually restrained and guided by respect for the law of the land and for the unwritten law of the stock exchange. In other departments, especially those further removed from the centre of business—farming may be an example—this desire of wealth is more obviously modified by adherence to the custom of the neighborhood as well as by other motives not purely economic. We must therefore give a careful and critical reception to any economic arguments which assume an "economic man." They are at best abstract, and deal with one side or aspect only of human activity. They tend to neglect the fact that man's other interests may mingle with and tend to disturb the even current of his economic activity. Man is a wealth-hunting, wealth-producing animal; but he is a great deal more. And although we may roughly divide his *activities* into those of business and those of leisure, we cannot draw the same line of separation within the *motives* which impel or inspire him and say that in business he is moved by desire of wealth, which is the end of business, and that in his use of his leisure he is moved by other motives of a more personal and perhaps more moral kind.

² *Economic Journal*, III., 386.

2. The second limitation concerns the validity of the laws formulated by the economists as a result of their reasonings. So far as these reasonings proceeded on the assumption that men in their economic activities were guided solely by economic motives, it is clear that the validity of the conclusions can be hypothetical only. So far also as they assumed an environment of free competition—an "economic" state for the "economic" man to inhabit—the conclusions cannot hold strictly of any society in which that free competition is not fully realized; and there is no society in which it is fully realized, although there are departments of social activity in the industrial and commercial states in which its realization is very nearly complete. The "economic state" is as hypothetical and unreal as the "economic man."

When the "laws" of the economists are thus recognized as of limited validity—when they are admitted to be hypothetical only, or to be not laws but tendencies, or in whatever way the limitation is expressed—the reason for distrust of the science on the part of the moralist is removed. When the "economic man" is allowed to be a figment there is no longer any need to cry out against him as a monster. And when "economic laws" are put forward not as statements of what does and must happen, but only of what would happen if certain tendencies were unmodified by man's varied motives and by the social order, there is no longer any excuse for dreading these laws as if they were relentless forces which must nullify all efforts towards social improvement.

3. The third point is concerned with an even more vulgar misunderstanding than the preceding. What ought never to have been in doubt is now at any rate made clear. Economic "laws" are not imperative; they have no binding force upon conduct and do not profess to have any. So far as they are valid, they are valid simply as generalized statements of the results which will follow from the interaction of given forces in a given medium. These forces are not spoken of as either moral or immoral, but only as operative in a certain direction and with a certain measure of efficiency. There is no obligation to refrain from modifying their operation by appropriate

means. Only, if we think of doing so it is well to understand them first. Economic facts and reasonings may be important data for enabling us to determine what we ought to do in certain circumstances. But economics does not of itself lay down any rules, as ethics professes to do, as to what we are to do and abstain from doing. One does not break any economic law by buying in the dearest market and selling in the cheapest, as one breaks a moral law by stealing one's neighbor's property or spending one's life in idleness.

All these points might be admitted without compelling any fundamental change in the view of economics presented by Mill or even by Ricardo. But, as a matter of fact, their elucidation has been accompanied by a gradual change in the views of the economists as to the scope, boundaries, and methods of their science. This change has been hastened by the criticisms of the historical school, by the concrete study of industrial relations and their development, and by the systematic application of statistical methods to economic questions. As a result we find that the contemporary treatment of economics produces a markedly different impression upon the reader from that produced by the treatment customary amongst the classical English economists of a generation or two generations ago. It is not merely that deductive reasoning is less prominent and facts are much more prominent—that the science is more realistic. Its connections are also emphasized in a new way. There is an absence of the clear-cut definitions of the older writers. Where these drew sharp distinctions, the moderns lay stress upon continuity, and not merely continuity within the economic range, but continuity of the economic with larger social and mental processes.

In this way not only does the old controversy of economics and ethics disappear, but the subject-matters of the two sciences are made to approximate and run into one another. And this causes a special difficulty in exhibiting the relation of ethics to economics, as that science is now conceived. As long as economics had a clearly marked region of its own, it was comparatively easy to examine the relations in which it stood with some other branch of inquiry. But when its territories

are less sharply defined and admitted to be continuous with an indefinite region which also belongs to some other sciences, the task becomes much less simple. Of course no one ever pretended that the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth took place in a world by themselves, unaffected by social and mental conditions other than those which had wealth and nothing but wealth directly for their object. Thus J. S. Mill, in defining the object of political economy as being "to investigate the nature of wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution," adds that this includes, "directly or remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings, in respect to this universal object of human desire, is made prosperous or the reverse." But the tendency even of Mill, and still more of his immediate predecessors, was (unless on a few special questions) to disregard the operation of these surrounding and connected forces, and to work out an abstract hypothetical science. At present it is usual for economists to lay special stress on these forces both in the definition and in the elaboration of their science. Thus Schmoller describes economics as having to do with "part of the content of social life, with one side of the social organism," and holds that "it can be understood only in connection with the remaining social phenomena. As an introduction to it we must seek to understand social life in general, and in particular, its mental, moral, and legal foundations." And he accordingly begins his work with an investigation of "some of the principal questions which lie on the boundary between economics on the one hand and politics, psychology, ethics, and jurisprudence on the other."⁸ That is to say the facts which we call economic, and which it is the economist's business to investigate, are not complete facts which can be studied by themselves, but parts of a wider group of facts without reference to which they cannot be understood. This same point—that economic facts are simply a portion of the larger group of facts which may be called social—is brought out in the various phrases in which the subject-

⁸ "Gr. d. allg. Volksw." (1900), I. 6.

matter of the science is defined by Marshall. In his opening definition, economics is called "a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of well-being. Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth, and on the other and more important side, a part of the study of man" ("Prin." ed. 4, p. 1). Again, it is described as "a study of the economic aspects and conditions of man's political, social and private life; but more especially of his social life. The aims of the study are to gain knowledge for its own sake, and to obtain guidance in the practical conduct of life, and especially of social life" (p. 117). And once again, it is said "economics is, on the one side, a science of wealth; and on the other, that part of the social science of man's action in society that deals with his efforts to satisfy his wants, in so far as the efforts and wants are capable of being measured in terms of wealth, or its general representative, *i. e.*, money" (p. 118).

I quote these various expressions because they all bring out both the wide range of economic phenomena, and also the special reference which distinguishes them as economic and not merely, in the wide sense, social phenomena. The "economic aspects" of social life differ from its other aspects although these may have to be taken into account in order that those may be fully understood. The "two sides" (as they are here called) of economics itself do not really differ—at least for our purposes. On the one side it is said to be the science of wealth; but as wealth is something that is being constantly made and exchanged and consumed by man, it is clear that the human and social activities involved in these processes must be included in the study of wealth. On the other side economics is said to be "that part of the social science of man's action in society that deals with his efforts to satisfy his wants;" but this broad statement needs restriction if economics is to be distinguished from social science generally; and it is at once restricted by the qualifying clause, "in so far as the efforts and wants are capable of being measured in terms of wealth or its general representative, *i. e.* money." This gives the *differentia* of "economic"

from other objects of human desire. They are "capable of being measured in terms of wealth," or, since "wealth" itself is a term about whose exact meaning there may be controversy, in terms of the general representative of wealth, namely, money. Economics deals with other things than wealth only in so far as they tend directly or indirectly to promote or impair wealth. Under this general description there are few (if any) factors in social life which might not gain entrance into economic study. But we must remember the reason why they are allowed to enter and the strict limitations put upon the part they are allowed to play. They enter only as aids or obstacles to wealth, and are evaluated only from this point of view. It is only *in so far* as they can be measured by wealth, *i. e.*, by money, that objects of human desire are recognized as economic goods. Just on this account economic goods are not the only good things. There are many others which, as we say, are "without price." If examples were wanted, one might point to an enumeration of things worth having: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."

Now, if we do think on these things with our present question in view, we see that some of them can hardly be said to have the slightest money value; others of them may be factors in economic goods. Justice for instance, may in some degree be a business asset worth money, as other personal qualities may be. But its goodness or worth cannot be measured by its wealth-producing effects. None of these things, in fact—and they are only examples of many others—derive their goodness from any tendency they may have to produce wealth; nor are those of them which have no causal relation with wealth less good than those of them which may have some such relation. The economist has a definite and finely graduated scale upon which he measures his values. But there are some values—and amongst these the most important—which cannot be measured on his scale.

This consideration points to a relationship between economics

and ethics which is of an essentially different kind from that first suggested. And it is now possible to distinguish them from one another, and to define these two ways in which economics is related to ethics, or, if the phrase be preferred, these two "ethical aspects" of economics.

1. In the first place are to be reckoned all those influences which may be described as moral, which enter into and modify the processes of the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. The economist cannot content himself by referring to the "desire of wealth" as explaining the whole of man's economic activity; nor may he regard the social medium in which economic affairs are carried on as planned and maintained for economic purposes only. Its purposes embrace but go beyond economy, and these further purposes react upon economic processes. To quote Marshall's words again, "ethical forces are among those of which the economist has to take account." The extra-economic forces of which the economist has to take account are partly natural or physical, partly human; and the human forces may be said to be ethical or quasi-ethical. They may be distinguished into three groups—mental, social, and legal—which, however, do not admit of strict separation from one another in their operation.

(a) There are, first, the mental processes: the impulses, desires, and purposes of men. These are commonly described as moral powers, since they determine conduct and are amenable to review by conscience. The idea that a purely economic motive, called the desire of wealth, can be separated out of these and is a sufficient psychological basis for the study of economics is quite untenable, and has indeed seldom been put forward in this bald form. We may indeed speak of a "desire of wealth," but it is a factitious desire which either arises after reflection on the facility which wealth gives for gratifying other desires or else grows upon the man of business through the gradual restriction of his interests to business and its immediate results. That is, the desire of wealth needs to be set a-going by other desires. In certain cases it succeeds in dominating these. But normally it exists only in company with a multitude of other desires to the gratification of which wealth may con-

tribute, and alongside of still other desires with which wealth has little or nothing to do. The mere consciousness of one's powers and delight in their exercise may lead to engrossing devotion to business and may result in wealth for which there was hardly any desire. The desire of amusement may lead one to neglect one's business, or it may lead to hard work for a time that the means of amusing oneself later on may be acquired. And in addition to the whole tribe of desires which fill the life of man, conduct is regulated and modified in varying degrees by the sense of duty or by ideas about good and evil. All these influences affect economic activities, and it is consequently illegitimate for the student of economic processes to neglect any of them. Any selection amongst them of "motives to be taken into account by the economist must be more or less arbitrary. In so far as the economist generalizes from facts, he is dealing with results to which all these forces have contributed. In so far as he argues deductively, he may be obliged to ignore them, but must admit that their omission impairs the validity of his conclusions.

(b) There are, secondly, the various forms of the social life, such as the division of classes, the customary standard of comfort of each class, and the like, and the various forms of institution—the family, the church, local governing bodies, and State. Many of these customs and institutions are primarily economic, for example, the competitive system, and among institutions, trade unions and employers' associations and trusts. Others have a different purpose or one of wider range; but all of them influence the industrial and commercial life of the country. If we were to go into detail a close correspondence might be shown between these social forms and the mental or moral tendencies of individuals. Individual and society do not merely interact; they are inseparable in their nature.

(c) Thirdly, there may be distinguished from social forms the system of law declared and enforced by the State. It also stands in the closest reciprocal relation to the moral sense of the community: on the one hand it may be regarded as the expression of the moral obligations which are held to be most essential by the community; on the other hand it in large measure

modifies and controls this moral sense. In stationary societies the two are in equilibrium; in progressive societies this equilibrium is being constantly disturbed.

All this is only an outline or indication of what I have called the first of the two ways in which economics is related to ethics. Economic facts are imbedded in a larger mass of facts, mental, social, and legal; and this larger mass of facts which surrounds the economic is of a nature which is, to a great extent, capable of being described as moral or ethical. We must bear this side of the relationship in mind, because it is of fundamental importance. But it is not *so* important, from our point of view, as the other mode of relationship which I am about to describe. All the above considerations can be taken into account by the economist without leaving the field and method of economics. The other aspect of the relationship, to which I now go on, implies a new point of view outside economics, and necessitates a different method of inquiry.

2. This second way in which economics is related to ethics will be found to lead to issues very different from those of the first. For we have found that economics is able to expand itself and take into its consideration all those ethical forces which may in any manner foster or hinder the growth of wealth or modify its distribution. This broadening of the basis of economics until every relevant social and mental factor has been taken into account is indeed a salient feature of the economic systems of the present day. But the second way of looking at the relation will lead to a new point of view. It will present the economic factor as only one factor in a wider scheme within which the place and rank of the economic factor have to be assigned to it, and an appeal has to be made to other than economic standards.

We have already found that the *differentia* of economic products consists in this, that they can be measured in terms of wealth, or of money as representing wealth. This is an easy means of identification. It also provides a standard for the measurement of purely economic values. This conception of value is indeed so fundamental in economics that the whole science may be said to hinge on it. The value of any article is

determined by relation to the other things which can be got in exchange for it; and when we have in money a general measure of the ratio in which things can be exchanged for one another, the measurement of value is easy. The term "value" in this use of it means "value in exchange;" and to this use the term is practically restricted in modern economic reasoning. This is a matter of convenience. But if we examine this conception of value, we find that it assumes another conception. The value of A consists in its relation to the amounts of B, C, and D, or any one or more of them which can be got in exchange for it. The value of B, in like manner, consists in its relation to the amounts of A, C, and D, or any one or more of them which can be got in exchange for it. Similarly of the values of C and D. And if we measure the value of all commodities by money, then money itself has to be valued in terms of commodities. In attempting to define the value of any one commodity, therefore, we are really always landed in a *circulus in definiendo*; and this circle is only hidden from us because we commonly define the value in relation to the common measure, money, and overlook for the moment the fact that the value of money itself must be defined in relation to other articles. The economic conception of "value" (*i. e.*, exchange value), therefore, can be supported only if commodities have, in some sense, a value which is independent of their relation to other commodities. That is to say, value in exchange rests ultimately upon what Adam Smith called "value in use," what Jevons and others call simply "utility." This term "utility," again, has been found capable of convenient manipulation in the intricacies of economic reasoning; and as it is found convenient there is no reason why it should not be employed. But it is hardly adequate to our present purpose. It has certain misleading associations of an ethical or philosophical kind; and it is besides a relative term which assumes as understood a purpose or end in the promotion of which the utility consists. The value in exchange of any thing depends upon the fact that it has a value independent of exchange, to some person or persons at any rate. They desire it for its own sake—to "use," as Adam Smith would

say, or perhaps simply to attain or possess. And this value, independent of exchange, which it has for them is shown by the fact that they would do something or give up something to get it. This is the fundamental "value," therefore, and I should like to give it that name. But to do so would only create confusion with the economic use so firmly established. I shall therefore use the term "value," as the economists use it, for "value in exchange;" and for the underlying conception, the value which is independent of exchange, I shall make use of the term "worth."

Now all things which have "value" (in exchange) either have worth themselves or lead to others which have it. But not all things which have worth have also value (in exchange). "Get wisdom," says the proverb, "and with all thy getting get understanding"—not clearly because they can be passed on for something else or can be measured by money, but simply for their intrinsic worth. The economist has his scale of values and can place all economic goods at their proper places on the scale. But the whole valuation is extrinsic. The goods are not valued for themselves, but for what they will bring—in money.

If we go any further and raise the question not of extrinsic values, but of the importance of economic goods in human life as a whole, we raise a question not of extrinsic but of intrinsic value, or of what I have proposed to term worth. In the scale of worth all economic goods must be re-estimated with reference to a different standard than the economic standard of value; and they must have their place assigned to them in comparison with the goods for which the economic scale has no room. This is the question, aspects of which will occupy us in the following articles; and it is strictly an ethical question, though it deals with economic material. It is not an easy question; and in many of its aspects it will be found not to admit of a fully satisfactory solution. But it is none the less a legitimate and indeed an essential question both for the student of economics and for everyone engaged in the business of life. The smallest consideration shows that the extrinsic values with which alone economics deals are an insufficient guide to intrinsic worth:

they shift with every turn of the market, or with a new invention, or with a change in the laws of the land. And it is necessary to ask whether there is any other way of determining the worth both of the things which money buys and of those things which it cannot buy.

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POSITIVISTS AND DOCTOR COIT.

I have seldom been more surprised by any article than I was by that written by Dr. Stanton Coit in the July number of this JOURNAL, and entitled "Humanity and God." I thought that I knew something about the "English Positivists;" but as Dr. Coit has discovered such things about them that I have never heard of, I must ask him to tell us where he found this singular variety, and whom he has unearthed as addicted to the practices he describes. In all the thirty-six years that I have been associated with the Positivist movement, in the twenty-five years that I was President of the English Positivist Committee, I have never heard or seen anything at all like the ideas Dr. Coit ascribes to our body.

He begins by asserting that the English Positivists are proud of having the words "Humanity" and "God" coupled side by side. And he goes on to declare that they represent Humanity as the equal of God. I can only say that I have never known any such thing, nor has our committee or our body ever used any such language. We have always taught that Humanity and God represent ideas entirely incommensurate, incapable of being compared, having no relation or analogy whatever. Humanity is a visible, localized, limited organism, wholly *relative*, and devoid of all the divine attributes necessarily associated with the idea of God. Humanity can no more be compared with God, or grouped with God, or assimilated to God, than could the idea of one's Fatherland or the Planet we dwell on. It is an idle sneer that Positivists ever pretend to make a God of Humanity.

Dr. Coit asserts that Positivists worship Humanity, pray to it as if it were God. I can only say that I have never heard of such a thing in the twenty-five years that I presided over the body at Newton Hall and at Clifford's Inn. I myself drew up a form of exhortations which has been in constant use at all Positivist Sacraments and Celebrations. But there is not a word in these sentences which is not directly applicable to the collective human race, with all its limitations, errors, and disabilities; nor is there a word to suggest that Humanity, as a being, can have any conscious communion with men.

In my valedictory address at Newton Hall, March, 1902, I said, "no invocations answering to the litanies of theology have ever been used by us." I was there summing up the record of our body since 1881. I added that our meetings had "no character of adoration," nor did we call them "services." I went on to describe Humanity as "an ideal assemblage of human beings, living, dead, and unborn, and (presumably) *without any collective personality or consciousness.*" And Dr. Coit now tells the world that we pray to Humanity.

He says that we "worship" Humanity, whereas in this same address it is explained that the *Cult* we accepted was "the collective commemoration of all that is wise, beneficent, beautiful, and creative in the history and endowments of Man." How can a practical, relative, scientific culture such as this be taken as equivalent to the adoration of an All-knowing, Almighty Creator of the Universe? They differ as widely as an historical lecture differs from a *Te Deum*.

Dr. Coit asserts that Positivists ask men to transfer to Humanity all the homage that Christians devote to God. And he asks us, why we do not boldly declare that Humanity is God. Our answer is that we see no analogy between the two. Let me quote from my own Annual Address in Newton Hall, January 1, 1902. I said: "Nor let it be supposed that we seek to substitute Humanity for God, or Allah, or Jove, or Jehovah. The idea of an omnipotent or superhuman deity *cannot be compared with the idea of a collective human civilisation*—" "our idea of Humanity is rather that of an idealized and glorified Country of the whole human race—what the image of

Rome was to the poet Virgil. The Religion of Humanity is rather a religion of *enlarged and purified Patriotism*, in which the Patriots are not of one race or land, but where the human race is the nation and our Planet is their native land."

Dr. Coit asks why Positivists use such a hymn as "Nearer, my God, to Thee." I can assure him I never heard of any Positivists who do so. We have a book of hymns which have been in constant use in Newton Hall since 1890, and then in Clifford's Inn Hall, and elsewhere. This collection of 143 pieces was made by my wife, and is now in a new edition. Sarah Adams' hymn "Nearer, my God to Thee" is not contained in it, though it is in the South Place and in the Essex Hall Hymnal. It is quite untrue that we have ever used, or adapted, or recommended this popular religious hymn. I should as soon think of giving it out at Newton Hall as Dr. Coit would think of asking his congregation on a Sunday morning to sing "Yankee Doodle."

It is also quite untrue to assert that British Positivists are in any real sense Agnostics, or indeed differ from Ethicists in the matter. In my Annual Address, January 1, 1904, I said: "We are neither Protestants, nor Catholics, nor Agnostics." We simply decline to dogmatize, or even search as to the origin of the universe, holding it outside all that concerns human life. We are by no means Agnostics," I said, "with a spiritual pride in avowing our negation of knowledge." As we know nothing we assert nothing as to the universe; and we forbear to inquire, to think, and even to deny. We have—to use Dr. Coit's own words to express his own belief—"no theory of the relation of Thought to a Being independent of Thought."

Into what Dr. Coit argues in Part II. of his paper, I will not attempt to enter. He seems to suggest that Humanity is the Moral Ideal: and that the Moral Ideal is "Very God of Very God." I cannot follow such tremendous descents into abysmal mysteries. I will only say that I cannot imagine that Humanity can be God; nor that Humanity (a real organism) can be the Moral Ideal (a spiritual concept); nor that the Moral Ideal (a human thought) can be God; nor do I even

understand what "Very God of Very God" means. All this seems to me a jumble of mysticism and theology—and humanly speaking mere clotted nonsense.

All the same I see with regret that the Moral Ideal thinks it consistent with its lofty pretensions roundly to charge brother Ethicists (as we certainly are) with duplicity and falsehood in concealing our real opinions in order to inveigle our hearers step by step. The Moral Ideal, in order to show its superiority over Humanity as well as God, dares to air its indifference to mere human ethics by accusing us of insincerity and fraud. I call the world to witness that if ever any body of men ever carried out our sacred motto—*Live without concealment*—it is the body with which I have been associated for more than a generation. There may have been in South America or in some obscure corner of these islands a body of people calling themselves Positivists who may have used hysterical language such as Dr. Coit pretends. But, if I can speak for British Positivists, I can truly say they will regard Dr. Coit's paper as a tissue of false accusations.

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THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONALISM.*

It may, I think, be rightly said that the greatest thing which has happened within the last two generations has been the practical enlargement of the world for all members of civilized communities. The world, of course, is of a different size for all of us, and it is very largely determined in that size by the attitude, the conscious and the unconscious attitude which we adopt towards it. That is to say, the world is as large as we by our practical experience and our imaginative experience and sympathy choose and are able to make it. Perhaps it is age when their practicable movements and actual concrete ex-difficult for us to realize how small a thing the world meant for most of our grandfathers and grandmothers, living in an

* An address before the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia.

periences of life were confined almost entirely to a minute fraction of the soil of the particular country upon which they were born. Even in this country, where movement was freer and larger at that time, it may be said that the world was not one tenth or one hundredth part so great, if measured by the experience of the citizen of fifty years ago, as it is for you to-day.

We know, of course, in general terms, how this change has been brought about. Partly, it is due to the facilitation of travel, the direct contact and experience with other peoples spreading so widely among modern developed nations—at any rate so far as the more wealthy classes are concerned. But that is not the chief instructor and the chief enlarger of the world. It is through the facilitation of news, through the press and the telegraph service, that we are brought to-day into ever closer, more immediate and sympathetic contact with the whole world. Everyone, to-day, as we say familiarly, lives at the end of a telegraph line, which means not merely that all the great and significant happenings in the world are brought to his attention in a way which was impossible a generation or two ago, but that they are brought at once and simultaneously to the attention of great masses of people, so that anything happening in the most remote part of the world makes its immediate impression upon the society of nations. The whole world is made cognizant of it, and the immediate and simultaneous sympathy it arouses brings a new element of sociality into the world. In this sense we may say that the world has been recently discovered for the mass of civilized mankind. It has been brought effectively within the true area of their attention.

But what is the intellectual and moral attitude to-day toward this large world, broken as it still remains into a large number of so-called separate nations? We are hardly prepared to take a cool, clear, scientific view of international relations. The press, of which I spoke just now, throws the limelight now upon one corner of the world, now upon another; now it is perhaps upon South Africa, now it is upon some great stir in China, again, some South American rebellion occupies the field of immediate attention, then we are swept away to the mystery

of Russia, to street fights in the city of Moscow, to the eruption of some volcano, or some new atrocities up on the Congo. Such interest so broken cannot be said to be effectively scientific or effectively humanitarian. We are not able to adjust clearly our minds or our sympathetic feelings to the interests of humanity as disclosed by these great events. This rapid, sensational posing of the different portions of the world before us seems at present to dissipate rather than integrate our thought and feeling, to arouse a constant, quick succession of unrelated interests. The daily press, the chief instrument of this dissipation is engaged continually in trying to alarm, surprise and amaze us by strongly marked display of new incidents in different portions of the world. What we call the "yellow" press (a press which is not confined to your country, a press which is closely imitated in my own country and in various countries of Europe), seems to have developed a new idea of providence, presenting it in the character of a great sporting committee, engaged in arranging "events" over the world; great feats, great new international handicaps are commonly being announced in alarmist letters, and this press, of course, is primarily engaged in taking the gate-money for this class of variety entertainment. So far as the conscious will of man is concerned, so far as these great events which are taking place in different parts of the world are the products of individual will, the notion is not wholly illusory. Underneath those motives which are brought forward to explain what is happening in political and other fields of enterprise, underlying such terms as "honor" and "prestige," we have the struggle for spheres of influence among nations, the struggle for greatness, for national self-assertion in various forms and in various parts of the world, that struggle which in its political and military side takes the title of imperialism. It is this contest that occupies the chief attention of the international committee, for which Mr. Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm are informal secretaries. For while many of the more violent and surprising happenings in the world present themselves to the reading public as uncaused sensations, the highest interest attaches to their great bouts of organized adventure, in which the power of personalities plays

a most distinguished and dramatic part. For "movements" and "forces" cannot even in the most democratic countries displace individual personality in the interpretation of history: in the most modern times national "destinies" are still frequently swayed by the personal influence of some great swash-buckler or some gambler like the great Napoleon III in France, or some calculating statesman like Prince Bismarck. Such men with such passions still play a considerable part in determining the great movements of nations. But, of course, in explaining history, we must not be led back into the old, false, heroic method of interpretation. We must recognize that behind these personalities are certain wider plays of interest and passion, the interests and passions of classes or groups within a nation, or the play of the desires, ambitions and needs of whole peoples. To these great forces, guided and exploited perhaps to some extent by the ambitions of strong men, statesmen and generals of industry or war, we must look if we should seek to understand the modern development of history. Not merely does the interest we have in foreign nations grow greater in modern times, but it is equally evident that the actual influences which work upon the lives of all of us from distant parts of the world are multiplying very fast. It is a familiar truth that whether we look to industry, to politics, to science, to literature, to travel, we find a number of bonds of interest which band men together irrespective of the national limits of the country to which they belong and in which they are born. Even so little time as a generation ago it might be said that for the most part we lived alone as nations; nations were loosely related to one another, and their individual members therefore, had a very slight realization of what the world meant outside their own particular nation.

Now is it equally obvious that every great public issue which confronts us in life is international; it is impossible to trace down those issues which are presented to us as great social issues, political or economic, and to find any solution which is satisfactory that does not present the elements of internationality. If any of you are sympathetically engaged in any great task of modern social reform you will find that you are con-

stantly brought up against this fact; you cannot find a solution adequate for the particular problem upon which you are concentrating your attention that is not thwarted by the play of forces outside your own nationality. That of course is conspicuously true of those movements associated with capital and labor, and indeed all movements which are comprised under the term "The Social Problem." It is not possible, we are now coming to see, for a social problem to be solved by a single nation; no nation can advance toward its solution at a very much faster pace than other nations, nor can it solve what it calls its own problems itself. There are no large problems which are securely fastened within the confines of a single nationality. All attempts to make this national isolation are in the long run futile. If we attempt to interrupt what is happening in the world to-day, we find the key to that interpretation in the tendency to equalization of the material, intellectual and moral resources over the face of the earth. This comes home to us most clearly in commercial matters, in the play of commerce between nation and nation. A generation ago that play was very slight. Now, of course, great masses of commodities are flowing tolerably freely, in spite of tariffs, over the whole surface of the globe. New countries are coming continually into the area of effective commercial intercourse. But that perhaps is not the most significant aspect of the material change which is taking place. The productive powers of mankind, capital and labor, are flowing with incomparably greater freedom over the whole world. The modern methods of investment simply mean that huge masses of capital are moving about to find the spot where they can combine most effectively with natural resources and with labor, and labor is seeking to follow the same line of free flow. This is the great thing which is happening from the standpoint of material development of the earth, the flow of capital and labor, drawn primarily by the self-interest of its owners to combine in methods and at places which are most effective for the production of wealth for the world—not of wealth for any individual nation. This flow of capital and labor, the largest practical thing that is happening to-day, is in its real meaning directed to the production and

distribution of wealth over the world, and all these little laws which are set up by nationalities to regulate the kind of things that shall come from one country to another, and the way in which they shall enter, and the terms upon which capital shall be used in foreign nations, and the regulations which restrict the movements of the flow of labor from one nation to another, all these are small and comparatively trivial barriers set up against this majestic world-flow of capital and labor. What is aimed at is a leveling process throughout the world, a leveling of economic and ultimately of social conditions between one part of the world and another; and the forces which impel this great movement are immensely and immeasurably stronger than those which artificial barriers of national law can possibly set up to prohibit or restrain them. You may, of course, impede the particular flow, you may alter a little the direction, you may block certain channels, but you cannot effectively, to any considerable degree, control these great world forces. It is the pace and the intricacy of this new movement which is causing a great deal of the bewilderment and the impotence which mark the conduct of modern statesmen in all the countries of the world.

The modes of cosmopolitanism which are already established strike us often as most significant. You can book a passage by rail or sea in London or New York for any point in the civilized or uncivilized known world. You can transmit money from Philadelphia to any part of the civilized world, surely, securely, quickly and easily. We can read books, either in foreign languages—if we know them—or in translations, books which put us in direct communication with the thoughts and feelings of distant peoples. Many of us have friendships which bind us closely to members of various nations of the world. Those who think upon these things are sometimes apt to exaggerate the actual achievements of internationalism, and they are brought up suddenly with a sense of shock against the hard political barriers which still stand in the way of free communication of nations: barriers which thrust back our thoughts and feelings on to the conception of hard, separate and antagonistic national entities. There are many who, when

the relations between nations are brought up as a subject of thought, immediately put themselves in a position of competition or antagonism. Nations seem to them natural competitors and not coöoperators. In this spirit we are all of us at times almost instinctively apt to interpret some great event that has happened—the success of the Japanese, the national revolution in Russia, the Anglo-French entente, the digging of the Panama canal—we are exceedingly apt to consider how these things will affect the strength of particular nations, and their grouping for competitive purposes, in commerce and in military matters. Education, the meagre and unintelligent way in which history is taught to us, not merely in the schools but in common contact of life, is largely responsible for this idea of nations as hard, separate unities, and the phrases which have caught upon our minds in the schools, phrases like "the balance of power," "the concert of Europe" (a concert which is always conceived, not in terms of unison, but rather antagonism and opposition), such terms as these are those that unhappily express the relations between nations. When we are discussing freely the possibility of the settlement of disputes between nations by arbitration, we are still met by the dominant theory that arbitration can only deal with certain sorts of issues, and that we must reserve all those affecting the honor and the vital interests of nations from any such pacific settlement by a court of international justice; we must still retain for these important issues the right to determine our own cause for ourselves. The idea of international relations which underlies this view is that of a poise, balance, or adjustment. I will ask you to distrust such mechanical analogies as applies to social affairs. The history of modern nations has disclosed two forms in which this balance of interests is conceived; one of them is known in England and presumably over the civilized world as associated with the ideas of Richard Cobden. Cobden and his friends primarily conceived nations as bound together by the play of purely commercial interests. If we could have free trade established between the different parts of the world, then the material business interests of these different parts would bind together the world so closely and so quickly that it would be

impossible for war to be maintained in the future. The society of nations was represented by this dream as a joint stock company, determined in its relations and in its constitution by considerations of purely utilitarian harmony, each seeking to get for itself the largest quantity of material wealth. Those who see to-day that the fiercest struggles between members of different nations are for the markets of the world smile scornfully on this dream of Richard Cobden. What Cobden and his friends failed to take account of was the continued power of certain classes of interests within the nation, as distinguished from the national interests conceived as a whole—the power of certain people to misrepresent the people. The identity of commercial interests which he saw between different nations is real and substantial, and commerce might have been made the great peacemaker if the antagonism of groups within the nations had not been so powerful as to override the community of interests between peoples. Cobden, of course, and his friends, and the spirit of his time, made overmuch of commerce. We now understand that nations, like individuals, "cannot live by bread alone," but by every sound feeling that comes forth from the heart of humanity.

But there has grown up and thrives in modern times a new conception which is perhaps more fatal than this former. Our new imperialists to-day have also their dream. That dream is that the world is destined by absorption on the part of the stronger nations to pass into a smaller number of vast estates, so large and so strong that they will find it necessary to come into closer union with one another, because the shock of arms and the waste of competition will prove too disastrous. When the lions have swallowed up all the lambs, then with glutted appetites a certain torpor will come, and from that torpor they predict a world peace. The nations grown so big, so rich, so strong, will fear to oppose one another in mortal combat, so they will be driven to come to terms; a few gigantic empires dividing the earth between them, conterminous with one another, powerful, definite and rich, will form a new sort of equilibrium of forces—fear, not gain, and not love, is designated as the ultimate peacemaker. But this equilibrium of

mutual fear is as far from true attainment as the Cobdenite dream—perhaps it is farther, if we look upon the actual condition of the world to-day. It is not true that the whole world has been absorbed or digested by a few great nations, or is on the point of being so digested. The seven great western powers of the world have already before them the absorption and the assimilation of nearly half the world which remains undivided. Even in Europe itself we have huge tracts of territory, the Turkish empire, and to that we must now add the great Russian empire, broken up, as it now seems, or breaking up, into new fragments. Even in Europe itself, there seems to be an enormous task to be achieved before we can attain anything that could be called a stable equilibrium of powers, or any confederation of European States. In Asia there are the great countries of China, Turkestan, Persia, Afghanistan and Arabia, and all the vague country known as Asia Minor. In Africa, besides the existence of the four independent states, there are huge tracts in the interior of Africa which are only nominally partitioned among the civilized nations of the world. In America I need only mention that medley of weak republics in South America. These parts of the world's surface, you will say, are loosely ear-marked by the civilized nations as "buffer states," "spheres of influence" or "spheres of interest," or some other in that sliding scale of aggrandizing terms is applied to them, marking them out for future absorption by one or other of their great civilized neighbors. But the notion that this is the beginning of rapid and final assimilation of the lower nations of the world is quite unwarranted in fact, and we are far too hasty in our own generalizations to the effect that the future belongs to the great empires. The movement for the development of great empires has gone on very rapidly in recent times, but we have no assurance that the true stability of national life will be maintained in these great, gigantic federations of states. Moreover, most of the territory which has been acquired by the civilized nations within the last thirty years is held very slightly and upon a most precarious tenure. The dream of a single empire in the future, or of a stable equilibrium of a few empires, dividing

among them the power of the world, and existing in amicable relations with one another, proceeding upon the line of national self-development purely, is to my mind less warranted than even the dream of Cobden.

We may ask then, is there no hope for a sound settlement of international differences and relations? Are nations inherently and eternally separate and hostile, forming among themselves temporary alliances for offense and defense, establishing balances of power, liable always to be upset by some new shift of events. It is strange how a fallacy which has been long discredited for human nature in the individual survives when we regard human nature in the nation. The doctrine associated with the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, the view that individuals existed originally in what he called a state of nature, where each man was at war with his fellows, and that individuals passed from this condition of hostility by means of what he called the social contract, agreeing with one another by means of mutual concessions to secure the self-interest of one another, has been repudiated by all modern thinkers as giving a wrong analysis of human nature, and as being a false account of the actual origin of society. It has been well and ably pointed out by modern thinkers that man, as far as we know him in history, is not a being purely absorbed in his own self-defense and individual interests, that the social character of man is part of his nature, and therefore there is a natural origin of human society from the beginning not explained as an artificial arrangement of individual self-interests. We are sure that there never was such an individual as Hobbes and his friends pictured; that theory ignores the essentially social nature of man. History shows man in the early stages of society, ay, and animals before the stage of humanity was reached, to be gregarious and sociable, to be concerned, not merely with their own interests, but with the interests of one another; the rudiments of the highest forms of modern society are found in the lowest forms of family life; and we now trace the development of societies and of human history as a struggle for life in which the coöperative factors of human life were more important than the competitive factors, a truth which

Prince Kropotkin so powerfully expresses in his book "Mutual Aid," pointing out that the notable factor in the doctrine of biological evolution is the fact that the tribe or group or nation grows more by social and coöperative power on the part of its individual members than by anything that can be called purely individual fitness and force. We have discarded the notion of pure selfishness as a basis of development. Beyond the limits of the nation, however, this hide-bound individualism is still maintained. When we regard the society of nations, nations viewed in their relations with one another, we still say they have no natural feelings for one another, they have no instincts of mutual aid. It is a strange assumption underlying this view—the assumption that the social feelings of individual men cannot pass the limits of nationality. In other words, we refuse to entertain, in any real sense, the conception of a society of nations in which the separate nations are related to one another by similar moral and psychical ties to those which we recognize within the limits of the nation. There can be, we think, no society of nations, because there is no real sociality among nations. There is no human need in one nation of the coöperation of other nations. Some sociologists in this country and others have attempted to insist upon this doctrine that the social nature of man is virtually confined to our relations within the nation, that outside the nation we have a condition of relations and an ethics which must be entirely separate from those within the national group. Among individuals in the nation the cruder forms of conflict are put down, the coöperative factor is recognized as a source of strength, the struggle, we recognize, is less a struggle for life itself, more a struggle to secure control of the environment. But all this, we say, is not applicable to the struggle between nations. The most urgent need for us, I think, is to break down this theory and this feeling about the separateness of so-called independent nations. For this hard-shell nationalism is false in the same way and to the same degree as the hard-shell individualism of the older times. The nature of a nation is not such as these people represent it, the contention that nations have no duties one to another of the same kind and in the same degree as

the duties between members of a nation is false. The instinct for internationalism is just the same within the nation as the instinct for society within the individual. It weaves, as we now see if we look clearly upon the events of to-day, a subtle network of institutions which transcend the nationality.

I cannot take time to dwell upon this subject, but you will find, if you consider this subject closely, that although the political relations between nations to-day are slight, the commercial and the scientific relations between nations in various spheres of action are growing closer and more constant all the time, and that is a true basis of internationalism to which political relations will have to adjust themselves. Political forms are already growing up to support and to express this actual union of interest and sympathy which has already formed between the members of different nations. So nations coming gradually to recognize those rights and duties which actually exist, must come by degrees to substitute a settlement of differences by arbitration for settlement by force of arms.

Yet how slow this idea is to gain assent may be illustrated by the views of one of our great ethical teachers in England of recent years, the late Prof. Ritchie: "There is only one way in which war between independent nations can be prevented, and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent." Now that is a most fallacious way of presenting the idea of internationalism. We do not insist that liberty or the true independence of nations shall be curtailed. A nation no more loses its freedom and liberty by entering into organic relations with other nations than the individual does by entering into organic relations with his fellow-citizens. We understand that a properly established state in a civilized community is engaged in enlarging the liberty of its members, and what is true of the individual is equally true for nations. There is no loss of nationality in entering into just organic relations. By giving up the right of individual war, by abandoning the right to fight duels or to murder a person who offends him in a society, a citizen does not lose his freedom in any true sense. We recognize that the true liberty of the individual gains precisely by the establishment of this just social order in the

state, and so it is in the establishment of an international state. The freedom of nationality, so far from being impaired, is actually fed and ripened by the establishment of international relations upon a just basis. The antagonism between nations will disappear just so far as we establish this new relation, and for its establishment one thing is necessary. The apparent oppositions of interest between nations, I repeat, are not oppositions between the interests of the people conceived as a whole; they are oppositions of class interests within the nation. The interests of America and Great Britain and France and Germany are common. The interests between certain groups of manufacturers or traders or politicians or financiers may be antagonistic at certain times within those groups, and those antagonisms, usurping the names of national interest, impose themselves as directors of the course of history; that is the actual difficulty with which we are confronted in desiring the establishment of a basis of effective internationalism. It is not a new story. The great German philosopher Kant recognized it very clearly a century and a half ago, when he wrote thus: "For if fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic, which by its very nature is inclined to perpetuate peace, this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the states." In accordance with the idea of the law of nations, gradually, through different unions of this kind, federation would extend further and further. That is to say, the conception of a real republic, by which is meant an effective democracy, is essential to the achievement of peaceable relations between the nations of the world; not of course the mere form of a republic, not a form in which the power of the people is usurped by bosses and formally registered by the vote of the people, but a real republic in which the people themselves, the several units, express themselves with freedom and equality in the determination of their own affairs. If only we get republics of that order, and not till then, shall we be able securely and effectively to achieve this great condition of a society of nations animated by the true spirit of humanity.

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MEDIEVAL MORALS.

The alliterative title of this article would naturally incline the reader to expect a treatise on the casuistry of the Middle Ages, a discussion of what things were "moral" in those days and what were not, a comparison of the measure of praise or obloquy meted out to certain deeds done in the Europe of feudalism and scholasticism with the requital of such deeds in the society of to-day. But I have set myself no such definite and calculable task as cataloguing the merits and misdemeanors of medieval Europe. I would attempt the more ambitious task of representing, that is, of making present to the reader, the atmosphere of medieval culture, the *milieu* in which the actions were done, the pervading spirit of the age of which the various cases are but *casus* in the literal sense of the word—"accidents." This may justly be called medieval morals if we divest the word "moral" of the particular content we are so used to giving it and get back to the original meaning of the word *mores*, customs or usages of social life sanctioned by the conscience of the community. Such is the force of the word which everybody who has wrestled in early youth with Cicero versus Catiline will recall in the famous rhetorical complaint, "*O tempora, O mores!*"

In other words, instead of particularizing, I would generalize: a dangerous proceeding always; one liable to grave lapses from perfect scientific demonstrability, yet, withal, the only proceeding of final value in the handling of history. For I am more convinced the more I study history that from longer or shorter periods of human toil and turmoil essences of wisdom, political, economic, social, religious, universal are distilled; and that all the work of scholars in learned monographs and laborious research, in bold construction and brilliant narrative, is but the machinery of the alembic in which these essences of wisdom are gathered. It is the constant power of alterability in history which gives it its fascination for minds enamored of the theme of moral progress. What has been, to be sure, has been; and the past, so far as the actual happen-

ings are concerned, even if it be but yesterday, is as far beyond our reach to modify as the solar system. But while the planets travel their "level way on track of plush" from year to year without more moral call to us than to bow our vain heads in awe, the passing events of history are charged with present significance. There is not one that might not have been different under different conditions—conditions which perhaps to-day are still waiting fulfilment, conditions which perhaps to-day are increasing the groaning and travailing of creation. The sciences we approach with a mind purely receptive: we are from generation to generation new discoverers of nature's old laws; the patient stars bear our intrusive telescopes, century after century; they endure the camera, even, now. The old earth furnishes plenty of hornblende and quartz for a million geologists' hammers to splinter off as souvenirs, and the ground persistently puts forth its flora to be torn to pieces by the botanist. The scientist does not create, alter, advise, improve—he beholds, penetrates, learns. Even in our attitude toward literature, so far beyond our reach is the creative genius of the great writers of epic, drama, and fiction, we are almost purely receptive; the joyful shock of appreciating a work of art like Tennyson's "Idylls" entirely unfits us for the least thought of revising it. But history we do and should approach with exactly the revisory attitude of mind—never accepting its record as final, even though it be as old as the Trojan War. We should take the facts of history as the texts for present day sermons, we should see in the course of history the triumph or the obscuration of ideas which human wisdom might, under conditions which still have their significance for us, have either brought to naught or hastened on to a glorious fruition. This is what I mean in saying that the final, the only value in history, lies in the generalizations it stimulates, the essences of wisdom which distil from its crowded centuries, the principles of social and individual ethics which can be deduced from its myriad mistakes and bungling half-excellences. This is perhaps sufficient justification for an analysis in the following pages of the spirit of the Middle Ages.

The term *Middle Ages* probably connotes to most minds a not very definite period before America was discovered and Martin Luther burned the pope's bull, when superstition and priestcraft held men's minds, feudal oppression and serfdom their bodies, fast in the millennial bonds forged by church and nobles; when the intellect was soberly busied with dull volumes of scholastic lore touching the purposes of Satan and the physiology of angels; when the tread of the caparisoned horse echoed through the courtyards of a thousand castles and the clash of mail resounded from the Orkneys to Sicily; when the love song of wandering troubadours and the coarse license of court fools brought a meagre measure of tenderness and jocularity into a world which lacked almost every comfort which the very moderately to do deem essential to-day. And this popular conception of the Middle Ages is true, too, in the main, as most truly popular conceptions of history are. Only it is a superficial conception—one that notes the obvious features of the age, but does not penetrate to the hidden springs of action or reckon with tendencies in transformation. The Middle Ages are accepted as a fairly homogeneous era of world history by most minds, accepted *en bloc*, conceived generally as vast gray background from which the various stages of religious, social, economic, commercial, educational progress of the last four centuries stand out in well defined outline.

Many causes are easily discoverable for this view of the Middle Ages, but, curiously enough, perhaps none is more potent than the very name *Middle Ages* itself. It suggests suspension, mediocrity, incompleteness. Obviously it could be invented only by a generation which divided history into three periods, one of which was intermediate between the other two, and of importance only as a link between the other two. The name actually was invented by an age which proudly felt itself to be the rebirth of the long obscured classic civilization of antiquity, and it was originally not an historical term at all, but a literary one. At the time of the Renaissance, namely, Latin literature, freshly cultivated, was classified in three epochs: the High or Classic age, extending to Constantine the Great (325); the Middle age, extending from Constantine to

Charlemagne (325-800); and the Low age, dating from the anarchy consequent upon the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire. This philologico-literary definition of the Middle Ages found its way gradually into the field of history, when the awakening of the historical sense of Christendom followed in the sixteenth century the literary awakening of the fourteenth. And as the historic sense of Christendom became more and more conscious of the tremendous significance of such rapidly successive events as the opening up of the two hemispheres to exploration and trade, the realization of national sentiment in the countries of middle Europe, the fall of feudal castles and feudal armies before the missiles of fire arms, the liberation of great masses of population from the age-long domination of the Roman Church, the discovery of the true relations of earth, sun, stars, and planets in the illimitable universe; as the splendor of the ancient civilization of Greece and Rome extending into the unmeasured past, and the promise of the new age opening out into an unmeasured future captivated the minds of thinking men, it was quite natural that the long centuries of Europe's travail of soul and body following on the overthrow of the Roman Empire should shrink into an unhonored age of transition—an age for whose errors and inconsistencies, for whose crudeness and cruelty, for whose stupid conservatism, for whose unsophisticated and awkward enthusiasms, the newly wakened Europe felt some shame. The exact limits of the Middle Ages, to be sure, were not, and never have been fixed. And perhaps there is not in the whole history of historical theory a more striking illustration of the change in perspective which succeeding ages bring, than just the comparison between the tendency of the eighteenth and that of the nineteenth century in the estimate of the extent of the Middle Ages. The eighteenth century, confident in the absolute perfection of its own political formulations, jubilant in the revolutionizing significance of its scientific discoveries, steeped in the literature and license of ancient Greece and Rome, prating of Decius, Horatius, and Brutus in its political assemblies, scattering the high sounding names of Troy, Carthage, and Utica over waste lands in remote colonies—this proud,

self-absorbed, world-renewing eighteenth century was inclined to let the despised Middle Ages reach to its own threshold. Whereas, on the other hand, the progressive tendency of the nineteenth century was to push back further and further the commencement of the modern age. When the truly scientific and sympathetic study of the Middle Ages was inaugurated (scarcely a half century ago), men began with wonder to discover how many modern ideas were underneath the troubled surface of the centuries from the eleventh to the sixteenth, how startlingly modern such men as Abélard, Roger Bacon, Frederick the Second, Petrarch, Philip the Fair, and Erasmus really were. That heavy black line separating medieval from modern, which men of few generations ago drew so confidently through the date 1492 or 1517 is being gradually effaced. The ages are blending insensibly into each other, and "medieval" is coming rightly to mean not a fixed period of time but certain set of ideas, forms, institutions which resulted from the blending of Roman, Teutonic, and Christian influences and animated the life of Europe through several centuries. When we speak of the Middle Ages, then, we should not think of a chronology, but of a structure of society—a society in which development has seemed to some modern scholars utterly arrested, only because those scholars have failed to recognize the tremendous work of equilibration and adjustment that Europe had to perform before the savage Germanic tribes were ready to quit apprenticeship to the empire and church of Rome, and move forward to the scientific, literary, material triumphs of the modern age.

History is continuous: it has no beginning, middle, or end. Hence the Middle Ages cannot properly be thought of as a period enclosed by fixed bounds. History is immanent, every moment having its own task, inevitably different from that of every other moment. Hence the Middle Ages cannot be thought of as an hiatus between a classic period and a modern period which resumed the task of the classic period. Dismiss these two conceptions of the Middle Ages as a peculiar, defined epoch and as an historic vacuum, and we are ready to appreciate the Middle Ages as what they really were, the scene for the

operation of certain institutional and social forces as inevitable in the Europe of their day as the slavery contest of fifty years ago in America or the determination of the control of the sources of industrial wealth to-day the whole world over.

To come to a nearer consideration of the institutional and social forces dominating the Middle Ages, with the especial purpose of discovering their moral aspect, it may be useful first to sketch in very broad lines the most striking features of the Middle Ages as contrasted with antiquity. In politics the Middle Ages abandoned the narrow city state of classical civilization for the ideal world state as conceived perhaps first by Julius Cæsar, and as fostered by the universal claims of the Roman Bishop. In religion the Middle Ages abandoned the local gods of classical polytheism for the ideal of a universal religion as founded by Jesus, developed by St. Paul, and favored by the widespread doctrine of Stoicism in the Roman Empire. In economics the Middle Ages abandoned the exclusively landed aristocracy of classical civilization and developed a class of free artisans and traders, a bourgeoisie or middle class, with its consequent creation of industrial capital, the wage system, currency, credit, and banking. In social ethics the Middle Ages abandoned the rigid caste distinction between free and slave, with its inhuman doctrine of the unlimited and irresponsible power of the former over the latter, and, under the combined influence of the Christian religion, Stoic ethics, and the German spirit of untamed liberty, substituted the serf for the slave—a long step toward the free workman of the modern age. In letters and art the Middle Ages lost the inspiration of classic antiquity under the flood of the German invasions, and at most were able to preserve the tradition of a lettered civilization in select circles and in the monasteries, until the age of the Renaissance again opened to Europe the treasures of antiquity. This hasty and very imperfect enumeration of the activities of the Middle Ages will suffice to show that they were by no means a period of sloth tempered by pageants.

It would be vain to think of examining the institutions of

the Middle Ages with any degree of completeness in the space here allowed. All that I hope to do is to illustrate, by the analysis of the spirit of a few of those institutions, how inevitably the social conscience of the Middle Ages moved in a sphere and accepted a view of moral ideals and moral relations quite foreign, and often quite uncongenial to our own. Let me again recall the definition of morals with which we started out: the "customs and usages of social life sanctioned by the conscience of the community."

The most obvious of the institutions of the Middle Ages are the universal papacy and the universal empire, both of which came to medieval Europe with imposing claims reaching back into a past hallowed and glorified by the names of Solomon and David, Cæsar and Augustus. Dying Rome in bequeathing to Frank, Goth, Lombard, and Saxon this dual unity of deified Emperor and deified Christ, set its stamp on European development for a thousand years and more. Here in the one great precinct of the Roman name, permeated by the one faith of the holy and indivisible Church, was the pattern of unity for a Europe however much perturbed by the shifting of nations and the raging of the heathen. It was that ideal which captivated the mind of the wonderful Charlemagne; and that ideal which he believed he had realized in his coronation in the Church of St. Peter's—the Roman Empire of the Cæsars revived at the base of the altar of Christ!

We are not concerned to follow the history of the tremendous struggle of the Middle Ages to equilibrate the powers of Pope and Cæsar—each supreme in his own theory of the Holy Roman Empire, each subject in his rival's. That story, enlivened by dramatic conflicts and no less dramatic reconciliations, with its Canossas and its Roncaglian Diets, belongs to the political and ecclesiastical history of the Middle Ages. We are to inquire rather how this idea of papal-imperial absolutism affected the conscience of medieval Europe. First of all it lent a very serious romantic air to the public actions of the Middle Ages, which contrasted sharply with the material and mental poverty and inexperience of the age. It is this fact which makes the Middle Ages so strikingly like the period of

childhood in a man's life: generous enthusiasms, immediate world-reformations, unattainable ethical aspirations, inviolable codes of chivalry, uncompromising programs of society on the one hand, as witnessed by the Crusades, the self-chastisement of the ascetics in monasteries, the preaching of Franciscan and Dominican Friars, the vigils of virgin knights, and the visions of macerated saints; on the other hand the violences and crudities of childhood, its ready beliefs and awful fears, its unguarded frankness of expression, its display of emotions, its immediacy of aim, its absorption in moving pictures, its supreme need of restlessness. To attain, and to attain quickly, is the great desire of childhood; a good postponed a day loses all its attractiveness, seems removed by an awful gulf of time. The same impatient persistency to realize its ideals characterizes the Middle Ages, heightening into violent quarrels what would now be conducted as diplomatic negotiations, and giving birth to movements and institutions which men of to-day regard with wondering scorn as the refuge of crazed fanatics.

But this feverishness of endeavor had to be. The gulf between the meagre actual and the compelling ideal had somehow to be filled. How could Europe hold back from the Crusades when God willed it—when the voice of his own vicar on earth (so Pope Gregory had styled himself nearly a generation before Pope Urban preached at Clermont) had proclaimed his will? How could bull-necked and mule-willed Henry Plantagenet help baring his back to receive a penitent's scourging, when England was languishing under the curse which his own murderous anger against Archbishop Becket of Canterbury had brought upon her? Whatever way ambitious individualism turned, whether to create a new political state as with Frederick the Second of the Hohenstaufens, or to discover the true method of science as with Roger Bacon, or to determine the measure of freedom conferred upon men by their labors in founding and maintaining a civilized community as with Marsilio of Padua—it found itself confronted and effectually checked by Roman system. Even the imagination of the poets beat itself in vain against the bronze bounds of this papal-imperial vault which spanned the Middle Ages. Dante, whose

marvelous imagination could build the circles of the inferno and the mount of purgatory, and people them with those tremendous forms which still shudder and thrill through the modern mind; this Dante at whose passing the Florentines nudged each other and whispered, "The man who has been in hell," could not see beyond the Roman horizon on earth. His historic imagination is held in a vise, between the clamps of Pope and Caesar. He argues in his "De Monarchia" why the medieval empire must be eternal, much as an old Roman augur might have argued why the Capitol should stand forever. The empire was essential to the world's peace, he said, for the alternative was anarchy, the empire was rightly acquired by Rome, hence in Rome must reside; the empire is of God, since his vicar in St. Peter's set the crown on the imperial brows. Strange confusion of mental activities in this Dante! He uses his historic imagination to create a real and awful inferno, purgatory, and paradise, while for the actual world of sense he has only speculative logic, used schoolman-like for the support of abstract political propositions. It is a sufficient example of the strange contradictoriness of the Middle Ages.

Besides confusing rational and emotional processes by the persistent introduction of the supernatural, supra-mundane papacy and empire into all the affairs of life, this immanence of the Roman idea elevated the two great institutions (especially the papacy) into fetiches for the common idolatry of Europe. The historic development of the institution, the ethical motive behind its establishment, the real value to the individual and to society of the observation of its forms and rites, were lost sight of. It became a task-master, a tyrant to Europe. The dualism of sacred and profane, holy days and common days, clergy and layman, church and world, city of God and city of man, was so heightened and so extended to all things material as well as moral, that the men of the Middle Ages found themselves moving in an atmosphere charged even to the kitchens of their humble cottages with the currents of inquisition, interdict, and excommunication. The institutions regulated, dominated their life. Through its mysterious channels of grace came their very right to existence. Its sacramental cere-

monies of baptism, confirmation, confessional, penance, extreme unction were the successive degrees in the unexceptional process by which mortals put on immortality.

Hence we discover everywhere in the Middle Ages an awed and deferential temper which contrasts strangely with the restless idealism we just noticed. These two irreconcilable tempers exist often side by side in the same man, giving rise to those sudden reversions from violence to docility, from boasting to humiliation, which so astonish us in the Middle Ages: an emperor one moment hurling defiance at the Church, and the next moment begging forgiveness in haircloth; a prince one moment chasing the Pope from Rome with his soldiers, and the next moment obediently marshalling those soldiers for a crusade to the orient at the Pope's command; a Hohenstaufen at one moment defying the vicar of God by thrusting his parchment of excommunication, leaden seals and all, down the throats of the messengers who brought it, at the next moment bowing his head to the marble floor of the basilica of St. Mark's while the Pope set his foot upon the rebellious neck in token of the external power of the Church. Inconsistency and contradiction, yes! but what else could there be when everything in medieval theory stimulated the utmost reach of the ideal, and at every point medieval institutions frustrated the ambitions of strong individualism. There was, in a word, no refuge for an independent or a disillusioned spirit; no possibility of getting outside the medieval system and seeing it in perspective. And that was just because the argumentative sense was sharpened while the historic sense was crushed. The words "Roman," "Christian," and "Catholic" are used constantly throughout the Middle Ages as interchangeable terms, and always as synonyms for "civilized." "Catholic" and "barbarous" were antonyms. Religious law and political statute were not differentiated. Aquinas, in his "Regimen of Princes," says, "Christ assumed power with Constantine." States were not differentiated, studies were not differentiated, arts and trades were not differentiated. Official duties and powers, judicial, military, financial, were not differentiated. In fact there was in the Middle Ages almost no differentiation—

which is the *sine quâ non* of progress—but only the one great sharp contrast of holy and profane, sanctioned and forbidden, Roman and barbarian, Catholic and outcast.

Let us consider now a second institutional feature of the Middle Ages—one which is only second to the overshadowing papal-imperial idea in its importance—the institution of feudalism. Here again we are not concerned with the external history of the feudal régime, either to enter into the heated debates as to the preponderance of Roman or German elements in its nature, or to follow its various fortunes, or note its many modifications in the different parts of Europe. It is the moral significance of feudalism in which we are interested.

With the breakup of Roman authority in the provinces occupied by the Germanic invaders in the fifth to the eighth centuries, and especially with the general anarchy and violence following the disruption of Charlemagne's empire in the ninth century, society learned to group itself about the strong man in his castle. Innumerable lords of estates, *de jure* subjects of a higher power in king or emperor, *de facto* independent sovereigns with the regalian attributes of armies, courts, and mints, appeared all over Europe. Their lands were distributed not to tenants who paid a rental, but to vassals who swore personal fealty. A social bond stood in place of what to-day is an economic obligation. Europe was a collection of great families, not of the same blood, but of the same lands. It was something like the vast Roman estates or "*latifundia*," except that the vast majority of the men who worked the Roman estates were slaves, whereas the medieval peasant, though often attached to the land as a serf, was personally free. So closely were the ideas of land (which, we must remember, was until late in the Middle Ages the only source of wealth) and personal service bound together, that the proverb was current, "*nulle terre sans seigneur*."

I have referred to the deferential temper nurtured in the medieval man by the constant pressure of the sacramental offices of the Holy Catholic Church. It will be easily seen how tremendously the feudal obligations, from a different point of

vantage, increased that deferential temper. Instead of an impersonal and equal law, the medieval man had over him a powerful and often capricious lord. The army in which he served was not his country's army but his feudal lord's. The court in which he was tried was his lord's court, the taxes which he paid were his lord's tithes, the mill where he ground his corn was his lord's mill, the source of his commonest necessities of food and clothing was his lord's estate. To be sure, after the Crusades had greatly stimulated trade and commerce, and the increase of population had set free enough of the feudal farmers and soldiers to make the nuclei of great industrial enterprises in the craft-gilds and trading companies of the growing towns, the dependence of Europe on feudal estates for its sustenance was at an end. But this development was rapid only in the latter centuries of the Middle Ages, and, more than this, the deferential temper remained long after its cause had ceased to operate. A social custom long outlives the circumstances which gave it birth. Witness the deferential temper of the English people to-day toward a nobility which has ceased, since the triumph of the bourgeoisie over the Stuarts, to compel deference through political powers. Politically and industrially England is a democracy to-day; socially England is still a feudal aristocracy.

Again, and perhaps of chief importance in an estimate of its moral import, feudalism taught the Middle Ages the glorification of force—a private will in place of a public opinion. See, how, for example in the field of law, the effect of this was to exalt caprice and force at the expense of equity and order. The imperial will was consistent and theoretically very powerful. The medieval jurists in the early days of the Hohenstaufens, had revived the principles of Roman law as codified by Justinian, and by those principles the will of Cæsar extended equally over the civilized world. But it is a commonplace of political wisdom that a central authority to be effective must be much stronger in its constitutional rights and powers than a local authority. The contact of men in the vast majority of their interests is with the nearer authority. The fathers who framed our national constitution had learned that impor-

tant fact from the dismal experience of the Confederation which lacked the military, financial and judicial machinery to make its theoretical sovereignty effective. The imperial will of the Middle Ages may be compared with the American Confederation of the years immediately following the Revolutionary War. Supreme in theory, in the harangues of its spokesman, it actually failed effectively to pervade and control Europe. And it failed chiefly because the imperial dignity after Charlemagne's real sovereignty declined upon men who were themselves generally only a little more powerful in land and troops than their great feudatories—*primi inter pares*. So medieval Europe beheld at close range the actual arbitrary wills of a number of feudal lords theoretically in subjection to the emperor, and at far range the theoretical equalizing will of the emperor actually effective only as far as his momentary resources, fluctuating constantly with his fortunes in the struggle against the Pope and his immediate feudatories, could enforce that will. Of course, under such circumstances it was the multitude of arbitrary wills that impressed medieval Europe. And consequently feudalism stood for the glorification of force—of private will in the place of public opinion. It was not until the imperial idea had weakened before the rise of nationalities, and the towns had grown sufficiently populous and wealthy to ally themselves with the national rulers against the arbitrary force of the great feudal lords, that a fairly homogeneous national will, and a fairly consistent public opinion took the place of the private wills of feudalism. But with this change we are already out of the Middle Ages.

In the third place let us turn to some economic features of the Middle Ages to note their moral significance. Here we cannot point to any one absorbing institution, like the papacy or feudalism, as absolutely and continuously conditioning the economics of the Middle Ages. It is rather the lack of institutions and activities which the modern age has developed that gives significance to medieval economics. The feudal structure of society of course had tremendous influence on the economics of the Middle Ages. When every great estate was

sufficient unto itself, and the little community gathered at the foot of the strong man's castle spun its own wool and tanned its own leather, there was no opportunity for the interchange of commodities which is always followed sooner or later by the interchange of ideas. When, again, in the twelfth century the feudal economic bond began to be loosened under those influences which we have already mentioned—the stimulus to wider (especially Eastern) commerce roused by the Crusades and the overflow of feudal population to make the nuclei of the cities—the economic situation was still for generations and centuries what our modern sense would call primitive. There were no regular taxes, only feudal dues. There were no large investments in industries, for the craft-gilds supplied the rude needs of medieval civilization without the necessity for the intervention of capital. Furthermore there was no temptation to sink money in capital, as the church insisted on the Mosaic law condemning all interest as usury. Only the despised and persecuted sect of the Jews practiced the abomination of usury, and by keeping a fund for circulation in Europe, relieved occasional stringencies of money and became the indispensable allies of the kings. It is hard to see how Edward the First of England could have kept his government going at times had it not been for the loans of the rich Jews whose brothers he drove from the land as heathens. Under these circumstances the increase of money in Europe did not bring about an increase of wealth. For the new money was either squandered or hoarded. If the empire had only been strong enough to enforce order throughout Europe, and to invite surplus wealth, as it was gradually accumulated, for the creation of a national debt—that ballast of political economics—it would have provided security and elasticity for the investment of money, and the industrial age would have probably come some centuries earlier than it did. But the empire, for reasons we have already noted, did not have this strength. There is no more pathetic scene in the political annals of Europe than the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick the Third, wearing the proudest crown in Europe for fifty-two years in the full fifteenth century, riding in the poor vehicle of an ox-cart from one feudal principality to

another, begging for the establishment of an imperial court, and an imperial treasury. And this was the end not the beginning of the Middle Ages! One power there was firmly enough seated and universal enough in its reach to develop and maintain a strong economic policy—the Roman papacy. But the papacy had no interest in fostering the growth of strong states, which would be sure sooner or later to conflict with its own sacerdotal claims. It wanted its tithes, annates, and Peter's pence, and it got them. It hoarded money in vast sums (bequests, taxes, fees of ecclesiastical courts), and was able, like the Delphic Oracle of ancient Greece, to finance almost any political movement that it wished. The remittance of sums to Rome through the papal agents was the origin of foreign banking in Europe. And it was from the financial operators of the papal curia, rather than those of feudal or imperial authorities, that the kings of European states learned to get control of a treasury and gradually win their economic independence of Rome.

When the barons of England, under the intrepid Simon de Montfort, were fighting King Henry the Third for the recognition of the Great Charter, young Prince Edward was on their side at first. Later he went over to his father, and as he led his splendid line with faultless generalship against the barons at Evesham, Earl Simon cried out: "It was from me that he learned it!" So could the popes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries shout their vain reproach of ingratitude against Philip the Fair of France, Edward the Third of England and the rest of the kings of Europe who were learning from Rome how to keep the riches of their own subjects out of the Roman treasure-chest. The chief allies of the kings in this struggle for economic independence were the towns; and the chief cause of the prosperity of the towns were the Crusades. Hence in rousing Europe to the Crusades the papacy had, like Faust, unwittingly conjured up a spirit which it could not lay—and that an "earth spirit," destined finally to deliver Europe into the lordship of the counting-house, the factory, the mill, and the mine. Whether considered under the family régime of feudalism, then, or the universal régime of the papacy, medieval

economics discouraged the formation and investment of capital, and fostered a hand-to-mouth existence. When crops failed from war, or pestilence, or the poor and wasteful methods of medieval agriculture, there was unrelieved distress, famine and black death. When money was plenty it was squandered on useless wars of vengeance or long elaborate journeys of king and court, tournaments, fields of the cloth of gold, immoderate feasts; or hoarded with as little profit in treasure chests. There was no debt of one generation to another, no bond of economic obligation between one land and another; and consequently the humanizing, steadyng, liberalizing influence which such relations bring, even to the reform of religious creeds, was lacking to the Middle Ages.

Let us consider in conclusion the moral import of the philosophy and learning of the Middle Ages. Buckle, in his famous "History of Civilization," remarks that "the growth of European civilization is solely due to the progress of knowledge, and the progress of knowledge depends on the number of truths which the human intellect discovers and on the extent to which they are diffused." Judged by this dictum, which I confess I regard as rather arbitrary, medieval Europe could make no progress whatever in civilization, for neither was it concerned to discover new truths, nor were the truths it had widely diffused. We find it hard to imagine great intellectual activity divorced from a scientific purpose which embraces some little application at least to the art of living. A character like Casaubon in "Middlemarch" is not only an anachronism for us; he is also a positive object of disgust. Now in the Middle Ages there was little chance for contact between learning and living. Science, the intellectual symbol of man's conquest of nature, had not yet come. The interest to know things as they are in their constitutions, their causes, and their effects, was not present to the medieval mind. The visible creation was only a theological symbolism. The heavens declared the glory of God, and were interrogated for nothing else. Zoölogy was of interest as far as it could furnish any beasts, birds, or fishes to typify the catholic dogma. The

pelican, which tore its breast to feed its young with its own vital blood, was the type of the great tragedy of atonement; the lion whose cubs were born dead and licked into life after three days by the father, was typical of the resurrection; the salamander, or lizard which lived in fire without being consumed, furnished comfort to the theologians who had any difficulty in convincing a skeptic that a soul could continue to live eternally in a burning hell. Without the stimulus and the reward of inquiring into nature for her own truth, we could of course have no science. But more than this, the more strictly philosophic, or metaphysical and ethical thought of the Middle Ages was under the tyranny of catholic dogma in its material, and of Aristotelian logic in its form. It always operated within fixed limits. It always had the truth before it began to reason about the truth, and was concerned more to come out at the right conclusion than to follow the straight path. Such philosophy developed keenness and cleverness, logical ingenuity, metaphysical subtlety (the Jesuit schools of the modern age illustrate all that clearly enough); but love of truth and wisdom, "philosophia," we can hardly call it. The church was the only institution that fostered learning; all the philosophers were first of all theologians. The Scriptures, completely sublimated into allegory, furnished reasons enough why the searcher for truth should not go outside the limits of catholic dogma. The woman who had lost the piece of silver sought for it in *her own house*, the man who needed bread for his family knocked at the door of *a neighbor*; therefore let us seek the truth in our own, from our own, about our own faith alone. Such reasoning was considered final. Philosophy was thus reduced to logic conducted on the premises of allegory. The mind by itself, through ardent cogitation, following strictly the categories of Aristotle, could know final truth. What Mr. Morley has called "a subtle manipulation of unverified words" passed for the deepest thought until the culture of the Renaissance made the scholastic philosophy look ridiculous. There were two serious moral effects of this scholastic philosophy working within predetermined limits exclusively with the tools of logic. First it glorified casuistry above con-

science in reasoning. To determine an ethical question, regard was had primarily not to social consequences but to scriptural or patristic precedent. Tyrannicide, for example, was justifiable, as proven by the cases of Jael and Eglon or Judith and Holofernes; but not tyrannicide by poison—there was no scripture for that! Slavery, which was right in the sight of the ancients for a psychological reason (the inability to recognize a brother in a barbarian) was justified by Augustine and Aquinas for a theological reason—the curse of Ham's descendants. It is the second sort of reason that smothers conscience. The other moral effect of the scholastic philosophy working within predetermined limits was that it was always arguing and always right. We know the type ourselves. Its contribution to real scientific or moral progress is *nil*. Of the deadening effect of the scholastic philosophy on all other forms of literary effort; its preclusion of a serious interest in human history; its discouragement of the lighter literature of enjoyment; its assumption of a monotonous substratum of evil for every character, so barring estimate and criticism; its scorn for the beauties of nature and the poetics of human emotion, I will not speak. The medieval scholar was like the medieval knight, burdened with a heavy panoply of armor. And when he fell before the onset of rational criticism, ethical idealism, and natural science, he lay overthrown in his own heavy leaning like the knight borne from his horse in the joust.

I have but touched upon the morals of the Middle Ages. Yet in this brief analysis of the import of the dominance of the papal-imperial idea of unity, of the feudal system, of economic theory, and philosophic methods, the reader must be impressed with the complexity of the Middle Ages and the vastly different conditions under which the medieval conscience had to shape itself from those which prevail to-day. It is not claimed that the topics chosen are even the most characteristic and instructive of medieval traits of character. They were chosen for two reasons: first because they are a varied selection, and secondly because they are not the sides of medieval life which are commonly celebrated in romances and popular histories.

Again if I have dwelt almost exclusively on the limitations or defects of medieval morals, that is because I have had comparison with the ampler, saner present in view, and not contrast with the classic past. In many respects the Middle Ages mark a tremendous advance over ancient civilization as in the conception of slavery, of the supreme worth of the human soul, of the Christian duties of philanthropy and sympathy, the sentiment of the unity of the race under a divine fatherhood.

It took centuries for Europe, thrown into violent confusion by the movement of barbaric tribes, to regain its poise and start again on the path of positive progress along many lines. But resistance to outward shock is also manifestation of great strength—and it was medieval Europe that saved Roman and Christian culture, imperfect as it was, from the Saracens, the Huns, the Persians, the Northmen, the Tartars, and the Ottoman Turks. It took centuries for Europe to find itself in nationalities, to develop that social consensus on which alone effective political authority can be based, to recover a spirit of humor "like sunshine on the deep sea," out of the gloom and fog of stern dangers, and awful dignities and dogmas, to confront nature with a receptive appreciative mind, not pre-occupied with theological finalities, and to recognize in the interchange of honest human thought and human toil the salvation of society. Ten centuries seem to us a long, long time for the maturity of such a program; but doubtless not to the great guiding Spirit of history with whom a thousand years are as a day.

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HUMANITARIANISM, PAST AND PRESENT.

One of the most interesting and least understood of all social phenomena is that complex of social forces, denominated humanitarianism. The rôle which this phenomenon played in the history of this republic during the first half of last century, is extremely important. Humanitarianism is the natural fruit of a condition of social flux and unrest. It arises in a complex society when the lower classes are struggling for better conditions; and when older dominating interests are being thrust aside by new rivals. The French Revolution and the fall of Japanese feudalism present to the student of history two very striking and dramatic climaxes of humanitarian movements. In both instances to the casual observer it appears as if the ruling classes became enthused with the spirit of self-sacrifice, adulterated with a considerable element of fear. In the United States in the period from 1825 to 1850 occurred a humanitarian movement which although it lacked the blood-stirring incidents of the two just mentioned, yields to none in its practical importance in the history of mankind. Many educated leaders and literary men were found supporting the struggling workers, advocating better conditions for workers and for the poor, and presenting high and noble ideals to the public. Le Bon would attribute all such phenomena to a "contagion" of the beliefs and hopes of the working classes to the class of educated and broadminded men who are ever the leaders in humanitarian movements. Whether this generalization is true or false, these are the men who give shape and direction to the longing and aspirations of the masses.

The second quarter of the nineteenth century was the chief humanitarian era of our history, as well as an epoch of transition in our industrial life. This era may be roughly divided into two periods, 1825-1840, and the decade of the forties. The first period is characterized by agitation for educational advance, prison reform, partial abolition of imprisonment for debt, temperance reform, charity organizations, the increase of literary activity, and the communistic movement of Robert

Owen. This period was preëminently a practical one; the decade of the forties was, on the other hand, in the main idealistic. Prof. Commons terms it the "hot air" period; it is associated with Fourierism, transcendentalism, abolitionism, and the Brook Farm experiment. The first division of this epoch is a product of the War of 1812 and the crisis of 1819; the second clearly traces its inception to the severe crisis of 1837.

The domestic system of industry, with its unique relations between apprentices and journeymen and the masters, stands midway between slavery and serfdom on one side and the modern factory economy, with its lack of direct personal relations between employer and employee, on the other. During this quarter of a century the North witnessed the rapid destruction of this old form of domestic economy, with its semi-feudal relations, and the adoption of the factory system, or of a more intensive and systematic form of domestic industry, with its sharper separation of employer from workman. The new class of employers was not united with its employees by any of the old customary or intimate relations. In New England, the social and political center of gravity was shifting from commerce and the ministry to the developing manufacturing interest. These economic and social changes produced the humanitarian movement and made it a powerful factor in the history of the period.

The prominent humanitarian leaders of this period came as a rule from the old New England stock; they were the sons of ministers, farmers, or commercial men, and were usually men who had received a college training. They were men only remotely and indirectly connected with the great industrial changes which had been sweeping over the northern and eastern sections of the country. Robert Dale Owen was an important exception to this generalization. He was the leader of the movement for the communistic or boarding-school form of education, which became one of the chief planks in the platform of the Workingmen's Party of New York City when it was at the height of its power. Robert Dale Owen was the son of Robert Owen, of New Harmony and New Lanark fame;

he appears to have obtained his peculiar views upon education as a result of having been a student in Fellenberg's school, at Hofwyl, Switzerland. This school was very similar in character to the well-known George Junior Republic, of Freeville, New York.

The humanitarian leaders were still influenced by the ideals and customs as to the treatment and care of workers which had prevailed under the domestic system. Custom at this particular period stood for better treatment of the working classes; it urged the necessity and the justice of a paternalistic attitude on the part of employers toward employees. These men were repelled by the harsh and unsympathetic treatment of the urban worker. They were not subjected to the persistent pressure of economic motives which so rapidly modified the point of view of the manufacturers. And it must not be forgotten that the roots of this humanitarian movement were nourished in the soil of the eighteenth-century idealism and rationalism. The humanitarians saw vividly the then existing evils of child and woman labor, pauperism, juvenile crime, intemperance and unemployment; they were strongly impressed by the disintegrating and deteriorating influence upon the family of life in crowded cities and dreary industrial villages. They magnified and glorified the desirable features of the earlier form of domestic industry with its intimate personal relations between employers and workers; and they did not see the evils which had been inseparably joined with that older system of industrial life. The hurry and hustle of business and the keenness of the race for profits offended and shocked them; and, furthermore, no golden stream was flowing into their pockets to obscure and blur their vision as to past and present conditions.

After the close of the Napoleonic wars, Europe began to send a flood of exports to our shores. A period of depression followed, beginning about 1816 and terminating in the crisis of 1819. Unemployment and pauperism soon caused urban life to present its most seamy side. Recovery from the depression was gradual; it was not until about 1826 that business again became prosperous. By 1828 or 1830, manufacture,

not commerce, held the balance of power in New England. Pauperism and crime became serious evils in the rapidly growing cities. Juvenile crime grew until it became a serious menace, and facilities for education were extremely inefficient. In 1826, Rev. Joseph Tuckerman resigned his pastorate in Boston and became a charity worker. "He found the streets filled with idle children, large families occupying the damp and dirty cellars of Broad and Sea streets, graduating regularly thence to the hospitals and almshouses." In 1833, it was conservatively estimated that one eighth of the total population of New York City were public paupers or criminals. Out of the evils of crowded cities, unemployment, pauperism and the intensification of industry, came the humanitarian impulse which expressed itself in so many different forms.

In 1824, Robert Owen came to this country, and two years later the communistic movement led by him reached its height. The period, 1815-1832, was marked by important religious revivals. The American Temperance Society was organized in 1826; five years later it boasted of a membership of 300,000 souls. In 1817-1819, many societies were formed for the prevention of pauperism. The Prison Discipline Society of Boston was organized in 1825. This society led in the fight for betterment of prison conditions and for the abolition of imprisonment for debt. In 1828-1831, arose the political movement which culminated in formation of Workingmen's parties in various cities. This upheaval was followed during the era of rising prices, 1833-1836, by the organization of local and national trades' unions. The agitation for educational reform was begun in the early twenties by James G. Carter, of Massachusetts; and made rapid strides during the decade of the thirties.

After the memorable industrial crisis of 1837 humanitarianism was reborn. Horace Greeley, perhaps the most influential of the adherents of Fouriéism in America, was driven to acceptance of this economic doctrine or religion as a result of witnessing the suffering and distress in New York City during the winter of 1838. This severe and unprecedented depression furnished the fertile soil for a revival of the humani-

tarian movement. Albert Brisbane and Horace Greeley transplanted Fouriéristism to American soil in 1842. Fouriérist settlements sprang up like mushrooms. No less than thirty-four settlements were established before the collapse of the movement in 1846. This panic was also followed by powerful revivals; and in 1842 began the Millerite excitement. The latter was practically contemporaneous with the Fouriérist movement. The famous temperance crusade of the so-called Washingtonian society of reformed drunkards began in 1840, and grew so rapidly as to unmistakably diagnose a condition of acute national hysteria. The close of the period is marked by the bitter fight in New York State over the adoption of a free public school system for the entire State. But this revival of humanitarianism was ephemeral; all the energy of reformers was soon absorbed in the abolition and the free-land movements. The fairest flower of this period was transcendentalism. This peculiar phenomenon was a reaction against sterility of thought due to business preoccupation and to "the dead weight of the popular theology." Transcendentalism was the creation of an intellectual class of humanitarians. The diversion of business into new channels and the rise of new political and social ideals left a portion of the old leaders and their families stranded and outside the active business and social current of events. An old ruling class was "dying out in a blaze of intellectual fireworks."

Every great economic revolution in the modern world brings forth class development and class decay; it results in increasing the strength and power in hands of one class, and in decreasing the influence of other classes and interests. A class which is losing its hold upon social and economic supremacy invariably produces humanitarian leaders. Economic changes, new inventions, migration of population, always cause social and political changes; new conditions confront society, and new social problems press for solution. Suffering and social unrest are the natural fruits. Old traditions and customs are ruthlessly cast aside. The rising class is constantly and steadfastly looking into the future; the past has no lessons for it. The decaying class, on the other hand, casts its eyes back-

ward; and then cries out bitterly against the present. The working class is ever struggling discontentedly upward; but it is looking toward a more roseate future. Although animated by radically different ideals, the workers and the humanitarians often unite upon certain planks in a reform platform.

In the economic interpretation of history, hunger and the desire for wealth should not be considered as the sole motives of human activity. Control of men is really the chief human ambition. The humanitarian leaders were men who saw a new rank of men rising to control not merely wealth, but the political and social affairs of the State and nation as well. They were animated by somewhat different ideals and motives than this new social and economic class. The humanitarian leaders felt themselves to be in instinctive antagonism with this parvenu class; they struggled against that which seemed to be evil; and they voiced their discontent in no uncertain tones. It was not a case of mere appeal to the grosser elements of man's nature; it went deep into the human instinct which is a development or growth conditioned by heredity and social and physical environment.

The leaders of industry are men who are aiding in bettering industrial methods, reducing waste, and increasing the efficiency of organized industry. But profits—dollars and cents—rather than good work is their watchword and criterion of success. True, they are interested in improving the efficiency of labor, and have introduced certain beneficial industrial methods; but, with some isolated exceptions, profits is the real goal. The business man has as yet imbibed little of the professional spirit. For this fact the consuming public must bear a large share of the blame; we do not as a rule seek out the physician who charges the smallest fee, but we do crowd into the retail stores on bargain days. The aims and ambitions of the business man ought to be balanced and guarded by others. The betterment of humanity in its broader sense becomes the watchword of the humanitarian leader. He is a man on a fixed salary, or one who has a competence; he is only indirectly affected by the vicissitudes of business life. The great world current of strife and competition, of endeavor and risk, flows

around him. He is in a comparatively quiet portion of the world's maelstrom. He can look at the struggle for wealth and power in a different light than do those who are in the heat of the contest.

The opening years of the twentieth century are witnessing the development of a new and powerful humanitarian movement. The economic developments of the preceding quarter of a century furnished the germ. This movement is concerned with social settlements, charity work, educational reform, municipal betterment, civil service reform and socialism. It is, as in the earlier period, producing a new and virile type of literary productions. Hard times and the increase of crime, pauperism and unemployment, following the crisis of 1819 and 1837, were potent factors in the evolution of the early humanitarian movements. Likewise, to-day the increase of juvenile crime and of unemployment are bringing to a focus the forces making for another humanitarian movement. To-day, the problem of unemployment and of irregular employment is one of the most difficult and baffling of all the intricate social problems. Juvenile crime is rife. The "boy problem" is serious in our crowded cities and in our commonplace villages. Dense populations and specialization of labor have deprived the boy of healthful occupation and necessary play space; he is set adrift upon the treacherous sea of street life. The cities are furnishing the new seed-plot for another humanitarian movement. But the fundamental factors of the problems are found in connection with sweeping changes in industrial methods and industrial control.

Business men and the children of business men who have been pushed to the wall by the "trustification" of industry furnish the raw material out of which the new humanitarian movement is being created. The leaders are university men who have been given ideals which cause them to look above and beyond mere wealth accumulation. Efficient aid is being rendered by the better class of club women of the country. The words of the leaders reacting upon the swelling ranks of

nized labor will develop a powerful and almost irresistible sentiment which will curb the excesses of the profit

hunters, and will tend to diminish the crying and shameful evils which have thrived as a result of the centralization of labor and the minute subdivision of labor.

A new period of social unrest and uplift is upon us. The workers and the humanitarians of to-day are uniting as of old upon certain items in a new program. The early movements were weakened and diverted into other channels by the presence of vast areas of uncultivated land on the Western frontier, and by the rising slavery trouble which finally culminated in that deluge of blood called the Civil War. The question is on our lips: Do similar channels exist to-day into which the present swelling stream of social improvement may be turned? Imperialism seems to be the dark cloud which lies threateningly on the horizon. With it will come a diversion from home problems to foreign ones which unfortunately have a false attractiveness—an attractiveness always bound up in the strange and the distant. This danger is clearly discerned by the humanitarians and by the most able and farsighted of the labor leaders of to-day.

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BACON'S MORAL TEACHING.

Among Bacon's writings no separate treatise on moral philosophy is to be found. The only place in which he devotes his special attention to moral science is in the survey of the existing state of knowledge that he gives in the "Advancement of Learning" and in the "De Augmentis," the enlarged Latin translation of the "Advancement." His treatment of the subject in those works is necessarily short, as moral science is only one of the many branches of the tree of knowledge that he there classifies and criticises. But this treatment, however short, is the deliberate expression of his deepest thoughts upon the subject, of opinions that he held unchanged through the best years of his life; for there is no material difference between the account of moral science given by Bacon in the

"Advancement," published in 1605, when he was forty-five years old, and that given in the "De Augmentis," published eighteen years later. We may supplement what he says in the "Advancement" and the "De Augmentis" by the numerous ethical remarks scattered through his various writings, but must always bear in mind that it is only in these two treatises—or perhaps, we should rather say these two versions of one treatise—that Bacon expounds in a systematic form his views upon what he considers most essential in moral science.

Bacon begins by dividing moral science into two branches; one theoretical, the other practical. The theoretical branch is concerned with the exemption or platform of the good; practical branch with the regiment or culture of the mind.

He first treats the theoretical branch, which he calls the "Platform of the Good," using "platform" in the old sense in which the word was generally used in his time, as meaning pattern or example. The title signifies that this branch of moral science discusses the nature of moral good and depicts patterns or ideals of the various virtues. Bacon admits that this side of moral science was well worked out by his predecessors, especially by Aristotle, who gives elaborate pictures of the principal virtues in his Nichomachean Ethics. Therefore Bacon contents himself with laying down a principle which he considers of paramount importance, and capable of being applied as a touchstone to decide between two conflicting views of different schools of moral philosophy. This great principle is the superiority of the general good over the private good. He finds this principle extending far beyond the range of ethics and illustrates it ingeniously by curious analogies taken from external nature. The first is from magnetism. A small piece of iron rises to the lodestone, but a larger piece of the same metal, in spite of the attraction of the lodestone, falls to the earth like a good patriot, giving up its particular affection to the lodestone and obeying rather its sympathy with the larger body, namely, the earth. His next illustration is from the supposed conflict of duty that water has to decide in the presence of a vacuum: "Water and massy bodies move

to the centre of the earth ; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world." The duty of water as part of the earth is to move to the centre of the earth. But it is also a part of the universe, a larger body which abhors a vacuum. Therefore water will follow the higher obligation and move upwards into a vacuum, seeking the more general good of the universe, rather than the less general good of this earth. Shakespeare, in his famous description of Cleopatra sailing down the river Cydnus, gives a similar picture of the conflict between opposing claims of duty in the air, relating how the Cilicians left their city to gaze on the beautiful Egyptian, so that Antony

"Enthroned i' the market place did sit alone
Whistling to the air ; which, but for vacancy,
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature."

That is to say, the air was strongly inclined from private motives tending to its own gratification to follow the citizens and gaze upon Cleopatra, but was prevented from doing so by the consideration that, had it thus selfishly followed its own inclination, it would have impaired the general good of the universe by forming an abhorred vacuum. In these lines of Shakespeare the phrase "but for vacancy" might be exactly paraphrased in Bacon's words "rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature," and no doubt the similar reference to the old doctrine of nature's abhorrence of a vacuum in the two passages supplies an argument to the heretics who maintain the paradox that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays. Bacon's sweeping generalization, by which he brings external nature under the sway of the moral law, also finds poetic expression in Wordsworth's address to Duty :—

"Thou dost preserve the Stars from wrong,
And the most ancient Heavens, through
Thee, are fresh and strong."

The same idea probably underlies Kant's famous declara-

tion that there were two things that above all others filled his soul with reverent awe—the starry heavens above, and the moral law within.

Passing from the physical analogies to the moral conflict that they are intended to illustrate, Bacon gives the story of Pompey risking shipwreck in a great storm to save Rome from famine, and saying to those who dissuaded him, "*Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam,*" whereby he showed his preference for the general good of his country as opposed to his own private good. Still higher examples of this spirit of sacrifice of self to the more general good may be found in the Bible, where Bacon reminds us that "the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion." He is thinking of Moses, who, when the children of Israel made a golden calf, prayed for them to God, saying: "And now, if thou wilt, forgive their sins—; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written;" and of St. Paul, who, in the epistle to the Romans, exclaims: "I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren."

Bacon is content with laying down his fundamental principle: he does not enter into the minute casuistical questions that naturally present themselves when we attempt to apply it. He does not ask himself whether the general good is always to be preferred to the private good, whether there are any limits to the sacrifice of self, or of the good of a smaller body, to the more general good. Is such sacrifice prescribed by the moral law under all circumstances? No doubt we shall admire the highest pitch of sacrifice of self. But doubts arise when it is a question of other sacrifices of the less general to the more general good. Should we in all cases praise the sacrifice of the good of one's family for the good of one's country, or for the good of the whole human race? Was Bacon justified in deserting Essex, his friend and benefactor, if he thought such desertion essential to the safety of England from revolution? If an Englishman who believed the spread of Roman Catholicism to be a benefit to the human

race had betrayed his country to Spain, would he have won Bacon's approval?

Such questions did not occur to Bacon. He would probably have regarded them as of no more practical importance than the quibbling subtleties of the schoolmen. At any rate, when applying the principle, he confines himself to the conflict between the good of the individual and the good of society. He therefore prefers the active to the contemplative life, and has little admiration for ancient systems of philosophy or modern religious professions that prevent a man from doing vicious acts by removing him from temptation and shutting him up in a tub or a convent, where he may selfishly pursue his own happiness and salvation, but can do little for the benefit of the human race. He strongly advocates bold and active morality. We should not cultivate "divine tranquillity without one pleasure and without one pain," or secure for ourselves the mental serenity and innocence that a recluse may find in his lonely cell. He rather bids us enter boldly into the battle of life, and do our best for our fellowmen. He quotes, as a moral motto, the saying of the great captain Gonsalvos, who pointed out Naples to his soldiers and protested that "he had rather die one foot forwards than have his life secured for long by one foot of retreat." Even if we fail in our high aims, such failure is far nobler than avoiding the danger of acting wrongly by a cowardly retreat from the world and its temptations. He derives the same moral lesson in his "Wisdom of the Ancients" from the fable of the Sirens. There are, he says, two remedies provided by philosophy for the violent enticements of pleasure. "The first means to shun these inordinate pleasures is to withstand and resist them in their beginnings, and seriously to shun all occasions that are offered to debauch and entice the mind, which is signified in the stopping of the ears; and that remedy is properly used by the meaner and baser sort of people, as it were Ulysses' followers and mariners. Whereas more heroic and noble spirits may boldly converse even in the midst of these seducing pleasures, if with a resolved constancy they stand upon their guard and fortify their minds."

Bacon's whole treatment of the comparison between the active and contemplative life to the advantage of the former is what Matthew Arnold would call *tonic*, and is in close agreement with that of a man whose mind was otherwise of a far different stamp. Milton, like Bacon, eulogizes militant virtue and in one of the noblest passages of the "Areopagitica" declares, "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but shrinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat."

Bacon maintains a similarly spirited attitude towards death. He condemns as pusillanimous the teaching of the ancient philosophers that all life should be *commentatio mortis*. By this timid treatment of death they exaggerated its terrors, instead of looking forward to it with the fearless magnanimity of the poet,

"Qui finem vitae extremum inter munera ponit Naturae."

He encourages us to despise death by pointing out in his essay that "there is no passion in the mind of man so weak, but it mates and masters the fear of death; and therefore death is no such terrible enemy when a man hath so many attendants about him that can win the combat of him."

Bacon's fundamental principle is an anticipation of a large amount of subsequent moral philosophy in England. When he says that the good of the greater body is "in degree the greater and worthier because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form," he applies the criterion of right and wrong laid down by those who base morality on the Darwinian theory; for "conservation of a more general form," from the point of view of a moral agent, may be identified with the "preservation of the race or species," which is the end of all moral action in the opinion of such evolutionary moralists as Mr. Leslie Stephens. Bacon's general good is to all intents and purposes the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the promotion of which is, according to utilitarians, the distinctive characteristic of all really virtuous conduct. For, throughout the whole range of Bacon's works, it is evident

that he regarded human happiness as the great end to which all human effort ought to be directed. The ultimate end of all knowledge was, he taught, "the benefit and use of men" and "the relief of man's estate," by which he meant the diminution of human misery, the promotion of human happiness. This was the object sought by Solomona, the law-giver of his ideal state—the New Atlantis—a king who "had a large heart, inscrutable for good, and was wholly bent to make his kingdom and people happy."

From the same "New Atlantis" we see clearly by what *means* Bacon thought the great end of general happiness could be best attained, namely, by good laws, good morality, and by inventions, through which man obtains increased power over nature.

Probably no one will be inclined to dispute the efficacy of good laws and good morality as means to the promotion of happiness. But Bacon throughout his works pays far more attention to the third means, namely, inventions; so that a careless reader of his writings might well suppose that he really valued no other means to happiness. In the order or society called Solomon's House in the "New Atlantis" we hear of no statues to religious teachers, moral philosophers or legislators, but only of statues to the makers of ships, gunpowder, letters, printing, glass, wire, etc. It was such inventions as these that Bacon aimed at multiplying by his inductive philosophy. He never seems for a moment to have doubted but that they would all add immensely to human happiness; and the same assumption is made by Macaulay in his famous essay on Bacon, and by almost all so-called practical men at the present day. Indeed, to a great many people, it seems to be an obvious truth that the inventor of any new means of shortening labor, curing disease, or conquering time and space by improved locomotion is a benefactor of the human race. Yet there is, nevertheless, very strong reason for doubting this assumption, whether we consider the mental satisfaction derived from the employment of inventions or the great changes that inventions have brought about in the conditions of human life.

The idea that men are made permanently happier by the

natural satisfaction they feel, owing to the possession of new power over nature acquired by inventions, is due to a rather transparent fallacy of the kind called by logicians *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*. Because new inventions or inventions with which we have lately become acquainted give us pleasure, it is falsely concluded that they will be permanent sources of pleasure when the charm of novelty has passed away.

If Bacon had been suddenly transported into the nineteenth or twentieth century, and been allowed to travel in a railway train or a steamship or a motor-car, he would no doubt have been thereby raised to a high pitch of happiness—for a time. But the delight would soon have been diminished by familiarity, and he would have begun to grumble at his train taking him to St. Albans at no quicker rate than thirty miles an hour, just as he grumbled before because his post horses could not go faster than eight miles an hour. In truth, the pleasure that men take in new inventions is no more permanent than the pleasure that an infant derives from a new toy. Familiarity soon breeds indifference, and the most wonderful inventions cease to give much satisfaction as soon as we become used to them and begin to regard them as matters of course. In his remarks on the pleasure of knowledge and learning ("Advancement," I. viii. 5) Bacon points out that "in all other pleasures there is satiety, and after they be used their verdure departeth; which sheweth well they be but deceits of pleasure and not pleasures; and that it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality." Saving the fallacious distinction implied between real and seeming pleasure, these remarks are true of the transitory pleasures derived from the employment of a new invention. But mechanical inventions have also more permanent effects than the mental satisfaction of those who make use of them. No doubt inventions such as Bacon aimed at and his followers achieved have largely and permanently, for better or worse, altered the face of the earth and the life led by the inhabitants of this planet. We cannot attempt exhaustively to go through all the multitudinous and far-reaching results of inventions and determine in each case

whether they conduce to human happiness or misery. When we read in Mrs. Browning's poem the exceeding bitter cry of children who, instead of playing in the flowery fields, are doomed to work in the darkness of the mine, or in the noisy factory—

"For all day long we drag our burden tiring
Through the coal-dark, underground;
Or all day we drive the wheels of iron
In the factories, round and round.
For all day the wheels are driving, turning;
Their *wind* comes in our faces
Till our hearts turn, our heads with pulses burning,
And the walls turn in their places;"

when we read these pathetic lines, we should be dull of soul if we did not recognize the fact that modern inventions have cruelly condemned, not only millions of grown-up men and women, but even young children, to be the slaves of machinery. It is not entirely without reason that Ruskin regarded a railway train, from one point of view, as a diabolical contrivance, disfiguring the landscape and shutting up the unfortunate traveler in a box, where he can neither breathe fresh air nor see the beauties of nature that he rattles past.

On the other hand, when we see the same railway train taking the poor children of the slums of London to enjoy a day among the wild flowers of the country, we get a glimpse of the other side of the question. The longer we consider the matter, the more we are overwhelmed by the immense number of facts that have to be considered, some seeming to show that inventions have made men happier, and others pointing as significantly to the opposite conclusion. One of the most striking and certain results of inventions is the increase of the population of the earth that has taken place in the last century, especially in regions of North America, which, but for the invention of the mariner's compass, would still be tenanted by a few thousand Indians, instead of the teeming multitudes of European descent now inhabiting the great cities of New York, Philadelphia and Chicago. Does this great increase of population imply increase of happiness? The answer to this question

depends upon the settlement of another question. Is the average man happy or miserable? If, as many ancients and moderns have thought, life is on the whole unhappy, then the increase of human beings merely means the multiplication of human misery. Until we have settled to our own satisfaction the great question at issue between pessimist and optimist, we have no right to assume that inventions on the whole promote human happiness. When we fairly consult our own individual experience of life, we shall probably be inclined to come to the melancholy conclusion that, in spite of all the wonderful inventions that have been made since Bacon's time by clever men of science working in the spirit of his philosophy, in spite of the steam engine, the telegraph, the telephone, the bicycle, the motor car and the electric light, we are not really much, if at all, happier than the men and women who lived in the reigns of Elizabeth and King James. If there has been any rise in the average of human happiness as the centuries have rolled past, we should rather attribute it to the development of artistic taste and of moral sentiment, and to the teachings of Christianity, than to mechanical and other inventions. Therefore many who agree with Bacon entirely in thinking that the happiness of men is the final end of science may reasonably disagree with him as to the means by which this end may be best promoted.

Bacon reveals his general accordance with utilitarianism very plainly in his essay of "Goodness and Goodness of Nature" where he declares *philanthropia* is the affecting of the weal of men "of all virtues and dignities of the mind the greatest, being the character of the Deity; and without it man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing, no better than a kind of vermin."

Bacon however, seems to differ from modern utilitarians in limiting the sphere of his highest virtue to human beings. The utilitarian of to-day, making happiness the end of moral action, is not inconsistent enough to leave the happiness of the lower animals out of consideration. Judging from his writings, Bacon would appear to have considered the animal kingdom as beyond the pale of human sympathy. This is indicated by the word that he employs to express the virtue of benevolence,

namely, *philanthropia*, that is to say, the love of *men*. When he tells the story of how "a Christian boy in Constantinople had like to have been stoned for gagging in a waggishness a long-billed fowl," he evidently has more sympathy with the waggish boy than with the unfortunate bird that was the victim of his cruelty. In discussing vivisection, he remarks that, although the inhumanity of the vivisection of *men* was justly reproved by Celsus, "yet in regard of the great use of this observation, the inquiry need not by him so slightly have been relinquished, but might have been diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive." It never seems to have entered his mind that anyone might condemn the vivisection of *animals* as inhumane or in any way objectionable. Bacon's want of sympathy with the sufferings of the lower animals may partly be due to the spirit of the age in which he lived. Certainly sympathy with the animal world has greatly increased since the days of Bacon, but even in his time, in "As You Like It," we have Jaques weeping over the sorrows of the stricken deer.

Bacon also in his treatment of another moral difficulty comes to a conclusion that is repugnant to utilitarianism, and forgets for a time the supremacy he ascribes to *philanthropia* or benevolence. That is when he discusses the question whether the *end* justifies the means, and determines that it is not permissible to do a small injustice in the present for the sake of great good in the future. Such a conclusion is not in accordance with the modern utilitarian's equal survey of happiness past, present and to come. The followers of Bentham clearly see that justice is generally productive of happiness, but, if they were convinced that some particular act of injustice would do more to promote than to diminish the happiness of the human race, they would be bound by their principle to approve of the unjust act; for, according to them, justice is only a virtue when it is conducive to happiness.

Dr. Sidney Lee, in his recent work entitled "Great Englishmen of the Sixteenth Century," quotes as one of Bacon's *precepts*, in inverted commas, the following words: "mixture of falsehood is like alloy which may make the metal work better." Now these are Bacon's very words, but that they should be

quoted as a precept of Bacon is a striking example of the injustice that may be done by quoting, apart from the context, a sentence, or, as in this case, a bit of a sentence. For the whole sentence tells us that "it will be acknowledged even by those that practise it not, that clear and round dealing is the honor of man's nature, and that a mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it; for these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet." Bacon points out the baseness of falsehood, though he admits that a certain amount of falsehood may make a man more effective. Must we not all allow that there is some truth in this admission? Did not the unscrupulous Themistocles do more to secure the liberty of Greece than the virtuous Aristides? Did not the perfidious Lysander do more for Sparta than the noble Calli-cratis. But this admission is only a concessive clause in a sentence the main purport of which is that falsehood is a disgrace and truth a glory to human nature. Elsewhere Bacon shows his high regard for truth by a fine application of the question which Job asked of his friends: "Will you lie for God, as one man will do for another, to gratify him?" In the first book of the "Advancement of Learning" he is arguing against those who opposed knowledge on the ground that knowledge of second causes tended to make men atheistical by freeing them from the necessity of acknowledging the great first cause. Even if this were a real danger, he urges, that is no reason why we should shut our eyes to the truth, for "certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes; and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were, in favor towards God; and nothing else but to offer the Author of Truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie."

We must now proceed to the second or practical side of moral science, which in Bacon's opinion is more important than the theoretical side, and had been nevertheless almost entirely neglected by his predecessors. The familiar proverb says that one man may take a horse to water, but twenty cannot make him drink. In the same way we may exhibit to mankind the most

beautiful pictures of moral virtue, but those pictures will not necessarily induce men to act morally. "An exhibition of the nature of good," Bacon says, "without considering the culture of the mind, seemeth to be no better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion." As a practical philosopher bent on promoting the good of his fellowmen, Bacon insists upon the immense importance of considering the means by which men may be impelled to act virtuously. He admits that this office is performed by sacred divinity, but moral philosophy should help as "a wise servant and humble handmaid." What then are the means that the moral philosopher can discover to induce men to do what they know to be right?

Vicious action, he thought was generally due to the fact that the reason was clouded by the passions and did not see clearly what was right. Therefore the great object of the practical side of his moral teaching is to curb the passions, so that they may not obscure our judgment of right and wrong.

To this branch of moral philosophy Bacon gives the metaphorical title "Culture of the Mind." Keeping up the metaphor, he remarks that just as the husbandman studies the different capabilities of the soil he has to cultivate, so the moral philosopher should study the varieties of the human mind, so as to apply to each different kind of mind the most appropriate culture. For the treatment that will improve one kind of mind will be useless or even injurious, if applied to another. A great field of materials for the student of this side of moral philosophy is supplied by poetry and history; "The poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities." How little the greatness of the Elizabethan drama was recognized by the learned men of the time is shown by the fact that Bacon draws all his illustra-

tions from Greek and Latin literature, and never once quotes Shakespeare. If Bacon ever saw Othello or Hamlet or King Lear represented on the stage, it is passing strange that he did not see that in those plays more powerfully even than in the greatest masterpieces of ancient literature was "painted forth with great life how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree."

Bacon gives a long list of the principal means by which the moral culture of the mind may be effected, and the passions may be controlled and modified, namely, "custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies." As, however, he is not writing a moral treatise, but only giving suggestions to others who may intend to do so, he contents himself with making a few remarks on habit and custom, to show how such subjects ought to be treated by the moral philosopher.

He concludes his treatment of the culture of the mind by insisting upon the supreme importance of aiming at good ends. If we can teach men to seek good ends, that will include all virtue, and thus the culture of the mind will be entirely provided for. The comprehensive, virtuous effect of aiming at good ends, is illustrated by one of those beautiful comparisons which illuminate so many of his pages. "If," he says, "these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again that he be resolute, constant and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this is indeed like the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time. So in obtaining a virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; but when he dedicateth and applieth

himself to good ends, look—what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto." Since the good end that Bacon especially recommends as far above the other ends is the good of others, the best way to cultivate our mind for moral action is to acquire *philanthropia*, or a love of our fellowmen, which brings us back again to utilitarianism, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

So far as we have examined it, Bacon's moral teaching is as elevated as that of most other moralists. He has not indeed the power of inspiring moral enthusiasm that we find in the writings of Plato, Kant, Emerson and Carlyle. For to inspire enthusiasm in others a teacher must be enthusiastic himself, and Bacon was not really enthusiastic in anything but the pursuit of scientific inventions. Therefore we do not find in his moral teaching, except, perhaps, in his eulogy of militant virtue, much more than a faint echo of the trumpet voice with which, in the "Novum Organum" he called upon men to conquer nature by scientific method of experiment. Also it must be admitted that, scattered through his writings, there are to be found many passages in which he betrays a tendency to Machiavellianism and to the pursuit of selfish ends by base means, such as might be expected in a man of the character revealed by his career as a statesman and a lawyer, and by his entries in his private notebook.

Nevertheless, if, as seems right, we form our opinion of Bacon as a moralist by the consideration of those parts of his works in which he is consciously and deliberately discussing the questions of right and wrong, and determining what kind of conduct is most noble and virtuous, his ethical teaching is worthy of his great name, and deserves more careful study than it generally receives in the history of English moral philosophy. Bacon has been called the Father of Inductive Philosophy, and the Founder of Modern Science. When we consider the wonderful way in which he anticipated the altruistic teaching of later English moralists, and the fact that he had in England no predecessor in moral science (for

Hobbes, with whom the history of English moral science is usually supposed to begin, published his "Leviathan" nearly half a century later than the appearance of Bacon's "Advancement of Learning"), we cannot but be deeply impressed by the originality, the clearness, and the suggestiveness of his treatment of the subject, and may with good reason add to his other honors the title of the Father of English Moral Philosophy.

MICHAEL MACMILLAN.

WAR AND SOCIAL ECONOMY.

In the so-called "glorious" victories of Cæsar, a million men perished on the field of battle. Napoleon, in the short space of nine years, was authorized to devote to "the glory of France" 2,103,000 of her sons. In the ten years following the attack on Fort Sumter, the world destroyed in war 1,400,000 lives and six billions worth of property. Two thirds of the combined budgets of the various states of Europe are devoted to the maintenance of armed forces, and to the service of a debt practically the whole of which was incurred by wars.¹ War expenses in Europe absorb one-half of all the wealth created by productive labor. In the comparatively insignificant war of England with the Boers, England lost 22,450 men and spent \$1,400,000,000. Three hundred and fifty thousand men were withdrawn by her from productive industry to engage in the destruction of war. Military expenditures in the United States during the last eight years have absorbed \$1,500,000,000, more than enough to pay the national debt and dig the Panama canal!

War, then, is alarmingly expensive. Unless indispensable as a means of preserving national integrity, the outlay is likely to exceed the income. But war, as a rule, is not indispensable. As a rule its causes are trivial. Its object to-day is usually commercial: it is waged for markets. War, therefore, is a phase of industrial competition, or it is rather industrial com-

¹ De Molinari, "The Society of To-morrow," p. 30.

petition writ large. Armies and navies are the effective instruments for opening doors to business enterprise. Their employment, however, is the superlative example of social waste. The question of their increase or enlargement is a question of social economy.

Now, it is not necessary, nor would it be correct, to regard all the losses of war as absolute waste. We may admit that war is sometimes necessary. As long as men regard the accumulation and sale of goods as the chief end of man, it probably will be unavoidable. It may sometimes result in "the stainless victories of immortal truth." It doubtless stimulates invention, and encourages the development of certain desirable qualities, such as courage, endurance, and the ability to act in concert.

But for all that, war is waste. For the question is not, Is any good derived from war? There is probably no form of national expenditure, no evil, to which some benefit may not be traced. "Evil," says Lowell, "its errand hath, as well as Good." The question is one of good relatively to cost. Do warlike expenditures bring as great a return as they would if applied in some other direction? Are the benefits derived from war worth the price paid for them? Might not the qualities of devotion, courage, etc., be developed at less expense, and without unchaining all the brutal passions? Put in this way, the question has but one answer: War is waste; for the test of waste is what might be done with the same means most wisely expended.

Suppose, for instance, that England had employed the men and the money devoted to the war in South Africa to beautify her cities, to develop her physical resources, or to educate her people; how much greater would have been the return in human well-being, both to herself and to the world? She might have made herself supreme in science and in art, an example and an inspiration, a light to the feet of all nations that would tread the path of peaceful progress. What has she to show for them? She has mastered, to be sure, an infant republic, and exhibited to the world the loyalty of her subjects; but at the same time she has conjured up, at home and abroad, the spirit

of militancy which, like Banquo's ghost, may not down, and has sown in South Africa the dragon's teeth of suspicion and hatred which later on may spring up, armed warriors that will humble her pride.

Suppose, again, that the United States had turned its expenditure for war to the direct promotion of the pursuits of peace. Can anyone doubt that the benefit to the country would have been immeasurably greater? Cut the estimated war expenses of the last eight years in two, and there would still be enough to construct the Panama Canal, according to the original estimate, and to secure the great increase in commerce it is expected to bring; to irrigate a large part of our arid lands and make homes for thousands of people where now is a barren waste, and to educate the 3,720,000 children in the country, now said to be without educational privileges; or, if devoted to the science of preventive medicine, it would have lengthened the average of human life, and have brought health and happiness into thousands of homes where now is disease and despair. Preventable disease kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The greatest enemy this country ever had is the small form of life that brings the hectic flush to the cheek of the consumptive. One hundred and sixty thousand annually fall before this implacable foe. What wisdom is there in spending millions to protect our coasts from an anonymous enemy, and practically nothing to protect the lives and health of the people? Would it not be wiser and more becoming in a Christian nation, to say nothing of economy, to spend money in trying to save life than in expensive preparations to destroy it?

Observe, too, that the economic losses of war do not tell half the story. There remain the ethical and moral losses—the debasement of character, the hatred engendered, the sorrow and suffering inflicted upon the helpless and the innocent, and all the other evils incident upon war.

Now, in spite of the waste connected with war and military expenditures, obvious enough when relative values of expenditure are considered, patriotic and conscientious men, both at home and abroad, are urging a still larger outlay. Germany

wants a larger navy. England wishes to increase her army. In this country the appeal for a larger navy is continuous and strong. The solicitude of the President in regard to a "big navy" is well known. Secretary Bonaparte, in his recent annual report, asks Congress to add thirteen warships to the navy at a cost of \$23,300,000. Newspapers of varied influence second this appeal, and insist that we must have a navy consistent with our advanced position as a world power.

The question whether this request for a larger navy should be granted is, I repeat, a question of social economy. It is this, Is the adding of warships to our navy the best opportunity now open to the Government to conserve and increase the welfare of the nation?

This question might be answered in the affirmative (we may grant it for the sake of the argument) if our navy were now of inconsiderable strength. But this is not the case. Congress has already responded to the popular demand in a most liberal manner. The naval estimates for the present fiscal year were the largest ever submitted, and they were cut down from those sent in by the bureaus more than \$17,000,000. During the past year we launched more war-vessels than ever before by this or any other nation. We have now in commission 157 warships, to say nothing of torpedo boats, tugs, sailing and receiving vessels. We have under construction 47 war-vessels, 14 of which are first-class battleships, and the construction of two more, at a cost of fifteen million dollars has been authorized.² Is not this liberal naval expenditure for a nation "conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal"? Shall we continue this form of expenditure when there are so many other avenues in which the public revenue may be directed with unquestionable benefit to the people? We have 10,000,000 poor whose health and happiness, and consequent usefulness, might be greatly enhanced if Congressional liberality should take the form of more liberal expenditure for internal development—sanitation, agriculture, forestry, irrigation.

² These facts concerning the navy are from the "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the year 1904."

Before expending another seven-and-a-half millions in the construction of a war-vessel, then, popular representatives would do well to consider the probable income if that sum were expended in other directions. What might be done of public value with that amount of money? Suppose, for instance, that it were invested in education. The average cost of a schoolhouse in the South is about \$275, and the average wages of the teacher is about \$25 a month. Seven million five hundred thousand dollars, the cost of the best type of warship, would build over 27,000 schoolhouses, or employ over 37,000 teachers for a school year of eight months. It is more than half as much as the total expenditure for the public schools of the South Atlantic States in 1903. There are but a few universities in the United States with an endowment of \$7,500,000. Is a battleship worth more to the country than a university? There are little colleges in our land, struggling along with an endowment of less than a million, that are worth more to the nation than any war-vessel that ever was built. They have made men, and a man is worth more than a man-of-war. There is really no comparison between the value of money spent in building fighting ships, which, anyhow, are soon out of date and must go to the scrap-heap, and money spent for education.

Instead, therefore, of increasing our sea-power by strengthening our navy, we should, for one thing, increase our brain-power by strengthening our schools. Brains are worth more than battleships. A good school is better than a fort, and the best army a nation can have is an army of intelligent school-teachers. The true greatness of our nation depends upon the intelligence and character of our people. These in turn depend upon education. Yet while we are expending annually on the common schools about \$250,000,000, we are spending as much on war. "At the present rate of expenditure on the army and navy," said the late Edward Atkinson, "in the year 1905 the amount will not be less than \$265,000,000, probably more." What more striking example of social waste could be found? Two hundred and fifty million dollars to put brains into people, and two hundred and sixty-five million dollars to blow them out!

What, now, is the justification of, and plea for, additional expenditure upon the navy?

We may pass without serious consideration those ebullitions of spurious patriotism to the effect that we must have the largest navy in the world. It is a childish, not to say a barbarous, delight that is found in that sort of superiority. Our navy is now fifth in point of size. When the present constructive program is completed it will be third. Suppose we make it first, how long should we enjoy the distinction of holding the first rank without renewed expenditure to increase the size of our navy beyond the increase of some rival nation? If it is wise for us to seek to be first, will not other nations think it is so for them? That is one of the worst things about the expansion of our navy; it evokes the spirit of rivalry and war. It puts an excuse for increasing military burdens into the mouth of every despot in the world. It makes tyranny easier and liberty less secure. The influence of the United States for good or evil is the most potent of all nations. It should be cast on the side of industrialism and against militarism, in favor of peace and not in favor of war. We should teach to other nations, by example, as well as precept, that our work is constructive rather than destructive; that to disarm is better, and more economical, than to arm. As Lowell wrote:

"Our country hath a gospel of her own
To preach and practice before all the world,—
The freedom and divinity of man,
The glorious claims of human brotherhood,
Which to pay nobly as a freeman should,
Gains the sole wealth that will not fly away,—
And the soul's fealty to none but God."

A significant effect of our example in naval construction may now be observed where perhaps least expected. The South American republics have become suspicious of our intentions, and are increasing their armaments. Brazil has recently appropriated \$60,000,000 for the construction of forty new warships. Argentina is negotiating with Chile for the abrogation of the protocol limiting the naval armaments of these two countries. When republics arm against a republic Liberty must

weep. We owe a debt of consideration to the republics on this continent which a large navy tends to make us forget. He is blind indeed who does not see that the swaggering patriotism and rodomontade indulged in by some of us since we became "a world power" cannot promote among them a feeling of friendliness for us. Assumptions of physical or moral superiority, sneers at the peculiarities of their people, ridicule of their pretensions, the cheap wit indulged in at their expense by pert paragraphers of the press, even though more thoughtless than malicious, can have no other result than to intensify prejudice and develop hatred all the more bitter because impotent. It would be worse than social waste, it would be a lasting shame and a crime, if by an arrogant spirit encouraged by a large navy, or by a lack of conciliatory diplomacy, we should provoke to hostility the struggling young republics we have guaranteed to protect against European aggression. But even this is possible if we follow the policy of enlarging our navy. Who knows but that a war, possibly the next great war, may take place between the Mother of Republics wedded to militarism, and a combination of her children, the offspring of Liberty?

The mere desire for a big navy, however, and the satisfaction derived from it, are not put forth as arguments with expectation, we may suppose, of greatly influencing the thoughtful citizen. It may do for the "jingo"; it is not sufficient for men who think. For these another argument is advanced.

This other argument is that a big navy is our best insurance against war. This implies, of course, that peace is maintained through fear, the fear of the nations with smaller armaments, which is not always the case. Few nations avoid a war because they are afraid. The men who plunge a nation into war do not do the fighting, hence they are not overawed by superior force. But granting to this contention all the weight that properly belongs to it, let us look more closely at this argument that the larger the navy the less likely we are to be involved in war.

A large navy requires a large force of men and officers to man it. When the ships now authorized are completed we shall have in our navy over 62,000 men and more than 2,000

officers. These men and officers are in the navy either because of an adventurous, thoughtless and irresponsible spirit, or because they believe in war. It is charitable to suppose the latter. The officers at least are persuaded that war is beneficent, and they are anxious to rise in their profession. Now, how long do you suppose these officers and men, wishing for an opportunity to distinguish themselves, will be content with inglorious idleness? Will they "not only be willing but anxious to fight?" They will be scattered over the world, in frequent contact with the "fighting men" of other nations. An insult to themselves will be interpreted as an insult to "the flag," which they must avenge. Experience has shown that a drunken sailor can stir up more trouble than sober men can easily adjust. When some men anxious to fight come in contact with others of the same mind trouble is likely to ensue. Assuming that every man and officer is a gentleman, the larger their number the more numerous the points at which international disputes may arise. How many wars have been provoked by the action of soldiers. The war with Mexico, for instance, according to General Grant ("Memoirs," I, 51), was "provoked by the army if not by the annexation itself."

A large navy, then, instead of being a war preventive is a war provocative; instead of being insurance against war, it is the next thing to assurance of war. Arms beget arrogance, and arrogance embroilment. This is recognized as true of the individual. It is true also of the nation. Our best insurance against war is justice, fair dealing, modesty, moderation, courteous consideration of the rights and claims of other nations, and charity for their weaknesses. It is not the policy of the "big stick." A nation should not undertake, any more than a man, to punish every fancied slight, to whip everybody that offers it an insult, or to resent with physical force every injury received. Our nation professes to have some regard for the teaching of Him who said, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you, and persecute you." This may be an impossible ideal. Nevertheless true patriotism consists in the desire, the will, and the act to raise the standard of

national conduct to conform a little more closely to this ideal, and not in talking of the necessity of war, and burdening the people with military expenses.

War, then, may be truly considered as waste. Social economy demands that the vast stream of revenue which has hitherto been flowing out upon the sands of war, where it is drunk up unproductively and lost, should be directed out over the fields of education and peaceful industry, to fertilize the soil and cause it to produce in ever increasing abundance the flowers and fruit of a higher civilization.

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REFLECTIONS ON KIDD'S "PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION."

Although Mr. Kidd's book has now been before the public for some little time, and various criticisms have been passed upon it, it would not seem out of place to revert again to a consideration of its main features, particularly as the subject-matter dealt with is, and is likely to continue to be of engaging interest to all who concern themselves with the study of social phenomena. It is intended in the following pages to take an independent and impartial review of the arguments presented, with the sole purpose of discovering how far they are adequate to support the author's theory, and therefore how far the theory itself is to be relied upon.

The first impression, I imagine, which the reading of the first few chapters of the book makes upon the mind of anyone to whom this class of literature appeals is that, whatever may be the value of the argument one way or the other, he is in the presence of a highly fascinating problem and one which, as the author is constantly reminding us, is entitled to "hold the imagination." As we read on, the mind is still held under the grasp of the same spell, and although it may find some difficulty in endorsing the argument put forward on behalf of the theory of the entire "subordination of the present to

the future," it nevertheless clings to the idea that the elaborately worked up argument will in some way or other be substantially shown to square with the actual facts of every day life. But as we read further and begin to near the end, the spell begins to vanish, the argument to falter, until in place of the hitherto steadily directed train of thought towards the solution of the problem, we have page after page devoted to the phenomena of trusts, monopolies, and so forth, continued almost to the last, with scarcely a word of explanation or comment—certainly no adequate explanation—as to the apparently adverse bearing that these phenomena have upon the matter in hand; and we close the book with a keen feeling of disappointment that an argument, otherwise presented in so convincing a manner, should at last fail to sustain the ground gained, and that, too, at a point where, if sustained, was more than ever likely to carry conviction. Throughout the greater portion of the book nothing is more admirable than the close reasoning and the dialectic skill with which the argument is pushed forward, combined with the earnest persuasiveness of the writer; but one rises from a study of its pages with a deep sense of its incompleteness; of a want which we instinctively feel could have been supplied, and should have been supplied in order to complete the harmony of the work and give to it its full consummation. Such at least is the general impression made upon the mind of the writer after a careful perusal.

Mr. Kidd's main purpose, if I read him aright, is to show that "the ascendancy of the present" is, so to speak, a thing of the past; that it must give way in an ever-increasing degree to the principle involved in "the subordination of the present to the future;" that, in order to comprehend human society and all it implies in terms of the Darwinian theory, it is necessary to show that the controlling centre of the evolutionary process is forever to be regarded as projected into the future; and that the winning peoples will be those amongst whom these principles are most exemplified. Further, that the present day conceptions of the meaning of the evolutionary process have had their "intellectual foundations" removed.

Let us deal with the latter assertion first, for no small amount

of Mr. Kidd's contention is based upon the alleged difference between his interpretation of society and that of all other philosophical teaching up to the present time. But the fundamental difference which he appears thus to regard as existing, is surely more imaginative than real, and in so far as it has any reality is exaggerated. I fail to see what bearing upon the argument such straining of divergent views can have, unless it be to emphasize the nature of the theory, in which case it does so at the expense of the theory itself. Compare for a moment the current theory with Mr. Kidd's. The impression one gets on reading Mill or Herbert Spencer is certainly not that our whole interest is bound up in the present regardless of the future. On the contrary, their conception of society, or a perfect state, is so far removed from the actual condition of affairs at present that its realization is likely to be immeasurably in the future. True their theory of progress may be "towards a fixed state in which a reconciliation between the self-interest of the individual in the present and the interest of society is to be completed." And is there any reason why not? Why should not an ideal state of society, as at present conceived, at a later date become realized? On the contrary, there is every reason to hope that such will be the case. And if so, what becomes of the contention that the individual must always be subordinate to society? This seems to be the point of difference between the two theories. The one assumes that the interests of the individual and of society, hitherto at variance, shall *at last* become one. According to the other, there appears to be no "*at last*," but an *ad infinitum* sub-serving of the present to the future. It precludes any ultimate state of perfection—any ultimate goal, and implies that there can be no defined purpose in the scheme of nature. With this lack of possible realization, much of the impetus to exertion manifested in all sorts of movements towards human welfare would be taken away, and with it must also go much of the field in which natural selection operates. And in so far as this was the case the premises of the theory would be removed. On the other hand, according to Herbert Spencer and the utilitarians, the very essence of the current theory subsists in

the fact that the realization of the future lies potentially in the present (itself a product of the past), which is but a stepping stone to that ulterior end. Thus in the one case the present is a means to an end; in the other, that end is denied. It is obvious that the ultimate and perfected advantages gained by natural selection cannot be shared *in toto* by the present; but there is always the *latest* acquisition of advantages shared—the *ultimate* advantages "in the making." And only in this qualified sense can the term "ascendency of the present" with any degree of justification be used with reference to the utilitarian theory.

In this connection let us glance back, as Mr. Kidd does on page 94, to the time of the ancient Greeks. To-day is the future of yesterday—of 23 centuries ago. Has not each successive "ascendency of the present" between then and now marked an upward progress of human society without any direct, conscious or real "suberving" of interests at each stage, and this in spite of an increasing consciousness of the presence of, and obligation to, a moral sense? Comparing the two extremes of this period, is not society now a more enlightened whole—a nearer approach to the idea of the interest of the one being the interest of all—than it was at the commencement of that period? "Subserving" there certainly has been (there can probably be no future without it); but it has been little more than the subserving of the interests of those at the time being existing, and has been synonymous with the struggle of each successive "present" generation to make the best of itself, without any premeditated idea of sacrifice for generations unborn. I do not deny, and no one will deny, that there have been many noble instances of sacrifice, wholly free from the taint of self-interest, undertaken for the sake of those who may come after. I am also free to admit that this spirit of sacrifice, or rather of altruism, is happily an increasing quantity, and is, as I believe, destined to become an important, if not the main factor in the development of the human race. But between admitting all this and subscribing to Mr. Kidd's dictum of the entire "subordination of the present to the future" there is a wide difference.

Yet another thought arises in this connection. Is there any

reason why the "strongest interests of the present" (page 94) should not be compatible with those of the future? Why "duty" and other moral sense conceptions should not be of like interest to both? Why, in short, "duty," etc., should not coincide with desire? For if it is conceivable, and for my part I fail to see why it should not be, that our sense of duty and of obligation to practice the virtues generally should one day, as the result of the gradual evolution of all that is best in the human race, come to be regarded as synonymous with desire—so regarded, in fact, that *to act* would be to practice virtue—then in that case there must come a time when subordination would cease to have any meaning—would in fact become non-existent, and virtue would be "all in all."

One other comment upon Mr. Kidd's premises calls for attention before proceeding to the subject-matter itself. In seeking to base his theory on the principle of natural selection, Mr. Kidd asserts that this principle acts "through the largest numbers," and proceeds to show that the "vast majority" (*i. e.* of the human race) must always be in the future, and that it is therefore in the interest of this "vast majority" that the present is to be exploited.

Without calling in question the truth or otherwise of this view of natural selection, it is only necessary here to question its relevancy to the matter in hand. Is there sufficient reason for the assumption that, in the case of man, the "vast majority" must always be in the future? We have no guarantee whatever that such will be the case. Unless we are prepared to admit an eternal succession of generations in this world, there must come a time when the majority is *not* in the future but in the *present*. Only on the further assumption of a never ending succession of generations can the original assumption of the "vast majority" always being in the future be maintained. So that as much of the theory as is based upon these assumptions must to that extent be invalidated unless otherwise supported by independent evidence. But although Mr. Kidd does seem to regard it as one of the premises of his argument, it does not appear that there is really any necessity to do so. For, taking natural selection for granted, and using

it in its widest sense as including the human intellect as one of its most potent factors, it is evident that if there is such a thing as social evolution at all, natural selection must largely operate, and it is purely gratuitous to assume that in order that it should do so the majority must always be regarded as being in the future.

Passing now to the subject-matter of the book, let us seek to have a clearly defined conception of the argument which the writer puts before us. In brief, it is this: that the controlling meaning to which human consciousness has become related is no longer in the present but in the future. And referring back to the times of ancient civilization he points out that there is an entire absence therein of "the assumption that in the last resort we have a duty, not only to our fellow-creatures, but to principles which transcend all the purposes" for which our own life and that of the State itself exists (p. 190). All ancient schemes of individual ethics and political theory, he points out, related to the idea of the sovereignty of the State, and Aristotle's conception of "virtue" was nothing more than a form of "political activity," or the effort of self-consciousness to realize itself. And in order to show the gradual unfolding of the world process by which we are surrounded, he divides the historical period which he surveys into two epochs. The first presents us with a type of society which exists in virtue of its ability to hold its own against all comers, i. e. a people in whom "military efficiency" has been brought about by a process of "military selection." The second epoch (and one which presumably we ourselves are but on the threshold of) presents us with the same society imbued with an entirely different set of principles and ideals, in that whereas the dominant note of the former was the self-sufficiency of the individual, that of the latter is its insufficiency or contempt of self. Moreover it is only after the first epoch has run its course that there can be any progress in the second or higher stage of social evolution.

This second or higher stage represents the passing of the present under the control of the future, and here we find ourselves in the presence of a "great antinomy" which may be

expressed by saying that on the one hand we have the dominant forces, which have all along been making for the "ascendency of the present," still with us; on the other, a new array of forces, the absolute negation of the ruling principles of the past, tending ever to the projection of the sense of human responsibility beyond the limits of political consciousness, and giving as a result freer play for all human activities than the world has yet witnessed.

We have in the presentation of this antinomy the outline of a problem which has long perplexed, and is probably destined still longer to perplex, the human mind. It is an elaboration of the problem foreshadowed in Mr. Kidd's previous volume "Social Evolution," where it was shown that as soon as the element of rationality was introduced into organic life, it was as if a new and revolutionary factor were placed at the disposal of natural selection. It is the same problem that we see Huxley endeavoring to grapple with when he uses the words *Cosmic* and *Ethic* as expressive of the two terms of the antinomy. And it is a problem which we still find ourselves struggling with under various aspects, and it may be in subconscious ways, but always when analyzed found to be related to two fundamental principles—the one, as to how far the promptings of pure self-interest should be allowed to lead us (comprised under the term "*Cosmic*"), the other, how far these should be combated by the promptings of interest for others (which may be comprised under the term "*Ethic*"). These two principles, in whatever manner stated, are to all appearance diametrically opposed to each other and utterly irreconcilable; and yet, if we are to accept evolution as the unifying process it is supposed to be, we are constrained to believe that, irreconcilable as they appear to be, there must be, far though it be removed from our view, some fundamental chord which gives harmony to the twofold process more immediately within our ken. It is the search for this harmonizing truth that gives so much significance to the book before us. If evolution is a unifying process whereby opposing tendencies become reconciled, what is the principle common to both which makes for this reconciliation? Herbert Spencer has pointed out that

whenever opinion is sharply divided on any point, reconciliation is to be brought about by emphasizing that ultimate element of truth underlying manifold differences. And a similar process would seem to be applicable in the case before us. Broadly speaking, granting that progress is an end—or more correctly a means to further an end—the Cosmic process makes for the improvement of the physical side of man's nature; the Ethic for the moral side of it, and before the latter can make any appreciable headway it is necessary that the former should at least have attained a certain degree of development. The former is the framework on which the latter operates, and though, when looked at in the abstract they are mutually subversive, yet when viewed more carefully and as a whole, it is wonderful how little in reality they are so. For looked at from an evolutionary point of view, the Cosmic, in point of time, far preceded the Ethic, and may be said to have largely completed its work. The ethical side then dawns upon the scene, and operating side by side with the cosmic, is frequently found in conflict with it. The result of this combination of forces, the one increasing and the latter (having largely done its work) decreasing, is that a feature of progress is introduced, which is different both in degree and in kind from any which so far had preceded it, and one in which physical characteristics are being increasingly subordinated to the ethical. Regarding the matter in this light we have first of all the physical (*i. e.* the cosmic) holding full sway; then the cosmic *plus* the ethical, in which the mollifying effects of the latter act as a brake upon the former, causing it to be slowly brought under its sway; and finally, through the vistas of time, we can conceive of the ethical so completely supplanting its rival as in the end to practically hold full sway. After this eventual triumph of right (for that is what it amounts to) over the physical world, we do no great violence to our imagination to conceive of a third—and that the greatest—factor, after long æons of comparative inactivity, at length coming to maturity and finally entering into full possession; namely, the spiritual factor—not indeed as another rival to the ethical, but as a higher expression of it.

This bald outline of a world process is of course largely conjecture, but it is conjecture which receives a certain support from actual experience. If we compare it with Mr. Kidd's two epochs and his tentative argument therefrom, we shall find a considerable degree of similarity. The first epoch—*i. e.* of military efficiency—is that in which the Cosmic holds its sway. The second represents the dawn of the Ethical, and as it increases in intensity, the gradual subordination also of all the interests of the present to it, together with the rising conviction of the greater importance of the spiritual over temporal interests. And as we have also seen, these phenomena occur in natural sequence, and in such a manner that the succeeding can only take place after the antecedent has reached a certain stage of development. The phenomena in fact represent a true evolution, and while in this bald outline we have only one or two stages in that vast evolution pointed out to us, there yet remains an infinitude of detail to fill in, and in this filling in there is abundant scope for speculation and for rival theories as to the significance and interpretation of passing events in their relation to a well-ordered whole. It is in respect to this interpretation as to the meaning of the forces we see around us that we may find ourselves in conflict with some of the opinions expressed in the book before us.

We need not follow Mr. Kidd in his examination of history in support of his argument. We are concerned rather with the application and interpretation of the facts than with the facts themselves. What we have now to consider is the predominant feature of the new process which the argument at this stage discloses to our view. The simple condition required for this process is that "the controlling meaning to which human consciousness has become related is no longer in the present." And the result of this is "a free conflict of forces" such as has never been before. It makes for "the emancipation of the future,"—a future in which every obstacle to this free conflict, every absolutism, every tyranny, everything in fact that stands in the way of the free rivalry of all forces, shall be completely swept aside—in a word, a future in which the right of universal opportunity shall reign supreme. And

be it remembered, the interest of the individual and of the present is to be continually subordinated to the larger interest of the future and the universal—nay, further, it is only by virtue of this subordination that the emancipation of the future will be brought about.

When the full significance of this setting free of hitherto restrained forces has been allowed to sink into the mind the problem becomes more engrossing. Assuming for the moment this free conflict of forces to be actually taking place, what should we expect to find? Rivalry and competition of every sort raging more fiercely than ever, and tending by that very fact to curtail the freedom which rendered such competition possible. And in the midst of it all the higher ideals of self-denial and subordination to the future would appear to be thrust altogether into the background. Where in such a world-conflict would there be any place for those ethical forces of which we hoped so much? We are again face to face with the great antinomy. Side by side with this strenuous life of rivalry, seemingly making for temporal welfare only, are we to suppose that there can exist a sense of disinterestedness in the present so active that it altogether transcends any interest therein? Mr. Kidd, I imagine, would unreservedly answer in the affirmative. He would transfer the controlling factor entirely from the present to the future, making as the motive of all our actions something far beyond us, and ignoring altogether interests here and now. While admitting a large measure of truth in this, we cannot go quite so far, for, as pointed out previously, it would imply that our best hopes and efforts can never be realized in this world, and this would be fatal to those hopes and efforts themselves. Moreover we know perfectly well, whatever may be said to the contrary, that as a matter of every day experience our interest in the present is a very real one, much too real in many cases. Nevertheless when we have said everything that can be said on the other side, there is a large measure of truth in Mr. Kidd's contention, and where we differ from him it will, I think, be found to be more in degree than in kind. I might interject the remark here that Mr. Kidd's expression "emancipation of the future" is not

altogether a happy one, for while in one sense conveying the meaning he wishes it to do, in another I think it possibly goes beyond his wishes.

In the sense of the free play of all forces eventually taking place the expression is of course to the point. But if every successive present is to be subordinated to the future, there can hardly in that sense be any real emancipation of the future at all. For the future instead of being emancipated will ever in turn come under the thraldom of its successor in point of time.

After all, "present" and "future" (and "past" also) are relative terms, and simply express the relationship of the observer to the point of time he is considering. And with respect to the controlling principle being in the future, it must, from the nature of the case, always be so more or less. The thing aimed at is always "future" to the endeavor made to achieve it. Realization and endeavor to realize are seldom simultaneous. They are of the nature of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent.

But to return to our subject. We have abundant evidence of interest which is centred in the present. What evidence is there of the transference of this interest from the present to the future?—not, be it observed, evidence of a passive *disinterestedness*, but of an active interest prompted by a sense of human responsibility projected beyond the present. Omitting for the moment any reference to our own day, if we glance back over the history of the human race, one significant fact stands out as the main feature of all the great movements that have from time to time marked the progress of the world. That fact is *the demand for justice*—the demand of the oppressed to escape from the thraldom, in whatever form, of the oppressor, and the gradual recognition, on the part of those who have the power, of the existence of certain rights in those who have it not. Crude and imperfect as this conception of justice was at first, it nevertheless has been accountable for the rising sense of moral obligation which has continued to expand until it finds its outward expression in many of the noblest features of our present day life. And it involves a con-

ception of responsibility to something not altogether in the present—though that has its part—but to something higher. It is therefore an abstract idea, containing some recognition of right and wrong as moral qualities.

Taking the Reformation as an instance of one of these world movements, Mr. Kidd shows that it was an endeavor to project the sense of individual responsibility *beyond* the principle of authority conceived of as resident in the organized church; it was in fact a rebellion striking at the root of that principle of authority (p. 302). The church, founding its policy on the idea of the greater importance of spiritual over temporal welfare, formed itself into an absolutism the aims of which were considered to outweigh every other consideration. Against this absolutism the forces of the Reformation were directed. It was the outward expression of the sense of injustice existing in men's minds at their enforced subjection to Rome, and their determination to free themselves from it. It was no expression of disapproval of the principle itself upon which the church based its policy, *i. e.* that of the greater importance of spiritual over temporal welfare. This principle the reformers acknowledged as much as the church. It was the wielding of it as a political weapon that they objected to. So long as the church confined itself to advocating its principles without seeking to *enforce* them upon unwilling subjects—without, that is, infringing the equal right of those subjects to accept or reject them as they thought fit—so long could no exception be taken to its policy. But the moment it so far infringed the liberty of others as finally to persecute those who refused to obey it, then it was that the equally high principle of freedom of thought and action found expression in the determination to throw off the yoke which was seeking to keep them in submission. It was the clashing of two principles, each, it may be, right in itself, but wrong, and indeed mutually destructive, when used in the form of compulsion. And here we come in sight of another principle of the utmost importance, and we are indebted to Mr. Kidd's pointed reference to it, for it is one which cannot be too strongly driven home. It is the principle of *tolerance* held as an ultimate conviction of

the religious consciousness, the only condition necessary, as Mr. Kidd points out, for the emancipation of the future. Toleration as *per se* a religious act does not receive anything like the acknowledgment it should do either from the pulpit or the platform. It is too much hidden under the shallow sophistry which seeks to show that toleration and strength of conviction cannot go together, whereas a moment's reflection should convince us that even in the same individual we frequently have evidence of it; for it is no uncommon experience to find oneself holding at one time of life a certain conviction and at another a conviction directly opposed to it. And yet we are obliged to tolerate our own inconsistency. If in one's own person such is the case, how much more reason is there for the exercise of tolerance as between ourselves and others? Yet as showing the persistency of the spirit of intolerance and how hardly it dies, no sooner do we see the Reformation carried through and the rule of the church thrown off, than we again find the victors enforcing the governmental ideas of their opponents—using as it were, the very weapon they had struck from their hands. Persecution with its attendant evils is rife as before, and in Cromwell's time we still find the ascendancy in the State—and alliance with it—of a system of religious doctrine believed to be right (p. 319). But as time goes on we see the latent spirit of toleration again and again asserting itself. Tracing its progress we see its effects in the gradual dissociation of religious consciousness from the authority of the State. We see the authority transferred from King to Parliament, and finally emancipation from the control of Parliament itself. True, in England the process has not yet reached this stage, but in America, where definite expression has been given to this principle of toleration by embodiment in an Article of the Constitution, we see it in full force, and it is cited by Mr. Kidd as evidence of a conviction of responsibility transcending the content of any interest within the limits of political consciousness (p. 326).

We must remark here that the argument deduced from the dissociation of the religious consciousness from alliance with the State (as being the outward historical expression of the projec-

tion of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process beyond the bounds of political consciousness) is not altogether conclusive. It might be due to indifference, or even to decline of the religious concept, rather than to an increase of it. And the fact that in this country (England) association with the State is still maintained detracts to some extent from the argument. True, in America indifference does not appear to be the cause, for there complete dissociation is said to be accompanied by intensity of belief. But in any case the argument stands in need of further evidence on its positive side.

In chapter X ("The Modern World-conflict") we have the argument carried a stage further, and it is sought to show that the principle of projected efficiency is the most effective cause of progress that has hitherto prevailed. "All systems of social order must go down before those within which the future has been emancipated in the freest and most efficient conflict of forces in the present" (p. 346). It must be borne in mind that an essential feature of such social order is the disintegration of "absolutisms," for if the forces which have been set free only use their freedom to combine in defeating freedom itself, in no true sense of the term can the free conflict of forces be said to exist. This would be the negation of the principles upon which such system of social order was based. It is necessary to bear this in mind, for if it is the principle of liberty that has transferred the ruling power from the King to the people, it is idle to assert that this principle is still held sacred if the power vested in the people is used as a weapon of tyranny in a similar manner as it was used by the monarch or by the church in times gone by. A right regard for the spirit of toleration, and consequently of liberty, is equally obligatory whether the power be vested in monarch or people, and any violation or abuse of the principle, no matter in what domain of thought or action, is equally reprehensible, and should be the object of strong denunciation wherever it occurs. As we shall see presently, it is essential to keep this point clearly before us; for it is abuse of the true spirit of liberty, so dearly bought, that is largely accountable for the very evils it is the function

of that principle to remove. It is therefore more than ever incumbent upon a nation priding itself upon its love of liberty, that it should, as one of its very first essentials, have a clearly defined conception, both as a community and as individuals composing that community, of the true significance of liberty, its self-imposed obligations, and the right and proper use to be made of it.

Proceeding with his idea of projected efficiency, Mr. Kidd sees in the system of party government the first large expression of the new principle—the subconscious admission that however intense our conviction we are not the ultimate repositories of truth. In his view the system of party government represents a conception of responsibility to principles projected beyond the limit of political consciousness (p. 354). There can be no purely intellectual sanction for the "submission of the individual to a world-process in which he has absolutely no interest." A purely "intellectual" demand for freedom is the theory of the interest of the individual in the present. Here we find ourselves at issue again with Mr. Kidd because of the want of definition in the use of the terms "present" and "future" as pointed out earlier on. It cannot be held that because of the individual's submission to a process, the realization of which may not be entirely in the actual present, he therefore has *no* interest in that process. The fact that he does not realize to the full the benefits his submission may bring, or that those benefits may to a large extent fall to the share of others, is not to say that he has absolutely no interest in them. Quite the reverse. For not only does he actually participate in the general welfare his submission brings about, but he derives a certain satisfaction from the consciousness that his act of submission not only has already brought, but will increasingly bring gratification to an ever widening circle of his fellow-creatures. He helps to work out his own salvation and in doing so contributes to that of those to come. The subordinating of his own interests to those of his fellow men or to future generations may in varying degrees be altruistic or it may simply be a sub-conscious submission; but in any case he nevertheless to some extent "*has his reward.*" Thus

viewed his submission can hardly be said to be without intellectual sanction, nor the current theory to have had its "intellectual foundations removed." But this is not to deny there may be other sanctions besides the intellectual. Mr. Kidd's contention would seem to land us on the horns of a dilemma. If, as is his purpose to show, the current theory (that the "ascendency of the present" is the end towards which social and political development moves) has had its intellectual foundations removed, and yet there is no intellectual sanction for the submission of the individual to the future, where, we ask, does the intellect come in at all? We are ready to admit, and gladly admit, that much of the modern conception of democracy is due to the operation of a principle—the most radical of any that has hitherto operated in the world—which acknowledges and emphasizes the existence of a sense of responsibility to each other, to an extent which has never been acknowledged before. But we cannot agree that this principle has "no relation to any theory of the State bounded by the limits of political consciousness." For, as we have just shown, although its relation to the State is not, and is not in any sense claimed to be, final or absolute, yet that it has a real and intimate relation therewith cannot admit of any doubt. We are reminded that this conception of "political tolerance" (as also of "intellectual" tolerance) is "only held as an ultimate conviction of religious consciousness." This may well be without being driven to resort to the "no interest in the present" theory.

An especially interesting reference is made (p. 364) to the question of free trade, and in the light of events which have taken place since the publication of this work, it is well to note their significance, as affording a striking commentary upon the argument here pursued. Mr. Kidd criticises, in fact denies free trade as an affair of State interest. Rather, he says—and this is the point to notice—it is due to the same "sense of responsibility in men's minds outweighing the claims of all political interests." Now compare this with, and judge it by what is taking place at the present time. Ask Mr. Chamberlain the motive of his policy and what will be his

reply? Assuredly that he is advocating it in the interest of the Empire. That is to say, in the interest of the "State bounded by political consciousness." If asked, "is it not due to a sense of responsibility to a principle projected beyond political consciousness?" "No," he will reply. "I admit that the principle of free trade is right in the abstract, but the immediate welfare of the Empire is the first consideration, and I am convinced that that can be best brought about by waiving for the time being the principle we have so long acted upon." Such, I imagine, would be the lines of his reply. The motive is simply the *political welfare* of the State, regardless of any loyalty to an acknowledged principle. It does not alter the case to say that his policy is in the *future* interest of the Empire, for it is only "future" in the sense we have already referred to. The change is intended to be made *as soon as consent can be obtained for it*, and is therefore essentially of "present" concern. And so it would appear that in this particular case at any rate, the argument does not hold good.

A page or two further on we have Mr. Kidd's opinion that a movement toward equality of *economic* opportunity is following that of political opportunity (p. 370)—an opinion in which we readily concur. But, quoting Sidgwick, he says it has become "an ethical postulate that the distribution of wealth in a well-ordered state should aim at realizing political justice." Quite so. And so would Herbert Spencer and the utilitarians say. But does this "realizing" not strike at the fundamental idea of "projection beyond political consciousness?" It is still the expression of a desire, and a hope to "realize" what is considered to be an ideal State. And if "realizable" the "projection" must some time or other cease. It can only be said to be "projected" in so far as it is not realized.

Space forbids us to follow closely Mr. Kidd as he develops his argument in the next few pages, but any survey of the book would be very incomplete without pointed reference to those characteristic products of uncontrolled competition, known as combinations, trusts, monopolies, etc. It is the phenomena of these trusts which I venture to say we shall

find the greatest difficulty in reconciling with Mr. Kidd's theory of projected efficiency. Let us remind ourselves that the ideal towards which we are moving is one of free rivalry of all forces in which the best organizations, etc., shall have the right of universal opportunity—an ideal resting ultimately on the principle of tolerance held as an ultimate conviction of religious consciousness. Let us first of all note a few of the more salient features of these trusts, as pointed out by Mr. Kidd (p. 420 *et seq.*), and observe their bearing upon the argument. Note their power. They are stronger to control legislative action than the say of the people; stronger in their influence than the most rigorous absolutisms of the ancient world. They possess a sinister influence over the distribution, or rather perhaps we should say over the concentration, of wealth, so that the capital of a private citizen is tending to equal the annual revenue of Great Britain or the United States. The ill-effect of this is not compensated by subsequent philanthropy; it bespeaks an unhealthy social state, and is demoralizing. There is, too, a wide difference between the "collective" or "business" conscience of these combines and the conscience of the "individual." Honesty is not a characteristic feature with them. They afford "great prizes for the most unscrupulous" (p. 428).

Such in brief being the leading features of these organizations, what are we to say of their significance in the midst of our western civilization? Are they the outcome of a sense of responsibility to a principle outweighing the claims of all political interest? Do they point to a sense of obligation to each other transcending all the objects for which they exist? Is there here any expression of the principle of "tolerance held as a conviction of religious consciousness?" Can it indeed be said in their behalf that there is any real regard for conscience at all, much less for that particular direction of it which requires submission in the interest of generations yet unborn? To ask such questions is to answer them. For we know too well that the guiding motive of these trusts is self-aggrandizement; their object the accumulation of wealth with little or no regard for any ulterior principle. Their aim is

purely one of material satisfaction here and now. They make for absolutisms of the worst type, with more and more "present" regarding and less and less "future" regarding qualities about them. In short they are the very embodiment of what we have come to regard as the "ascendency of the present," and in this light indeed Mr. Kidd himself also regards them.

How then are we to establish the principle of projected efficiency in the face of such formidable evidence to the contrary as this? That is the question. There may perhaps be some glimmer of hope in the remonstrance shown on the part of those outside these monopolies, in the growing feeling of antagonism towards them born of a higher regard for justice and freedom, but as yet this is insignificant in comparison with their powerful influence. This concrete example, in fact, of the ascendency of the present which Mr. Kidd has given such prominence to, appears to me to clash so sharply with the principle of projected efficiency as to well nigh eclipse it altogether; and in order to restore the force of the main argument we require to find some equally powerful evidence of, or movement in favor of, the principle implied in the "subordination of the future." Where is it to be found?

Incidentally in connection with this question of trusts it is interesting to recall President Roosevelt's remarks in his presidential address two years ago. "More important," he is reported to have said, "than any legislation is the general growth of a feeling of responsibility and forbearance among capitalists and wage-workers alike." And further, "the right of freedom and the responsibility for the exercise of that right cannot be denied." If these words or the principle underlying them were acted out by all concerned in these huge organizations what different factors in our western civilization they would become.

So far then as we have traveled in our survey of "The Principles of Western Civilization" we still find the "ascendency of the present" largely dominating. Let us see whether Mr. Kidd succeeds in showing that it is giving way before a higher principle. The point we have reached is still that of self-interest in uncontrolled competition for private gain. We have

seen all principles and considerations eliminated but those which contribute to success (p. 438).

Mr. Kidd, in one of his many and apparently unsympathetic references to the Manchester School, points to it as advocating the removal of all barriers to trade, and providing for the uncontrolled competition of forces (p. 435). This school stands for the policy of non-intervention, and as Mr. Kidd sees in it no evidence of his theory of projected efficiency he does not adduce it in support of his argument. But it in effect brings about the same free play of forces as does his own theory, and it is difficult to see why he should not claim it on his side instead of ruling it off as something quite apart. If it is not positive support of it, may not its very passivity mark the rising into consciousness of a principle at least akin to the one he presses upon our notice? If not in this and similar movements, where are we to find evidence of it at all? For as yet (p. 452)—and we are well through the book—"all is related to the ascendancy of the present." The regulation of conditions of employment, the question of a living wage, etc. are indeed instanced in support of it. Also the fact that the exploitation of less developed peoples has "at times revolted the general conscience at home." These no doubt are evidence of what we may call a broad humanitarian spirit; but they do not fulfill the requirement of the argument in respect of full subordination to a principle entirely transcending any interest in the present. And in the case of the exploitation of less developed peoples, we certainly cannot be said to have rid ourselves altogether of the motive of self-interest.

Socialism, again, whether it be the outcome of the same humanitarian spirit, or simply a policy prompted by self-interest, cannot be advanced in support of the argument inasmuch as it seeks to suspend all competition and the free play of forces. Yet it represents phenomena in the midst of our civilization which must be reckoned with in any speculation as to the laws underlying the evolution of society. And if it cannot be brought under this theory, then, unless it can be satisfactorily accounted for in other ways, it must considerably detract from the value of it.

What then, we are driven to ask, does represent the principle of projected efficiency at the present day? Where is its counterpart in actual life? Of all the great movements quoted—both those in the past and those under our own observation—do any of them bring sufficient weight in its favor? However near they approach to satisfying the theory in full—and many of them do approximate to it—they all stop short at the point which requires the submission of the individual to a process in which he has absolutely no interest and which is altogether outside the bounds of political consciousness. Of an increasing consciousness of ethical, and indeed of religious ideals, and of a deepening sense of responsibility towards them, there is happily some evidence; but for an example of any movement that “adjusts the current interests of the world to a meaning which infinitely transcends them” we look in vain. Yet, according to Mr. Kidd, the “winning people” must have this characteristic. Rivalry, he says, will take place between a few great, clearly defined systems of social order, and the factor of success will be the degree of efficiency with which the principle of subordination of the present to a larger future has obtained expression (p. 466).

The *one condition* in which the present can thus ultimately pass under the control of the future, is that brought about by the conscious conversion to a sense of responsibility transcending the claims of all present interests, of the only power which can be effectual in the matter—namely, the State—through the consciousness of society. The general will “by its own determinative act” must effect this. But again we ask where is the evidence of it?

In the concluding pages of the book evidence of the “ascendancy of the present” is once more brought to our notice; and the “now universal tendency in modern industry to monopoly ownership” is pointed out as one instance. But if this “universal tendency” exists as a fact, how are we to reconcile it with that other assumed fact that the present is being (and consciously) subordinated to the future? If the former is making headway with such bounds, what of the latter, the existence of which we have such difficulty in finding evidence

of? And with this riddle we are still confronted on closing the book.

Reflecting upon the book as a whole we readily admit its merit as a highly valuable contribution to the study of social philosophy, and welcome it as one well calculated to stimulate thought in a much-needed direction. Mr. Kidd's idea of projected efficiency is extremely fascinating; it is presented in such a manner as to assuredly "hold the imagination." One could have wished, however, that the book had maintained with equal effectiveness to the end the force of the argument so ably advanced earlier on. It ends by showing that "the ascendancy of the present," so far from giving place to an era in which the spirit of "subordination to the future" is to be the dominant note, remains as powerful an element in our Western civilization as ever it was in the civilizations that have passed away. The theory presented, acceptable as it is in many respects, is undoubtedly exacting; and the weighty facts brought out in the latter part of the book are apt to leave the impression of an irreconcilability which is not readily removed. But the fact that such evidence has not deterred the presentation of the theory enhances, rather than detracts from, the value of it. It is not by the entire annihilation or elimination from our national life of a healthy and legitimate interest in the present that the course of social evolution will be advanced—any more than true religion is advanced by asceticism—but rather by seeking to arrive at the correct mean of regard to be paid to things temporal and things spiritual respectively—by taking as it were a right perspective of human destiny. Only when we awake to the full "consciousness of the nature of the majestic process of cosmic ethics" can we grasp the true significance of the drama unfolding before us, and see clearly the part we are destined to play in it. It is this ethical side of the problem which we could have wished Mr. Kidd had further developed. As it is the balance of the argument preponderates on the side of the Cosmic. Let us hope that in his next volume he will make good this deficiency.

W. E. LISHMAN.

DURHAM.

THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL VALUE OF THE FAMILY SYSTEM IN JAPAN.*

Translated by GALEN M. FISHER, M. A., Tokyo.

In the May number of the *Shin Koron* appears an interview with Dr. Junjiro Takakusu, the Director of the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, on the subject "The Family Unit of Japan and the Individual Unit of the Occident." Dr. Takakusu's eminence and his long residence in Great Britain make his utterances noteworthy. While his opinions in this interview are at some points based upon what seem to a Westerner insufficient knowledge or observation, yet on others he makes keen observations which Occidentals may well take to heart. The interview in substance is as follows:

Japan emerged from the Russo-Japanese war with a reputation among the powers which can hardly be enhanced. She has, thereby, caused a readjustment in the balance of power throughout the world. But she has furthermore made it certain that no power will dare to attack her single-handed within the next, say, fifty years. Before the war, Japanese bonds of a face value of Y1,000 never brought more than Y700, but now the market price has risen to above that figure. Before the war, there was quite a party in England that looked with suspicion upon the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but which now feels that the alliance is one of the strongest anchors of England's position. Formerly some English magazines were not so much in favor of Japan, but they have all flopped over and are supporting Japan, heart and soul. Not only that, but Englishmen seem to be inclined to take lessons of Japan along the line of education and military arts, *e. g.* Mr. Sawayanagi, the Director of General Education in the Japanese Department of Education, has been invited to London to lecture on Japanese education, and the English Red Cross Society has sent Miss McCall to

* Notwithstanding the inadequate understanding of the individualism of western nations which the following article manifests, it is of interest in showing what the educated Japanese are saying to each other.—Managing Editor.

investigate the organization of the Japanese Red Cross. English officers are being sent to Japan to be attached to Japanese military posts, and some are already here. Before the Hague Peace Conference, Japan was rated as a third-class power, but at one leap she has now made for herself a place among the first-class powers.

The sweeping victory over a great power like Russia makes the Japanese nothing less than a marvelous race. We must, therefore, ask for an explanation. In the West there are all sorts of reasons given; for instance, in America it is said that it is because the Japanese are such light eaters, and there is one party which has even gone to the ridiculous point of advocating the principle of light eating. In London, some persons went around and called on local Japanese, making minute inquiries as to their mode of life, and their conclusion was that although the individual Japanese is an unimpressive person, yet when Japanese are massed they can do things which Westerners cannot; so in the West students are still puzzled to get at the real secret of our wonderful achievements. They will not rest satisfied, however, with a mere shrug of the shoulder, and "I do not know," as we are inclined to do, but will follow the problem to the end.

What is the secret of the corporate unity and oneness of spirit of Japanese soldiers and their remarkable discipline? What is the reason for the superior sanitation and commissary arrangements of our army? What is the reason for the utter scorn of death, which seems almost animal-like, and that passionate patriotism which possess us? And finally, what is the reason for the absolute security of military secrets? We must confess that looked at one by one we are weak, but when massed together we are stronger than Western soldiers. And furthermore, we Japanese have not only assimilated Western knowledge and mechanisms, but we have improved on them in not a few cases, as for instance, the Shimose gunpowder, the Murata rifle, the Arisaka gun and the Kimura wireless telephone. Our Red Cross Society, while at first copied from the West, has attained a unique pitch of perfection, and our relief of soldiers' families, our system of information, our care for prisoners of

war and our issuing of government bonds, have all demonstrated that we can subordinate personal and private interests to public welfare, so that it is not too much to say, that among the peoples of the world we are considered in this respect to be an ideal army and nation.

There certainly must be deep-seated reasons for this. Of course, we must admit that our thorough military and naval training and our system of public education during the last forty years are the immediate causes, but the primary cause for all these phenomena is that in Japan the family is the unit, whereas in the West the individual is the unit of society. If we inquire what is implied in making the individual the standard, we must reply that it means putting personal gain and personal convenience foremost and ignoring the convenience and interest of others, or even if others are considered, it is, in the last analysis, for selfish reasons. For instance, the child considers that he owes his parents no special return, because they, as his authors, were responsible for him, and when he reaches maturity his first duty is to look out for himself. This leads to the revolting custom of children paying board to their parents when they reach their majority, and an elder brother, although he may be a millionaire, feels that he is under no obligation to support a younger brother who has become a beggar through his own indolence or wrong-doing. If parents are well-to-do, then children will often come to see them in order to stand a better chance of inheritance, but if they are poor, then the children set up for themselves and gradually grow farther and farther away. In short, in the West, gold is life and self-interest is central. They never think of accepting money from parents if they can possibly help it. If a man cannot earn enough to support himself and wife he will not think of marrying; and so, if you were to ask a millionaire: "Your son is certainly of marriageable age, when does he propose to marry?" he will answer, "Oh my, he is not thinking of that yet, he is not getting enough salary to support two."

In Japan, the family system leads to mutual succor and mutual coöperation on the part of all those who are at all connected. Parents help children and children parents. Elder

brothers help the younger and the younger help the elder. The honor and glory of the house are the first concern of all. If there is want in one section it is made up by another. And these families gathered together into groups, make a village, and groups of villages infinitely multiplied make a corporate nation. To be sure, this principle tends to foster a spirit of borrowing and dependence, but it also makes possible some of the finest fruits of national patriotism and family devotion, so that we Japanese look back for 120 generations to the founder of our empire, Jimmu Tenno, and feel that ever since we have been all one people. In Japan, though an emperor lack distinguishing virtues, we never falter in our allegiance to him, and we say with all our hearts: "May our emperor reign for a thousand, yes, eight thousand ages."

The term family unit in the West has a different connotation from that with us. In the West the man and wife alone constitute a family. When children grow up they marry and separate, but in Japan a family is a chain of generations all linked together for mutual dependence and mutual help. It is this principle of mutual obligation which has given birth to Bushidō and to the spirit of patriotism. A parent whose child is killed, although at first he may be inclined to rush to help, yet will grit his teeth and say like Masaoka: "It is for the sake of our lord and master." When a telegram comes from army headquarters telling of the death of a husband on the battle-field, it is this spirit that makes wives rejoice that their husbands have fulfilled a soldier's duty. And from this same principle have come the wonderful military discipline, the contempt of death, the *esprit de corps*, the scarcity of Russian spies.

In the West when a man dies, his wife upon hearing of it is likely to faint away, but in Japan a wife curbs the natural emotions under the impulse to see that the family does not suffer.

From the point of view of individualism, death on the battlefield is the height of folly, but to one who holds to the family principle the thought must come, when faced with danger or death: "How will this affect my parents? If I am

guilty of any disgraceful act it will bring dishonor upon my whole family and house. I must die." When a soldier leaves for the front he is escorted with flags by all his fellow townsmen, singing: "Crush like a jewel; scatter like a flower;" but if perchance he comes back alive because of fear of death, there is nothing before him but to drag out his life and die.

Loyalty according to Chinese Confucianism and loyalty in Japanese religion are fundamentally different. A Chinese sage said: "If the rulers are not fit rulers then the subjects are not obliged to accept them as rulers," and therefore if an emperor were incapable the people were relieved from obligations of loyalty; but in Japan there is nothing of the sort. No matter what character a ruler may have, we cling to him because he is the representative of the Imperial line. He is the direct descendant of the father of the people. Thus Confucianism has been fundamentally modified since coming to Japan.

Buddhism and Christianity are both individualistic, but Buddhism after passing through the Ryōbu Shintō and other transformations ended up in Shinshiu, a sect built on the idea of the family system, a totally different thing from what it was at first. In Japan if one's parents die we honor them because they have lived and nurtured us and we show this feeling of reverence by worship. Japan has reconciled the individualistic Buddhism of India with the communal principle of Japan. When Christianity was first introduced into Japan by Francis Xavier, a great many listened to his preaching, but upon asking what had become of their mothers who had never heard and believed in Christianity and being told that they were now under the tortures of eternal punishment, they said: "If that is so then we will have nothing to do with it," and we to-day would say that their decision was most praiseworthy. So Buddhism and Confucianism had to be transformed by the communal or family principle before they could be naturalized in Japan.

The problem before us to-day is how to build up a strong and great new nationality. From some points of view what may be called Western individualism must be heeded if we are

to stand up in the severe competition of modern life, for Western civilization is entirely a product of individualism; but on the other hand, if the family principle is overthrown then Japan will certainly be in grave danger. There is among young men a strong tendency to adopt the individualistic basis and make self-interest central. But if this tendency prevails, then we may prophesy that if another war occurs in fifty or a hundred years from now, the results will be far otherwise from what they were in the last.

It is a striking fact that our emperor's rescripts on education and on military duty, which used to excite the ridicule of Westerners are now praised and by not a few read in the same reverential tone as they read the Gospels. It is from the individualistic principle that the labor and social problems of the West have been born, and it is well-nigh impossible to avert strikes if this principle is adhered to. But in Japan strikes are comparatively few because when a man is employed, as, for instance, in the department of engraving and printing, if he falls sick, then members of his family are accepted as substitutes and if one member of a family is embarrassed he is helped out by all his relations. So, in Scotland where the clan system, which is analogous to our family system, prevails, such labor troubles are almost unknown. And recently in Winchester, England, a self-governing community based upon the family principle has been founded.

From this time on we must give particular attention to this great problem, both in politics and in education. Without individualism we must recognize that a complete character cannot be developed, and also that in order to prevail in competition we must sharpen each man's faculties by taking lessons of the individualism of the West, but we must ever be on guard to avoid the weak points of both principles and to harmonize their strong points. So far as one's own ideas and philosophy go, there is no objection to holding extreme individualistic views, but at the same time, for the sake of Japan and her maintenance among the nations of the world, we must hold to the family principle which has prevailed among us for 2,000 years, supplementing it by the individualism of the West.

We may then look forward to the formation of a new and completer nationality. But most of all we must be on guard against espousing extreme individualism.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

LE MORALISME DE KANT ET L'AMORALISME CONTEMPORAIN, par Alfred Fouillée. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1905.

This is a difficult book to review. It presupposes a whole system of thought, already expounded in the previous works of a veteran philosopher, works to which he is constantly referring the reader, and it points forward to ideas hereafter to be developed in a constructive work on ethics which will complete the Philosophy of the "Idées-forces." M. Fouillée is one of the most voluminous philosophers of our day, one of the few who may be said to have adequately and completely expressed themselves. At least that will be his position when he has completed the promised work on Ethics, to which, I for one, after the perusal of the present work, shall eagerly look forward. It would obviously be out of place to attempt here an appreciation of M. Fouillée's Philosophy in general: while even his ethical position is but slightly developed in the pages before us. The present work is purely critical. It consists of a dissection of the ethical system of Kant, and on the other hand of what may be called its extreme opposite—pure Naturalism or "Amoralism" in two of its forms, the older Hedonism and the newer "Amoralism of Power" of which Nietzsche is the most famous exponent.

The chapters upon Kant are full of good criticism. It is somewhat unsympathetic criticism. Kant is a writer in whom almost every position can be understood in more than one way, in a way which makes it important, suggestive, full of meaning, capable of rational development even when no modern thinker is likely to accept it just as it stands, and a way which makes it not merely untenable, but to the last degree self-contradictory and extravagant. M. Fouillée generally prefers the latter interpretation. He does not impress one with the idea that he has ever thought himself into the position of Kant as Kant appeared to himself, and that is essential for a critic who wishes to do justice to Kant's stronger side. His weaker side has seldom been more faithfully and unsparingly exposed than by M. Fouillée. The criticism is always acute and well expressed. Much of it is not of course (as it could hardly be with so well-worn a theme) in substance very new or original, and the treatment of Nietzsche will be found perhaps by most readers the most fresh and instruc-

tive part of the book. The epigram with which the section is introduced will be read with interest by English readers:

“Selon l'épigramme d'un philosophe anglais, M. Bradley, la métaphysique consisterait à chercher de mauvaises raisons pour ce que nous croyons d'instinct. Les amoralistes, eux, cherchent de mauvaises raisons *contre* ce que nous croyons d'instinct, contre la possibilité de désintéressement et la valeur supérieure du bien moral” (p. 241).

M. Fouillée charges Nietzsche, apparently not without some justification with considerable unacknowledged obligations to his own previous writings, and traces others of that writer's paradoxes to their sources in a way which suggests how few really new thoughts are necessary to enable a brilliant stylist to dazzle a world which does not know the old ones.

In Kant and Nietzsche alike the fundamental defect discovered by M. Fouillée is a violent Dualism between Nature and Morality. Kant's Morality becomes in consequence a mass of arbitrary assumptions having no real connection with the real life of men, set over against a supposed natural man who is an equally unreal abstraction, purely selfish, absolutely limited in his thought to the world of sense, determined in every action in accordance with a mechanical law of succession quite unlike the actual mental life of a human being as revealed by a more accurate Psychology. Nietzsche, assuming the same fundamental antagonism between Morality and Nature, revolts against and dethrones one of Kant's unreal abstractions—the assumed noumenal Legislator issuing commands from the outside which have no relation to the actual conditions of human life and the actual structure of human minds, and enthrones the other moral abstraction—the purely egoistic, animal, non-social, natural man, whose worst tendencies are hypostatized into an “Über-mensch” who has as little in common with real human nature as the “noumenal self” of Kant.

The following passages will perhaps indicate M. Fouillée's general attitude:

“Nous rejetons le dualisme. Nous accordons que la nature *incomplètement* interprétée est amorphe; mais, prise dans sa vraie et entière signification, que fait entrevoir l'expérience intérieure, la nature est pensée et désir de l'idéal, non pas seulement du réel; elle est conception et amour d'une réalité supérieure; elle est donc morale, ou plutôt elle se fait elle-même morale par les idées-forces qui sont en elle, qui sont en nous, qui sont nous-mêmes” (p. 329).

“Kant, encore une fois, n'a pas seulement, comme tous les vrais philosophes, cherché le monde réel au delà des *sens* externes; il l'a cherché au delà de notre *conscience* intime, dans une sphère qui demeure spéculativement indéterminée et indéterminable, la sphère des noumènes. Il a exilé la réalité vraie en dehors et au delà de toute expérience, même intérieure: il l'a conçue comme transcendante. C'est cette conclusion qui, nous l'avons fait voir, n'est ni nécessaire ni justifiable, soit au point de vue de la théorie, soit au point de vue de la pratique, où elle ne peut engendrer qu'un moralisme formaliste sans soutien dans la réalité. Aux “formes” rationnelles de Kant il faut substituer *l'expérience*, mais en poursuivant l'expérience la plus *radicale* et la plus totale, d'où finit par sortir l'universalité. A la théorie kantienne de la *conscience* de soi, que Kant représente soit comme *sens* intérieur, soit comme *conscience intellectuelle* d'une simple *forme* vide, nous opposerons, dans un autre ouvrage, la *conscience* comme *expérience* la plus profonde du *réel* (p. 333).

“La Nature des soi-disant *naturalistes* est une fausse nature dépouillée d'un de ses côtés, l'intérieur, tout comme la matière des soi-disant matérialistes est une fausse matière, dans laquelle il ne rest plus que des formes mathématiques et logiques, sans rien qui la constitue au dedans. Vouloir tirer une morale quelconque d'une telle nature ou d'une telle matière, c'est assurément vouloir tirer le plus du moins, l'être, la vie, le sentiment et la puissance d'une machine formée de rouages abstraits tournant dans le vide selon des lois abstraites. Les matérialistes sont des idéalistes sans le savoir et sans le vouloir.

Mais le sens matérialiste du mot *Nature* est un sens métaphysique, finalement abusif, qu'on n'a pas le droit de lui donner. La *Nature* peut sans doute désigner le monde matériel le mécanisme universel, dans lequel les matérialistes veulent faire rentrer les phénomènes de la vie mentale. Mais la *Nature* peut désigner aussi l'être universel avec ses lois fondamentales, la *Natura naturans* de Spinoza; et c'est ce dernier sens qui est seul légitime. La vraie morale des idées-forces, est alors celle qui veut que l'homme vive conformément aux lois profondes de la *Nature* universelle, telle que nous pouvons en avoir l'idée non seulement par les sciences objectives, mais encore et surtout par les sciences subjectives” (p. 345).

La nature, c'est le grand Tout, et la moralité, que veulent en

vain supprimer les adorateurs du plaisir ou de la puissance, est une partie du Tout, mais qui, grosse de l'avenir, vaut plus que le tout considéré tel qu'il est actuellement (p. 347).

These are excellent maxims. They suggest no doubt the spirit in which a sound Moral Philosophy should be written. Everything of course depends upon the execution: and what M. Fouillée's actual Moral Philosophy will be like the present work does not enable us to say. The author's object, he tells us, is to prepare the way for it by explaining his attitude towards the sharply opposed but equally one-sided systems which are here criticized. This object he has accomplished in a way which shows that the writer's hand has lost nothing of its acknowledged power, but his position as a thinker will depend mainly upon his more constructive works.

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THE PROPHET OF NAZARETH. By Nathaniel Schmidt, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in Cornell University, Director of the American School of Archaeology in Jerusalem. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905. Pp. xii and 422. 8vo.

This book is at once a delight and a disappointment. There has long been a need for a life of Christ by a thorough Semitic scholar, of reverent and devout temper, who should in his work follow sane critical principles. The work under review is the product of a competent Semitic professor, and is written in an admirable spirit—a spirit at once appreciative and critical—but it is nevertheless a disappointing work. Broad and accurate as the scholarship is in the main, and much as one admires the mastery which it displays, of many and varied fields of learning, it nevertheless goes astray at the most crucial point, the analysis and exegesis of the Synoptic Gospels. Admirable as is the spirit displayed throughout the book, and evident as is the author's effort to throw aside all prepossessions and follow the evidence, he is notwithstanding ruled throughout by the idea that Jesus was nothing more than man, and that to suppose that he was more is to make him unworthy of the admiration of men of robust minds at the present day.

There are to-day three classes of writers on Biblical questions: those who are hopelessly wedded to the metaphysics and methods of the eighteenth century, those who have revolted from these so thoroughly that they can see no truth at all in the old positions and feel called to spend much of their force in iconoclasm, and those who, while accepting modern scientific methods with heartiness, have not been driven so far by antipathy to the old positions that they are blinded to the fact that the old views stood for vital truths—truths which must be stated in a new way, and which are accepted for new reasons often, but which are yet the natural unfolding in modern life of the truth of the old positions. The first of these classes we would call the reactionaries, the second, the revolutionaries, and the third, the evolutionaries. It is to be regretted that Professor Schmidt in spite of his admirable spirit places himself with the revolutionaries instead of the evolutionaries.

The scope of the book may be seen by a glance at its table of contents. Its fourteen chapters bear the following titles: "The Christ of the Creeds," "The Decline of Dogma," "The Old Testament Basis," "The Jewish Messiah," "The Son of Man," "The Son of God," "The Logos," "The Secondary Sources," "The Gospels," "The Life of Jesus," "The Teaching of Jesus," "The Historic Influence of Jesus," "The Present Problem," and "The Leadership of Jesus." Three excursus follow, on "Gnosticism," "The Collegia Vicentina," and "The Resurrection." Three indices, one of subjects, one of authors, and one of texts, conclude the work. The text-index registers not only Biblical, but Patristic and Talmudic references.

It is Professor Schmidt's aim in these chapters to show how the creeds pictured Christ, how the mind of the modern world has moved away from these dogmatic positions, that there was no Old Testament anticipation of the appearance of such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, that the term "Son of Man" was not a Messianic title, that Jesus never claimed to be the Messiah, and was only a prophet of extraordinary sanity and insight, that the whole Messianic rôle was created for him by early followers, so that he is misrepresented in every document that has come down to us, that his life as it can be reconstructed was noble and simple, that his teaching was characterized by marvelous insight into ethical and religious conditions and equally marvelous ability to point to a sure remedy for many individual and social

ills, that, in spite of misrepresentations of him in the organized life and credal statements of the church, the influence of Jesus has been the mightiest force for good during all these centuries, that in our present problems with all their variety and perplexity we need the leadership of Jesus and may expect great help from the inspiration of his teaching and example in solving them—help which Professor Schmidt believes will be all the greater when Jesus is conceived in a purely humanitarian way.

On questions of literary criticism we observe that Professor Schmidt takes as a rule the most radical positions. Sometimes he stops just short of the most radical by taking the penultimate position. For example he dates many Psalms, even in the early and middle part of the Psalter in the Maccabaean and Asmonæan periods in spite of the evidence for the gradual growth of the Psalter. The Synoptic Gospels in their earliest Greek form appeared, he holds, early in the second century (p. 230). He accepts only five of Paul's epistles as genuine, Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, and Philippians, and these he believes have been considerably interpolated. The Ignatian epistles are probably all spurious (p. 189 ff.), and the Diatessaron known to us has, he thinks (p. 208), been accepted as Tatian's on insufficient grounds.

These radical positions indicate the trend of Professor Schmidt's thinking. There are on many pages statements with which one heartily agrees, passages in which admirable learning is reflected, deep insight into the moral or religious worth of antiquated points of view is exhibited, or strong moral passion is revealed, but nevertheless many pages bristle with statements which one would challenge and with positions which one would like to debate with him.

Let it not be thought, however, that the reviewer rejects the critical method of study. There is no doubt that there is in the New Testament a large element of Jewish thought—thought, too, which Jesus rejected, but which his disciples could not. Some of this is embodied in the Synoptic Gospels themselves, and cannot be eliminated by comparison of documents. As Professor W. N. Clarke has shown in his "Use of Scripture in Theology," this can only be accomplished by judging some of the reports of Christ's sayings by the other reports which undoubtedly reflect the very heart of his thought. As to the general method of investigation, therefore, we heartily agree with

Professor Schmidt, though, as will be stated below, we differ with him in details of the application of it. Such a method unfortunately introduces a subjective element into the problem, and for this reason the results of any one scholar at this early stage of critical investigation must be corrected by the vision of many others, that the subjective personal equation may be corrected and the truth be discovered. In the problem before us the subjective element cannot, with our present critical apparatus, be eliminated, but the critical method should be so applied as to reduce it to the lowest terms. This, we think, Professor Schmidt has not always done. He has also in the judgment of the present reviewer vitiated his whole treatment of the synoptic material by ignoring stable results of his predecessors.

It has been proven, for example, in Abbott and Rushbrooke's "Synopticon," and elsewhere that in the material common to Matthew, Mark and Luke, Mark was the earlier. Any other supposition was shown to involve literary conditions which are inconceivable. The evidence is so convincing that most recent writers on the synoptic problem have adhered to this view. One may reject the "two source" theory as Professor Schmidt does (p. 227), without ignoring this literary fact. It is true that our author has applied a test, of which scholars have made too little use—retranslation back into the Semitic original—but this instrument cannot destroy the clear evidence of the history of the documents in Greek, nor justify us in ignoring that history. Indeed since Professor Schmidt's work went to press Professor Burton has published in Vol. V of the "Decennial Publications" of the University of Chicago, Series 1, a new study of the synoptic problem, which while it does away with the "two source" theory, showing that at least four sources were used, presents in a new, exhaustive and convincing way the evidence for the priority of Mark and its use as a source in Matthew and Luke. At this point in his work it seems to us that Professor Schmidt's application of the critical method is at fault. Instead of patiently following the results of detailed criticism based on convincing comparison of the documents in Greek, before he applied his Semitic retranslation, he has taken a shorter cut, which leads him astray. Because Matthew can be retranslated more easily into Aramaic than Mark or Luke and because of the reported words of Papias about Matthew, Professor Schmidt believes that Matthew in its earliest form lay nearer to the original Aramaic

gospel, that it is older than Mark, and that it was used by Mark as a source. To account for certain phenomena he has to allow (p. 223) that it has been more largely interpolated than either of the other gospels, but in spite of the interpolations he holds that even in the eschatological discourse Matthew presents an earlier form than Mark. Now to the present reviewer all this seems to land us needlessly in a bog of speculation. Surely our first duty is to analyze our present gospels by means of comparison of the Greek into their original sources as Professor Burton does. When this is done it becomes evident that the statement of Papias is as applicable to the sayings which Professor Burton believes to be the "Logia of Matthew" as to Professor Schmidt's hypothetical Matthew. That any amount of interpolation would make a primitive gospel into the artificially topical collection which our Matthew now is, it is hard to believe, even if we did not have the convincing comparison with Mark to show that Matthew is not the more primitive. That such a gospel as Matthew could undergo such transformation as Professor Schmidt supposes and still preserve the evidence of its primitive character is also most difficult to believe. The fact that Matthew can often be turned into Aramaic more easily than Mark is sufficiently explained by supposing that the original "Logia of Matthew"—one of its underlying documents—was written in that tongue, and that, as has long been recognized, the compiler of the gospel was a Jew more deeply interested in Messianic prophecy than any other evangelist, who no doubt still thought in the Aramaic idiom.

This peculiar application of the theory of an Aramaic gospel is one of the factors which leads our author to reject the date for the Synoptic Gospels which is most generally accepted by critical scholarship, and to place them in the second century. Another factor is his conception of the relation of Jesus to the Messianic ideal. To that we must now turn.

While Professor Schmidt's views on this point come out in many parts of the book, the heart of his treatment of the subject is found in his chapters on "The Son of Man" and "The Son of God." These chapters are a condensation and popularization, brought up to date, of the author's very learned articles on the same subjects in the "Encyclopedie Biblica." As has been said, Professor Schmidt believes that the "Son of Man" meant only "man," that it was not a Messianic title, and that Jesus never claimed to be

the Messiah. Into the philological part of the argument we need not go here. Much as we admire the scholarship displayed and acknowledge our indebtedness to it, on some crucial points so good an authority as Professor Dalman ("Worte Jesu" 191 ff.) has shown that another view is more probable, and the present writer thinks that Professor Schmidt and others have not adequately answered Professor Dalman's arguments. We might, however, admit all that Professor Schmidt claims about the meaning in extant Aramaic of the term "Son of Man" and the result is by no means as revolutionary as he supposes, for as Professor Matthews has pointed out ("Messianic Hope in the New Testament," p. 103), the crucial question is not a problem of philology but of exegesis. In questions of exegesis, philology must be supplemented by other considerations. Professor Schmidt's exegesis appears to us to have been made unsound by four causes: 1. An overstraining of philological considerations to the neglect of context; 2. The denial to Jesus of any originality in the use of the term "Son of Man"; 3. The unnecessary rejection for subjective reasons, of many sayings of Jesus as spurious, and 4. An unnatural conception of what a Messianic claim on the part of Jesus involved.

Let us illustrate these four points. Professor Schmidt admits as genuine uses of the term "Son of Man" by Jesus only passages in which he can make the term mean "man." But his interpretations are often exceedingly forced. In Matt. viii:19 ("The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man has not where to lay his head"), it is most unnatural to suppose that the term refers to man in general (p. 111). To teach that the birds and beasts have a more secure abiding place than man is not only untrue, but in the context pointless. So Matt. xi:19, Luke vii:34, is recognized as a genuine saying of Jesus (p. 124), but in this passage a contrast between John the Baptist and humanity is meaningless, as Professor Schmidt himself (p. 269) seems to recognize when he refers the passage to Jesus. So, too, in Mark ii:10 it will strike most interpreters as more than doubtful whether Jesus meant to say: "Man has power to forgive sin" (p. 106). In the interpretation of many other passages it can be shown that Professor Schmidt overstrains philological considerations. He also seems to us to deny to Jesus ordinary originality in the use of words. He cannot find in Daniel or in Enoch evidence that the term

"Son of Man" was used as a Messianic title. He does find that in some passages in the Synoptic Gospels it is so used. To explain this he supposes (p. 132 ff.) that an idea from the Rig Veda found its way westward, had been adopted by gnosticism, and from gnosticism found its way into the Synoptic Gospels, and transformed the misunderstood Aramaic phrase for *man* into a Messianic title which was accepted by the church! Such a theory strikes the reader as a clumsy, unnatural, and highly improbable explanation. Some of the steps are historically so improbable as to be to the present writer practically unthinkable. It is far simpler and more natural to suppose that Jesus used the term "Son of Man" in a new sense—a sense in which it had a pregnant, spiritual significance, which only the development of spiritual insight in the disciples could enable them to understand, and that the transformation in its use observable between Enoch and the Synoptic Gospels is due to the impulse of Jesus himself. Professor Schmidt, though he dates the Enoch parables too late, confesses (pp. 117, 132) that in Enoch xlvi, etc., the term "Son of Man" had been made descriptive of a heavenly being who might be the archangel Michael, and who was expected to become the Messiah. It is only a step from this to such a use on the part of Jesus as we have supposed, though a step which only a religious genius could take.

Again, Professor Schmidt rejects as spurious many sayings of Jesus for reasons which seem to be subjective, and which an equally reasonable interpretation may regard as genuine. Thus, (p. 124), Matt. xx:28; Mark x:45: "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many," is regarded as a comment of the evangelist. Luke xix:10 is regarded (p. 123) as a later interpolation, containing a beautiful tribute to Jesus. To most interpreters it will seem far more reasonable to accept both as genuine sayings of the Master. They are quite in harmony with his conception of his mission and most appropriate on his lips. Similarly in his discussion of the term "Son of God" Professor Schmidt (p 151 ff.) rejects the beautiful passage, Matt. xi:25 ff., as out of harmony with the genuine sayings of Jesus, and as casting an undeserved reflection upon his character. Surely the metaphysical difficulties which Professor Schmidt sees are read into the passage! For Jesus to recognize that he had a unique consciousness of the Fatherhood of God would be but the natural

recognition of the fact on any theory of his person. For him to see that the great mass of men lacked that consciousness and without his help would not attain it, in a moment of discouragement to say as much, and to invite all men to come to him and find rest in obtaining it, is quite in harmony with his character. To deny him this privilege is to deny him the liberty one would accord to any mortal.

Similarly Professor Schmidt rejects as unhistorical the voice heard by Jesus at his baptism (Mark i: 11), and regards the accounts of his temptation as unhistorical (pp. 148, 262). A far more reasonable view takes these two as records of psychological experiences of Jesus, related to his disciples under the forms of Oriental imagery. This view is held by many eminent interpreters and harmonizes with the highest probability. It is most natural to suppose that the most religious Jew of the period would in the course of his development determine his relation to the chief religious ideal of the time, the Messianic hope, and that Jesus had a real religious development.

This, however, leads to the fourth point mentioned above: Professor Schmidt has an unnatural conception of what a Messianic claim on the part of Jesus involved. He seems to think that Jesus could not have entertained such a claim with out giving to it the same content that his contemporaries gave to it, and without making claims to a metaphysical origin which seems to Professor Schmidt so absurd as to remove Jesus, if he made them, from the sympathy, if not the respect, of modern men. The present writer cannot but regard this attitude of our learned author as the result of prejudice against past theological conceptions on the one hand, and of too great literalism on the other.

To take up the latter point first, why is it not natural to suppose that Jesus, conscious for years of the Fatherhood of God to a degree far surpassing the consciousness of others, experienced such an overwhelming sense of that Fatherhood in connection with his baptism that he was convinced that, whatever the Messianic hopes of his nation might mean, the spiritual kernel, which they pointed to, was to be fulfilled in him and in the work he could do; that, retiring to the wilderness to meditate upon this, he reached epoch-making decisions as to the nature of his mission? The accounts of his temptation reveal at once the depths which he found in his own nature as he measured it against the Messianic background, and his choice of a spiritual fulfillment

of his mission. He rejected current Messianism, and determined by teaching the direct reign of God, and by ministering to men's bodies and souls to so win them that he should rule them through devotion and not by the conquests of war. In carrying this out he chose as a self-designation a term which, while not exactly Messianic had been used in connection with the Messiah. He put into this term his new Messianic meaning. He used it in self-designation, waited long for his disciples to rise to the point of spiritual discernment where they could grasp his thought, and was crucified before they had learned to differentiate his teaching from the current apocalyptic expectations. Such a supposition attributes to him no dishonesty in the use of language, since every advance in thought makes the creation of a new vocabulary necessary. His was a matchless effort to turn the aspirations of his countrymen from political to ethical ideals, from a material to a spiritual leadership.

Such a view has in its favor the fact that it puts Jesus into that relation to the religious thought of his people which one naturally expects in a religious youth, a relation, too, which all the early documents assert of him; it also accounts for the many sayings, of which Professor Schmidt makes such radical use, in which he refuses to pose as the Messiah in the ordinarily accepted sense, and it accounts for the fact that in many passages of the gospels Messianic hopes of the ordinary kind are attributed by the evangelists to Jesus. Professor Schmidt's view is that the later crude Messianic expectations attached themselves to him without adequate cause. It is far more in accord with historical analogy to suppose that a real claim of Jesus which was misunderstood lies at their foundation.

If, now, we turn to the metaphysical side, Professor Schmidt seems to make the same mistake as the old dogmatic theologians, though his is upon the opposite side. He is too sure about what was possible for Jesus in the way of consciousness and what was not. Sometimes, as on p. 156, he writes most reverently of the limitations of our knowledge as to the inner life of Jesus, but in the same connection he practically asserts that Jesus avoided the temptation of assuming a special unique relationship to God not attainable by others. The fact is, the whole teaching, influence, and history of Jesus prove that he did bear a unique relationship to God, whether we explain that relationship by calling him a religious genius, or explain his being in

the terms of the Nicene creed. We search the annals of the human race in vain for another who possessed a consciousness of the Fatherhood of God in such unbroken communion as he, and whose teaching and life level up to the moral height of his. Whether others can attain one of similar kind or not, is a question that may be unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative; whether others can reach it in his degree, is a purely speculative inquiry. So far as we know none ever has done so, and we know of no one at present who seems in danger of doing so. Difference of degree often amounts to a difference of kind, as may be seen by comparing the intelligence of a dog with that of a man. Professor Schmidt, accordingly, seems too certain of the metaphysical limitations of this unique life. Grant that the old distinctions between the natural and the supernatural have broken down; grant that the ancient creeds attempted to map out the divine nature and to define the nature of Jesus in ways which mean little to us now, they did recognize in Jesus an element that separates him from other men as one unique, and the student who does justice to the documents in the application of the historical method, must recognize that, however he defines it, the unique relation to God which they recognize in Jesus is a fact. To assert that we can explain it on a purely humanitarian theory is to erect a new dogmatism in place of the old, and to assume that we who cannot define the limits of our own spirits in relation to the Eternal can define the limits of his! Similarly the trinitarian definitions of God, to which the recognition of the unique nature of Jesus gave rise, may seem to us arbitrary and unreal, but history shows that the real thought which underlies them—the conception of God as eternally loving and social in nature—is necessary to the maintenance in large numbers of men of a genuine Christian life.

We have dwelt thus long on these points, for we believe that in regard to them the author has missed the goal. But they must not prevent us from appreciating the more valuable part of the book. The chapter on the "Teaching of Jesus" is one of the best presentations of Christ's teaching in modern literature. The real teaching of our matchless Master as to war, oaths, divorce, the treatment of women, and the rescue of the fallen is set forth here with a clearness and power that charms and persuades. The author has been anticipated in many of his positions, as he recognizes, by others, especially by the Society of Friends, but none

of them has portrayed them with his learning and eloquence.

Professor Schmidt also happily sets forth the stimulus which the intellectual life receives from the influence of Jesus, and with timely effectiveness the real attitude of Jesus toward works of beauty. The chapter on "the Present Problem" is an analysis of our present conditions by one who possesses the breadth of view and analytical power of a scholar, the passion for righteousness of a prophet, and the gentle spirit of service characteristic of Christ. The concluding chapter on "The Leadership of Jesus" reveals an appreciation of the Master, a faith in his power, a belief in the necessity of his leadership, and a devotion to his cause, that might well put to shame many who hold a different theology. For the help and inspiration of these pages we are profoundly grateful.

Since experience teaches that men come under the sway of Jesus in large numbers only as they recognize that God speaks in him as nowhere else in the world, we cannot share Professor Schmidt's hope that the leadership of Jesus will be experienced in a large measure by an age which holds a purely humanitarian view of him. We recognize nevertheless that Jesus himself never made the acceptance of a theory about his person the basis of discipleship. He called men to follow him, to learn to love him, to discover what he was, and left them to define him as they chose. Men can never unite in his service on the basis of identity of metaphysical definition of his person, whether humanitarian or the opposite, but only on the basis of love for him. From our standpoint, then, we heartily agree with Professor Schmidt's eloquent words (p. 384): "The thought of Jesus may, in numerous directions, become a stronger force in the life of the world than it has yet been. But far more potent than his word is his wonderful personality. It cannot be defined; names and titles utterly fail to do justice to it. Its subtle influence cannot be explained; it can only be felt. The hearts of men burn within them, when he talks with them in the road. When he breaks to them the bread of life, their eyes are opened; and though he vanishes from their sight, they can never forget him. To have once come under his spell, is to be his forever. To know him, is to love him."¹

BRYN MAWR, PA.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

¹ The book has a few imperfections which it did not seem fitting to mention in the text. On p. 42 the word *Hasmonæan* is misspelled. On p.

DR. MARTINEAU'S PHILOSOPHY. A SURVEY. By Charles B. Upton, B. A., B. Sc. Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College, Oxford. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1905.

If, as Hegel suggests, attempts to interpret a writer are the marks of his greatness, James Martineau has no need of further witnesses. Among his many interpreters none speaks with greater authority than Professor Upton. One of his pupils, he has also been a life-long student of his works, and has further been able to correct and extend the impression of his master's teaching by frequent familiar conversations. The result is a condensed account of his opinions written from the inside which never flags in interest and impresses the reader with a vivid sense of reality. Prefixed to the more biographical and expository chapters is an Introductory Essay on the relations of Dr. Martineau's writings to present views on the Philosophy of Religion. In this the aim is to show that in spite of the defection of some idealist Professors of whom Dr. Martineau himself had hoped better things, the central ideas of his philosophy have found a powerful echo in leading present day writers, both in Oxford and Cambridge, and further, that his theory of the relations of will and force, notwithstanding the different interpretation which another pupil—Principal Carpenter—has recently put upon his words, never changed, and in the form in which he consistently held it is not incompatible with newer physical conceptions. This latter contention receives somewhat hasty treatment and we think will prove unconvincing to those who have followed with any attention recent discussions on the relation between human volition and physical energy. The first chapter tells the story of Martineau's exodus from the Houndsditch of Hartleyan philosophy. The saying that one never knows a thing till one has had to teach it is illustrated in his case. It was in the attempt to expound the theory

317 n 4, in the fourth line from the end, part of the sentence is omitted and a portion of another from the third line above is substituted. On the title page the author is said to be "Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in Cornell University, and Director of the American School of Archaeology in Jerusalem." The name of the latter institution is not "The American School of Archaeology in Jerusalem," but "The American School of Oriental Study and Research in Palestine." Moreover, Professor Schmidt was its Director only for the year 1904-1905. In using the title this fact should have been stated. To insert it, without the date, in a book which is to circulate for years is misleading.

in College lectures that the poverty of its leading hypotheses dawned upon him. The liberation of his mind from the cramping influence of its mechanical necessitarianism was completed by his study of Cousin and Channing. Professor Upton has done well in quoting the words in which Martineau records the sense of relief with which he escaped from his "logical cage into the open air." The passage may take its rank beside the somewhat similar confession in Mills' Autobiography. From this time (1839) we are told "his philosophical teaching remained substantially unaltered and self-consistent" a fact it is necessary constantly to bear in mind in estimating the work of the nonagenarian philosopher. The succeeding chapters are devoted to the development of his thought in Lectures, Reviews and Correspondence, Studies in Berlin, and Discussions of the Metaphysical Society. Thereon follow the two main chapters of the book containing an analysis of Martineau's two chief works, the "Types of Ethical Theory" and "The Study of Religion," with the aim of setting in their proper focus the two fundamental ideas which he regarded as the Urim and the Thummim of his ethical and religious philosophy, the freedom of the will and the existence without us of a Divine Mind with which in virtue of our freedom we can put ourselves in understanding communion. For a lucid account of the evidence in which these ideas rested and the spirit in which they were applied in the solution of ethical and religious problems the reader, who is not already familiar with the main lines of Martineau's philosophy, cannot commit himself to better guidance than these chapters supply. Chapter VIII under the title of the "Study of Spinoza" is a closer account of Martineau's relation to various forms of Pantheism and the determinism which they involve. The book ends with a chapter all too short on Appreciations and Criticisms.

While he has here given us a lucid and sympathetic interpretation of his master's opinions, Professor Upton has shown himself no blind disciple and it is interesting to inquire how far in his view we are to attribute stability to the results achieved. Martineau's place in the world of religious literature is fortunately assured beyond all dispute, but he is a metaphysician as well as a seer, and we need not be surprised if his metaphysics fail to satisfy to the same degree as his devotional writings. Many, even during his own life time, noted the curious contrast between the formal philosophy and the religious teaching of one who "thought

like a Socinian and prayed like a Pietist." In the former there was from the first and remained to the last a deistic element that was proper enough in the successor of Priestley and Price, but was curiously foreign to the religious spirit of both an earlier and a later period. At the same time it would have been strange if one so sensitive to intellectual movements had made no attempt to bring his philosophical conclusions into harmony with the influences that moulded the thought of his own century. Hence we have flowing side by side with each other in his writings two currents, one which makes for dualism in metaphysics, individualism in ethics, deism in religion; another which subordinates all these to the spiritual view of man's relation to God and the world, and of the parts of the world to one another, to which his own ethical nature leaned—making it possible for his critics to say of his Philosophy what Mandeville says of his Hive, that "every part was full of vice, yet the whole was a paradise." All this Professor Upton is prepared to acknowledge. He makes it clear that in his view, as contrasted with an inferential theism such as that with which Martineau starts, no position is tenable as the basis of a sound ethical and religious philosophy which does not provide for an immediate apprehension of the divine. He himself finds such a basis with Cousin in the necessity of presupposing as the foundation of the unity of subject and object in our consciousness "a superior absolute unity which contains and explains them." But he is forced to admit that, with the exception of isolated statements, there is nothing to show that this was at all clear to Martineau, or that he was prepared to face the complete reconstruction of his system that it would have involved. It will be of great interest to hear, as we hope we shall in an independent work from Professor Upton, what form the reconstruction in his view ought to take. One thing is likely to become clear in the course of such a restatement. It is hardly likely that so fundamental a change in one of the two leading ideas of Martineau's philosophy can be carried out without affecting the other. That Professor Upton is at present unconscious of any such possibility appears from the running fire of criticism with which he assails any view of the freedom of the will which is not in strict accordance with that which Martineau held. We agree with him that it is too early to assume, as some idealists have done, that controversy as to the existence of an indeterminate element in choice is virtually at an end. But to admit this is one thing, to maintain indeterminate

freedom on the ground that without it moral responsibility and religion in the true sense of the word are impossible is quite another. This view seemed forced upon Martineau both by what he denied and what he accepted in the philosophy of his predecessors. But many things have happened since then. Owing to the growth of psychology we have become familiar with the difference between mechanical and psychological causation and are prepared to admit that actions may be intelligible though not mechanically necessary. Owing to the growth of Monism, religious philosophy has substituted for the older deism a theory of immanence which identifies the inward essence of the human soul with the divine and interprets progress as the development of the God-like in ourselves. In this altered venue it becomes impossible to assign the same paramount importance to the question of the formal freedom of the will. The important thing is to realize in the first place the possibility of determination by ideas and purposes as the characteristic of mind and will, and secondly, determination of the widest and deepest ideas of which we are capable (freedom from the casual and accidentally insistent) as the end of all moral progress. The emphasis has shifted from the form to the content of volition. Whatever truth there may be in libertarianism, the freedom for which it contends is from such a point of view, only at best a moment in a process which acquires its value from the end that is reached, not from any of the parts into which it may be analyzed. Whether when libertarians realize this they will still consider it necessary to have recourse to a conception so remote from all analogy as that of a will, or an element in will, which defies all relation, whether to natural impulse or to formed character, and is wholly indeterminate, remains to be seen. Meantime it is interesting to notice in support of the present contention that while there are still libertarians and determinists, as in Martineau's time, the wheel has come full circle, and things are no longer as they were. The determinist rejects the freedom of the will as incompatible with moral responsibility and any true theory of punishment, while the libertarian supports it in the interest of a form of pluralism which is the very antithesis of the theory of God and of duty for which Dr. Martineau took so courageous a stand.

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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS. By Edward Westermarck, Ph. D. Vol I. London: Macmillan & Co., 1906, pp. xxi, 716.

The greater part of this very interesting volume consists in an enormous collection of instances of moral judgments, collected from all parts of the world, and from all epochs of history, and classified under various heads. Several chapters, however, raise general ethical problems.

The first chapter opens with the remark, "That the moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions, either of indignation or approval, is a fact which a certain school of thinkers have in vain attempted to deny" (p. 14). Not only one school of thinkers, but many schools, and many thinkers who belong to no school in particular, have not only attempted to deny this, but have succeeded in doing so with the greatest ease. Presumably, Dr. Westermarck means that their denials have been mistaken, but for this view he offers no arguments. Dr. Westermarck's subjectivism is complete. Our emotions are not merely the criterion of right and wrong but their essence. An action is only good, if it is approved, while it is approved, and for the man who approves it. It is recognized that consequently "there can be no moral truth in the sense in which this term is generally understood."

The second chapter declares that all moral emotions are retributive emotions, though not all retributive emotions are moral. In the third chapter Dr. Westermarck discusses theories of punishment. He endeavors to show that the retributive theory is necessary, because without it we should be compelled to award and withhold punishment in a manner which would be recognized as unsuitable. His arguments are at any rate ingenious. Unfortunately space forbids any discussion of them.

In chapter 4 the moral emotions are distinguished from others, the test being that moral emotions are disinterested and impartial. Their origin is ascribed in the same chapter to the indignation which arises at the breach of custom, and, to a lesser extent, to the approval which arises at the observance of custom.

The sixth chapter covers a surprising amount of subjects in a small space. Bad, vice, and wrong; ought and duty; right; rights and duties; injustice and justice; good; virtue; merit; the super-obligatory—all these concepts are analyzed within twenty-seven pages. We have only time to note that Dr. Westermarck's sub-

jectivism drives him to define "good" as what is approved, and consequently to hold that the performance of a duty, when too common to excite approbation, is right without being good.

In the seventh chapter the historical side of the book becomes more prominent in a discussion of the development of judicial punishment and judicial organization. In the eighth chapter we pass to the discussion of what is held to be a proper subject for moral judgments. It is maintained that "moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event but the intention" (p. 205). He defines intention, however, in such a way as to practically identify it with motive (pp. 204, 207).

The same subject is considered in chapter 9, where instances are given of how far different nations considered accidental acts or omissions to be punishable, and how far they have confined punishment to acts which have been explicitly willed. In chapter 10 the responsibility of "agents under intellectual disability" is discussed. Among the many cases of trials of animals which Dr. Westermarck has collected, perhaps the most delightful is one of a sow and her six young ones in 1457. "The sow, being found guilty, was condemned to death; the young pigs were acquitted on account of their youth and the bad example of their mother" (p. 257).

In the next two chapters the author deals with the extent to which such circumstances as compulsion, self-defence, and the like, are allowed to affect the condemnation of crimes, and with the extent to which we are held responsible for the unexpected consequences of careless actions.

In chapter 14 the subject of Free Will is discussed. Dr. Westermarck holds that "a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free will" (p. 322). This is, on his theory, equivalent to the assertion that actions are none the less morally good or bad because they are completely determined. In discussing the causes which have led to the denial of this view, Dr. Westermarck introduces a very clear account of the distinction between determinism and fatalism. "According to the fatalist, the innate character is *compelled*; hence personal responsibility is out of the question. According to the determinist, the innate character is caused; but this has nothing whatever to do with the question of responsibility" (p. 326).

Dr. Westermarck, however, seems curiously mistaken about Spinoza's position. On page 322, after saying, as quoted above,

that a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free-will, he continues "I hold that Spinoza is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more love or hatred toward one another than towards anything else, because they think themselves to be free." This passage would give the idea that Spinoza believed in free will, whereas no philosopher was ever a more rigid determinist (cp. "Ethics" II, 48. "In the mind there is no absolute or free will"). And so far is he from holding that our emotions towards men would be more intense if we conceived them as undetermined, that he says exactly the opposite; "an emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary, is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary" (IV. 11). It is true, as Dr. Westermarck says, that Spinoza also holds (III, 49, note) that "men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else." But free, with Spinoza, does not mean undetermined, as it does with the supporters of free-will. It simply means self-determined. (I Def., 7, "That thing is called free which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone.")

The second half of the volume is devoted to the examination of the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and the judgment passed on these modes of conduct by different people in different ages. The author groups these modes of conduct into six groups. The first of these includes the conduct which directly concerns the interests of other men, and the second the conduct which chiefly concerns the agent's own welfare. All acts, however, which concern sexual relations are withdrawn from these two classes, and form the third. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, which they regard as supernatural. The present volume deals with the first class only. The chief place is naturally assigned to Homicide, the general consideration of which occupies three chapters. Then follow Parricide and Infanticide, the Stealing of Women and of Slaves, Human Sacrifice, Capital Punishment, and Dueling. After Death comes the question of Bodily Injuries. Then we pass to Charity and Generosity, and to Hospitality. The Subjection of Children, the Subjection of Wives, and Slavery conclude the volume.

The mass of information included in these chapters is wonderful. The use which Dr. Westermarck makes of it I have no pretensions to criticise. At any rate, everyone who reads this volume will look forward with impatience to the next.

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J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

A NEW MORALITY. By Arthur Tisdall Turner. London: Grant Richards, 1904. Pp. 48.

A man who happens to be a member of the "thinking world" (for whom this book was written) will open his eyes in wonder on seeing its title "A New Morality." When he opens the book and reads in the preface that it is the net result of seven years concentrated thought, and that only the "most robust intellectual constitutions" can assimilate the mental food which it contains, he will, unless he be an exceptionally reckless man, shut the book again. If, however, the threat of a shock to his "religious susceptibilities," induces him to read it, he will find that the concentrated wisdom which the author offers is of the following kind: "The commands thundered from Mount Sinai, the moral precepts inculcated in the Sermon on the Mount, the eightfold path taught from the wisdom garnered beneath the Bo tree of Ind—these and many like them are but expressions of individual opinion, and represent to the 'truly enlightened' nothing more and nothing less." Again, "Whatever you desire to do, that do; and whatever you do, do it without regret." Our adviser forgets the existence of police courts; and the possible inclination of a fellow "desirer" to thrash us also escapes his notice.

Mr. Turner has concentrated too much. He should have looked out a little on the world, and passed more of the seven years in the company of the "old" moralists. Had he done so I am sure that he would not have repeated these commonplaces, and with such tragic emphasis.

RADYR, CARDIFF.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

THE POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE MEREDITH: By G. M. Trevelyan. London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1906. Pp. xiv, 234.

This book ought to be of great service to those of Meredith's readers, and they are many, who wish to grasp a view of life that

seems to them at once impressive, sane, and extremely perplexing. Mr. Trevelyan gives an admirably luminous account of it, showing in what way the dreams of the poet and the philosopher underlie the conceptions of the novelist, the reformer, and the moralist.

It should be said in passing that his criticism of the poems is excellent; enthusiastic and loving, it is also modest and discriminating,—a truly delightful combination. But it is with the philosophy that this review must be concerned, and Mr. Trevelyan is so much in sympathy with that philosophy that to review his statement is almost to review his author. Now to the present reviewer it seems to have become clear that Meredith's position cannot be made consistent through and through. He demands that we should have trust in Nature, joy in life, and faith in progress, that we should cherish as our soul's banner "the dream of the blossom of good," and it is plain that this trust and this joy are of a character that go beyond experience, and past proof. They are far from being opposed to experience or proof, but if in some sense they can be said to contain knowledge, it must be admitted that the knowledge is inchoate. The important point, in short, is that they do form a Faith, that is, a body of opinion which is accepted and acted upon, but which is not taken to be demonstrated. In this sense they are as much a "creed" as any other, though they may be less definite. There is no inconsistency so far, but Meredith and his school go on to blame, or to appear to blame, as weak and unworthy, any demand for a further faith,—for a faith in immortality. But how if there seems no right to the first triumphant confidence unless the second hope is allowed? How if the blossom of good seems, without this, to be "born withered in bud"? Neither Meredith nor his disciple would ever bid us deny our own judgment, or call that good which we do not in our hearts think good, but on the other hand they do not answer the question, and for the inquiring mind of man it is not enough simply to bid the questions cease. Sometimes Mr. Trevelyan seems to try to mend matters by qualifying Meredith's hope, stating it only as *almost* unlimited, a hope in a partial, not an all-victorious, Beneficence of which we may feel ourselves the children. But this appears to do injustice to the inner spirit of much of the poetry in the vain effort to defend all its philosophy, to take away its inspiring quality without giving it logical coherence. For the faith remains a faith, even with these limitations. To look up at the stars may give us hope, but the comfort they have always brought to man does not stand or fall

with astronomical proof: the astronomers certainly do not tell us—they rather deny—that the universe is infinite in such a sense that “there must also be infinite life” (p. 117). And when we read how, under the starry skies.

“The spirit leaps alight,
Doubts not in them is he,
The binder of his sheaves, the sane, the right,”

it is hard not to feel that the poet’s inspiration has swept him, and us, further than the critic altogether knows. Nor does Mr. Trevelyan’s distinction between optimism of temperament and optimism of belief clear up the difficulty. The distinction is true and valuable, but a hearty readiness to enjoy the best in things does not therefore imply the hope that they will be good. A brave and joyous temperament is quite consistent with a philosophy like Mr. Santayana’s, or, as Mr. Trevelyan all but points out himself, with such a one as Huxley’s. But both of these in their insistence on the “indifferentism” of Nature are at the opposite pole from Meredith’s. There would be no sense in talking to such thinkers of the duty to trust. Such a command indeed is only not immoral if based on the conviction that there is something worth trusting. But with this conviction we at once pass from the sphere of temperament to that of belief.

There would no doubt be less difficulty if we could take the view that personal immortality really does not matter, that it is even part of the narrower selfishness to wish for it. And at times this is suggested both by poet and critic when they discourage the demand. But it is here that these soldiers of common sense seem to have lost sight of their own flag. The question, perhaps, must be left for the long generations to answer. It is roughly this: can a generous nature acquiesce in the miserable failure even of one of the countless lives we see fail in this world, and yet keep the exultant rapture Meredith has poured into his cup? Can it turn its head away from this “foul aspect” without being untrue to facts? Can it forget one of the millions without “shortening the stature of its soul?”

It would be a pity that the notice of so good a book as this should be nothing but a polemic, and it is a pleasure to close with two quotations which will give some idea of its range and vigor. One is a statement, clear and suggestive, of Meredith’s conception of God: “God is identified not with all Nature, but with the good

elements in her, which it is the task of man to bring to full and conscious life in himself by the hard process of evolution, the education of blood and tears" (p. 119). The other is a penetrating account of an experience common to many who follow, enthralled if half-unwilling, the unmasking of Willoughby Patterne: "It is the terrible sympathy which the author compels us to feel with the detested Egoist, which renders that all too familiar image of our baser self a nightmare to haunt and warn us out of the sentimentalist's paradise and the tyrant's castle."

There follows an acute and noble justification of fiction as being what Aristotle might have called "more philosophical than history." "In fiction we can see men and women as they truly are, and not merely as they appear to themselves and others, . . . see common events in their most important but not their most evident aspect, . . . see them moulding the character and inmost being of each of the men and women concerned" (pp. 172, 173).

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS; VOLUME II, FOR 1905. By Francis Galton, Edgar Schuster, Patrick Geddes, M. E. Sadler, E. Westermarck, Harold Höffding, J. H. Bridges and J. S. Stuart-Glennie. Published for the Sociological Society by Macmillan & Co., London, 1906.

This volume is the second of a series published annually, which constitutes the journal of the Sociological Society, a body founded three years ago in London. As with other learned societies, papers contributed by eminent members are published, and the discussions on them are recorded at the ends of the papers; but the Society has taken a new departure in circulating widely proofs of some of the papers amongst well-known persons in many countries, with a view of obtaining from them for publication valuable opinions and criticisms. Papers by Mr. Francis Galton and Dr. J. H. Bridges have thus been subjected to very wide discussions of a most suggestive character.

The papers included in the volume before us illustrate five different branches of the study of the social organism, or five different "approaches" to sociology, as they are called in the Preface. Taking them in the order in which they are presented to the reader, we find first an example of what may be called Bio-

logical or Evolutionary Sociology in Mr. Galton's three brief articles on Eugenics, "the science which deals with those social agencies that influence, mentally or physically, the racial qualities of future generations." This department of social science applies a knowledge of the laws of evolution and heredity in animals and plants, and of some facts concerning heredity in mankind, to the practical problem of how to control and environ the citizens of a state so as best to promote the gradual development and improvement of the stock with a view to reaching a higher type of manhood. Whilst improvement of the conditions and habits of life of the poorer classes of the community is recognized by some of the contributors to the discussion as the most potent means of improving the race, Mr. Galton's papers, and most of the discussion, are chiefly concerned with the regulation of marriages as a means to that end. Any idea of breeding a high type of man by selective mating, as domestic animals are bred, is not urged by the author, and is dismissed by various members of the audience as undesirable, intolerable, or impossible. Mr. Galton wishes merely to restrict marriages in which one or both of the parties are physically or mentally feeble, or afflicted with any disease a disposition to which may be transmitted. Habitual drunkards and criminals would come under his prohibition. No conclusions are expressed, or actual proposals for action made, in these papers, because our present knowledge of the laws of heredity is most inadequate. The first paper is designed to show from the history of many races in all parts of the earth that marriage customs have everywhere imposed considerable restriction upon freedom of choice, to which people have readily submitted. It is not unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that with a widespread knowledge of the social evil resulting from the union of unfit persons, a custom of tabooing such marriages might grow up, and lead ultimately to the general acceptance of legislation absolutely prohibiting them, and providing the necessary means for prevention. The second paper is a sketch of subjects suitable for eugenic inquiry, which acquires especial importance in view of the appointment, early in 1905, by the University of London of Mr. Edgar Schuster to a newly-founded Research Fellowship in National Eugenics. It contains many suggestions as to means to be adopted in the difficult work of obtaining data regarding the effects of heredity, on which eugenic regulations might be based.

The second branch of the study of society illustrated in this vol-

ume is purely descriptive and comparative of man and his institutions as they are found to exist at the present day. It yields the main part of the science of Sociology as the word is generally understood in America, where this method has received far more attention than in England. The lengthy memoir on "Civics" by Professor Patrick Geddes is unfortunately the only paper representing this important department of the science in the collection under notice. The city is viewed in its component activities, and there is an analysis of the influence of occupations and surroundings upon the thoughts and habits of its inhabitants.

The psychological side of sociology is represented by a short paper by Professor M. E. Sadler on "The School in some of its relations to Social Organization and to National Life," which discusses the general educational policy of a nation, though it cannot be said to contribute much to so great a subject.

The ethical branch of sociology, which studies the determining causes of different codes or standards of conduct, is represented by an important paper from the able hand of Dr. Westermarck on "The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships." Very many interesting examples are given of belief in supernatural powers determining the daily actions of peoples, and particularly noteworthy is the author's analysis of the motives underlying the customs of many primitive nations relating to the hospitable entertainment of strangers. Another paper, by Professor Höffding, on "The Relation between Sociology and Ethics" belongs to this section of the subject; but, for lack of an orderly arrangement of the subject-matter, the article must fail to instruct, or even to enlighten as to the author's views, any but the most painstaking reader.

A fifth section of Sociology is the Historical Branch, the aim of which is to make use of the material supplied by the historian and the archaeologist to determine the laws, if any, of the evolution of human institutions and civilization. It treats a whole group of intercommunicating races as its unit, *e. g.* the Western Aryan group, and is thus essentially different from Biological Sociology, which studies the minuter evidences of evolution as observed in the individual. A paper on "Some Guiding Principles in the Philosophy of History" by Dr. J. H. Bridges exemplifies this department of the subject. It contains some interesting generalizations, the most noteworthy, perhaps, being that which sums up the progress of western civilization "as a passage from theocracy to sociocracy"—from a condition in which the ideas and institutions

of mankind are dominated by a belief in the active interference of supernatural will-power in the affairs of man to a state in which "the governing considerations in public life" are scientific and human. The last three papers of the volume are by Mr. J. S. Stuart-Glennie, and two of them, on "The General Historical Laws" as a basis of a "Science of Socialization" and "as applied to contemporary events" respectively, belong to the historical branch of sociology. The other article is an original attempt to classify all sciences, beginning by dividing them into the sciences of Motion, of Evolution, and of Socialization. The idea is worth presenting with fuller explanations and examples.

The general impression given by the papers mentioned is that sociology is an immense and fertile field, of which the surface is only just being scratched. Many of the authors seem painfully oppressed with the absence of any recognized methods and limits to the subject, and this leads them to waste much space in vague and tiresome generalities which lead to no conclusion. When much solid work has been done on the lines sketched out by some of the authors, the scope, relationships, and methods, of the science of sociology will unfold themselves.

In conclusion a word must be said regarding the form and printing of the volume. A binding of mustard-colored buckram does not to most minds connote a scientific contents, and to letter it in gilt is merely throwing away gold. The pages are too large (10 by 8 inches) for convenience of holding the book, or of following the lines in reading. The paper is of poor quality: it is blotchy, and so transparent that the print shows through from the opposite side in an ugly manner. The essays themselves are for the most part printed in a large clear type, but, if he wish to acquaint himself with the discussions and "written communications," the reader must wade through large and forbidding pages of small print. It seems a little ungracious to honor the contributions of distinguished foreigners with a type which would make the average reader skip them; and the more so because there is no obvious reason for not using large type. Want of space cannot be alleged, for I have hardly seen a book in which blank pages, whole and half, are so lavishly distributed. In the 308 pages which make up the book I count the equivalent of 28 pages left blank which would have been utilized in the style in which the memoirs of learned societies are usually printed. In particular the typography of Professor Geddes's essay is remarkable. The sections are headed with large

instead of the more elegant small capitals; and the text is composed alternately of large type such as is used in the other papers, and of blocks of small print, containing about half the essay. If this be altogether a printer's vagary, it is only to be hoped that he will not do it again. If, on the other hand, as seems probable, the author placed in small print matter which appeared to him of less importance, it may be doubted whether such discrimination was wise. The small print often contains illustrations which are needed to force home the general statements in large print; and, if the portions in small print had been pruned a little and incorporated with the rest, the article would have been read with more pleasure and conviction.

H. STANLEY JEVONS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF, WALES.

FICHTE: SEINE ETHIK UND SEINE STELLUNG ZUM PROBLEM DES INDIVIDUALISMUS. Von Dr. Maria Raich. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1905.

This is on the whole a disappointing book. The authoress obviously has a thorough and competent knowledge of Fichte's writings. She approaches the subject from an interesting standpoint, realizing how much there is in the meaning given by Fichte to such expressions as *Activität*, *schöpferisches*, *Personalität*, *Vernunftkunst*, and in the importance given to such conceptions in his system that make his philosophy of great value to modern thought. In reading the book we come every now and then upon a suggestive passage that makes us see how wonderfully Fichte united some of the opposing tendencies of modern thought; how he starts from the Kantian categorical imperative and completes it by a fuller and juster psychological analysis and by his doctrine of "the beautiful soul"; how he was the great leader in the German glorification of the state, and yet realized, as few philosophers have done, the worth and beauty of the individual. This, no doubt, was the impression which Dr. Raich intended her book as a whole to produce. We can believe that the authoress could have achieved this result if she had gone about it in the right way. But unfortunately the actual impressions created by reading the book are those of weariness and perplexity. As it stands, the book is not much more than a cento of quotations from Fichte, interspersed with a few guiding comments by Dr. Raich. Even these are arranged

in such a way that it is very hard to tell when we are reading Dr. Raich, and when Fichte. Now much of Fichte's thought may be modern and of great importance and value for modern controversies, but the framework of his philosophy, his "*Ichheit*," and *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, and his way of using such terms as "objectivity" are only puzzling to a modern reader. Dr. Raich herself explains that this has inevitably led to the opinion that Fichte is a psychological idealist. Now this being so, if Dr. Raich had translated the Fichtian *Ich* and all its implications into modern philosophical language, and given us an account of Fichte in her own words, the book might have been a valuable contribution to philosophy. As it is the book comes too perilously near deserving the title "Extracts from Fichte," and philosophical extracts are not to be recommended.

A. D. LINDSAY.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

SAGGI PER LA STORIA DELLA MORALE UTILITARIA. II. LE TEORIE MORALE E POLITICHE DI L. A. HELVETIUS. Di Rodolfo Mondolfo. Verona-Padua: Fratelli Drucker, 1904. Pp. 141. IL DUBBIO METODICO E LA STORIA DELLA FILESOFIA. Di Rodolfo Mondolfo. Verona-Padua: Fratelli Drucker, 1905. Pp. 190.

The monograph on the moral and political theories of Helvetius with which Prof. Mondolfo continues his studies in Utilitarian Ethics is excellent both in form and in matter. The author pays special attention to the points of similarity and of difference between Helvetius and Hobbes (from whom this series of studies takes its departure), and he is inclined to give the palm of consistency to the former. He is also at pains to place the theories of Helvetius in their proper perspective and historical setting. Prof. Mondolfo might, however, have given with advantage more prominence to the influence of Helvetius on the formation of English Utilitarianism. It was the study of Helvetius that gave to the philosophy of Bentham its distinctive direction—the approach to ethics from the side of politics. It was Helvetius, again, whom Bentham followed in giving a new foundation in utility to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. To Helvetius the sovereignty of morality lay in the sovereignty of the general interest, and this again depended on the sovereignty of democracy and of liberty—a con-

nection of ideas which gave to the practical philosophy of Helvetius not only a peculiar consistency, but also a special significance for modern developments. As Prof. Mondolfo justly observes, the originality of Helvetius does not consist in this or that element of his theory, but in the whole that he made out of the different elements; while he shows that the prominence which Helvetius gave to the element of liberty was largely due to the circumstances of his time. "The truly original side of his doctrines is not in their principle, but in its application and consequences: in his conception of society and the relations of law and morality with liberty." Helvetius—and this was his most original service—put political liberty upon a basis not of natural right but of utility: and in making liberty the last word of his practical philosophy he was the "true precursor of the Liberty of Stuart Mill." On the other hand, the difference between Helvetius' treatment of the idea of liberty and the *Essay on Liberty* is no less significant. On this point Prof. Mondolfo is particularly instructive and suggestive. He shows how Helvetius came to combine at one and the same time the principle of liberty and of the vastest action of the State: how his doctrine contained germs of certain types of socialism, such as that of Owen and Fourier; and how it approached Rousseau's conception of the "general will." Certainly, a very interesting as well as a most suggestive appreciation.

The same author's lecture on "methodical doubt" and the history of philosophy is a vindication of the historical method in philosophy, of which his monograph on Helvetius is itself an admirable example. It is fortified by a detailed review of philosophic opinion on the conception and value of the history of philosophy, and of its place and significance in philosophical discipline; but the discussion, though of considerable interest and importance in itself, is of no direct concern to the readers of this JOURNAL.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH PHILANTHROPY. By B. Kirkman Gray. London: P. S. King & Son. Pp. 302.

Few more inspiring subjects could be chosen for study than the History of Philanthropy. It would seem not only to embrace the good works wrought by "those that love their fellow men," but to involve also a comparative study of the social and theologi-

cal ideas by which they were inspired and in the light of which they may be explained. This, at least, would be demanded from any complete study of the subject.

Mr. Kirkman Gray has, however, set himself a more limited task. He is rather concerned to find a reasoned answer to the question as to what should be the sphere of charity in the modern state. What tasks may it appropriately undertake? How should its functions be delimited as between itself and state action?

In seeking an answer to these questions, Mr. Gray thinks we must first interrogate the past in order to learn the lessons of experience. His book is therefore an attempt to recount the History of Philanthropy in such a way as to reveal the development of principles applicable to the present.

The inquiry covers the period from the reign of Elizabeth to the end of the Eighteenth Century.

Comparatively little study, however, is sufficient to show the difficulty of tracing the development of any consistent principles governing the practice of philanthropy or tending definitely to assign to voluntary charity its appropriate sphere. Philanthropy is for the most part spontaneous, individual, experimental. In generation after generation, it is true, institutions need reform and such abiding evils as poverty and disease take new shapes that call for cure or prevention. Meanwhile the standpoint and level of public opinion are shifting. Each age brings a new interpretation of social responsibility. It is chiefly the work of philanthropy to lead the way, to inspire, to educate.

But necessarily, just in the measure of its success, the reason for the existence of any given movement for reform passes away. A History of Philanthropy tends, therefore, to be the tale of a succession of disconnected movements, of skirmishes in the advance guard of a progressive civilization.

Still certain abiding needs remain, and in the efforts to satisfy them the joint workers with voluntary charity are private economic enterprise and organized state action. How the division of labor between these three forces shall be made in the best interests of the society is the problem set for solution. The answer to such a question involves a complete social philosophy. A reading of past charitable history is, however, helpful in an attempt at such a construction. It is abundantly shown, for example, that as time passes many of the risks and uncertainties of life are calculable by the actuary. Economic enterprise in the shape of insur-

ance companies undertakes whatever was at one time left to the charity brief. Again certain public utilities come to be recognized by all but extreme individualists as best provided by means of a payment by tax according to ability rather than for a price from business corporations or from philanthropic gifts. Roads and bridges are no longer kept up by private charitable bequests as was often the case under Elizabeth. It is doubtful whether our hospitals should not be similarly maintained.

But the most marked change in the political temper of our time is in respect of the attitude towards the exercise of sovereign power in the interest of social well being. Compulsion is seen to have its place as a means to secure a higher performance of social duty. The conception of crime as antisocial action is changing as regards the kind of deeds or omissions that it includes. The state now compels the slave to be free where once the act of manumission was left to the promptings of philanthropy.

But perhaps insistence needs most to be laid on the fact that these three lines of activity are each needed to supplement each other. Their respective spheres are separated by no rigid boundaries. Their limits are elastic. For many purposes they should compete in healthy rivalry, each accessory to the other. The state administration needs the revivifying influence of the reformer and the inspiration of voluntary philanthropy, as self-interest in economic enterprise needs to be controlled by the former and ethicized by both. Charity, on the other hand, is often in danger of mistaking the means for the end, of resting content with removing symptoms and not the cause of evil, and above all of forgetting that with process of time, individuals need the recognition of rights that are due rather than the multiplication of bounties bestowed.

All these things Mr. Gray's book suggests, although the arrangement of his material and the language in which his story is told are both capable of improvement. We hope it may some day be strengthened and revised in such a way as to mark more thoroughly the difference between unnecessary and trivial details and the larger matters that mark the growth of political and ethical principles.

C. J. HAMILTON.

LONDON.

A MODERN SYMPOSIUM. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London : Brinley, Johnson & Ince, Ltd., 1905. Pp. 100.

This book purports to be the report of a meeting of a club, called The Seekers. Its object and method are indicated in the following words spoken by the chairman: "I propose that Cantilupe should make a personal confession; that he should tell us why he has been a politician, why he has been, and is, a tory, and why he is now retiring in the prime of life. I propose, in a word, that he should give us his point of view. That will certainly provoke Remenham, on whom I shall call next. He will provoke someone else. And so we shall all find ourselves giving our points of view." There are many speakers. They include a tory, a liberal, a conservative, a socialist, an anarchist, a professor, a man of science, a journalist, a man of business, a poet, a gentleman of leisure, a member of the Society of Friends, and a man of letters. The book has a genuinely literary character and is entertaining in the best sense. The dramatic setting increases the interest; but there is a lack of spontaneity in the arranging of the speakers which mars the artistic effect; the chairman is too much in evidence.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

RADYR, CARDIFF.

A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION. By Thomas M. Lindsay, M. A., D. D., Principal, The United Free Church College, Glasgow. In two volumes. Vol. I, THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY, from its beginning to the religious peace of Augsburg. International Theological Library. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1906.

Adequately to treat the History of the Reformation requires a combination of qualities. There is needed not only the patient investigation of the historian into a mass of documentary evidence, consisting largely of little known local and municipal records, whose relative value only wide experience can appraise, but the judgment of the sociologist and the theological acumen which can present with lucid fairness, the true differences between Luther and Rome on the one hand, and Zwingli and Calvin on the other. Professor Lindsay's smaller works—his Monographs on the Reformation and his article on Luther in the Cambridge Modern History, to say nothing of occasional essays on the early schoolmen,

have given us the right to expect these qualities from him. He has brought out the full significance of the movement with which he deals by treating it, as it must be treated, in its social environment, complicated as it was by the political and economic conditions of the time, as the gradual outcome of a slow, unconscious process.

The new vision of the real world had led to that new vision of the world of spirit on which the ends of the ages were met. Italy and Germany were near, the parts of one Empire, and the Renaissance and the Reformation are but the different racial expressions of a joyous spirit of discovery which made the world new. The Renaissance, aristocratic, like all artistic movements, was incomplete; an emancipation of the reason which grafted Christianity upon Aristotle produced neither sound theology nor sound scholarship. Professor Lindsay brings out with admirable clearness that the Reformation, which set the judgment free in matters of religion also, was the fruit of continuous growth, had its roots fixed deep in the past; that Luther only articulated the views long held by silent individuals, and already voiced by one courageous member, Marsilius of Padua, when he proclaimed the priesthood of believers. The ideas of Wyclif and of Huss were at work beneath the simple piety of the ordinary German man. Germany was deeply religious. It was regarded even so late as the beginning of the sixteenth century as the most secure and fruitful source of papal revenue. No country spent so much on indulgences and pilgrimages, or supported so many churches and religious houses. The hunger for sermons foreshadowed the modern zeal for lectures. This piety, which spread religious education far and wide, was in many cases, as Professor Lindsay shows, of a non-ecclesiastical kind. Many shared the opinion of Luther's father, that the clergy both secular and regular were rogues or fools. Reforms which the Curia neglected, though advised by the Councils of Constance and Basle, were in Saxony, Brandenburg, and Mansfield carried out by the secular authority. Begging, of which the church approved, was suppressed by municipal by-law. There were numerous semi-mystical praying circles and brotherhoods. Prayer meetings were held, and the Bible read in the vernacular by the Kalandsgilden or Friendly Societies of Artisans. The Brethren of the Common Lot founded Schools and employed education to raise "Spiritual pillars in the temple of the Lord;" and what they taught bore a great resemblance to Lutheranism in many respects. These societies were regarded with suspicion, but their influence was

great. The Universities were wholly scholastic until the persecution of Reuchlin rallied the Humanists to coöperate in the new movement. The peasantry had a powerful stimulus to unrest in their economic grievances. Since the time of Huss, there had been constant social risings. Primarily revolts of the poor against the rich, they acquired religious significance from the fact that their animus was more and more directed against the wealthy clergy. As early as 1476, Hans Böhm, a visionary who could not even say the creed, had propounded a religious socialism which spread far and wide, and was revived in the Bundschnuh revolts, recurring at short intervals between 1493 and 1572. A series of bad harvests aggravated the misery of the peasantry.

No part of Professor Lindsay's book is more interesting and valuable than this. His description of the career of Luther is, of course, accurate, and his elucidation of the religious position admirable, but here he perhaps hardly gives a full impression of the force of that extraordinarily human personality whose sanity and vigor enabled him to control a tremendous moral crisis. The discussion of Indulgences is excellent. The theory of "thesaurus meritorum," the doctrine of attrition, and the sacrament of penance could not be more lucidly set forth. It is very important to make clear, as Dr. Lindsay does, that what Luther had to deal with, what he had in his mind, was not so much the theological doctrine as the common practice with regard to indulgences: and certainly it was difficult to view the practical expression of that doctrine in any other way. Practically the purchaser of an indulgence believed that it remitted not his penalty only, but his guilt. "God desireth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should pray and live."

The central point was, as Professor Lindsay insists, that the Bible was not a doctrinal, but a personal revelation: the meaning of Christianity Luther found in the faith that throws itself upon God. From such a faith the priesthood of believers followed naturally. Faith incorporates Christ, the personal Godhead, with the believer: the believer who has faith is regenerate and finds his assurance of salvation not in the imperfect works he therefore can do but in the perfect mediatorial work of Christ which, through faith, he can appropriate. As a summary of the sources, manner and result of the Reformation, at once succinct and adequate, this work is quite first rate. For the thrill of the great movement indeed, the magnetic apprehension of

sovereign personality, for the inner history of Luther, Erasmus, Charles V, etc., we must look elsewhere. To give this was not Dr. Lindsay's design; his is the dry light of reason, but from the basis of his exposition, we may proceed to it. We look forward with great interest to his second volume, which deals with the lesser movement connected with the Reformation, and with the counter Reformation.

M. A. HAMILTON.

LONDON.

ETHIK. Von Max Wentscher. Theil I: KRITISCHE GRUNDLIGUNG, 1902. Theil II: SYSTEM DER ETHIK, 1905. Leipzig: J. A. Barth. Pp. xii, 368; xii, 396.

To Professor Wentscher the first and last word of ethics is personality—

“Höchstes Glück der Erderkinder
Ist nur die Persönlichkeit.”

and the essence of personality is free will. The task of ethics is to exhibit the aims and ideals of “a possible willing”—to set up, as it were, “a kingdom of possible willing.” The question “What can we will,” is thus declared to be the primary and central problem of any ethics, and the idea of Freedom is made the highest principle of morality.

The spiritual affinities of such an ethics are to be found in Kant and in Nietzsche, but Professor Wentscher deserves the credit of a thorough-going attempt to derive not only the soul but the body of ethics from the principle of “the ideal of a free will.” In the first part, the idea of “die Bethätigung freien Wollens in immer-höherer, vollendetester Ausprägung” as the original essence of morality is justified against other points of view by an examination of the problem of conscience and the problem of freedom. The author formulates the whole duty of man in two ethical axioms:

1. Strebe nach höchster Ausprägung wahrhaft eigenen Wesens und fester Grundsätze einer vollendet eigenen, freien Wollens.
2. Mache von dieser Fähigkeit freier Bethätigung eigenen Wesens den kraftsvollsten und umfassendsten Gebrauch.

In the second part (which has appeared after an interval of three years) these results are applied to the actual content and detail of the ethical life. What the author attempts in effect is to

establish a "system" of ethics on the ground of the principle of Freedom, and in such a way as that the system may seem to be a necessary development in all its parts of that principle—a principle which is further developed by antagonism with the ethics of pessimism and asceticism. The author traverses in succession the forms of individual, of "historical-national," and "culture" life, showing how their whole value and significance lie in their relation to the needs and demands of the free and personal life. We have not space to follow the argument. It suffices to say that it is eminently solid and systematic. What may be described as the ethics of Personal Idealism has seldom, if ever, been elaborated with such concreteness or detail. It is a point of view, indeed, which is at all times essential to ethics, but which is not always honored in the observance. That the state exists for man and not man for the state is a truth which was never in more need of assertion. We are not sure, however, that the ethical individualism of the author has not proved too strong for him in the end, and that he has not to a great extent failed to establish a vital or organic relation between the individual and society. We seem to miss the other side of the ethical fact which is emphasized in Hegel's idea of the state and of its significance for "freedom." If the individual seems to fall short in "organic" systems of ethics, the world seems in Professor Wentscher's view to have no other significance than that of the individual's playground. The significance of history again for ethics begins and ends with its use in offering to "individual insight" an "Uebersicht über alles was überhaupt mögliche wollen," in supplying "the free individual" with materials for personal choice. In his general results, Professor Wentscher reaches much the same conclusions as any other "idealistic" system of ethics; but the strain of subjective idealism and of what might almost be called moral solipsism gives to Professor Wentscher's exposition at once a peculiarity and a difficulty of its own. It has at the same time the singular merit of carrying its principle through to the end—of pursuing it assiduously into its most uncompromising applications in ethics and politics. Such a procedure exposes its author to somewhat easy criticism, as he is himself aware; but we prefer to emphasize its merit. It has the conspicuous merit—not too often associated with modern books on ethics—of being a challenge: a challenge not only to the "ungirt loin" but to a vast amount of ethical commonplace.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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THE GOOD AND THE BAD.*

I.

For better or for worse, we have developed the inveterate habit of formulating our experience in terms of personal values. Familiar illustrations of this fact are not wanting, for what are literature and the fine arts, ethics, esthetics, and religion, but the organization of man's "sense of fact" along the lines laid down by his multifold relations with the world of things and of selves? Without a like reference to what is of worth, how shall we be brought to understand history, economics, sociology, or political science?¹ Nor are we confined to the academic disciplines for our examples, for the commercial and social life of to-day has its justification in the fact that it provides a means for the testing of the ideals, that it lends itself as a medium for a larger and more permanent social integration. Now the examination of these examples is serviceable for indicating the close connection there is between our sense of values and those relations of selves which are made explicit in our judgments of worth. If it were within the scope of the present paper, we should have to point out that

* Read October 25, 1906, before the Philosophical Society of the Ohio State University, as the president's address.

¹ Whether or not the same truth lies at the foundations of science and metaphysics is a question in debate which, for that reason, we may leave out of the account. There is, however, a strong presumption in favor of this view.

all value-judgments proceed from centers of personal interests, whatever the other terms are by which such judgments are limited. One term of the value-judgment is always variable, but the other is always constant—the judging consciousness itself. Consequently, the different types of worth are determined by the different kinds of variables within the field of values. Thus, whether the object of valuation be some other self or selves, as it is in some forms of literature, in ethics, sociology and religion, or whether it be things, as it is in economics, commerce, and in part in esthetics, the point of the judgment is to determine the relation between the judging mind on the one side and the given object on the other, when their time and space relations are no longer problematical and may be taken for granted. The worth of a thing or a self may be conditioned upon its being here and now, but it is not determined by that fact. Ultimately, this worth is dependent upon the object's ability to serve as an ideal center for the reconstruction of experience.

What we have suggested as being true of all value-judgments may be made to apply to any of the special fields within which such judgments obtain, by making explicit the variable term of the relation with which these judgments deal. The subject of this paper falls within one of the classes already enumerated as belonging to the general field of appreciation. The good and the bad are to be considered not as the only, but as the main types of *moral* worth.² But before we can state the problems that center in these two forms of ethical relationship, we must define the variable end of the relation to which we give the name moral. To put the matter in a concrete way, our question is whether they are things or selves which receive moral valuation. The answer is, of course, obvious; for if in our final interpretation of the universe we are led to affirm or deny its ethical character, we are persuaded to the view we take

²It is not usual to include the bad along with the good in what we consider moral. There seems no better reason for refusing it a place here than for refusing to classify the ugly together with the beautiful in what we call esthetic.

by the position we hold as to whether the world manifests itself in a characteristically personal way. The ultimate philosophical problem and its solution, however, lie beyond the limits of the present discussion; we refer to the possible opinions that may be maintained to emphasize that the term "moral" carries with it, whenever used, a reference to those relations which are determined by the nature and relations of selves. The moral sphere is essentially that which is constituted, directly or indirectly, by interacting selves. The primary characteristic, therefore, of the moral life, the menstruum within which it takes on definite form and feature, is its social quality. Morality, from this point of view, may be defined abstractly as a system of inter-individual relationships. But the relationships existing within any given society depend upon the position the several individuals hold in the social organism taken as a whole. It is obvious, therefore, that those forms of social life are moral which have regard to constitutional limitations. Now, if we lay stress, as it seems we must, upon a system of checks and balances which becomes effective through the organic nature of any society as the determining factor of its moral character, we can see the reason why the ethical field has been limited by some to those forms of social organization in which the human subject is all. The contention of Descartes, for example, that God is above morality, although based upon theoretical grounds, is the view of all who cannot find a common factor between finite and infinite existences. The point is mentioned here not for discussion, but for emphasizing the social nature of all moral life when society is regarded as a self-limiting organism.⁸

Morality, thus determined, may be studied from either or both of two points of view. In the first, we are concerned with institutional morality. From the psychological standpoint, we may indicate the same set of facts by the term "moral judgment." To combine in a single sentence the separate interests just mentioned, and at the same time to express the relation between them, we might affirm that moral judgments are judg-

⁸ Cf. Aristotle's "Concept of Entelechy."

ments of society which take concrete form in an indefinite number of social institutions. By an institution, in this connection, is meant the embodiment in the concrete form of convention—either of law or custom—of the social judgment with respect to what it is permissible for the members of society to do, and what relations they may properly sustain to one another under certain ascertained limitations. Or, to state the same truth another way, the moral judgment is concerned with expressing the constitutional conditions under which it requires each and all who have membership in the group to regulate their lives. The moral judgment, consequently, is, before and above everything else, legislature. In this, it seems to us, Kant was unquestionably right, but his method was defective because the moral will was taken abstractly, apart from its concrete embodiment in the moral institutes of society. The administrative feature of the moral life, on the other hand, is a secondary and derived aspect determined by the requirements of particular cases. In other words, the enforcement of law is a moral function of society, because the law is not a heteronomy but an autonomy, the expression of its own proper being.

The other point of view for the study of morality is that of the several members of society, the standpoint of the subject of moral law. This gives rise to what, in distinction from institutional morality, we may call instrumental morality. Reverting to the terminology of psychology, instead of being concerned with moral judgment, we are now introduced to what are called the moral feelings. The question we confront is not what is right or wrong, good or bad, but what is our reaction to that which has these determinate qualifications. The problem of morality from this standpoint refers to the mechanism of moral action. To put the same statement in the accepted terminology of ethical science, we are stating the question of motive, when motive is some kind or other of feeling. Just as society's chief interest is in the statement of what the right thing is, the subject's chief concern is with the means through which the right thing is to be done. It is in this sense that we mark off the considerations that group themselves around the moral feelings as problems of instrumental morality. What to do and how to

get that done are the two main questions of all practical concerns. They will provide points of attachment for the further discussion of this paper. The question, therefore, to which we may now address ourselves is this: If the moral life broadly considered is found to have the characteristics of both judgment and feeling, to be both institutional and instrumental, in what special sense is this true of those forms of conduct we call good and bad?

II.

In this section we shall direct attention to the good and the bad as types of moral judgment. There are three forms—at any rate three, and there may be more—which these judgments may assume. These we shall discuss in order.

The good and the bad get their specific determinations, in the first place, through the relations they sustain to an ideal. If it is objected to this statement that the relations escape definition because the ideal, through which the qualities are determined, is left without content, it should be replied that this primary requirement has been met already in the conditions under which alone such judgments take place. We remarked above that all moral judgments are social when the constitutional limitations of the *socius* within which they are made have become explicit. Only on these terms can any social fact be moral. Hence when we say that any fact is good or bad through the relation it bears to *an* ideal, we are to be understood to mean *the* ideal which, as a matter of fact, has made the judgment in question possible. The significant question for ethics, or indeed for any other science which develops in ideal ways, never concerns the scope or extent of the ideal, but rather whether any given content is capable of functioning in the interests of a better ordered experience. To speak, therefore, of *the* ideal from the standpoint of the various natural and anthropological sciences, as if to validate their separate judgments were possible only on the supposition that some inclusive and unchanging norm were capable of being stated, is to run counter to the actual way in which our experience in

the several fields of knowledge has grown, and to claim an absoluteness for our finite judgments which falsifies the history of human culture. An ideal we have in every separate social concernment which, in respect to the actually existing situation, is the only ideal. To ask for more than that is to burden ourselves with what could be of no possible use, and to make futile all progress in moral living. It is sufficient, therefore, to recognize that all moral qualities are determined with reference to an ideal which controls the given situation in which conduct takes place. This is the first type of the concrete moral judgment.

Looked at in a slightly different way, the procedure in this case may be said to be analogous to that which is implied in scientific classification. The formula of classification may be expressed thus: "This" is a case of "that." Now, in the present instance, the "this" is always some definite action: going on an errand, studying one's lessons, casting a ballot, or what not. Now each of these is, in one point of view, only a "this." It is, as we say, a "fact." It is there, a positive existence, a something not to be doubted. But to be merely this, to have to pass from one to another of such facts over the chasm that secures to each its separate identity, requires us either to give up thinking, or to find in the emotional irritation generated by a disordered sequence the motives of our cognitive efforts. As we have stated it elsewhere, "Science springs out of the conflict of wishes with facts, and is at bottom the effort to satisfy a vague undifferentiated esthetic sense which showss itself at first under the demand for order and unity. The primitive consciousness of what is esthetically satisfying, and the restraint under which the human spirit lies so long as the objective world presents itself haphazard, gets expression for itself, earliest as well as latest, in the refusal of the human mind to believe that the phenomena of perception *cannot* be reduced from the changing order to a rational system of relations."⁴ The ground of this belief, which extends beyond the philosophical to the scientific fields of inquiry as well, is the

⁴ "The Concept of Change," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. IX, p. 503.

fact that thought has not to do with a foreign material, but is the instrument which reality employs for its own reconstruction. Every fact, therefore, is an aspect of reality which to be really real must develop meanings through which its individual isolation is overcome in some inclusive whole.⁵ As a question of classification, this signifies that any given fact acquires importance if and when it is an example of some other fact or facts with which it is capable of assimilation. What this other—the “that”—is in an ethical problem, we have already indicated. It is the meaning, the convention, the law or custom, of which the total situation is the finite expression. If the separate, self-identical deed is capable of being regarded as a unique exemplification of the standard life of the group, it is to be judged good; if, on the other hand, it tends to subvert the communal interests, it is to be judged bad. The good is whatever works toward the self-preservation of the whole, it is whatever is capable of being controlled by the interests which are functional in and through the society which determines the particular deed. The bad is whatever works toward social disintegration, it is whatever makes demands upon the social order which, without self-modification, it is unable to meet.

Secondly, good or bad may be predicated of the relation which any social deed is the means of establishing within the social order. In the first case, it is the action itself which receives moral approval or disapproval. In this, it is the redistribution of the social life as a whole which results from the individual piece of conduct. At the close of the last paragraph we referred to self-modification as the characteristic demand of any deed which is called bad. The point of view from which, in this second type of the moral judgment, we regard the moral life, requires us to consider how far modification of the common social ideal may take place without determining the action through which this is brought about to moral disapprobation. This question involves the more general in-

⁵For the psychological account of the process, *cp.* Stout, “Manual of Psychology,” pp. 84 f.

quiry into the nature of the ideal especially with reference to its possibility of development. We may point out that the ideal is the organic law of the moral process through which the *socius* comes to complete self-expression. What, therefore, is required by the idea of growth as characteristic of the moral community, is that every deed should be a unique expression of the common good which the *socius* aims to conserve. As unique, this means that precisely the same thing can never happen again. But, because it is unique, every deed also tends toward the modification of the ideal to which it is assimilated by the moral judgment. Now, as was suggested above, the moral judgment is not concerned with the administration of a law which has its basis outside the sphere of its application, but with the formulation of the law by which, throughout its whole course, definite communities are to be guided and controlled.⁶ The law, therefore, which in every moral judgment receives a new interpretation, cannot be other than the expression of the degree of social integration which the particular group, through its structural differentiations, has at any time attained. What we considered, in the first instance, as a case of classification, we now regard as a growth in the complexity of the structural elements and relations of society as a whole. The problem, consequently, from this point of view reduces itself to a question of fact which only the life history of the community can answer. Growth, that is to say, takes place, if at all, within the limits of variation which are determined by the whole social structure. What these limits of variation are is impossible to state *a priori*. But whatever they are, so long as the deed falls within the specified limits, there is provided the foundation of moral approbation, the degree of approval depending upon

⁶ Theological ethics, as a rule, labors under the disadvantage of the administrative view of the subject; but we do not think this essential to its standpoint. Of course, theological ethics cannot be scientific in the narrower meaning of the term, but must be based upon a definite theistic interpretation of the universe. A bad theology, then, as readily as a bad metaphysics or a bad science, may lead to one-sided and erroneous views in the field of morality. But a good theology is just as possible as a good science or a good philosophy.

whether the upper or lower limits of change are reached. The good, more specifically considered, is that which secures a moderate readjustment of conditions as the determining factor of further moral judgments. The bad, in consequence, must be looked upon as that which carries us beyond either of the extreme limits of variation. When the action falls below, and becomes merely imitative, it is bad; when it falls above, it is so unique that it has lost its points of attachment with the common life, it introduces a relation that is disruptive.

The third type is the personal. This is a late and highly developed form of the moral judgment. It implies the other two. To say "you are good" means not merely that this thing you do exemplifies the moral ideal, nor only that the relations established by means of your action tend to the conservation of the common good, but that whatever you do will both exemplify and conserve the established ends of the moral community. It is definitely a judgment on character. But no judgment on character of the kind we call good is possible which is not at the same time the expression of a confidence which has its roots in the experience of the past. In this type of judgment, consequently, we have the completest exemplification of the social faith (*con-fides*) which guarantees the future. Our future actions are conditioned by the personal type of the social judgment. Or, as we popularly say, we do what is expected of us. We do so, not because we must, but because the ideal has become an established principle of action with us; our life has been completely socialized. We may affirm that it is "the spirit working in the man, the spirit of devotion to the moral ideal and the constant working to realize it, which are the chief distinctions between the good and the bad."⁷ But this spirit and this devotion are themselves the resultants of the life to which they themselves are more and more effectively the instrumentalities. The moral person, in other words, is a product of social evolution in which the ideal no longer exists as an abstract requirement, but assumes more vital relations in a living example. It is the absolutely free life be-

⁷ Ladd, "The Philosophy of Conduct," p. 443.

cause there is no tension between the individual and social aspect of moral existence.⁸ But for the present the implications of the view we are suggesting lie beyond the scope of this paper. We must, therefore, be content to remark that he who does not satisfy the conditions of being morally approved must submit to the other types and methods of judgment until society has—as we significantly say—made up its mind about him. For to be called good or bad is, when thoughtfully done, an irreversible judgment. This is what is expressed, for example, in the proverb, “Give a dog a bad name and hang him.” Sometimes it is a long road that leads to social excommunication, sometimes it is only a step. But when, in the judgment of society, a man has lost that feeling for his fellows which is the basis of social commendation, he is *ipso facto* a bad man and comes under social disapprobation and condemnation. He is refused the privileges of the flock because he is not a bird of the same feather.

III.

From the standpoint of the subject of moral action, we are concerned with feeling as instrumental to the moral life. The question whether there are unique moral feelings which serve as a guide to what is right and deter from what is wrong, is only indirectly involved in the problems of this section. We have to ascertain how any one comes to do the things society considers right and wrong, good and bad. Feeling working toward moral ends may be considered in typical ways.

The first case is where a particular action gets done because it is regarded as a means to the satisfaction of a desired end. Now from the standpoint of feeling, we are always at the disadvantage of selecting as means those actions which are only indirectly connected with the end we wish to realize. The reason for this lies not so much in the means we adopt as in the end we aim at. Hence it will be seen that in such examples as fall under this case, we do not have a series of events which are causally connected, but one in which the causal relation is, if

⁸ Cf. Jesus: “My Father and I are one.”

at all, only implicitly contained. The fact is that the relation between the feeling and the action through which the feeling is to be satisfied is not one that is based upon an analysis of the several factors and the discovery of a common ground, but is due to the practical connections which feeling is alone capable of sustaining. Experience, that is to say, directs the feelings in the choice of means to the ends which are important to them. Now in the moral life it is fundamentally necessary to have, as the support of the individual's efforts in the direction of the larger good, the approbation or good will of society. This is only to state formally what we mean when we insist upon obedience to the laws and customs of the social order as the condition *sine qua non* of making the laws which are the expression of the growing life of the community. Right judgment of what is morally worthy is, according to the best insight of the teachers of morality, secondary to right conduct in the relations of life.⁹ Hence it is that feeling takes precedence of thought in relation to what is right for any one to do. We cannot, therefore, look upon it merely as a remarkable coincidence, but as the result of the psychogenetic development of the moral life, that it is through the feelings that we come most directly into touch with the common life which we share with our fellows in any prescribed social order. The social judgments which exist in the form of institutions become effective through the instrumentality of the feelings in the life of individuals for the getting done of those things which are in harmony with the social ideal. The thing done, however, from the standpoint of the individual does not fall under a class concept, it is not a judgment, but is intended to be the medium of that form of satisfaction which the social approbation mediates.

In the second case the judgmental element, which is barely noticeable in the first, becomes more pronounced, but is yet subordinate to the feelings which are satisfied through the moral approval of what we do. We should include here all

⁹ *Cp.* Jesus: "Not everyone that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven."

examples of imitation, as well as those actions which, through either experience or judgment, are known to be germane to one or other of the wider classes of actions which have already received the social sanction. At the best, imitation is but a pale shadow of the moral life. And yet the common run of mortals, except by a providential mistake, never gets beyond it! It was this stage of moral development that a teacher of ethics had in mind when he declared to his class that "the good man is not the man who does what I do, but the one who is in right relations to the moral ideal." And yet it must be admitted that imitation, when looked at from the ethical point of view, is a means, and, at an early stage in the moral education of the individual and of the race, the only means available for effecting the "right relation to the moral ideal" which was said to be *par excellence* the test of the goodness of what any one does. For I do what you do, not only because I must do something, but because what you do is fraught with no ill consequences when you do it and, before the development of a critical judgment, there is no reason why it should be otherwise when I do it. When I imitate another for moral reasons, therefore, I do so for the satisfactions that are to be gained, not because I particularly care about the thing itself. The individual interprets actions through their values, and feeling is the sense of the value which things have. When, however, our sense of values fails, or—which is the same thing—our feelings deceive us, some factors of the problem become emphatic which before were either overlooked or taken for granted. Does it, for example, make no difference who does the action which is morally approved? If it does, imitation is no longer a safe guide to life, and when persisted in, may become the source of much that is to be morally reprobated. Why I may not do without censure what you do with impunity is because when I do it it does not belong to the same general class of actions, or does not effect the same relations, as when you do it. The law gets fulfilled in the one instance, it is broken in the other. Hence judgment must be made explicit if, from the standpoint of the subject, the moral feelings are to receive their fullest reward. Judgment thus becomes a

means for the development of the moral life. A larger feeling and active life is possible with the growth in intelligence of the moral subject. Any thoughtful course of action thus becomes good, not because it is rational, but because it secures the social approval in which, for the individual, moral good resides. However rational in itself considered the same action might be, in the absence of the conditions of moral valuation that same thing would be regarded as bad without the approbation of the community which is interested in the relations which the action establishes. We affirm that, from the individual standpoint, satisfaction of the feelings which center in the social judgment are the only guide to moral action, and to the distinctions of good and bad. All moral actions are middle terms between these two sets of factors.

Whether or not we ever reach, as a matter of individual experience, the third form which instrumental morality is capable of assuming will depend, in part, upon the issue of the demand for judgment which, as we have seen, the developing moral experience sooner or later emphasizes. If and so long as the requirements of the particular case are met by assuming the social judgment as our own, or, if and when we come to realize, as a practical affair, that the moral satisfaction we aimed at is to be reached by another course of action than the one first essayed, we have not gone beyond the cases of the second kind. It is only when we persist in our demand for moral approval of the thing we do in face of social disapprobation that the conditions are present for the development of the highest personal or individual morality. But the recognition cannot be given without a redistribution of the factors of the moral ideal and a new insight into the implications of its own nature now, for the first time, made explicit in the individual who has created the new demand. This is the significance, for example, of Oliver Twist's request for "more." When the problem is stated in this way, it is no longer a question of the rightness or wrongness of an action, but of the goodness or badness of an individual. If the social consciousness comes to be aware of its own moral ideal in a more thorough and efficient way through the individual, if through the individual society comes

to see and realize its own truest, its most ideal life, the individual has reached a point when *self-approval* is the necessary correlate of the satisfaction which, though deferred, is invariably mediated by this type of social judgment. If, on the other hand, the tension between the individual and society is not resolved, but becomes a breach, we have a situation which, from the social standpoint, is capable of interpretation in only one way, but, from the individual, is significant of several. If no common factor can be found between what the individual does and what society approves, as a matter of social preservation the individual is excommunicated, he is a bad man. He stands for what, with respect to the social order within which he lives, is disruptive. He not only does what is wrong, there is social remedy for that, but he persists in it. Now persistence, in whatever line it may work, is a fact of character. It is, therefore, right to take the particular action as representative, as a sample of what it is reasonably certain we may expect on other occasions. The social judgment, consequently, passes over from the conduct to the individual whose it is. But the conditions under which we have supposed the higher morality of the individual to develop require, even when the social judgment secures our social elimination, that we maintain the correctness of our feelings and the rightness of our action. If and when this is done, there is developed the consciousness of a probity which finds its justification in a wider and more inclusive morality.¹⁰ We act on our sense of values. But our sense of values must receive justification through their connection with a more fundamental ethical existence. I am good then, not because my individuality of action forfeits me the emotional satisfactions which are connected with the social approval, for that is the only test of goodness we have, but because what I do and the feelings I aim to satisfy have their roots in a more essential moral order. Moral actions are moral first because they are typical, and when they are called in ques-

¹⁰ Cp. Paul: "With me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you, or of man's judgment: Yea, I judge not mine own self. For I know nothing against myself; yet am I not hereby justified: but he that judgeth me is the Lord."

tion, they may be vindicated by stating the implied principle.¹¹ When, therefore, the lower and the higher come into conflict there is only one moral course. We must then become intelligent if we are to meet the demands of the best life. We cannot be good apart from a knowledge of what the good is. No less than religion does morality require of us to be able to give a reason for the faith that is in us.

But, finally, we have to consider those cases in which the conflict between feeling and judgment has another termination. We are not always able to defend the things we do. Nor does society easily forgo its own point of view. When neither of these solutions of the moral situation is available, for whatever cause, the only moral course for the individual is to conform his actions to the requirements of the moral life as they have become organized in the conventions of society. Now this may be a permanent or only a temporary resting place in the struggle for the higher life. We may be forced into conformity because we cannot, or because we cannot as yet, justify the thing for which we demand approval. In the former case, it is a matter in which we are in the wrong. When our action is incapable of interpretation through its relation, as means, to the broader social satisfactions, as ends, which are mediated by the social judgment, it loses every vestige of moral significance, and becomes the center of an experience which is wholly individual. Herein it seems to us lies the fallacy of hedonistic theories of ethics; they make the pleasure connected with the performance of the concrete act the end for which the actor strives, instead of considering the action merely as a means to a pleasure which is connected with the action's social value. For us, we find in that action which is done for the sake of its pleasure-giving qualities the essentially bad action. If there is no other reason why anything should be done than the merely psychological fact that it is the source of pleasure to the doer, there is no possibility of bringing it

¹¹ This is the significance of Kant's dictum: That we should so act as to be able to will that the principle of our action should become the basis of a universal legislation.

under a moral denomination. It is merely something which is. It is a brute fact. It happens. Now if one persists in that kind of life, *he* is essentially and radically immoral. But if one attempts to justify himself by ever so small a show of reason, as he may do, for example, by appealing to the unity of consciousness which underlies and gives coherence to the several actions in question, he has made it possible for society to judge him bad, although it is questionable whether he will not himself pass too rapidly beyond the reflective stage to know himself as others know him. There is no basis of moral distinctions where individuality of feeling is all. Good and bad are sounds without meaning.

Our inability to defend our action, we have said, may be due to another cause. The fault may not lie in the conduct, but in our inability to find reasons for it. It may be the better thing, but we cannot as yet assert that it is, because we do not know why it is. It is a case of moral feeling being in advance of the moral judgment. In this situation, we limit ourselves by the recognized social requirements as a temporary expedient, and until the moral situation has become, by the growth in intelligence, more sharply defined. Theoretically, there is no antecedent impossibility to any one being forced to maintain himself in what, with respect to existing moral institutions, is an individualistic position. Sometimes the moral dialectic forces upon some people the *rôle* of an Athanasius against the world. Such a position, however, is defensible only when the concrete case has been thoroughly absorbed by the moral ideal of which it is, *ex hypothesi*, the only example. Herein we find the significance of the great moral characters. They have, as we say, an eye for essentials, and the courage to act in conformity to them. There is no immediate approval possible in such a case. The individual who is forced into this conflict with the moral ideals of his class or age must define the principle of his action, give himself to its exemplification, accept all the consequences, and—the rest is with history.

We may sum up the various points of the discussion in the following statements:

1. Moral action is always social when the social is defined

by means of the constitutive ideas which are the organic law of the moral community.

2. Institutional morality is a study of moral judgments which have become concrete in the form of social conventions, laws or customs.

3. Instrumental morality is a consideration of the moral feelings as a means to those satisfactions which center in social approval.

4. Good and bad as moral judgments assume a variety of forms of which we mentioned three: (1) They indicate that an action does or does not belong to one or other of the general classes of actions which have been approved by the moral judgment; (2) they refer to the relations established by means of any action according as it does or does not require a change in the constitutive ideas of the *socius*; (3) they are predicated of individuals who, by their action, tend to make explicit or to destroy the fundamental principles of the society within which the action takes place.

5. From the standpoint of moral feeling, good and bad may mean three things: (1) that action is regarded by the individual as good or bad which serves or fails as a means to the satisfaction of the desired end; (2) moral feeling conditions the rise of judgment which then becomes instrumental to the doing of those things which are or are not conformable to the moral ideal and therefore of securing the approval or disapproval of the moral community; (3) self-approbation, from this standpoint, is conditioned by the conflict between the judgments of society and the feelings of the individual. This conflict makes possible the highest as well as the lowest types of moral life.

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THE IDEALIST AND THE INTUITIONIST.

Since idealist ethics first began, its exponents have contrasted it in general and in detail with a well-defined set of doctrines, those of the naturalist and the Hedonist schools. And with Plato at the beginning and the latest text-book at the end, this work seems now to have been effectively and usefully done. On the other side, however—that of intuitionism—it seems to me possible and desirable to have the boundary line more clearly defined.

I am sure that most beginners fall into confusion here, and I believe there is some excuse for them. Written accounts often allow the two schools to approach very closely. A recent work (Mr. Warner Fite's "Introductory Study of Ethics") treats intuitionism as a special kind of idealism. And an established idealist text-book, after criticism of the older "morality of conscience," has the remark, "If it be said that what is intuitively apprehended is not right and wrong as such, but the true end of human life, we have passed to a new theory altogether. . . . In this form intuitionism can no longer maintain itself as an independent theory. . . . On any theory of the end, we may very well admit that its worthiness is intuitively discerned. . . ."

The present time in English ethics is perhaps suitable for an attempt to draw the lines more firmly, since a doctrine remarkably like what is mentioned here has lately been brought forward, in a way which seems to give it much likelihood of maintaining itself as an independent theory. In the mutual criticisms of Mr. G. E. Moore and the idealists, it is interesting to observe how hard the critics sometimes find it really to meet each other. And I believe this may be due to the fact that each side partly fails to see where the two begin to differ. Idealists cannot help thinking that their opponent is really an idealist who has lost his way; while Mr. Moore on his part persists in regarding them as highly confused exponents of the intuitionist view.

Now I am anxious that the extremely limited scope of my

article should be understood. I am not going to write history. Intuitionism as it has appeared in the past does not concern me; it may be true that this has a close relation to idealism, and it has certainly been a good ally against naturalist schools. But certain views, lately put forward under the name, I believe are destined to have considerable importance, and to be of considerable use to the coming generation, if only their upholders and the idealists will not try to adopt each other as allies (and complain of each other as bad ones). I believe the service of ethics and especially of the teaching of ethics at its present stage lies not in the non-recognition of the differences here but rather in the discovery and the emphasis of them; and not in the search for an undenominational substratum, but in the formulation by each side of a definite and denominational creed. The more the two can get their typical features into clearly contrasted articles of belief, the fairer will be the choice between them, and the sounder the synthesis which may come in the future.

Those who suggest these creeds need not always write criticism any more than history. They need not always prove that this or that writer believes this or that on such a point, but only that it would be convenient if he and his opponent could in future agree to state their difference in this way; or not even that, but only that the typical party names might for the future conveniently be given to those who could. This may seem too loose and easy an endeavor, yet it seems as if such irresponsible but definite suggestions might have a useful place. They afford opportunities, at any rate, for the exhibition of bad misapprehensions, and therefore for a reply to them; and even this may advance the subject by helping the student.

After all this preamble, I am only going to deal with one small point where it seems to me a difference might be found, and which in that case ought to come somewhere near the beginning of both creeds. In a second article I shall try to give tentative statements of a few other clauses on the side of idealism.

To come at once to such business as I do undertake, I suggest the following: There are two groups of intuitionist

thinkers who may well be of importance in the future. In England, Mr. G. E. Moore might consent to lead the first of these; and (his Hedonism apart) the late Professor Sidgwick might have consented to lead the second. There is also a group which combines the distinctive views of both of these, and this I believe is represented by ordinary "common sense." With the first two groups idealism should, I think, consent to part company on this point amongst others—a difference in the analysis of conceptions corresponding in the first case to the adjective "good," in the second to the verb "ought." And these differences would seem to involve corresponding differences in the psychological analysis of two particular states of mind. In the case of the first group the state of mind in question is what we know as "approval," in the second it is "the sense of moral obligation." In the abstract the question could be settled by psychology alone; as a matter of fact it is far too difficult for psychology, and must stand or fall with the rest of the corresponding doctrines.

Once more, I am not dealing at present with the rest of these doctrines, but only with this single point. And I say idealism *should* consent to part company here because I am not quite sure that we have clearly made up our minds about it yet. I only think that idealism would be a firmer and better defined body of doctrine if it could conscientiously, just at this place, draw its boundary inwards and leave the intuitionists outside.

To begin with Mr. Moore and approval—the state of mind in which we judge a thing "good."

According to my reading, approval as such for the intuitionist will have in it something which is distinct from any kind of desire as such, or experience of the satisfaction of desire or need, or recognition of the kind of thing that would satisfy; distinct from anything outside a universe indicated by "approval," "good," "right," and a few other terms. "Approval as such," for he need not deny that the state might always be accompanied by desire or involve it as a consequence or even as a condition. But in itself it is an element distinct from the whole world of our desires. We approve

when, without reference to any want or need in ourselves, we recognize that this or that is absolutely good. What I approve may be entwined with desire in all kinds of ways; nevertheless my approval must be distinct from my desire and from the recognition of satisfyingness. This gives Mr. Moore his unique and indefinable adjective "good."

The typical idealist, on the other hand, I suggest should simply deny the existence of this peculiarity. According to him, the state we call approval in the broader sense will consist characteristically of the recognition that a thing satisfies my desire or fulfils my need, and in the narrower sense it will be the judgment that a thing fits in with the system of life desired on the whole, the knowledge or the feeling that "this is what I really want," or "this is what my truly human nature needs." I speak vaguely with intention here, not wishing for the moment to attempt an exact definition. What such an idealist dislikes is the closing of a universe which for him is not closed. For him, the application of the adjective "good" is essentially and rightly dependent on somebody's nature on the conative side, or somebody's needs and dispositions. "My" good and "your" good and "his" good are logically prior to "the" good (whereas for the intuitionist "the" good, or possibly "goodness," is fundamental, and "my" good is meaningless.) And this gives T. H. Green his statement that the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies desire.

If this does not sound commonplace, it may sound like a sinful perversion of Green and all proper idealists. I am not forgetting the main doctrine of idealism, which makes very definite statements about the needs of rational beings in a rational universe. As a matter of fact, it says, we all need something which it describes thus and thus; this and nothing else is "desirable," *i. e.*, would be desired if we saw clearly. And it is much more convenient in some ways to call this "the Good" with a capital letter, and to say that we need it because of its character, *i. e.*, because it is Good, and that therefore Good is logically prior to "need." But it is that *adjective* of Mr. Moore's which makes the difficulty I am trying to solve.

It seems hopeless to meet him, as some seem tempted to do, by simply complaining that "good" is not pretty as an adjective; the word is much too common and convenient for that. And if we allow ourselves to agree with him that it stands alone and indefinable we seem led into many difficulties. If we give a definition, this seems to me a possible one. I believe that all the chief features of idealism may be kept, even though we begin our definitions thus. But it involves the consequence that our creed and the intuitionists must state a difference in psychological doctrine near the beginning.

Let us turn now to the second group of intuitionists, and the question of the sense of moral obligation.

It is rather curious that Mr. Moore should claim Professor Sidgwick so emphatically as one of the few writers who have recognized the truth that the adjective "good" is indefinable. Not only does Professor Sidgwick never say this, but on page 110 of the "Methods of Ethics" (6th edition), he actually gives an explicit definition, with which idealists, according to my view, need find very little fault. Its expression sounds partly hypothetical, but the context seems to show that the writer is expressing his own real opinion. "It would seem, then, that if we interpret the notion 'good' in relation to 'desire,' we must identify it . . . with the *desirable*, meaning by 'desirable' . . . what would be desired . . . if it were judged attainable by voluntary action, supposing the desirer to possess a perfect foresight, imaginative as well as intellectual, of the state of attainment or fruition." And on page 111, "A man's future good on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him were accurately foreseen and adequately imagined at the present point of time."

The quotations on page 17 of *Principia Ethica* are taken from Professor Sidgwick's claim for the ultimateness of *ought* or the notion of moral obligation. This he deliberately distinguishes from the other notion of "good." "The ideal element" (in "good"), he says, "is entirely interpretable in terms of *fact*, actual or hypothetical, and does not introduce any judgment of value, fundamentally distinct

from judgments relating to existence; still less any 'dictate of reason.' It seems to me, however, more in accordance with common sense to recognize—as Butler does—that the calm desire for my 'good on the whole' is *authoritative*; and therefore carries with it implicitly a rational dictate to aim at this end." (Op. cit., page 112.)

Professor Sidgwick, then, takes "good" in a way that an idealist might easily accept, but he becomes an intuitionist, according to my view, by his treatment of "ought." Mr. Moore says that "good is . . . the only simple object of thought which is peculiar to ethics" (*Principia Ethica*, page 5), and he drops Professor Sidgwick's idea of obligation, altogether. His only statements on the matter, I think, are to the effect, "The assertion, 'I am morally bound to perform this action,' is identical with the assertion, 'This action will produce the greatest amount of good in the universe.'" (Op. cit., page 167.)

So there are the two groups of intuitionists, and, just as idealism parted from the first over the analysis of "approval," so it should part from the second over the analysis of the sense of obligation. Idealists, if I am right, had best claim that this state of mind, if properly examined, would provide no notion of a command, but only that of some demand of our nature or another's; "this gap cries out to be filled thus;" "this is what is wanted." The specifically moral "ought" will stand for "this is *the* thing wanted; the thing that will satisfy the fundamental needs." The "must" of duty to the martyr is only the voice of his deepest self. "I must have this, though I die for it."

Intuitionists, just as before with "approval," claim that there is a distinct and peculiar element here, distinct from all desire and need and recognition of what would satisfy. For the idealist the state of mind now in question is really the same as that which occurs in approval. He has reduced both to the recognition "this is what is wanted," though the tone and feeling vary in different circumstances, and therefore two different peculiarities in its two chief sets of appearances are believed in by his opponents. I think that

the typical common-sense moralist believes in both these peculiarities, so that his ethics has not one "ultimate and unanalyzable idea," but two. I am not sure that an intuitionist system would not be most manageable on this basis. But intuitionism is possible with only half of it.

Psychology, as I said, might conceivably settle these two questions, but as a matter of fact they are much too hard for psychology. We cannot answer them by introspection. The man untrained in philosophy may think he can, and, if he keeps clear of the grosser errors of psychological Hedonism, is apt at once to give an intuitionist account. But in the first place he has probably been brought up so, and in the second place it is by far the easiest account to give; if we do find it hard to see a connection or an explanation, it is always easy to say that the thing is disconnected and inexplicable. Psychology is really helpless, for the present at any rate. We shall decide these two details according to our acceptance of idealism or of intuitionism as a whole, and that will depend mostly upon our metaphysics.

The idealist might find a little support, however, in noticing that the intuitionist doctrine *looks* like a very natural remnant from an obsolete faculty psychology. Nobody a while ago need object to conscience seated apart from the rest of us, or to reason perceiving an inexplicable and unarguable fitness of things, or to moral sense or moral feeling giving information about a quality concerning which nothing else could speak. But with our modern education we object very strongly. I am not making Professor Sidgwick or Mr. Moore responsible for the older intuitionist doctrines, yet I hardly think that theirs can be made sufficiently unlike. It seems as if that approval and that sense of "oughtness" must still remain discordant—I will not venture to say incompatible—with the rest of what psychologists have taught us by this time.

There is some weight also in the other fact that a plausible account can be given of the way in which intuitionism may arise. *Eg.,* the original idea of good for me might be

vaguely "what I want." Then I notice that I want some things more than others, some more permanently than others, some only as means; some I seem always to want at bottom; some other people agree with me in wanting. I gradually form the conception of something that remains good for me whatever I may seem to want at the moment, and again of something that is good for others as well as for myself. The limits become vague, and I easily pass into thinking, (1) of something which essentially is good *whatever* I want, temporarily or permanently and at top or at bottom, (2) of something which is good *for* nobody in particular, good in itself. My approval, the recognition of satisfactoriness (or of "real" satisfactoriness), is then interpreted as being the recognition of this indefinable good, and apart not only from the conation of the moment but from all my conative nature.

Starting with the proposal that we should agree on this as one special point of contrast between our two great schools, I shall try to mark that contrast still further by proposing a few definitions of important terms, definitions such as in my opinion idealists might accept, whereas intuitionists certainly could not. In doing this we shall go over a good deal of the ground that has been traversed already, but go over it in a more elaborate and emphatic way. I begin by repeating with as much emphasis as I can, that I know that for idealist definitions mine begin at an unusual end, and that nevertheless I am not forgetting the fundamental doctrines of idealism and their relation to general philosophy. I believe that those doctrines can very largely be expressed in language whose terms are defined as I define them. Mine is very far from being the only way of defining, and for many purposes it is not the best, but it has the special advantage for my purpose of bringing out this contrast which interests me; and I hold that it is a possible way, that is, that the language is not thereby rendered useless for the objects of idealism. In my second article I shall try to show this by expressing some idealist doctrines in the language thus prepared. That is, assuming my

definitions, I will try to write a few clauses of the idealist creed.

Meanwhile to make definitions. Not many are needed, but "good," "ought," and "approval" must be precisely explained. After that I shall go on to a further point, and discuss the meaning which, having once started on these lines, we shall have to give to the most important idealist term of "self-realization."

I am going to begin with the adjective "good," and the common property "goodness." We cannot well avoid using these words, and therefore, if I understand idealism at all, we must be ready to define them. I choose to begin my definitions here, and, as I say, I do not think this need render our language useless.

I shall cling to authority to the extent of starting from a passage in Professor Mackenzie's review of *Principia Ethica* (*INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, April, 1904, page 381).

"It is pretty certain that the original meaning of the good in human experience is one that is distinctly relative. What is good is, in the first instance, what is good for something or other. It is only by after reflection that we come to recognize that such mediate goods must have reference to some end to which they are means, and so we are led gradually to the conception of some good which is not a means, but is valued purely in and for itself. What is good thus signifies, first of all, a means to some desired or desirable end, and afterwards some ultimate end involved or presupposed in desire. There are thus two meanings of good, both connected directly or indirectly with desire, and both capable of being defined in relation to desire. It is no doubt wrong to say simply that good is what is desired or willed; it might be truer to characterize it as the objective counterpart of desire or will, or as that which would satisfy desire. It is difficult to see how it could have any meaning for us at all apart, apart from some such reference to conation."

"It is no doubt wrong to say simply that good is what is desired or willed." I think there are two ambiguities against which Professor Mackenzie may be guarding himself here. (1) Desire and will are generally used as terms implying clear consciousness; our desire for an object is a "state of mind" which may come and go. We do not wish to say that a thing ceases to be good for us when we cease to think

about it, or to deny that it may be good for us, even though we have never desired it, or even thought of it at all. (2) The strength and vividness of a desire vary much with accidental circumstances, and it would be unusual to say that the satisfaction of a keen momentary desire was always a great good. Perhaps the term "want" or "need" is superior in both these ways, and we might say provisionally that a thing was good in so far as it satisfied a need, or if actual would satisfy it.

But to make the contrast with intuitionism perfectly definite we must insist that all good is *my* good or *your* good or *his* or *ours*. Whatever is good is good *for* somebody. Your good is the satisfaction of your need, but that is not my good unless it satisfies my need too. Hence, to prevent all ambiguity we had better say: "A thing is good *for any being* when it satisfies a need of his, or if actual would satisfy it." This does not forbid us to speak of a "common good," but that will be common in the sense of belonging to us both, not independent and belonging to neither.

There is a further point disconnected with intuitionism. It seems that we can have a permanent desire—that is, a want or need—for things which even if actual would not be part of our own experience. An example would be found if a man, without believing in his own existence after death, still wished that after his death a friend or a cause should prosper. These cases introduce great awkwardness into language and theory, yet it seems impossible to deny their existence. The result is, that in words which, though awkward, appear the best available, we shall have to admit that in certain cases a need may be "fulfilled" without being "satisfied." I keep here what I think is a strong implication of the ordinary use, that "satisfaction" of my need means a personal experience of mine; "fulfilment" seems more easily deprived of this implication. There will be fulfilment without satisfaction if a beloved person attains great good without my being aware of it; satisfaction without fulfilment in the opposite case of false good news.

Then, if we allow the above use of words, do we still wish

to say that a thing is good for me in so far as it satisfies my need, or shall we say "in so far as it fulfils it?" On the whole I am inclined to make the change. This would allow me to keep, as a verbal statement. "I need or desire a thing inasmuch as it is good"; for by our use I desire what fulfils, satisfaction being only a result of the fulfilment or of my knowing it.

A thing, then, shall be called good for any being in so far as it fulfils a need of his, or if actual would fulfil it. This is to be a definition. Goodness as the name of a common property shall *mean* exactly this property of fulfillingness.

Moreover, I am not going to limit "need" in any way; it is to be taken quite widely, so as to cover our cravings, conscious or not, for the smallest objects as well as the biggest, and for means as well as ends. This is because I think the use of the adjective "good" in this wide way is so firmly fixed in common language that it is convenient to keep to it. There is nothing to hinder the special idealist qualifications from being superimposed. Needs which in any sense are peculiarly "real" will have peculiarly "real" goods corresponding to them. "The Good" in the sense of "the best possible state of things" will not include everything which in the wide sense is good; on the other hand there will certainly be some "fundamental" needs which it must fulfil.

"*Approval*" (to proceed) will mean the recognition, or perception, or feeling, "that a thing fulfils my need, or if actual would fulfil it." We must not say that "we approve because we recognize this," or we shall be back at the indefinable approval of the intuitionist. Neither must we admit that we can approve a thing which fulfils somebody else's need, unless either (a) his need is for the same thing as mine, or (b) I need the fulfilment of his. My approval in the broad sense is the recognition of "fulfillingness for me." There are various narrower senses, reducible to the recognition that the thing is the *best* of its kind which is possible in that place.

[These proposals involve the psychological doctrine explained before; because we wish "approval" still to denote

the ordinary state for which it is used. The definition of "good" involves no such doctrine; it is only a matter of the way in which we choose to use language. But unless our doctrine of approval is adopted, the definition of "good" will render that word comparatively useless for ethics.]

Approval even in the broader sense must not be identified with liking. For liking seems best used to imply desire, whereas approval strictly implies only need. A need may exist in every sense in which a disposition can exist, and we may yet be quite unable sometimes, though we know it is there, to *feel it as a conscious craving*. Thus I may fully recognize that to sit down and write some pages of a book would best fulfil some deep-seated needs of mine—to make profitable use of my time, to do a thorough piece of work, to earn my salary in an honest way, to contribute to the progress of philosophy. If I consider that these needs are the most important that can be fulfilled just now, then I approve of the action in the special ethical sense as well as in the broad. Yet I may not *like* it much at all, in itself, or as fulfilling these needs. I may not carry it out. If I do carry it out, I may be impelled not much or even not at all by the needs in question, but by habit, or by a desire for self-control and consistency, or even merely to prevent future remorse. If I do a thing I must like it in some respect, but the respect may be very different from that in which I approve it.

"*Ought*," by reason of all its associations, is hard to keep to what I suggest should be the typical idealist sense. In this sense it must never be defined to express a commandment, but simply as a demand.

"This ought to be" in the broadest sense must just mean, "This is what is wanted here." "This would fulfil a need." It would be equivalent to "this is good" except for the custom of applying it in general only where a thing is not yet known to be actual. Specializing further, the context will usually determine *whose* need is in question. "He ought" may refer only to some private need of his own; "My would-be murderer ought to go well armed." But in the marked "ethical" sense we can substitute the ethical "I ap-

prove," and then the reference is to *my* deepest needs, or, as idealism claims in its positive doctrine, to *ours*.

The needs referred to, in the broader use at any rate, may be of most miscellaneous kinds. An interesting class arises from the need for logical consistency. "My whole system of thought demands . . ." "If the sides are equal, so ought the angles to be." "A kindly man ought to be pleased with such a thing." Here comes in what at first sight is puzzling, the question "why ought I to approve of this?" It only means, "On what grounds does consistency demand that I approve?" This special need is supposed to require that I shall recognize an object as fulfilling certain other needs. Similarly with the statement, "This is desirable." In consistency, since they have certain needs, men should desire certain things.

Other miscellaneous instances are easily interpreted. "That bridge ought to bear an engine to be of any use." "A child should not have more than five hours' work." "It's no affair of mine, but I think he ought to do it." "There ought to be a Turner on that wall." "There ought not, for the poor are starving." "I suppose I ought to go and call." "We should love one another." More complicated, and I think generally used with an uncertain intention, are, "He ought to be more reasonable," "to be patient (though he isn't)," "to see that it can't be done." Simpler are, "He ought to be hanged" (our notion of a satisfactory world demands it); "I ought to be immortal." In "I ought not to be expected to do it, ma'am," I profess to speak in the same sense, but suspect that I lie.

Everywhere is the notion of filling a gap with the thing wanted, or, more specifically, with *the* thing wanted. There will be nothing in the pure idealist sense but this demand from the gap; no commandment, obligation, precept, or moral law (except in the way of a "natural" law dealing with morality). Any implication to the contrary will be an unjustifiable borrowing from the prestige of intuitionism.

I have now suggested special definitions for three important ethical terms. I thought that idealist ethics would be a better marked body of doctrine if its typical denominational creed included a divergence from typical intuitionism on a

certain psychological point; and, because this point interested me, I framed my definitions so as to bring out the contrast in question. Now will this introduce great awkwardness into the statement of the rest of the system, or shall we be able to proceed? It will be something of a test if we end by examining the possibility of giving a corresponding definition of one or two other important terms, and still keeping them to their chief ordinary uses. In what sense, then, can we retain the phrase "My good is self-realization"?

If the definition is to correspond with what we have already, it will be well to express it in terms of "need," in the wide ordinary sense of that word. I suggest that self-realization should mean what *most* fulfils all my needs when I take them as a whole; what most fulfils me who need; the "fulfillingest" fulfilment.

I can explain it no more definitely than this, and I admit that this is vague and awkward, and constitutes a disadvantage of the language I have suggested. Still I think it is just clear enough to make the use possible, and I do not think the denotation which results need differ from that to which idealists usually refer—at least when the *doctrine* of idealism is supplied.

Ordinary quantitative measurement is, of course, out of the question; there is no unit of need or of fulfilment. The "most" seems to refer to some kind of intensive quantity or quality as much as to anything else. Our translations are hopelessly vague, yet we do attach some meaning to our phrase when we say that one state is more satisfactory than another. On this subject we may notice that it is the "more" that concerns us even rather than the "most." What I have to aim at is always "the greatest fulfilment that seems possible under the circumstances." I do not think it is wrong to speak of this as "aiming at self-realization." It is not the same sense as we use in "aiming at the bull's-eye," for this, if the middle of the target were shut off by an obstacle, would be quite different from aiming at getting as near it as possible. But I believe the sense is almost equally common.

The idea of "proper" or "normal" *proportion* does not, I

think, help us much. We have certainly some idea that one side of our nature or a small group of needs in us ought not to have all the satisfaction; that, however intense this satisfaction might be, we should get a more fulfilling whole by making provision "in due measure" for other kinds of needs. It is true also that increased satisfactoriness seems often to lie in better proportion rather than in greater quantity. Things seem to fall into their places, and the more important to get their proper dominance. But the "proper proportion" is more obscure in terms of what we have as yet, than the "fulfillingest fulfilment"; and I do not see how in any language I can define the first except in terms of the second.

Now most accounts of self-realization define it in some such terms as those of the development of character, the explication of a divine principle, the working out of an ideal. Hence the creed of idealism, if it can be written in my language, must contain clauses to the effect that these things are what we most want. That is, it must contain certain definite statements as to our needs, based on the conception of us as rational beings in a rational universe.

I did not wish to employ this usual definition, because, my definition of "goodness" having gone before, it would not be clear, without the positive doctrine, why these things should be good. But with accounts I have chosen, "self-realization is my good" is self-evident. The positive doctrine of idealism will follow to show what else, besides the greatest fulfilment of needs, self-realization will be.

To return to authority, Professor Mackenzie himself *tests* the universe that is to be realized by the sense of fulfilment that we get from living in it; the true self, he says, is "the universe within which we should find an abiding satisfaction."¹ All I have done is to take something like this frankly for my *definition*, and to leave the creed itself to explain what the universe in question is.

But now an objection may be made from my own point of view—that I am injuring my language by wasting a use-

¹ "Manual of Ethics," 1st edition, p. 137.

ful word. In my use "self-realization is my good" will be too self-evident, for it will be simply tautologous. I have not yet defined "my good," but if I did so (since "a good of mine" means "what fulfils a need of mine"), I could hardly define it except as my greatest fulfilment; and that is the way I have defined self-realization.

This is true, but I accept the tautology for the sake of conveniences elsewhere. And the objection itself suggests a way of making my suggestions more plausible as suggestions for *idealism*. I have not been able properly to explain "greatest fulfilment of need;" it certainly need not mean fulfilment of our most vivid and conscious desires; but it must surely mean at least that which I should *choose* if I were wise. If I realized and felt at once all the needs of my nature, each to the extent to which it is real in me, I should surely pursue what seemed to satisfy the nature thus known, and if I knew enough about the objects as well, I should pursue what really was its greatest fulfilment. But now idealists since Plato have maintained that if I knew all about the universe and all about myself I should seek my true good. And so it seems that this good of theirs must coincide with my "fulfilment," and therefore their "self-realization," which by their doctrine coincides with good, will denote the same as my "self-realization." I have only chosen this property of greatest fulfillingness (which seems vague enough to be interpreted to suit us all) to mark out this one thing that we all mean.

This is enough for the present, and I will only conclude by summing up what in this article I have attempted to do.

It seemed to me desirable for ethics, just now, that two well-marked doctrines should get themselves formulated with a good deal of difference between them, under the traditional names of intuitionism and idealism. This is partly a matter of convenience only, for there is nothing to hinder any or every writer from eclecticism or synthesis. We only want two definite creeds to which to give the party names, and in my opinion it would be an advantage to have a sharp contrast between these typical creeds.

One point of contrast which I thought they had better contain lay in a psychological doctrine as to the nature of two familiar states of mind. Because this especial point was interesting to me, I suggested that, for occasional use at any rate, idealism might have definitions of its most common terms which would force the contrast there into prominence.

But it might be objected that this would be inadvisable, because the only creed which could then be written in familiar-sounding language would be something very different from anything to which we have been accustomed to give the name of idealist ethics. And thus if this received the party name, the tradition would be broken, and the arrangement would be too inconvenient for ethics to profit by it.

I do not think that this objection is well founded. For partial justification of myself, I tried to take a test case. I took two important and familiar terms from common idealism, defined them in a way which fitted them in with the rest of my set of definitions, and then tried to see whether or not they could denote what they ordinarily denoted, and so enter in the ordinary way into the expression of familiar doctrines. It seems to me that this may quite well be the case.

But in a second article, I will try to justify myself further, though not completely, by attempting to write in this given language from this given point of view a few fragments of what I take to be the ordinary idealist creed.

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THE ETHICS OF PASSION.

A leading characteristic of the present time appears in the increasing diffusion of independent thought. In past times an Englishman could be relied on to accept from tradition certain broad principles of conduct in public and in private life. He did not examine these principles : he breathed them with the air. But it is becoming more and more his tendency to take nothing on trust, to refuse submission to the claims of any so-called principles, until he has seen them in relation to the needs of the individual, that is of himself. It will not be necessary, under existing circumstances, to relate this observation to the conduct of public affairs.¹ It is the object of the present essay to consider certain effects of the tendency which already manifest themselves unmistakably in our domestic life.

The spirit of independence has its drawbacks, varying in proportion to the value of the principles it calls in question, and the difficulty of apprehending them ; but it has counter-balancing advantages. Principles which rest on no reality crumble at its touch. Yet inasmuch as few principles have been accepted by society and passed into its "conventions" without in some measure representing truth, it can never be fair to assume that a convention is wholly devoid of basis ; and to criticise it profitably is to separate in it what is reasonable from what is not. Such a task requires a degree of patience and discrimination hardly attainable except by those who make of such attainment their conscious aim. And thus it comes about that certain laws of life are hastily disposed of as unreal, because society, in giving them its sanction, has not accurately defined their scope.

It is a characteristic of this new spirit of criticism to set reason above reverence. Whereas there were at one time topics which by common consent were regarded as intimate,

¹ Written in the last days of the late Conservative administration.

if not sacred, and it was the habit of the younger generation to believe that life involved difficulties of which experience alone held the key, it is now the custom for the most delicate of problems to be handled in ordinary conversation, for questions which require the subtlest understanding of the most intricate social relations to be discussed with reckless assurance. There is, in fact, no subject exempt from the methods of free speech now current, and only one subject for which exemption is pretended. But as this pretence is as harmful as everything else fictitious, and serves to give a negative emphasis to the hidden subject, as, moreover, the number of publications which deal with it directly or indirectly is continuously increasing, there seems no choice left but to draw the veil aside, and admitting fully the delicacy and difficulty of the task, attempt to treat the subject in the light of day, criticising the critics of society, and showing how far her tradition or instinct in the matter can be justified. The subject in question is the mutual love of man and woman, the true relations in that love of mind and body, the meaning of marriage. The ruling of society in these matters has been administered with the utmost sternness and its extreme penalty invoked upon the least appearance of neglect—but without avail. The present generation decides that severity was assumed to cover an insecure position and supports the decision by an argument of overwhelming force. It points to the admitted fact that marriage, as society has understood it, represents no single principle; that it stands for a concession to the baser elements of human nature; that the act which renders possible the continuance of the race is declared indistinguishable from the satisfaction of impure desire. To these ideas, and whatever apparatus society may summon to enforce them, the present generation rightly refuses its submission. It will not lightly receive its condemnation, and revolts against a verdict which, claiming the authority of experience, reveals a spirit of cynicism and distrust. The value of the revolt remains to be decided and will depend on the sincerity and moral fibre of those who have undertaken it. Its main line of attack seems, however, to have defined itself already, and calls for the consideration due to a

subject in which the nation's welfare is involved. It begins by insisting that the intercourse of the sexes and the desire which seeks expression in it belong to the equipment of true manhood and true womanhood, their pride and not their shame. It holds that marriage, as at present understood, imposes false restrictions upon this intercourse; that its true warrant lies not in a covenant, indiscreetly made in youth and found in later life to be arbitrary, but in that sense of spiritual unity which belongs to periods of passionate feeling, and naturally claims for itself a physical expression. Serious difficulties attach to the conception, but a relentless logic is applied to them. The state of emotional exaltation which is held to justify this completeness of union cannot be commanded by the will, perhaps cannot always be controlled by it. It is not regarded as on that account less worthy of a place in human life. Rather is it held to belong with those higher instincts which, like the inspiration of the poet, are chiefly valued for the power of their mystery and the mystery of their power. To confine such an impulse to a single relationship, when an equal sense of spiritual affinity may belong to others, would be illogical; to expect to anticipate its promptings, to bind its future by a vow must be absurd. Passionate mutual love—not remembered from the past, but realized in the present—becomes the only sanction of intercourse between the sexes, and that intercourse is held to be true and noble whenever and wherever such mutual love exists.

Readers who suppose that the point of view suggested is one they can afford to neglect are relying on a convention which no longer possesses its former strength. It is not a mere theory that they are being asked to consider, but a principle of life upon which an increasing number of the keenest spirits in the rising generation are prepared to act. Taken, however, as theory, as we now must take it, it has the undeniable advantage of representing a real desire to understand and abide by what is true; and those who believe it to be mistaken must remember that, far from owing its origin to sensual or moody natures, it springs and grows freely in many that are most frank and clear. In exact proportion to the power and nobility of those

and false
and ignori...
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mutual love
does not exist

who embrace the doctrine is the importance of that sympathetic understanding which may enable us to disclose the error which lies at its root. It should first be noted that the strength of the doctrine lies not only in its assurance of the unity and purity of human nature, but also in the intimate connections it sets up between the act of intercourse and an exalted emotional state. No relation is suggested to problems of pleasure or the desire of it. Passionate love is proclaimed to be the only sanction. (Its weakness lies in the fact that it recognizes one aspect only of a problem that has many; it has seized upon a single element of truth, and has claimed validity for the conclusions which seemed to follow from it, because it mistakes this element for the whole.) But before calling attention to certain facts of nature, which the doctrine seems to disregard, it will be well to point to an inconsistency which is inherent in it as it stands. The main contention of those who support it is that spiritual affinity between lovers finds in the act that unites their bodies a natural and inevitable expression; that to ask the meaning or value of such expression, to expect to find a reason for seeking it, is the mark of a mind that is unnatural and impure. Consider, say they, the why and wherefore of so obvious an expression as shaking hands, apply the dissecting intellect, and who knows but you may persuade yourself that the expression is inessential, that the friendships in which it has indeed most meaning are those that could most easily dispense with it. Is that any reason for dispensing with it? A natural impulse prompts you to find such expression for your affection; an impulse no less natural prompts you to find complete expression for a passion more complete. These instincts are rooted in your nature more deeply than the deepest thought: to submit them to calculation is to drag them in the dust.

Such an argument, however, is fatal to the theory it is intended to support. If the essence of the act of intercourse is its spontaneity, how is that spontaneity to be reconciled with precautionary measures, by which possible consequences of the act may be avoided? Is not the mere fact that such consequences claim consideration, that they cannot fail to present themselves to the minds of the lovers, in whatever degree for

the moment they may be engrossed in one another, fatal to the pure instinctiveness of the act? Does it not render incomprehensible the theory that the act can be an end in itself? How can I take care at one time to prevent the consequences of an action, and at another declare that it is its nature to have no consequences? To reply that it is at certain times only that there is danger of such consequences and that it is at other times that the act has the essential value claimed for it, is no reply. [It provides no means of escaping the compromising elements of calculation and precaution.] Spontaneity is destroyed, and it is no less destroyed if it be argued that the consequences may be disregarded as preventable at all times. To prevent the consequence is to recognize its natural connection with the act.

*you fail to
distinguish be-
tween: 1) The
gratefully ac-
cepted result
of an act and
2) The foreseen
and pondered
goal of an act.*

But a wider aspect of the problem claims attention. It has hitherto been the assumption that spiritual affinity expressed itself naturally in physical union. Has the assumption any warrant? Among various tendencies of modern popular thought the tendency to an obvious identification of soul and body takes an important place. This tendency has value as a protest against the equally obvious separation of them, which characterized the thought of preceding generations. But it lends itself to a vague idealism of a dangerous kind. Some time ago a writer in the *Contemporary Review* stated, in an article entitled "The Higher Love," his belief that poets—of whom he instanced Shelley and Rossetti as examples—could testify to an experience denied to common men, in which the body underwent a spiritual change, its particles were readjusted, and it became the soul. A very little reflection upon the passages he quoted served to show that his interpretation of them was too literal. Who, for example has ever supposed that Rossetti's line "And when she kissed, her mouth became her soul" was intended other than figuratively, and even taken as a figure does it not appear somewhat exaggerated? Is it to be regarded seriously as in any sense a revealing statement? Yet the considerations which induced the writer to believe it so were familiar, and are thoroughly characteristic of the time. That some kind of identification of these apparent opposites

is possible, that in more exalted realms or on a higher plane of feeling they will be found to coalesce, is very commonly held. But by what token can the more perfect state be with certainty recognized? Opinion is here more vague. The general tendency of the new school would seem to tell clearly in favor of absorbing and transporting personal passion, finding expression in a concentrated emotional experience. It is partly because such experience baffles the understanding, and yet is known to be connected with periods of intense vitality, that it is regarded as a bond of mysterious union between the body and the soul. To one who, like the present writer, has an unchanging belief in the spiritual nature of so-called material things, who believes that the supposed distinction between the two is nothing more than a distinction between two attitudes of mind with regard to things, of which that attitude in which they appear as spiritual is the true one, it is a matter of the utmost moment to recall such a doctrine as this of the union of soul and body, in however minute a degree, from the regions of the mysterious and indescribable.

Thought on this subject is apt to begin with a rough but serviceable distinction that hands, feet, and the rest are physical or material; feelings, emotions, thoughts, spiritual in their nature: and it is believed that hands and feet are capable of exaltation, that they may be raised to the rank of spiritual agents. To this belief it is a corollary, generally overlooked, that thoughts, emotions and feelings, however spiritual in essence, are capable of depression, may be lowered to the rank of material agents. What is the key to the interchange? Imagine the one side as a complicated machinery—limbs, nerves, muscles—the other as a controlling board, complex also, and in intimate connection with the works. It is the purpose of the board to get from its machinery all the service it can give. When all its powers are fruitfully directed, and all possibility of waste foreseen and avoided, the board may reasonably be said to have brought its machinery into unity with itself. To command this perfect serviceableness clearly involves sustained and concentrated effort on the part of the directors, and a concerted plan of action. Unless they agree together, if

thought goes its own ways or emotion overrides it, if either of them is disturbed by feeling, the action of the machinery instead of being serviceable becomes destructive. It asserts itself blindly and its forces expend themselves without an end. Unless the directors can return to a mutual understanding, they must submit. They are reduced to the position of servants and minister to a machinery, which only continues working, because nothing exists to stop it. In other words the body becomes a spiritual agent, on condition that its directing forces, feeling, emotion, and thought, unite to exact from it the utmost service that it can render.

Space would not permit a general application of the principle. Our business here is to apply it to the intercourse of friends. How then, shall we discover terms against which neither thought, feeling, nor emotion will rebel, how hit upon a principle of action founded in that perfect coöperation of the three, which we have called spiritual? Let us suggest in the first place that spiritual affinity of the most perfect kind is as possible between friends of the same, as between friends of opposing sexes, and that therefore the expression of spiritual by physical union cannot be essential. Thus it would seem that both in the act of intercourse itself and the kind of relationship which looks to it as a climax, the understanding has been denied its proper place, and emotion left to guide alone. One and the same conclusion, it appears, may be reached by following two wholly different routes. And first, intelligence as a spiritual directing force claims that the resources at its command shall never be cramped or narrowed, but shall be allowed to expand and develop, to set up a net-work of relations with an ever widening world; that they shall cease growing only with the failure of that power of living sympathy on which their life depends. A man's greatness is proportionate to the area of the world in which he can truly be said to live. But he only lives when emotion animates his action and his thought. Therefore to control the flow of his emotion, to husband it as the most precious of his possessions, the very secret of his life and power, must become his most eager aim and interest. Of every moment in which he is conscious that emotion is stir-

J. J. C. 1871
measured
time
certainty
certainty

ring in him beyond its usual force, his paramount duty is to ask whether such emotion is fulfilling the splendid function for which it is intended, whether the world in which it is placing him has the grandeur and nobility which call on him, if he is to enter into it, for a great outlay of his reserve of life. Now if—as is the opinion of those whom we are combating—the meaning of intercourse depends on the intensity of emotional exaltation that accompanies it, then, in view of all that is highest in human nature, and of the ideal in whose light man belongs not to his friend only, but to his friends, and to his country, and to the world, reason forbids as incompatible with these wider obligations the act which concentrates into passing moments of intercourse between individuals that vital energy which alone can sustain them in continuous communion with the wider life of humanity. In other words, the value of emotion is not in its intensity alone; it is not to be estimated by the sense of exuberant life which may accompany it, but by the grandeur of the object by which it is evoked. And in proportion as that object is grand and worthy of the soul will be the difficulty of considering the emotion it arouses in isolation from it. In every serious branch of life, it is an infallible sign that power is being wasted, if the exercise of it is valued for its own sake, and not for its results.

by what standard would we judge?

But by a second route it will be possible to reach the same conclusion. Renunciation and restraint are words which, according to the new school, have little that is serviceable to correspond to them. Believing as completely as they do in the singleness of human nature, they see no reason for refusing it the satisfaction of its desires. Difficulties that seem to involve this kind of duty have arisen, say they, because natural demands have been left unsatisfied, and nature is in revolt. But here again the understanding puts in its plea. The word exaltation, a favorite with the new school as we have seen already, itself implies the raising to a higher level of something which was not previously at that level. Applied to human life it involves the recognition in its course of rise and fall. It is better to be high than to be low, and it is better to maintain a lofty level than only occasionally to reach it. If

man is a free agent, he has to face this problem—how to raise his action to a high level and maintain it there. Effort is involved, and choice. Combine the notions, and it appears that elevating or elevated action will not be that which is natural in the more obvious sense. To set aside the action which offers itself as pleasant or exhilarating and to follow that which is arduous and perhaps painful can only be described finally as unnatural by those who deny that ascent is natural to man. Here again is an idea which may rightly be applied to personal relationships of man and woman. What obvious and so-called natural expression a strong feeling claims in such relationship, our friends of the new school are not the first to discover. The assumption that, because obvious, it is elevating is their own. Rather, if noble ends are to be achieved, if human nature is to be exalted, its forces must always be maintained in a delicate balance, its action never permitted to drift towards satisfaction of the most prominent desire. If exaltation means submission of body to spirit, if it is to be applied to the state in which the body is devoting its energies without reserve to the fulfilment of a spiritual purpose, then to take the throbbing of the pulse, high pressure upon life's piston, as a token of it, is the meanest and most superficial of vulgarities. Exaltation is not attained by abandonment, but by control.

It will be useful to summarize at this point the conclusions to which the argument has been leading us. Starting in sympathy with those who criticise the common conception of marriage as a *pis aller*, and refuse to admit a divorce of body and spirit in the fundamental institution of society, we were led to endorse their view that the intercourse of the sexes when worthy of human nature must be in its essence a spiritual act, and that this act, involving, as it must, the most intimate and perfect mutual understanding, could only be conceived as spiritual, when such mutual understanding was present as a reality to the minds of those whom the act made one; that is, when the act was prompted by an unreserving love. Further than this we were unable to follow them. That the act without love is valueless is no proof that love is incomplete with-

Then diffi-
culty is the
touchstone,
and flag-
pole set by
the proper
idols.

This attitude
is incompati-
ble with
such an idea!

and is not
an idea!

you just ob-
jected to the
element of
reason intruding
in the matter
of birth control
(p. 185)

Why? Why
cannot it
be an end
in itself.
See 185

out the act, and offers no suggestion that love requires it. Emotion is a spiritual agent, not merely according to its intensity, but in so far as it unites with reason, and gives its life to action which thought approves. Its tendency is to waste itself, to flow along the easy channel, to rush the rapids and revel in its own spray. If it is to work in the spirit's name, it must recognize the law of renunciation and admit that what is easiest is not always best.

But it would be of little value to criticise the authors of these new opinions without at the least suggesting what their logical development appears to be. They splendidly refuse to admit a slur upon human nature; they insist on viewing it as spiritual and entire. But when they attempt to explain the bearing of one of its profoundest instincts, their argument breaks down. It takes refuge in vagueness, and disappears in a quotation from the poets. Action, we have suggested, can only be called spiritual when emotion gives it life, and reason purpose. The act of intercourse is one that cannot be dissociated from emotion of the intensest kind. Viewed abstractly such emotion cannot be determined as a servant either of flesh or spirit. It may be either. It becomes spiritual in so far as its vital force is directed to the attainment of an intelligible end.

It is assumed by those whose view we are calling in question that the closest human relationship finds its culminating expression in the intercourse of the sexes. How then is closeness of relationship to be tested? To love is to desire the welfare of the beloved, and to make that welfare an end of action. A man's welfare is inseparable from the development of his powers. To develop his power is, as we saw earlier, to widen the world to which he is vitally related. And so the closer a relationship the more complete will be the recognition by each of its members, of the whole area of relations which form the life of the other, or on which the possibilities of wider life depend. A relationship is close, in the spiritual sense, when it means the adoption by each of the other's standpoint, when, by imaginative sympathy, the world which is living to the one can be placed at the service of the other, and each become greater by a share in the other's experience. By a thousand

complexities life conspires to hinder the realization of a perfect communion even in these highest of interests. And clearly the commonest and most elusive lies in the engrossing and fascinating attraction which a single personality can exercise, and which leads at last to the belief that to be related to the person is to submit to the fascination, the closeness of relationship measured by degree of mutual absorption, and of oblivion of all that lies beyond. What wonder if such closeness culminates in an act which makes each the other's world? But, if we accept the belief that a relationship is close in so far as it implies the recognition of wider relationships, what meaning can we ascribe to the act? Individual men and women meet together as members of a community, whose life did not begin with theirs and will not end with it. For all that they prize most dearly, they stand indebted to those who came before them, and in proportion to their nobility will be their desire to hand the treasure on to those who shall succeed. But it is futile to bequeath a treasure except to natures capable of cherishing it. The hope of the race lies in the character of the generation yet unborn.

A familiar truth is apt to lose its meaning in its familiarity; here it befits us to restate one of which the bearing is too seldom realized. It was remarked earlier that spiritual affinity of the most perfect kind was as possible between friends of the same as between friends of opposing sexes. The truth admits of an exception. To a relationship which includes difference of sex is attached a transcendent power which changes and widens its outlook, and cannot fail to give unique value to the mutual dependence of those whom it unites. To such relationships belongs the power, not merely of anticipating the wants of the future or providing conditions favorable to the growth of true and noble aspiration; the power belongs to them of giving continuance to the human family itself. All beauty, truth and honor, all that gives human life its dignity and its reward, appear but shadows when compared with the spirit itself, of which they are but the qualities or the expression. The love of man and woman means more than mutual recognition of the beautiful and good; it means, or may mean, the desire to

"I am a ^{realist}, ^{not a} ^{ideal} ^{philosophical} ^{one} ^{you belong} ^{in the middle} ^{ages.}"

perpetuate the spirit in which the good and beautiful are most perfectly expressed. The advocates of the theory we are criticizing have insisted that intercourse between the sexes is spiritual only as springing from an exalted emotional state. We question the value of the exaltation to which they pointed, because it seemed to express itself in an arbitrary way. (?) But as soon as thought attempts to grasp the limits or penetrate the possibilities of the act as we are now conceiving it, it must become clear that the boundaries of speech are over-passed; here at least is an act in which the whole being is involved, which reason can never exhaust, to which emotion can never be adequate. It may be possible to separate in thought an action and the results that spring from it, and to ask whether the action would be the same if the results were different. Yet it should be remembered that such a question, taken strictly, can only mean "Are these results, or are they not, fortuitous?" are they or are they not the true results? An action and its consequences are one: the meaning of an action is in its purpose. (The act of intercourse is not in itself complete: its meaning depends on the part it plays in a relationship that outlives it.) Our opponents pointed out that it did not become spiritual, that is, had not its true meaning, in being excluded from all relationships but one. We have tried to show that the extension of it leaves it no less arbitrary: it has meaning, we suggest, only as a single deliberate act of procreation, a conscious prayer for fruitfulness.

"I am a ^{realist}, ^{not a} ^{ideal} ^{philosophical} ^{one} ^{you belong} ^{in the middle} ^{ages.}"

It was noted earlier that the new opinions had their source in a revolt against the conventional conception of marriage, and it was admitted that there were elements in that conception which fully justified the revolt. It would be unreasonable to leave the subject without suggesting a practical estimate of the new position in relation to the old. Is it really the outcome of a comprehensive grasp of the many aspects of a complicated case, or is it, in the last resort even less reasonable than it at first appears? The established conventions of society, the rules, that is, by which the multitude of men agree instinctively and persist in agreeing to govern their action, cannot fail to be based on a recognition of fact, which is not except ^{the same} ^{argument} ^{was used} ^{why?} ^{more spiritual} ^{call himself} ^{a realist} ^{and} ^{more spiritual} ^{if we} ^{even if we} ^{accept your extension of the significance of intercourse} ^{or aspects' extension} ^{notice that it doesn't exclude} ^{under man rules} ^{Digitized by Google} ^{under man rules}

the less real because it is often unconscious. If the conventions which surround marriage are among the most arbitrary to a superficial view, if nevertheless society expresses a more than usual determination to protect them, it is fair to argue that a fact, that can as little be overlooked as it can be understood, is here involved: the truth is that society is here, perhaps blindly, yet with a force which comes from the very heart of her being, fighting for the welfare of the generation to be: if the individual can sink reason in the passion of the moment, she cannot

"Keep the young generations in hail,
And bequeath them no tumbled house."

Such is always her cry: and if the individual will not listen he must submit.

That the existing conception of marriage is imperfect, that it attempts to defend much that is indefensible, that the true issue is not clearly discerned, all this and more may easily be allowed. The mother's passionate devotion to her young is often wasted or misapplied: do not try on that account to persuade her that she has mistaken its true object: spend your energies, if you are wise, in directing it into serviceable channels. The new view, which we have been combating, begins by making an arbitrary distinction, which it is the whole strength of marriage, as we now understand it, to reject. It is probably forgotten by opponents that marriage as an institution to be practically applied must accommodate itself to existing conditions, and accept human nature as it is: if it admits the possibility of conduct not ideal, it may yet provide the best practicable means of limiting such conduct: it may of itself be productive of conditions in which the error of such conduct, its unnaturalness, most clearly comes to light. It is no argument against an institution, that it provides for the rank and file of men; the institution is great, if it affords them protection against their baser selves; if it does more, if it gives scope for the development of their true humanity, let us beware how we attack it.

The ideas which we have been considering in this paper, strike at marriage at its root. Righteous revolt against a con-
ainst public sanitation
& vaccination.

Therefore, let
children be
raised in an
atmosphere of
monogamous
honest & strife-
& poverty.

The cat is out
of the bag: here
is his fin-
nese . . . , when
social failing;
all the rest
is part of it...
Gavagai

cession which, if human nature generally demands it, does not on that account become just in principle, is used as pretext for reckless assertion of a new morality, which neither instinct nor reason can justify. Marriage may have stooped to give appearance of decency to what is base; the reason was that a greater interest was at stake. If it was supposed that baseness could be forgotten when withdrawn from sight, the mistake was grievous: but is it not as grievous to suppose that to disclose it is to change its nature? Baseness will not change to honor in obedience to proclamation, however ingenuous such proclamation may be.

*see? for
and quite
the greatest
to show
"it is
in essence*

BASIL DE SELINCOURT.

KINGHAM, CHIPPING NORTON.

"base". He has assumed it.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ETHICS.

Systematic writers on political science and ethics have with rare exceptions recognized a more or less close relationship between the two. The degree of the *rapprochement* thus recognized usually depends upon the view of the writer as to whether the State is a jural or moral entity or a combination of both. The ancient writers with few exceptions accorded to ethics a conspicuous if not a predominant place in their treatises on politics; indeed, the relation as it often appears in their descriptions is one of identification and consequently of confusion.

In his treatise on the "Republic," Plato combined both ethical and political theory, conceived ethics and politics to be in close connection, and even employed "violent metaphors to exaggerate the intimacy."¹ To him the end of the State was virtue, and this teleological idea so dominated his method as to lead him to completely subordinate his political science to his conception of morals.² Indeed, politics in his system of thought was merely a branch of ethics.

Aristotle, the most eminent of ancient writers on politics,

¹ Grote's "Plato," Vol. I, p. 166; Wundt, "Ethics" (tr. by Washburn), pp. 10-17.

² Compare Dunning, "Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval," p. 57.

likewise conceived the aim of political science (which he called the master science) to be the determination of the highest good or happiness of man.³ The State exists, he said, for a good life, and without virtue it has no true existence.⁴ The true statesman, he argued, must study the nature of virtue,⁵ and for virtue, habits and teaching are requisite, and these should be provided for by the State.⁶ Politics, the main ethical science, he subdivided into two sections, that which treats of the moral action of the individual and that which treats of the State. The former is ethics; the latter, politics proper or the doctrine of the State.⁷ In short, he seemed to regard ethics as a part of general politics.⁸ But unlike Plato, whose political and ethical conceptions were blended and confused, Aristotle treated ethical and political theory as separate subjects, though adjoining and partially overlapping each other.⁹ He was therefore the first writer to create an independent science of politics.¹⁰ It should be remarked, however, that the separation was rather the result of Aristotle's rigid application of the analytical method of treatment than of any conviction of the independence of each science, for, on the contrary, he never denied the intimate connection, if not the interdependence, of each upon the other. In short, the differentiation was rather an incident of his method than an essential of his system.¹¹

³ "Ethics," Bk. I, chs. 2, 4.

⁴ "Politics" (Jowett), p. lxix.

⁵ "Ethics," III, I, 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, X, IX, 8.

⁷ Zeller, "Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics," Vol. I, p. 186; Vol. II, p. 136.

⁸ Grant, "The Ethics of Aristotle," Vol. I, p. 410. For a further lucid discussion of Aristotle's conception of the relation of ethics to politics, see Janet, "Histoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapport avec la morale," Vol. I, p. 103 *et seq.* See also Willoughby, "Political Theories of the Ancient World," p. 146 *et seq.* Wundt declares that with Aristotle politics was the final stage of ethics. "Ethics" (tr. by Washburn), p. 18.

⁹ Grote, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 166.

¹⁰ Grant, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 410. "Not only," says Grant, speaking of Aristotle's method of treatment, "is a reaction thus made against the system of Plato, but also, by the whole treatment which Aristotle gives his subject, ethics is virtually and forever separated from politics."

¹¹ Compare Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 53. Zeller, in commenting on Vol. XVII.—No. 2.

Machiavelli was the first political writer of note to deny the existence of all connection between ethics and the theory or practice of politics. His political philosophy as embodied in "The Prince" and less fully in "The Discourses" may be summed up in the aphorism, "the end justifies the means," in all political affairs.

With him hypocrisy, bad faith, deception, falsehood, duplicity, violence, even murder are legitimate means for accomplishing political ends. The customary rules of private morality which govern individuals in their relations with one another Machiavelli did not seek to overthrow, but in his mind they had no application to princes; and what was virtue in the one case might be vice in the other. "Let the prince," he said, "look to the preservation of the State; the means will always be deemed honorable and will receive general approbation."¹² Where the safety and liberty of the State is in danger, he argued, considerations of justice, mercy and honor must be disregarded, if necessary, to maintain its life and independence.¹³ Contrary to the policy of his precursors in the field of political science, he sought to delimit the spheres of ethics and politics by rigid lines, not only for purposes of treatment but for purposes of conduct and living.¹⁴ In thus pleading for the study of the phenomena of politics as absolutely isolated from ethics Machiavelli's philosophy was unmoral rather than immoral, but his doctrine of political practice was purely immoral and wicked. In the former respect he was more nearly right especially from the scientific point of view; and his divorce of

Aristotle's conception of the relation of politics to ethics, observes that they may be considered as related to one another as the pure and the applied part of one and the same science. Aristotle's subdivision of politics in the wider sense into ethics and politics proper, Zeller regards as admissible, since according to Aristotle the means by which the knowledge of virtue is acquired (a problem of ethics) are to be found only in the life of the community, upon which his *ethics* does not further enter, his description corresponds to the actual relation in which his treatises on *Ethics* and *Politics* stand to one another. "Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics," Vol. II, p. 136, note 3.

¹² "The Prince," ch. 15.

¹³ "The Discourses," III, 41.

¹⁴ Janet, "Histoire de la Science Politique," etc., Vol. I, p. 75.

the science of politics from the science of ethics did much to clarify the problems of politics and to "check the tendency to make of political science a mere congeries of moral and religious precepts."¹⁵

Of later views may be mentioned those of Spinoza, Hegel and Kant. Spinoza, following Plato, treated politics as a part of ethics and based his political doctrines on ethical principles.¹⁶ Hegel went to the extreme in emphasizing the moral nature of the State in opposition to its juridical nature. He conceived the State to be simply the objective realization of the moral law, and morality (*Sittlichkeit*) to be its vital principle and its end.¹⁷ In any such view of the nature of the State ethics must inevitably occupy a predominant position. Kant rather inclined to the opposite extreme in treating the State not as an ethical entity but as a purely juridical establishment devoid of moral bonds.¹⁸ But he did not overlook the influence of moral principles upon political theory and practice. "Politics," he said, "may be regarded as saying 'be wise (*i. e.*, prudent) as serpents; 'morals adds as a limiting condition, 'and harmless (*i. e.* guileless) as doves.'"¹⁹ Kant's view, in its outward appearances at least, is colored by the juridical method of treatment common among German writers of the juristic school. To them the State is simply an institution of law, and all other aspects which it may present and all other factors which may enter into its consideration, moral, social or otherwise, can be safely ignored in political treatises. Political relations to them are always "öffentliche rechtlichen verhältnissen," political conceptions are always "rechtsbegriffe," and the organization and functions of the State are always described in terms of their "rechtliche Natur."²⁰

Other German writers, less enthralled by the juristic method

¹⁵ Dunning, "Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval," p. 302.

¹⁶ Duff, "Ethical and Political Philosophy of Spinoza," pp. 3, 11.

¹⁷ "Philosophy of History" (tr. by Sibree), pp. 40, 54; tr. by Morris, p. 79.

¹⁸ "Philosophy of Law" (tr. by Hastie), secs. 44-48.

¹⁹ "Principles of Politics" (tr. by Hastie), p. 120.

²⁰ Compare Deslandres, "La Crise de la Science Politique et le Problem de la Methode," ch. III.

of treatment, have not only recognized the intimate relation between morals and political science but have accorded to ethics a conspicuous place in their political treatises. Both von Mohl and von Holtzendorff, two of the most eminent of European public lawyers and political scientists, treated the theory of political morality (*Staats sittenlehre*) as one of the "political sciences."²¹ While the noted Bluntschli gave strong emphasis to the view that politics had a moral content (*sittlicher Gehalt*) and that the State had a moral nature (*sittlicher Wesen*) and was bound by moral duties,²² von Mohl's action was based on the view that the exposition of the relations of the State from the standpoint of morality was an indispensable part of any perfectly scientific treatise on the nature of the State. The constitution was or should be, he said, not simply an objective realization of justice and wisdom but also of pure morality, and should reflect the entire moral content of the nation.²³ In his encyclopedia of the political sciences he devoted a lengthy chapter to the subject of *Staats sittenlehre*, enumerating with fullness and discussing with detail the moral duties and obligations of the State and of its subjects and of the operation of the moral law in international intercourse. He has sometimes been criticised for subordinating politics to morality according to the Platonic-Hegelian system,²⁴ but a careful reading of his treatise does not leave this impression. Bluntschli, unlike von Mohl and von Holtzendorff, did not go to the length of classing political ethics as one of the political sciences, because, as he said, the fundamental principles of ethics could not be explained out of the State. To him there was a scientific distinction between *politik* and *ethik* which should be observed in treatises on either subject, though he fully recognized the existence of a close relationship between them.²⁵

²¹ Von Mohl, "Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften," pp. 59, 504; also his "Geschichte und Litteratur der Staatswissenschaften," Vol. I, p. 126. Von Holtzendorff, "Principien der Politik," p. 6, and Treitschke, "Politik," p. 87, *et seq.*

²² "Theory of the State," p. 2.

²³ "Encyklopädie," pp. 63, note 8; 517, 518.

²⁴ Ruemelin, "Politics and the Moral Law," p. lxxv (tr. by Tombo).

²⁵ "Lehre vom Modernen Staat," Vol. III, p. 7.

The French conception of the intimate relation between politics and morality is indicated by the connection in which the terms are frequently used in their political treatises. Thus they often speak of the *sciences morales et politiques* as though they were inseparable and interdependent. Paul Janet, in his brilliant "Histoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapport avec la Morale" (2 vols., Paris, 1884), gives great weight, as may be inferred from the title of his treatise, to the moral side of politics, and argues that it is "useless and unnecessary to separate two sciences which are naturally united by a thousand bonds."²⁶ He conceives the State to be an institution impossible without morals and virtue, possessing moral duties and rights and having a moral end. Politics, theoretical and practical, he insists is permeated through and through with a moral idea.²⁷ The true conception of the relationship, as Janet well observes, is not that of absolute independence according to the Machiavellian philosophy nor that which, according to the Platonic idea, sacrifices the one to the other, but an intermediate view which recognizes a moral basis for political theory and a moral element in political practice.²⁸

The English political philosophers, no less than those of the continent, have uniformly recognized the close relationship between ethics and politics. Hobbes seems to have virtually identified the two,²⁹ and the principles of morality entered into Bentham's treatise on legislation as its dominant feature.³⁰

²⁶ Vol. I, p. 75. See also Funck-Brentano, "La Politique," pp. 7-23.

²⁷ "L'état n'est pas un simple mécanisme, composé de certains ressorts, pour produire certains effets; il se compose de personnes morales avec lesquelles ou ne peut pas jouer capricieusement, comme avec les touches d'un instrument; il est lui-même une personne morale, ayant un fin morale, des devoirs et des droits et s'il lui est permis de atteindre cette destinée de diverses manières, il ne lui est jamais permis de l'oublier," Vol. I, pp. 90, 91.

²⁸ "The bond of connection between politics and morals," says Janet, "is the idea of right (*droit*). The object of politics is not, as Plato maintained, the establishment by force of a reign of virtue, but the protection of right. The State rests on virtue but virtue is not its object. Virtue is a quality which belongs to the citizen," *op. cit.*, p. 99.

²⁹ See "Leviathan," p. 4.

³⁰ "Principles of Morals and Legislation," especially ch. 17.

Among recent political writers, Sir James McIntosh, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Sir Frederick Pollock and W. S. Lilly classify political science as one of the moral sciences or as a branch of ethics. Professor J. S. Mackenzie conceives political science and ethics to be closely related "departments" of a larger subject which corresponds in a rough way to Hegel's "philosophy of right" (including philosophy of law, of art and of religion).³¹ Sidgwick, one of the most eminent of English writers on politics and ethics, regards the State as "an essentially moral sphere" from which it is impossible to banish moral considerations,³² and most of the other English commentators hold essentially a similar view.³³

Among the older and abler American writers on political science, Lieber and Woolsey both gave great weight to ethics in their treatises on the State. Lieber, a Prussian by birth, but long a distinguished citizen, publicist and scholar of the United States, deeply impressed with the moral element of politics, wrote an exhaustive treatise in two volumes on political ethics, which was first published in 1838. After an elaborate discussion of the field of ethics and the nature of the State, he proceeded to lay down the rules and principles of morality which should govern States in their intercourse with one another and their relations with the individuals who compose their citizenship. He conceived the State, not like Kant and the other

³¹ "Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 47; see also Morris, "Hegel's Philosophy of History," pp. 1-3.

³² "Elements of Politics," pp. 94, 95. For Sidgwick's view of the relation of ethics to other sciences see his "Method of Ethics."

³³ McKechnie, in his "The State and the Individual" (pp. 96, 98, 377), asserts that the State is nothing if not moral; that it partakes of necessity in that same moral nature of its citizens, to which it owes its origin, and that its whole fabric rests on moral considerations. Amos, in his "Science of Politics" (p. 447), says, "There is no serious thinker at the present day who, if pointedly questioned, would deny the applicability of the words, right, wrong, duty, conscience, morality and immorality to the conduct of States and governments as well as to that of individual men and women." Cunningham, in his "Politics and Economics" (p. 141), declares that the action of the State is distinctly moral in character and that its chief business is that of enforcing morality. See also Sir J. F. Stephen, "Liberty, Fraternity and Equality," ch. 4, and T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation."

German legists as a purely juridical establishment, nor like Hegel as a moral entity, but as both a jural society and a society of moral being⁸⁴ created for a distinctly moral end.⁸⁵ Lieber's editor and, in a way, his successor in American political thought, Theodore Dwight Woolsey, was equally imbued with the moral idea of the State and insisted upon the treatment of political ethics and political science as coördinate and interdependent sciences. Political ethics he defined as that branch of moral science which treats of the duties and obligations growing out of the relations of men in the State.⁸⁶ In his notable work on "Political Science" he gave a conspicuous place to the subject of political ethics and, following both Lieber and von Mohl, discussed at length the moral virtues that go to make good citizenship, including the moral duties and obligations incumbent upon the State in its dealings with its citizens, with foreign States and with their citizens and subjects.⁸⁷

From this review of scientific thought it is clear that there is a practical unanimity of opinion concerning the existence of a mutual *rapprochement* between politics and ethics; that neither stands isolated and disconnected from the other, but that they are like the closely interwoven branches of a common stem.⁸⁸ Both are concerned with the good of men as citizens of the State, and there is much justification for the view held by some writers that that part of politics which is concerned with the wellbeing of society may properly be classed as a branch of ethics, as the term is understood in its wider sense.⁸⁹

Perhaps the better view is not to regard ethics as a branch of politics or politics as a branch of ethics. Although closely related, the two domains are capable of an exact differentiation and each conserves its own force and dignity. Neither can be subsumed under the other like species and genera. Yet ethics, occupying a position well without the jural sphere, is able to

⁸⁴ "Political Ethics," Vol. I, p. 162.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁸⁶ "Political Science," Vol. I, p. 382.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, ch. 9.

⁸⁸ Ruemelin, "Politics and the Moral Law," p. 61.

⁸⁹ Compare Sidgwick, "History of Ethics," p. 3.

exert a powerful influence upon politics. The maintenance of the lines of differentiation, but withal the promotion of close and, consistent relations between the two spheres, should be a special task of philosophy.

States, like individuals, have moral natures, and in their multiform relations and activities should consider themselves bound by the rules of the moral law, which is nothing more than the sum total of the doctrines of duty and virtue. In the course of their life they cannot safely ignore the ethical considerations which lie at the basis of all their obligations and responsibilities. Indeed, we are coming more and more to accept the view that the State rather than the church is the proper organ for the fulfillment of the moral ideas of mankind.⁴⁰ In practice the most highly civilized States now act on this principle, and every good constitution aims to be the objective realization of the moral concensus of the nation. In method and in subject matter law and ethics coincide.⁴¹ In early times they were not conceived of as distinct in any respect. Ethics was treated as a part of the law of nature or natural equity, and when the former commanded what the latter forbade the individual was under a moral obligation to disobey the positive law. Long after the distinction was clearly recognized administrative officials found it convenient to evade the positive law by appealing to the law of nature, which they proceeded to administer.⁴² By some writers law is conceived of as simply regulated morality, that is, as the realization of the moral ends of the State, and that the whole purpose of the criminal code is to enforce the morality of the State. "In every sentence of the penal code," says Wundt, "there speaks the voice of an objective moral conscience."⁴³

⁴⁰ "We appear in all legislation," says H. D. Traill, "to be more and more unreservedly accepting the principle that the physical wellbeing and the mental and moral training of the community are matters within the special care of the State." "Central Government," p. 16.

⁴¹ Palmer, "Field of Ethics," p. 40.

⁴² Holland, "Elements of Jurisprudence," p. 37.

⁴³ "The Facts of the Moral Life" (tr. by Gulliver and Titchener), p.

This conformity of the legal command to the moral conscience constitutes the most effective sanction of the law. The commands of the State cannot be effectively enforced when contrary to the common consciousness of right and wrong, that is to say, the power of the State is limited by the moral opinion of its citizens. The complaint of the old Roman poet, *quid leges sine moribus*, is as applicable to-day as when written two thousand years ago. In the interpretation of law we find the principle universally recognized that the will embodied in the law shall not be construed as being in opposition to the general norms of morality.⁴⁴

The whole problem of government, both as regards its internal and external relations, is largely one of political ethics. The acquisition of new territorial domains, the desire for external power, the government of subject peoples, the regulation of immigration, the liquidation of public debts, the maintenance of monetary systems, the care of the poor, the treatment of bankrupts, the punishment of criminals, the protection of vested rights, the maintenance of the public health and safety, and many other governmental functions involve fundamental moral questions such as cannot be ignored if the Biblical truth

277. Hegel, Krause and other writers identified law and morality. Wundt, "Principles of Morality" (tr. by Washburn), p. 160.

"Compare Wundt, "Principles of Morality," (tr. by Washburn), p. 177. This view is not inconsistent with that of Hibben, "Relation of Ethics to Jurisprudence" (INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. IV, p. 138), who says, "In the interpretation of law ethics has no place. What is written must be interpreted as it reads," for the will of the legislature can legally be no other than the voice of those whom it represents. While Hibben maintains that no ethical factors enter into the interpretation, he admits that they may nevertheless "modify the original data of the problem." See also Jellinek, "Die Social Ethische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht und Straf;" and Ihering, "Zweck im Recht," I, 434 *et seq.* "Law," says Ruemelin, "may be compared to the great dikes which transform lands wrested from the sea or exposed to its floods into a firm and lasting position; political science builds, protects and widens these erections . . . therefore politics, law and morality serve but one purpose, the progress of mankind," "Politics and the Moral Law," p. 65. "Ethics," says Austin, "consists of two departments: the one affects to determine the tests of positive law, and is styled the science of legislation, or briefly, legislation; the other affects to determine the test of positive morality, and is styled the science of morals, or briefly, morals!" "Jurisprudence," p. 61.

that righteousness exalteth a nation has any meaning. The maxim *salus populi suprema lex esto* has sometimes been interpreted as a justification for the sacrifice of moral principles to those of public expediency; but it will rarely, if ever happen that the supposed law of political necessity will require the wanton disregard of conceded moral standards. The principle of justice no less than that of political expediency should be a rule of political life and the above maxim may well be interpreted in connection with another of scarcely less fundamental significance: *Fiat justitia pereat mundus*.

In its relations with other sovereign communities the State, no less than individuals, should be governed by the injunctions of the decalogue. The territorial expansion of the State, the extension of commercial advantages, the observance of treaty obligations, intervention in behalf of oppressed peoples and many other questions of international politics are at bottom also questions of international morality. Want of frankness and comity, the practice of deceit, bad faith and duplicity, disregard of international obligations are all moral vices no less reprehensible because committed by the State than by individuals. Thus the bases of all State action, whether viewed from the standpoint of domestic policy or international conduct, are the precepts of morality, which should serve as guiding principles. All the relations with which politics has to do, says an acute writer, lie within the domain of ethics. Duty, loyalty, honesty, charity—these are the forces that underlie and support the State, that give to law its most effective sanction, that cross and modify the egoistic struggle for gain.⁴⁶ There is no small amount of truth in the observation of Lord Acton that the marrow of civilized history is ethical, not metaphysical, and that political differences essentially depend on disagreement in moral principles.

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* Monroe Smith, "The Scope of Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 4. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his "Liberty, Fraternity and Equality," goes to the length of arguing that not only must governments have a moral basis, but that the connection between morals and religion is so intimate that this implies a religious basis as well. P. 58.

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION.

Though more than a century has elapsed since the doctrine of abstract rights was at the height of its credit, it has never ceased to afford a convenient resource for indifferent thinkers. To affirm the existence of an inherent right in a certain class of persons is perhaps no more than a specious form of *ignoratio elenchi*, but it offers at least a temporary vantage-ground. It is not easy to dislodge those that take refuge here, and the wisest course for an antagonist who is not satisfied to rest in a metaphysical abstraction, is generally to pass by on the other side and seek more promising encounters.

The use of the term "rights," however, in the sense of justifiable claims, has its value if its significance is realized. Where the claim is not based on *a priori* considerations, but is regarded as a privilege which is granted, or which ought to be granted, to individuals or classes by society in the interests of the whole, it may form a perfectly fair subject of debate. In this aspect alone can there be any profitable discussion of parental rights. The apportionment of control over the destiny of the rising generation between the community and the individual parents must be a matter of social expediency, but the line that is drawn will naturally be determined by experiences of a general character that admit of being formulated into principles. The vindication of a claim or right on either side will fitly be based on such generalizations.

It will be admitted that the well-being of a race or nation has been often affected prejudicially in the past both by too much and by too little interference on the part of the community with the responsibility of parents. The State upbringing of children in Sparta, on the one hand, and the sanction that has frequently been given to infanticide on the other, may serve as illustrations of policies that have been condemned in the name of general principles which rest on historical inductions. It is, of course, possible to argue that to class the exposure of children under the head of murder is to assert the supremacy of eternal law over

even social expediency. But the naturalistic explanation is at least equally admissible; one law of social utility may be pitted against another. It may be urged that it is demonstrably more important for a community to enforce the principle of the sanctity of human life than to rid itself arbitrarily of its weakest members.

However transcendental may be the view that one takes of ethical sanctions, the *a posteriori* argument can never be negligible. If it is possible to formulate any definite principles for the assignment to the State and to the parents of control over the lives of children, these principles, whatever else they may rest on, cannot escape the test of the ultimate consequences to the community. Even the most inveterate intuitionist will seek to justify his social program by a forecast of its influence on the welfare of future generations. If it be found that there are no principles of universal authority in the matter, but only ideals that are subject to compromise in the conflict of contending forces, there will be all the greater need for clear-sighted anticipation.

It was inevitable that the cry of *Rights* should be heard on all sides in connection with the present controversy over the teaching of religion in the national schools. We have had to listen to various assertions of the right of the parent, the right of the majority, the right of the State, and even the right of the teacher. But it cannot be said that much reasoned effort has been made either to base these rights on any recognized doctrines of social philosophy or to defend them on the ground of practical advantage. There has been, on the part of the protagonists at least, too much dependence on the spurious authority that so often belongs to mere phrases, which express nothing but the failure to grasp the laws of social development. It is worth while to make some endeavor to clear the ground by examining the authority of such principles as may be invoked, and weighing one policy of expediency against another.

The almost universal course of events has been in the direction of limiting parental control by legislative interference. It is not always easy to distinguish clearly the ground of these encroachments. In our own country there has been little effort

to pursue any methodical plan, or to lay much store by ultimate sanctions. Many of the measures have been prompted by a purely instinctive sympathy, and if there has been any imaginative regard for consequences it has not usually been very far-reaching. Until now the interference has been restrictive. Parents have been curbed in their freedom to use their children's lives for their own interest or for the gratification of their ill-temper. But this somewhat negative attitude has naturally suggested a definite initiative. The reprobation of neglect took the form of an injunction to rear the children in accordance with a certain standard, and thus the State began to constitute itself the arbiter not only of the *bona fides* of the parents' intentions but of the soundness of their judgment.

The decisive step on this venturesome path was of course the Education Act of 1870, and the fact must be faced that the nation was thereby committed to a situation in which all discussion of first principles could have no longer more than academic interest. There is a great deal to be said for the view that the State was then acting *ultra vires*, and that it should have been content with offering free education to the children of those parents who might choose to take advantage of it. If such a policy had been combined with a radical reform of the Poor Laws, and had been supported by a more enlightened practice of private charity, an automatic escape might have been secured from the danger of preserving and perpetuating the relatively unfit, to the detriment of more socially efficient families. But in social politics there are certain steps that can hardly be retraced. It is unlikely that the State will ever withdraw its constraining hand in this matter, until a universal appreciation of the benefits of education makes it unnecessary, if that consummation is ever reached. For practical purposes the right of the community not only to insist that children shall be educated, but virtually to determine *how* they shall be educated, must be considered a *chose jugée*, and the only open question that remains is concerned with the implications of this decision. The significance of the new departure was twofold. The State for the first time definitely intervened to curtail the privileges hitherto possessed by parents of compassing the

mental and moral, as well as the physical, welfare of their children, and at the same time it claimed not only to judge of results, but to prescribe the processes by which they were to be attained. In regard to material well-being the State has been content to demand that children shall be properly nourished and cared for, without dictating the kinds of food and clothing that are to secure this end, but in the vastly more important matters that concern the mental and spiritual condition of the children it has been forced very largely into prescribing not only the ideals but the methods of procedure.

There may be a few consistent State-socialists who would join hands with the survivors of the old school of absolutist politicians in justifying such an intellectual and moral tyranny, but it may be assumed that the vast majority of plain people in this country, if they admit its necessity at all, do so with regret. They would like to leave as much responsibility in the hands of the parents as they consider compatible with the interests of the children regarded as independent social units, and of the community as a whole. Indeed they would probably be prepared to run some risks for the sake of preserving the continuity of influence between one generation and another. This inclination is due less to an unthinking acceptance of any metaphysical doctrine of parental rights than to a belief, based upon observation and experience, that social stability is primarily founded on family life, and that every weakening of the bond between parents and their children must have its influence on wider relations. This is a matter where the instinct and common sense of the majority give surer guidance than any number of fine-spun theories, and we may confidently accept as the highest wisdom the prevailing conviction that the family is the true social unit, and that all forcible interference with its internal independence requires to be specially justified.

At this point it must be borne in mind that the recent tendency on the part of the State to encroach upon parental freedom, as upon individual freedom in general, has been affected by changes in the constitution of the governing body. Dictation is naturally less obnoxious, and less likely to be mischievous, in communities that are approximately democratic

than in those where there is an obvious divergence of interest between the rulers and the ruled. Where the people to a greater or less extent govern themselves, the central control takes on another color. It is reasonable enough to regard our own country as being governed in the long run by heads of families, and the coercion that is exerted in such matters as education is to be explained in two ways. In part it may be looked upon as a mere affair of convenience, the carrying out of an arrangement as to the principle of which practically all are agreed, but which is facilitated by a centralized organization. In part, however, it is a genuine constraint exercised by the majority over those members of the body politic whose sense of parental duty is below the average standard of the community.

The position, then, may be stated thus. The growth of self-government has given encouragement to a concentrated direction which increasingly curtails individual liberty. The sphere of independence that is specially threatened is that of parental influence and control. The establishment of compulsory education was a definite step that has introduced difficulties in its train. Most people in this country would wish to secure as much personal freedom as possible, especially in the maintenance of parental authority, wherever there is evidence of good intentions. The problem is to devise a working arrangement which will enforce a mental and moral discipline on all children, without imposing the will of a majority on its general direction, against the conviction and desires of individual parents.

It is evidently a question of compromise. There is a conflict of principles. The State is presumed to be wiser than the least wise of the fathers and mothers of families, and more disinterested than the most selfish, and there is a manifest social benefit in its substituting its own ideals and methods in such cases. But this cannot be done without also coercing many whose conceptions of the upbringing of children are perhaps higher than those that become stereotyped for universal application. Moreover, the State, as representing the general feeling of the community, is aware that even where the sense of parental duty is weak it can be cultivated by exercise, and that

to deprive parents of responsibility is to help in postponing indefinitely the development of a completely rounded family life. What autonomy is it possible to retain for the parent in this difficult situation?

The question of parental rights in education is not, then, what parents are entitled to demand, for there is no title in the matter, but simply what freedom of choice and what responsibility can safely and practicably be left to them. In the criticisms and suggestions that are now to be offered, it will be assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that all parents, and not merely a large majority of them, are directly concerned in the nature of the teaching that is given. No account will be taken of the other form of coercion that is involved in the forced contributions to education funds, as these do not fall on the tax-payers and ratepayers in their parental capacity.

No serious controversy arises except in relation to subjects of study that trench on convictions and beliefs which have a definite bearing on the conduct of life in its widest sense. Theoretically, no doubt, it might be possible to teach even geography or arithmetic in a partisan spirit, but as the problem has been recognized to be one of practical compromise, the issue may be considerably narrowed down. The difficulty is critical in relation primarily to the teaching of morals and religion, and secondarily to such subjects as history, literature, and some departments of science. How far can respect be paid to differences of opinion in these matters among the parents of school children?

As the religious problem is at present the crucial one, it may be dealt with first. There are several conceivable solutions which it is worth while to enumerate, though some of them should have to be at once ruled out of court.

1. The religion established by the State might be compulsorily taught to all scholars in the national schools.

2. The State religion might be alone taught, but with a conscience clause, offering the alternative of no formal religious teaching.

3. Schools of different religious color might have equal support from the State, as in Germany.

4. In the same school, there might be a choice of religious instruction, given by special teachers, according to the demand, as in the secondary schools of France.

5. There might be compulsory teaching of a more or less neutral kind prescribed by local authorities so as to be confined to the common ground supposed to be held by the parents concerned.

6. Religious instruction might be absent in any formal shape, but a tacit recognition of the prevailing faith in its general aspects might be enjoined, as in the United States.

7. Religious instruction might be left to the discretion of the teacher, on the understanding that there should be no set lessons, and no favor shown to any special formulary.

8. The secular ideal might be pursued in its extreme form, by the express exclusion of every reference to religious matters, as has been tried in Australia and elsewhere.

This list may not be complete, but it probably offers sufficient material for the discussion. Of all possible courses suggested, the first and last, representing the extremes of intolerant zeal, may be dismissed as no longer within the field of practical politics in this country. Those that remain will now be examined, not from the point of view of abstract political justice, or logic, or educational expediency, but solely in respect of their value in preserving for the parents an effective direction of their children's ideals and beliefs. At the same time, of course, the judgment that is passed on each proposal must have regard to the surrounding conditions that would make it acceptable or unacceptable at the present juncture. Moreover, there are one or two solutions that would deserve favorable consideration from the standpoint in question, but have to be dismissed owing to special circumstances that make them impracticable in this country. The plan of separate schools, for example, is suitable in Germany only because the cleavage into Lutheran and Catholic is simple and definite, and the distinction is largely territorial; it would be impracticable in England, where sects are more numerous, and their distribution is almost universal. It would appear that the final choice lies among the three possible courses numbered 3, 5, and 7. These may be named the

Right of Entry, the Simple Bible Teaching, and the Teachers' Discretion solutions. There will in any case, no doubt, be temporary expedients devised, combining features taken from any two, or from all, of these methods; but the ideas are sufficiently distinct to be discussed independently.

It will be convenient to consider first the intermediate plan, which professes to be one of general conciliation. It is assumed that with all the apparent differences of religious beliefs in this country at the present time, there is a substratum of common ground which might be made the basis of a universal scheme of religious teaching in the national schools. That this notion is at the best only approximately correct hardly needs showing. There is probably not a single proposition in regard to religious matters that would command universal assent. But even if a common ground of agreement could be discovered that would unite the great majority, and if it were granted that the remainder might be justly disregarded, the unanimity would be wholly illusory. It is not the neutral substratum, but the distinguishing characters of their creed, in which religious enthusiasts are really interested, and we can hardly wonder that what is called undenominational Bible teaching should seem to many no better than the play of Hamlet with the title *rôle* left out. In the realm of ideas the notion of a "common ground" is only a figment of nomenclature. The further back we have to travel in search of a meeting place, the more deeply do we penetrate into the darkness. What we gain in breadth of platform we shall lose in sympathy. After a certain point, which is soon reached, every surrender for the sake of widening the borders will alienate as many as it attracts. In no circumstances can there be any finality in the revision of creeds, and when the task is undertaken for diplomatic purposes, there is little promise of benefit, however praiseworthy the end may be. The dream of a form of religious faith that will be sufficiently colorless to repel no one, and is thus fitted by its negative qualities to be the spiritual nourishment of our school children, must be abandoned as an unworthy as well as an impracticable ideal. Teaching of this necessarily perfunctory kind could not take the place of parental influence, and so far from aiding or supple-

menting it, it would only leave unfortunate impressions that must be removed before any good seed can be sown.

At this point we may ask a little more closely what form of religious teaching would be likely to meet the wishes of the average parent. Many conjectures have been hazarded in the present controversy as to his real condition of mind, and most of the answers probably lie under the suspicion that attaches to all wide generalizations. We shall not be far astray, however, in assuming that those who have their children's welfare at heart at all, are divided into two classes. They either incline to attach a definite importance to the doctrines and traditions of a particular church, and desire that their children's moral and spiritual training should be closely associated with these, or on the other hand they incline to trust chiefly to personal influence and example, and are comparatively indifferent as to any dogmatic basis for the guidance of conduct. It is pretty certain that no enthusiasm exists for mere generalities of religious beliefs, apart from their elaboration in the doctrines and practice of a particular denomination. Even if it were true, as Sir Oliver Lodge complacently assumes, that "the existence of higher beings and of a Highest Being is a fundamental element in every religious creed," no saving grace could be found in the mere assertion of such existences, and a scheme of instruction that was drawn up on so abstract a principle would appeal to no parent, to say nothing of its hopeless ineffectiveness from an educational point of view. If the State is to aim at satisfying the parents, it will succeed far more completely by paying deliberate regard, on the one hand, to the wishes of the genuine believers in dogma, and on the other hand, to the natural desire of all right-feeling parents, whatever be their religious faith, that the influence of teachers who command their children's respect should be as untrammeled as possible, than by trying to steer a middle course that will please no one.

If, then, the plan of so-called simple Bible teaching, or undenominational religious teaching, prescribed and regulated by the local authority, be found wanting, there remain only the alternatives of arranging for special facilities outside the school

routine, or leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the individual teacher. These methods correspond to the two classes of parents that have been distinguished, but just as the two attitudes of mind are not necessarily mutually exclusive, so it would be possible in a certain measure to combine the two principles in the actual provision and organization of schools. Indeed, the natural process of evolution would seem to be that in the present state of public opinion all schools should begin by offering special facilities for denominational teaching to meet the wishes of every religious group among the parents concerned, and that these should be continued as long as the demand remains effective, the freedom of the ordinary teachers in regard to religious questions being made as complete as possible. In the degree that the separatist spirit on the part of the parents declined, and that the unsuitableness of all dogmatic teaching for the young was recognized, the demand for special facilities would fall off, and the responsibility for the moral and spiritual welfare of the children, as far as it can be sought in the school, would devolve more and more upon the regular teachers. On the broad grounds of toleration and of respect for parental responsibility it is desirable that the State should concede the right to every parent who belongs to a recognized religious group, to have the opportunity of having his children taught his own faith by an expert teacher, as long as he genuinely lays store by it. Purely secular teaching is an impossibility. A State religion is worse than a political injustice; it is a spiritual blunder. A neutral and composite religion is a sterile hybrid. Even if the demands of parents for religious instruction were to be regarded as grounded on superstition and prejudice, it would be the wisest course to give heed to them, as long as they were made for their own and not for other people's children. In this matter the zeal of parents is a more trustworthy guide than the zeal of churches or of political parties.

The question will be raised—What use are the teachers likely to make of their opportunities in the circumstances suggested? It may be presumed that in cases where a school is for any reason almost wholly attended by children of a single denom-

ination, the atmosphere of the special religious instruction will more or less pervade the whole school life, and the habitual influence of the ordinary teachers will naturally strengthen the special bias. The more divided the children are in faith, the greater will be the disposition to abstain from any expressions of a partisan spirit, and in such a situation it is probable that the majority of teachers would cultivate a noncommittal attitude that did not express their own position, and did not enable them to let their influence be fully felt. This is the penalty that must be paid for the privilege of exercising a free choice of religious instruction. At the worst the harm is negative, and only leaves the more to be done at home, of which the parents cannot complain. But as the demand for special religious teaching abated, and the teachers realized that the responsibility rested on them of bringing moral and spiritual influences to bear on their pupils through the channels of the ordinary school work, it cannot be doubted that as a body they would justify the trust reposed in them. Isolated cases there might be, no doubt, where the public confidence was abused. There would be a certain number of bigots who persuaded themselves that it was their duty to make opportunities for a propagandism which ignored differences of faith among the parents of the scholars, and on the other hand, there would be a certain number who made the absence of set lessons and precise formularies an excuse for ceasing to trouble themselves about the whole matter. These are the "unprofitable servants" of the State, and no pains can eliminate them altogether. But the majority of teachers enter the profession under the stress of a sympathy with children that forms an effective safeguard against temptations to indolence and cowardice in the discharge of their duties, while the experience they gain is a constant preventive of dogmatic methods that would sin no less against sound educational practice than against the honorable understanding implied in their position. The prospect of a few failures to rise to a due sense of responsibility must not be allowed to withdraw attention from the immense advantages of solving the religious difficulty by leaving it in the hands of the teachers. It would not be possible for the State to propose this solution immediately

and directly without encountering formidable opposition from various quarters, but the plan of allowing it to come about automatically by the decision of the parents has the merit at once of silencing irrelevant criticism, of satisfying those who should have the chief say in the matter, of strengthening the position of those on whom the burden will mainly fall, and of securing the highest interest of the children in the most effective way.

It has been noted that there are other subjects of instruction besides religion that introduce matters of serious controversy. The most important of these is morals, which is often brought forward as a satisfactory substitute for dogmatic religious teaching, chiefly on the ground that it largely covers the area of spiritual influence without arousing the same sharp antagonisms. I have argued in the *JOURNAL OF ETHICS* for July, 1906, that there is no more substantial common ground in practical ethics than there is in religion, and that from the educational standpoint, the subject is quite as unsuited for systematic treatment, in elementary schools at least. As a temporary expedient, however, there is much to be said for the suggestion that courses in morals, such as have a place in French schools, should be given to those children who do not avail themselves of the facilities for religious teaching. It is certainly desirable to test the sincerity of both parents and children in their wish to be relieved of such spiritual instruction, and so long as this reason exists, there would be some fitness in asking the ordinary teachers to undertake the lessons in morals. Radical though the differences of moral outlook may be, they have not given rise to recognized sects in the same way as religious differences, so that the task could hardly be regarded as imposing an irrelevant test. It might, indeed, be considered an interference with the freedom of parents if these lessons were made compulsory as the sole alternative to some form of religious teaching, but it would be difficult to look on this as more than a theoretical grievance.

In the case of morals, however, as of subjects like history, literature, and science, the final solution must be sought in the same direction as has been indicated in the case of religious

teaching. These must all hang together. The characteristics of the faith that prevailed among the scholars would inevitably give the tone to all other teaching, and Catholics must be content with this security, if they are not prepared to remain independent of national support. In schools where special religious teaching in one form or another was sought by a majority, and where more than one group was strong, a more negative policy would naturally be followed in the allied subjects. But as the parents ceased to regard the traditions and creed of their own sect in a narrow and absolute sense, the teachers would be enabled to enter into the full freedom of their position, and all the subjects of the school course, including morals and religion, would come to be treated in a genuinely synthetic spirit, and with the tact and judgment that a sense of increased responsibility may be trusted to impose.

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THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN AN INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY.

It is my object in the present article to discuss a problem which may be stated as the paradox of impersonal ethics. The difficulty to which I call attention becomes a serious one only through the change in social structure which accompanies the transition to a modern industrial state. The discussion necessary for a description of the question will accordingly be sociological in character. But the thought with which I conclude and which seems to contain some suggestion of a solution will be of a mystical tendency.

I.

The morality which appeals to men with the sanction of the ages is chiefly concerned with the relations of persons who know one another as individuals or who recognize at least the claim of some mutual bond, whether of kindred or of mere propinquity. Thus the swimmer who refuses to spring into the water to the rescue of a drowning child earns the contempt

of his fellows, and on reflection probably concurs in the condemnation of his cowardice. But the most numerous and important relations in modern industrial society are not between persons who can in the most shadowy sense be said to know one another. Even when it is possible to discern any personal issue at all, the parties to the bargain are absolute strangers. Let a vote of money be proposed for surveying and charting the shore and ocean, or for erecting lighthouses, buoying channels and fixing warning bells on submerged rocks. Something of the simpler personal appeal may be found lurking in such practical work as this. But before such a task can be begun it is necessary first to proceed to a distance more remote from the risks of the fisherman in his storm-driven cobble. The power to prepare a chart depends on previous scientific equipment, and the distinction in emotional interest between the child struggling in the water and the maintenance of the hydrographical department of the admiralty is sufficiently obvious.

The first belongs to the sphere of personal morality, and is indeed as simple an instance as we could select. The summons was clear, the claim of weakness on strength, from individual to individual. It may be regarded as typical of all those cases in which it is possible, if not immediately, yet by a not too recondite reflection, to discover the person to whom service is due. The antithetical case (hydrographical department), while far from being an extreme one, is perhaps sufficiently lacking in elements of personal interest to be typical of those impersonal problems to which the progress of society has given preëminent value.

The changed character of this typical reaction gives rise to an ethical inquiry which is also perplexingly fresh. Whereas a man's influence on and duty toward strangers has been, comparatively speaking, slight and intermittent, it has become continuous and dominant. The range of response to the unknown is often dismissed with such proverbial wisdom as "put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers." This attitude, never very promising, is now impossible. In the industrial world a man's largest claims and duties are to strangers

whom he does not know, has never seen, and cannot love. It is useless to call such people neighbors, and no extension of neighbor morality touches the difficulty. What is needed is to gain a sanction not only for right behavior, which legislation might compel, but for a right emotional attitude toward the anonymous crowd. This must be as tough and flexible as the sanctions which a good man respects within the little world of home and acquaintance. The assumption that our dealings are chiefly with a few familiar figures and only incidentally with a world-mass of population is no longer a true one. There is no thread in the stuff of daily life which is not spun in the mill of the anonymous. Personal ethics has certainly not lost in positive value; on the contrary, its applications become more various and difficult as they are less easily reduced to the simplicity of a "drowning-child" type. But relatively they yield position to problems of the "hydrographical-department" type.

It is not strictly correct to speak of this latter class of relations as impersonal, because, of course, in the last resort there must be people on both sides. But the individuals are too aloof for the old persuasions to have much power. A and B are separated by a dreary sea of regulations, theories, statistics. As a rule A can only discover B by a process of maxima and minima which may involve a knowledge of the use of the "modulus." Even so B does not appear as an individual, but only as one of a group or average. It is not possible to love an average.

Or is it perhaps possible? Certainly love to those we do know profoundly modifies our attitude to those who are unknown, but in the process the emotional content undergoes so vast a change that it seems open to question whether it should be called love. Or if that is not doubtful, yet the transferred emotion is so different from the immediate personal response as to need, if not a new name, a very clear recognition of specific differences. The final result may be to restore the word love, but if so it will only be through a recognition of personal affection as merely a first and inadequate expression of the idea. Every deep affection reveals something of cosmic meaning to

the lover. He finds the universal Human in the particular person. But is it possible to find the Human in persons who cannot first of all or at any point be known as persons?

II.

It is required to find moral worth in a complex of relationships which seem to be wholly impersonal. The difficulty is not slight from a speculative point of view, and is coming to possess a very practical concern. It is the same as that which Macchiavelli evaded with such notorious success when it presented itself in a less obstinate form in his day. His church had worked out more or less adequately a doctrine of personal morality. Feudalism also had created a not entirely unsatisfactory conception of moral responsibility between related social groups. But very little had been secured in regard to the ethics of the State, and especially little in regard to Macchiavelli's particular interest, the bond of the prince to his subjects. He found this relation outside of the normal sphere, and he left it there, choosing to apply unmoral judgments. Of course if he had had a moral genius he would have sought for a moral creed of princedom and empire. Although he did not do this, yet within the limits he set himself Macchiavelli's judgments were sound and his knowledge of the situation was extraordinarily clear. Old social forms were passing away, although they were still to be found, as Macchiavelli says, in some of the free German cities; and the ruler of such a city accordingly did prudently to retain the old moral bond and to celebrate and secure the affection of the citizens. But he himself was writing for the prince of an unfree city. His mind was further preoccupied with the position of the king or emperor of an unfree state or empire. For such potentates "it is better and more secure, if one (love or fear) must be wanting, to be feared than to be loved" (chapter xvii). He opposes the interest of the "whole universality" to that of "particular persons," and identifies the whole universality with the personal aggrandizement of the prince. For the conduct of Medici he found no moral sanction and he discovered none.

The problem he avoided was a branch of the general inquiry whether humane enthusiasm can be carried beyond the sphere where personal love is the rule.

If we shirk the ethical significance of the anonymous relations, the alternative is a species of Macchiavellism. True, political theory is not now busied with the petty fortune of a prince, and a modern Macchiavelli would write a treatise on "Scientific Legislation." Now the maintenance of external order and even of material prosperity might safely be left to legislation which should deserve the adjective. So far as human intercourse is reducible to the type of foot and mouth disease regulations, nothing more is needed. In any case, legislation must play a tremendous part, if not the title rôle. But the best legislation cannot do very much to create the interior response to social demands which should be the crowning enterprise of ethics. It does achieve something in this direction by indirectly accustoming men first to obey, and then in the result to revere the law which represents the will of the whole universality.¹ But immediately legislation is unethical. Is the whole of what is most characteristic to be left to administration orders? If not, then man's spiritual interest must include and influence even the details of such impersonal regulations.

With that reflection we turn to the main issue. The typical social reactions we have to consider are a result of the industrial revolution, or of the aggregation of population round mines and factories and, to an increasing degree, in large towns. If a broad distinction be made between town and country dwellers, we find that over three fourths of the population is living in urban districts and less than one fourth in the country, and that this is almost exactly a reversal of the conditions which held before the middle of the last century. The registrar general, in his latest census report, gives several ingenious illustrations of this closer physical proximity. In 1801 there were 152 persons to the square mile, but in 1901 there were 558. Or again, if the people were plotted out at

¹ See Dicey's "Law and Public Opinion."

equal distances, each would have stood 153 yards from his neighbor at the earlier date; a century later the distance would have been only 80 yards. But of course they are not thus plotted out. For a picture of the former things you must look to Huntingdonshire; for the meaning of the present you turn to the banks of the Mersey. The town has gained on the country, and the large town at the expense of the small. They are all satellites of a world market.

This massing of population has had two results which determine the conditions of our problem. The normal relation is between persons who are (1) on the one hand more unknown, and (2) on the other more closely interdependent than formerly. How is the moral bond to be secured or kept in such a community? The difficulty is the greater because the typical reaction is not even between this and that unknown person. Very rarely can the effect of my action on that person be tracked down, and frequently no effect can be shown to follow from a particular action. Both "this act" and "that person" are lost in the limbo of law of averages.

The normal relationship, that is to say, is not so much between individuals as between groups. These groups are at once mutually unknown and closely interdependent. The fact is strikingly illustrated in the exchange of goods and it will not be time lost to analyze a single instance. The old relation between the producer and the consumer was usually simple enough. One man made and sold a pair of boots, another purchased and wore them. Such a relation is uncommon at present, though a few of us are still measured with notched strips of brown paper. The bargain between two which was sufficiently typical of the pre-factory system has given place to a series of bargains between four (or more than four) "persons." (Usually each of the persons except the consumer is a group.) I do not know how many men or girls helped to make the pair of shoes I bought last week, but the number is certainly large, even if the makers of the machinery are not counted in. I neither know nor can know who the people were. I neither know or can know the conditions of their work or the circumstances of their lives. The most I could

learn would be as to average conditions, and perhaps some of the outstandingly good or bad conditions, and those not of these particular persons, but of average workers in the shoe trade. The simple personal bond is dissolved and banished behind agreements as to piece-work lists, regulations as to non-textile factories, and so forth.

The complication becomes still more impressive if we look more narrowly at a single one of these persons or groups in the transaction between the man who makes and the man who uses. The shoes were presumably made in a factory belonging to a company of shareholders. To whom is the duty of the employee? To whom is the limited liability of the shareholder? The workers do not know the real employers, nor the employers the workpeople. The workman does find or thinks that the demand made on him by the director in the name of the employers clashes with what he owes to his fellows, *i.e.*, to those whom he knows in his own town, and others who, though personally strangers, are of like kind with himself. The shareholder, again, is probably a small holder. If so, he cannot determine the conditions of the business even in the slightest degree, however desirous he might be to improve the lot of the workers. Apparently he is under an obligation to a special group which he (fractionally) employs, although he is not acquainted with any of its members. But he cannot influence this group except by altering the general regulations of a whole community. On this larger aggregate, again, his action can only be indirect. Between him and the act of justice he may discern lie his political party, the government of the day, and perhaps the competing claims of other acts of justice. Turn the question as he will, his direct concern is not with the men he employs or with any known persons, but with impersonal principles. The goal certainly is man, but the course is long; the race is an obstacle race, and the fences are too high for him to see over.

One more view we must take of the problem of our relation to the unknown many, in order to notice how it is intensified by the claims of the few who *are* known. There is conflict between the love of one and the welfare of an average mass of

population. As, *e. g.*, when a mother wishes to sacrifice herself in nursing her boy who is ill with one of the notifiable fevers.² She herself will nurse him; he shall not go to a public hospital. It is quite likely that she can isolate the case, and then no danger will follow. It is entirely a matter of probability whether any other child will catch the disease. Is the possible danger of some unknown being to oppose her passionate affection for her own child? Flesh of her flesh cries against the hypothetical unit in a mass of population. Statistics could only discover the damage if the law were generally evaded. It is law of averages against "my boy." Modern legislation repeats the hard saying of the gospel: "if any man cometh unto me and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children."

We have seen how a single simple transaction, such as an ordinary purchase, illustrates the dependence of the individual upon many complex groups of unknown people. Curiously enough this growth in the anonymous character of social life is accompanied and marked by largely increased opportunities of personal contact. This latter phenomenon is the most noticeable and has received most attention. In itself it is important enough. "Even in peaceful communities the greater propinquity that comes with social growth and the greater intimacy of men in their social relations subject the natural order to a breaking strain."³ The claims of personal morality do not become less, but greater. The need for neighborliness is more imperative. Even in these personal relations of man with man, social control is needed, because, as Professor Ross forcibly argues, the demands on us are greater than our average consideration for others can discharge. But on this side the difficulty is not so much one of thought as of motive. We know what we ought to do, and will not do it. The problem of

²The competing motive may be and often is a less respectable one of profit or convenience, as in all the actions to which laws relating to Removal of Nuisances or Smoke Abatement apply. The principle is the same; the gain is tangible and indubitable; the damage of the particular act is only hypothetical.

³Ross "Social Control," p. 50.

a London playground is more various than that of the nursery, but it is of precisely the same kind. To meet it, nursery ethics need to be strengthened and perhaps developed. But nursery ethics simply do not apply to the impersonal processes of social life.

The crux of the difficulty does not lie here, and the very increase of this which is merely incidental does but serve to obscure the growth of anonymity which is essential.

III.

From the time when men first discerned in modern (or as we say ancient) Athens the likeness of the ideal city of God it has always been true that "when there is no common but only private feeling a state is disorganized." When city merged in empire this became more penetratingly true. But it was less obvious because thought was concurrently turned to the one-sided perfection of the individual, whether for the present or a future life. It became easy to mask the disorganization which afflicted the individual as well as the State, because the lowest ebb of public enthusiasm has often left bare the most excellent private virtue. But individualism is merely a heresy and its praise only that which may rightly belong to sectarianism. The conception of social justice as the highest nerve centre of all moral worth has fallen into abeyance. Its regnant authority is to be rediscovered only through the deepening gloom of the anonymous. For recent political theory there was, and perhaps there still is, an aspect of exaggeration in Plato's, "I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about the justice of institutions." ("Republic," v. 330; Jowett's trans.)

Our difficulty is much more troublesome than Plato's, for he expressly decrees that "our city is to be neither large nor small, but of such a size as is consistent with unity." ("Republic," 423). Under modern conditions the city may no doubt be considerably larger than that which Greek theorists would admit. But the modern State is incomparably too big for the old relation of the citizens to apply. If we are to gain

anything approaching the antique standard of loyalty for our population-mass of 40,000,000, we had better reconcile ourselves to a long roundabout order of quest. We may have it directly for our cities (the case of London is a doubtful one), immense as they are. The old mood of the good citizen can be expanded and enriched till it embraces even a factory town. I imagine this gives in part the true explanation of the recent growth of municipalism which is more than a mere desire to manage our own affairs. It is also an aspiration to organize the common life round an ideal end not too distant or strange. The citizen can love his city. It is less easy to see how he can apply civic enthusiasm to a population-mass of 40,000,000.

Yet this is to be done. In some form or other the social morality which will disregard and so triumph over the lion form of the anonymous must crystallize round the idea of justice, and that not as an abstract conception but as an immediate and persuasive force. The contemporary phrase which most adequately expresses the idea is the love of humanity. Only it must be recognized that love of humanity is not necessarily love of the individuals. These last, so far as they are unknown, cannot be objects of affection, and even when they are known are not necessarily loved. Justice, or a love of humanity, is predisposition to love and act rightly toward individuals. It is an attitude of emotional preparedness. I wish in these remaining pages to inquire how this emotional predisposition is to be cultivated and rendered available for units who must till the end remain anonymous units in a crowd. I suggest a twofold inquiry into the function of social knowledge and of social imagination respectively.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the sociological study which, before Comte's time, and increasingly since then, has yielded so much information as to conditions of social life. The net result has been to translate the economic fact of solidarity into one of the most potent regulative moments of consciousness. Physical interdependence is shown to involve social responsibility. The bearing of this on our inquiry is patent. But it is necessary to remember that, though the sociologist may be driven in the first place to his

study of social conditions by the pull of human sympathy, yet as sociologist he is concerned with conditions, and persons are not his immediate goal. The individuals, if they appear at all, do so in the guise of statistics. The student still moves among averages which, however invaluable as abstractions, remain only abstractions. They are the proper object of the student's attention, just because the prevalence of impersonal relations is the typical social reaction. He may begin with the personal instance, but he is inevitably driven back from it. Knowledge leads away from personal considerations. To most people a page of figures (illustrating, let us say, the incidence of a tariff) means anything or nothing. Even the few to whom they have one exact lesson cannot gain in this way the whole emotional preparedness which we have seen to be necessary.

From the collection of knowledge we pass on to the attempt to popularize it. The method almost always adopted is that of an appeal from particular instances of extreme distress to the sentiment of pity. This is dangerous on many accounts. For one thing, appetite grows with what it feeds on, and repeated doses of sentiment require to be more violent. They have a strong personal realization of the humanity of other individuals, I am and ought to be a little callous. The infantile death rate does not touch a man in the same way as the loss of his own child. The facts are not really of the same order. It were equally mischievous to reduce our sense of a private bereavement to the languid interest which is aroused by an annual report of the registrar general, or to raise the emotions with which the report is studied to the pitch of the individual grief. Knowledge of social phenomena is strictly requisite; but it carries the mind not to persons and personal considerations, but away from them. Persons there are, certainly, yet inasmuch as they are unknown the appeal of their need is not to sympathy; at least, not to the same order of sympathy as is accorded to a familiar friend. The question must be viewed in another light. If "efficiency" be the aim, knowledge may be enough, and in any case we must have efficiency. The sympathies may become much stronger and more supple, and help to correct what is known as the bureau-

cratic tendency. But something more is required if we are to be. It is not in itself sufficient. With regard to the fate of unknown men such immediate unreflecting sympathy is considerable, but it is also more transitory in their effect. The social value of men, even the members of the most anonymous group. This additional force is found in the exercise of the social imagination, and I venture to submit a thought which may be of value in spite of its mystical trend.

Through the imagination the obstinate distinction between the known and the unknown is found to be malleable. Even those who are dear to us because of their idiosyncrasies (*i. e.*, our friends) are inadequately known until they are discerned also in their representative character. So far as this operates, the mind is able to reach forth to the crowd without an overwhelming feeling for its unknown individuals. Let me illustrate by reference to Walt Whitman's work, the value of which consists in its power of evoking this kind of interest. A long procession of people of every age, sex and occupation passes by. Critics have complained that separate figures are not individualized with sufficient precision. It was no part of Whitman's business. Almost all his portraits are of deliberate purpose the portraits of nameless men. He chants the word *en masse*:

"Passing stranger!
I am not to speak with you, I am to think of you when I sit alone."

Or, again,

"And you that shall cross from shore to shore years hence are more
to me, and more in my meditation, than you might suppose."

The passing stranger to whom he does not speak has power to sound in his mind the call of a common humanity. In this way all shapes of democracy pass before him, "the beauty of wood boys," the lumbermen in their winter camp, spar makers in the spar yard. They are results of centuries and forerunners of centuries. The elusiveness of Whitman's faces is the supreme triumph of his artistic effort. He does not try to portray these lumbermen who pass, but to stir the lumberman

mood in his readers' mind. Each individual has symbolic much more than individual significance. Whitman was by temperament quick, and by culture became more sure in transferring his symbols. Therefore the man who should cross Brooklyn Ferry years hence was so much to him. The faces as they pass flash fragments of the message of the passing crowd, fragments which the visionary crowd of coming years piece into a whole. And this for the crowd of the coming age, because the rushing units of the present crowd are visionary also. All are ciphers of the secret of the World, and the poet deciphers them. This power of discerning the common human quality of those who pass before our eyes, or who even pass only in the abbreviated sign of figures in a statistical list, is needed to vitalize the knowledge derived from study of averages. The ethical regard for the anonymous crowd depends equally on statistics and poetry.

By the one method we approach from the outside, by the other from the inside, to the same thought *nequaquam sumus homines sed partes hominis*. Strangely enough this fragmentary nature of the person is most clearly revealed first then when personal affection is most indissoluble. In the love of man for woman, which is tremendously for this and for no other person, individualism is taut as the strung bowstring, yet also just here most people gain their chief or only hint of the symbolic character of the individual. Every lover is said to be a poet. The beloved is one, and is more imperiously distinguished in her own personality than in any other experience of life. She is also more representative than any other can be of the larger common life which beats through all things. Every simple love song is an epithalamium of the earth, and no tragedy of fire or flood or winter's frost is strange to the lover's mind. The more intimate the love is, the more symbolic is it. The one affection is felt as instreaming from the ocean of being.

We have considered the tensest personality of all; its representative quality is shared with the most vague, as it reveals itself to the modern lover of nature. There are people who can feel the same master passion of identity with the tree in

the forest. The tree also has (for them) a personality, although it is of a weak kind. From this tree the man passes easily to the communion of the dryads or of whatever personal or impersonal spirit he finds as the life of the woods. He enters into companionship with the secret being of the growing things and comes out into a broad place, even the common life of plant and brute and man. The individual in this case is almost entirely symbolic. If it were altogether so there would be no resemblance to human companionship and I believe those who have experience of such ecstatic communion with the life of the woods will agree with me that it is of the same kind as human love. But a particular tree is more readily symbolic than most particular men, partly no doubt because the man is more stubbornly an individual. Just because earth and the still unbanished earth-born things are more easily seen as representative of the one tide of life which pulses through creation than is man in his state of banishment, therefore it is that to so many the communion of nature rather than the communion of man is the inlet of the religious life. But even if it should be harder to catch the meaning, yet the message of man is an ampler revelation.

Now for the conundrum. The tree is symbol and the beloved is symbol. The mere acquaintance is not symbolic except in exalted and infrequent moods, the faces in the crowd are not, emphatically the figures of a census report are not. But there is no reason why they should not be.

What is required is a quick and delicate capacity for transferring the mystic thought stirred by the loved one whether of the daughters of men or of the trees of the earth. The love itself is not transferable, though a certain preparedness to love may be. More often the strong love of one acts as an alternative to the love of many. But that which is behind and alone gives its worth to personal love is not exclusive and may be in widest commonality shared. It is possible to become so responsive to the power which enfolds us that the passing faces by the roadside may recall us to ourselves and to the universe even as a mighty love does do. I go even further. The statistical inquiries to which I have referred as

the antithesis to personal emotion may convey the same message. It is not love either for the figures or for the persons whose lives are lived in the dim obscurity which lies behind them. There in the distance are persons, but they are not persons for me. The figures cannot enable me to discern or to love them as individuals. But figures are also symbols and they, too, as surely as the well-beloved, can carry my imagination to the divine earth-born nature which gives fullest meaning to her and them.

Thus sociology and mysticism lead to the same conclusion. The one discovers a progressive interdependence in external form among those who are less than individuals to each other. The intuition of mysticism discovers an identity of individuals because, being symbolic, they are more than individual. Yet love is and remains for persons, woman, tree, or arithmetical number. There is even a certain advantage in the power of easily transferring the persuasion of human kindred from the familiar face to *x*, and thus of kindling loyalty into a flame. In the ordinary love of persons there is an effort to bend the loved one to the lover's law of development. Imaginative love leaves him freely to his own.

So long as social relations were of the simple personal type the need to discover a representative or symbolic quality in unknown persons was curious or speculative, but with the growth of industrial society the need has become an intensely practical one.

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A NEW SEARCH FOR THE SOUL.

That ancient recipe for the making of rabbit pie which begins: First, catch your rabbit, and ends without further details, is a sound maxim, worthy of broad application. It expresses not merely common sense, but the golden rule of modern science, cautioning us to commence with tangible realities if we would seek unknown truths. But nowhere has its advice been more often neglected than in learned speculations concerning the future life of the human soul. If we ask ourselves in each case: Has this investigator first caught the soul? we are apt to see his theory in its true relations, hanging like Mahomet's coffin between heaven and earth, out of all connection with established fact. Surely the first and necessary step is to find the soul; for what the soul can do must depend largely upon what it is.

Near the close of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant noted this deficiency in the work of his predecessors. To him it revealed the reason why all former attempts had failed. He perceived that the soul must be found at the start instead of at the completion of the investigation. Unfortunately, however, he did not find the soul himself and cautioned others not to attempt it. He continued in the faith that the soul exists, but he was also convinced that its abode is in a region whither mortals cannot go.

Seventy years went by before Kant's optimistic conclusion, based on his failure to find the soul, ceased to satisfy the old longing of mankind to know its destiny. Then scientists attacked the problem, and in certain quarters materialism won the day. Moleschott, Büchner, and others insisted that mind is a function of brain. This statement meant that with the death of the brain, its function and consequently our consciousness will cease. Like all the rest they had not found the soul. To speak metaphorically, a thorough search of all the accessible briar-patches was made without a vestige of rabbit being found. They repudiated Kant's suggestion that the rabbit in-

habits a briar-patch impenetrable to mortal investigators. The soul, they were prepared to assert, does not lie within the radius of scientific observation.

To-day finds us still on the horns of this dilemma. Attempts to furnish reasoned proof of immortality are treated like children's efforts to gain the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. It is a conflict between faith and reason. Some are yet loyal to Kant; others, not given to dreaming, courageously face the facts. Destroy the brain, say the latter, and destroy its gray cells and the multitudinous fibers connecting them, then we must believe that this world of sights and sounds and all that goes to make up the corporeality of things will instantly be blotted out. The last shred of things will vanish—our sensations, our perceptions of external objects, all our ideas based upon these, and the very words by which we designate them. Even if by any chance these should all remain, yet with the destruction of the connecting fibers alone we should lose the power to associate one perception or idea with another, without which we would have no power to remember anything or to reason about it.

Are these things the most dearly cherished possessions among our mental furniture? If so, then our search for the soul thus far proves disheartening; but, personally, I cannot believe that the factors just enumerated are essential to our spiritual welfare at all. The experiences of which death must deprive us let us place in one scale of the balance, and turn to seek other mental experiences to heap upon the other scalepan. We seek only such experiences as can be known by us in our present earthly life, and of these only such as have no demonstrable dependence on the brain. If any are found, we shall weigh them over against the contents of the other scalepan; in this way their worth may be estimated.

The fleeting pageant of external images that flows onward, always changing, never halting so long as the brain is in a state of sufficient activity, is not the whole of human consciousness. Flowing parallel to it there is another stream, as it were, of personal comments, of appreciation and disapproval, such as each of us might pass with respect to pictures thrown upon

a screen. It is the content of this second stream that I propose to weigh over against all the relatively objective factors of mind—the sensations, ideas, and such other phenomena as are known to owe their origin to the activity of the brain.

Whether this current of subjective feelings, this inner life, is worthy of the dignity we confer upon it, whether it can fulfil the requirements demanded of a soul, is matter for debate. One general statement, however, is not open to dispute: were we deprived of our feelings, the remainder of consciousness would amount to nothing; our sensations would lose their pleasure and pain; our thoughts would be bereft of all interest and vitality; our convictions and ideals would lack the quickening touch of the spirit and fall as empty sounds on deaf ears. Within the flow of *feeling* is all the zest of life contained; beyond it lies nothing that of itself could make immortality desirable.

The problem, then, is whether the life of feeling requires an accompanying series of molecular changes within or among the cells of the brain; or whether, on the contrary, all the changes occurring in the brain have reference only to the objective side of consciousness, in other words, to sensations, perceptions, and ideas, exclusive of the feelings. This question touches the weakest point in our knowledge of brain-physiology. To quote Professor Wundt, probably the best authority on the subject: "The question has been raised whether or not particular *physiological processes* correspond to the simple feelings, as is the case for the sensations. Older psychology was inclined to answer this question in the negative, and to contrast the feelings as inner, purely psychological states, with sensations as processes aroused from without. In modern times, on the contrary, the affirmative answer has generally been given, but for the most part without the support of adequate empirical proof."¹

Strong feelings are usually accompanied by bodily expressions, but bodily movements of whatever sort are not the feelings themselves. So also our sensations and ideas arouse feelings, and occur simultaneously with them, but they are not the

¹ "Grundriss der Psychologie" (English translation by C. H. Judd, 1897).

feelings. If we make these careful distinctions we find that a definite brain-center for the production of feelings themselves is not known to exist.

And yet our feelings are undoubtedly in close accord with our sensations and bodily movements; no one is likely to deny the connection of soul and body, however helpless our efforts may be to understand it. Perhaps the connecting link is not imbedded in the substance of the brain. The sight of cruelty arouses a feeling in us just as surely as does the sensation of pain inflicted upon our own bodies. We cannot infer that the feeling aroused by seeing another suffer comes to our mind through the channels of visual sensation, else why should not the same sight always produce the same effect upon us? Instead of the same feeling we find a bewildering variety, ranging from fear and horror to compassion and resentment.

With respect to our own sensations there is an equal variety of accompanying feelings. Probably never do we experience the same feeling on two occasions when viewing the same landscape. It is this limitless variety that makes the mechanical explanation especially doubtful; for while sensations, perceptions and ideas are in a sense common property to us all and possess relative stability, coming, going, and returning at our bidding, the feelings that they yield are multifarious and fleeting; they probably never return a second time in exactly identical form.

If, on the other hand, the feelings were subject to the same physiological laws as govern memory processes, or if they stood in the same relation to the brain-function of language as do our ideas, then there would still be reason for accepting the physiological theory in regard to them. But indeed there is no true memory of the feelings. What we do in endeavoring to revive a past feeling is to recall the circumstances of the event under which we felt it. Thus Ulysses recalls his wanderings and lives over again his trials and hardships. Oddly enough he finds pleasure and no longer sadness in them. And so all of us, in recalling the past, experience feelings that rarely even remotely resemble their originals. It is idle to suppose that we can accurately remember our past life of feel-

ing. Herein, perhaps, lies the charm of our past childhood, and the basis of the perennial belief in a lost golden age.

The same observation can be made in regard to the brain-function of language, which we find impaired or completely destroyed in cases of mental aphasia. Words recall things, sometimes very vividly; but words cannot reproduce feelings. The spoken or written word "anger," for example, never causes us to feel anger. It is this fact that makes psychological dissertations on the "moral and intellectual sensibilities," as all will agree, extremely dead and colorless.

Even our opponents cannot reasonably expect the discovery of a feeling-center in the brain, since no person while retaining consciousness has ever been deprived of this universal faculty. No mind has ever been proved to exist in the condition of a purely intellectual machine, conscious yet cold and impassive. Even in the various forms of insanity, where the mind is chaos and the flow of feeling strangely distorted, there is no occasion for inferring that a center of feeling is affected. It would be more strange were the feeling not harassed by the vagaries of a diseased organism that takes the bit in its teeth and runs a wild career. If the house be smoky, it is a sad abode to dwell in.

The statement, therefore, that mind is a function of brain, seems to lack adequate empirical proof in so far as it pertains to the feelings. Nevertheless, science has its articles of faith; and one to which the majority subscribe is that the purposes of science require the assumption of a purely material foundation for the entire human mind to rest on. I doubt that human ingenuity can devise a conclusive proof either for or against the statement. If we make it merely a matter of faith, the structure of the brain is sufficiently complex to satisfy all demands. If its millions of cells are deemed too few to account for the actual variety of psychical phenomena, the complexity of its structure can be indefinitely increased even to the extent of supposing each cell to possess the complexity of a separate brain. By this inconsequential method we may arrive at the belief that the entire brain acts as a center for the feelings. Thus the brain may be conceived as having a double task to

perform; while producing the external pageant, it may also create a running commentary upon its own product, just as though a hand that is painting a picture were able at the same time to appreciate its own work. But such a theory relies on our ignorance, not on our knowledge, of the brain, and has no real advantage over the ancient doctrine, long since discarded, that the feelings reside in the heart and the liver.

On this matter of the feelings in relation to the brain, the final word seems to be *ignorabimus*: we shall remain in ignorance. The most that can be done is to show that there are two radically different ways of arriving at belief. The man of science may hold the materialistic view, but the same man as a man of feeling may hold another. Yet both natures carry conviction and present a remarkable paradox in human nature. Doubts and fears come in the moments of intellectual groping when a man tries by means of reason to solve the momentous problem of his destiny. In such moments he is yoked to an unbeliever that is none other than his own brain, and there is a kind of irony in the fact that reason should discredit the claims of feeling in this very question that happens to involve an invidious comparison between them.

The explanation of the paradox can, I believe, be truly given. The brain and the products of the brain belong to one sphere, the feelings to another. The faculty of reason is a brain process; it deals in ideas, and all that comes before its tribunal must come in the form of ideas. The feelings, on the contrary, in that they occupy an inner realm of consciousness, will receive scant justice in the outer realm where the intellect has set up its tribunal. They cannot appear before this tribunal and must, so to speak, offer substitutes to present their plea. These substitutes are not feelings but ideas—they are really ideas-of-feelings—and here lies the difficulty. Surely there is a wide difference, for example, between feeling happy and merely having the idea of happiness. The experiences of the inner life will fade when subjected to this process that reduces their infinite variety to a few general types, represented by colorless ideas and designated by words that are incapable of reviving the impressions they stand for. If this substitution

is allowed before the case goes to trial, the outcome will be certain enough, since ideas are undoubtedly dependent on the brain.

We can surmount this difficulty, however, for the intellect will acknowledge its mistake as soon as it realizes that it has been dealing with the wrong things. At the same time the fact will become obvious that every successful search for the soul is a personal matter; each must make the search for himself. Another cannot make the discovery and communicate the result to us. All communication between men is a communication of ideas by means of words and gestures. The nearest approach to a communication of feelings is to convey to the other man's consciousness an idea that will awaken in him a feeling that bears some likeness to that we ourselves feel. He must be capable of that feeling. This is the secret of all art, and the artist is he who by words or musical sounds, by sculptured forms or painted canvases can convey certain sensations and ideas which will be capable of inspiring lofty feelings.

We are constantly beaten in upon by a world without, and only in brief intervals can we still the tumult and let the life of feeling assert its superiority. Then if any man pauses to ask himself, what am I? he will discover the essential difference between himself and all other personalities to consist not in the relative scope and variety of his ideas, nor in the keenness of his reasoning power, nor in the strength of his memory, qualities that are fortuitous and liable to progressive decay. He will recognize himself rather in his personal interpretations of all things, of works of art, creations of nature, acts of men. As his countenance has no exact duplicate the world over, so he feels sure, though he cannot prove it, that his spirit is destined to value all its experiences in its own peculiar way, and that the current of his inner life carves out for itself its own channel, and broadens, deepens, and determines its course, be it for better or worse, wholly free from any form of compulsion. Such is the estimate that feeling places upon itself.

An advantage is gained over all other doctrines of the soul by identifying the immortal part of man with the current of

feeling. The soul is thus found in close connection with our earthly bodies; it is discovered to exert a guiding influence on our earthly lives. The relationship supplies a solution to the mystery why man, if he be indeed immortal, should be leading an existence here on earth. The significance of our present life is established when we are able to view it as a stage in a progressive evolution of spirit. Again, with reference to the life beyond, the feelings, in that they constitute the warp and woof of personality, are alone qualified to span the chasm to another sphere, maintaining the thread of personal identity, which if severed must render any form of immortality absolutely meaningless. Our personality can thus persist without the artificial aid of memory, which is the frailest of our faculties and a serious obstacle in many doctrines of immortality.

And now, after a long journey, we have perhaps reached the true goal we were seeking. Our search is ended; and, repeating the metaphor used at the outset, the scale-pans are laden. Each individual must judge the result for himself, because, in truth, the weighing should occur in the realm of feeling where each personality is a law unto itself. Though our future is doubtless incapable of proof, none being able to say what even a day will bring forth, yet you may perhaps agree with me that the soul can be found for the seeking.

It may be that in parting company with this world we shall be as candles that are snuffed out. Certain it is that a soul would become a nonentity if bereft of all environment. Some instrument—no doubt, some organism like our material bodies, though not of necessity material—is needed to establish a relationship with any new environment. The greatest assurance we possess that our hope in this respect is not vain lies in so common a miracle that we might easily fail to see its real significance. Daily, in thousands of places on our earth, new spirits are arriving, as Minerva sprang, armed *cap-a-pie*, from the head of Jove; and thus they begin before our eyes to create for themselves their environment. The homely fact of birth, the most mysterious event in the whole range of human observation, is perhaps a precedent of something that in each mortal's existence is yet to happen.

Supposing such an event to occur, the personality embodied in the life of feeling will be no prey to a prearranged and rigid environment, but will have a share in the work of making that environment; for that is even its purpose while here. Unless this be so, immortality offers a prospect that none can endure to contemplate. Instinctively we cling to the souls we have. We shrink from entering a strange place, naked, with only a passport. We shrink from a burst of glory such as would shatter our old standards of right and wrong, and impose upon us a new personality that could attain every desire without a struggle. Secretly we cling even to sorrow, and hate the doctrine that would convince us that saved souls, by some mysterious regeneration, are rendered incapable of aught but feeling happy. And above all, we long for and pray to have the comradeship of our old friends.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

HENRY SIDGWICK. A Memoir. By A. S. and E. M. S. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1906. Pp. x, 632.

To all who can feel the attraction of a noble mind spending itself in the search for truth this biography must be of compelling interest.

But perhaps it will be most impressive to those who, although they had the privilege of knowing Dr. Sidgwick, knew him only at a distance and chiefly through his lectures or his books. His remorseless demand for accuracy of statement, his keen critical analysis, his refusal to accept vague dreams as satisfactory solutions for the intellect, the crisp "dry light" in which he seemed to live, may have hid for such superficial observers his intense sympathy with the longings and aspirations of man's heart. His Socratic irony obscured for them his Socratic earnestness. In their ignorant haste they may even have thought that Sidgwick cared more for the intellectual search than for the character of the conclusions. Now they discover that the central fire from which that dry light came was a burning longing for God, Freedom, Immortality, a "hunger for the Infinite," if ever there was one. They realize that it was his entire devotion to truth, coupled with his fear of raising needless distress and doubt, that made him refrain even from "good words" on these matters. They learn, too, what may surprise them even more: that the man they looked on as the embodiment of alert, cheerful activity, as one who must certainly be intolerant of any morbidity—that this man knew to the full the pain of self-distrust, perplexity, misgiving. It was because he burnt his own smoke that the flame was so clear. At the same time they have the happiness of seeing that the world was for him a world where, as he said at the end, he had found it sweet to live. His life was serene to an exceptional degree; it had the support and crown of an ideal marriage; it was rich in practical work, work for the broadening of the university, work for the advancement of women's education, work in psychical research. It is striking to see the place that the last took in Sidgwick's view of the universe. His ethical system, as most readers of this JOURNAL will remember, demanded for its completion a conviction of the moral government of the world, and that, in its turn, needed the proof of immortality. For he accepted two fundamental principles of action

as both alike reasonable: one, that the individual should seek his own happiness, the other, that he should aim at the general happiness of mankind. Now in this life the two often meet in an irreconcilable conflict. The heroic man, conceivably, might always find a compensating happiness in the act of self-sacrifice for the good of others. But everyone was not a moral hero, and everyone had a right to ask the question, "If it is not my happiness to work for the general good, why should I do it?" But a life beyond death would give scope for a working-out of emotions and faculties such as would enable any sacrifice for the general good to issue in a richer happiness for the individual. To find evidence for such a life Sidgwick turned to psychical research. When he felt that the proof he desired was, for the present at least, to him unattainable, he had serious thoughts of resigning his Professorship of Moral Philosophy. The passage from his letter (*JOURNAL*, March 16, 1887) to his friend Symonds, in which he speaks of this, is so illuminating that it must be quoted here. After mentioning his own personal desire for immortality, he goes on:

"But at present the recognized failure of my efforts to obtain evidence of immortality affects me not as a man but as a moralist. 'Ethics,' says J. A. S., 'can take care of themselves' . . . But my special business is not to maintain morality *somewhat*, but to establish it logically as a reasoned system; and I have declared and published that this cannot be done if we are limited to merely mundane sanctions, owing to the inevitable divergence, in this imperfect world, between the individual's duty and his happiness. I said in 1874 that without some datum beyond experience 'The Cosmos of Duty is reduced to a Chaos.' Am I to recant this conviction and answer my own arguments, which no one of my numerous antagonists has yet even tried to answer? Or am I to use my position and draw my salary, for teaching that morality is a chaos, from the point of view of Practical Reason; adding cheerfully that, as man is not after all a rational being, there is no real fear that morality won't be kept up somehow On one point J. A. S. has not caught my position; he says that he never expected much from *the* method of proof on which I have relied. But the point is that I have tried *all* methods in turn—all that I found pointed out by any of those who have gone before me, and all in turn have failed—revelational, rational, empirical methods—there is no proof in any of them. Still it is premature to despair, and I am quite content to go on seeking while life lasts; that is not the perplexing problem; the question is whether to profess Ethics without a basis." (pp. 471-473.)

Elsewhere, and earlier, in the book there appear traces of another view as to a possible way of meeting the difficulty of the

conflict, a view based on the sense of the sublimity of self-sacrifice without the hope of reward. I say "another view," because this sense seems to me to imply that the aim at the general happiness must be definitely set above the aim at the personal as the fundamental test of rightness in conduct. In other words, benevolence without other happiness must be felt as ethically more satisfactory than happiness, however great, without benevolence.

But it is difficult to think that Sidgwick would have accepted this way of putting it, or could have accepted it without recasting his system. What he does say goes no further than this: "As for the great question of immortality there was one line of thought I wanted to suggest in which from time to time I find a kind of repose. . . . It is that on moral grounds *hope* rather than *certainty* is fit for us in this earthly existence. For if we had certainty, there would be no room for the sublimest effort of our mortal life—self-sacrifice and the moral choice of good as good, though not perhaps good for us here and now." (Pp. 338, 339.) (See also Pp. 253, 254.)¹

The general development of Sidgwick's whole mind and character through the different periods of his life from his first doubts on the old orthodox creed, is well symbolized by four texts which, we are told, ran in his head at different times:

"From about 1861 to about 1865—(he was 23 in 1861—the text was, 'after the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers.' From about 1865 to October, 1869, it was 'are not Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel? May I not wash in them and be clean? . . . And his servants said, My father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing, wouldest thou not have done it?' From October, 1869, to about 1875, the text was, 'Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.' From about 1875 to about 1890, 'But this one thing I do, forgetting those things that are behind, and stretching forth unto those things that are before, I press towards the mark.' And finally from about 1890, 'Gather up the fragments that are left, that nothing be lost.' "

The end of it all, when he faced death from cancer with

¹ It might be suggested here that it would be a great help to students if an appendix were added in a future edition giving a brief account of the drift of Sidgwick's works on ethics and political philosophy.

heroic and most human fortitude, is so beautiful and so beautifully told, that it seems almost a profanation to comment on it. But all readers will feel that, grateful as they are for the whole book, they are most grateful for that.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF CONDUCT. By Thomas Marshall, M. A. London: Unwin, 1906. Pp. xxi, 578.

This book deserves recognition as a considerable effort to present the substance of Aristotle's "Ethics" to the general reader, on the part of a writer who is not in sympathy with idealistic philosophy. The author, I should judge, though genuinely interested in Aristotle, not merely in the "Ethics," but also in the "Metaphysics" and "De Anima," can hardly be regarded as a highly trained scholar; and the general result is that his views, vigorously and persistently maintained, convey a one-sided but not valueless impression of Aristotle's thought, although in detail his interpretations and arguments are far from trustworthy.

The book is divided into chapters with such titles as, "The Genesis and Nature of Moral Conduct" ("Ethics," I, xiii, Book II), or "Feelings in Relation to Conduct—Pleasure and Pain" ("Ethics," VII, xi-xiv, and X, i-iv). Each chapter consists of a short introduction, followed by a full analysis of the text, with footnotes citing largely from the Greek, and a conclusion dealing with the subject by way of summary and criticism. There is also a general introduction in which "the purport of the Ethics is summarily set forth." The author rightly claims the liberty of using illustrations from common things to enliven his account of Aristotle's doctrine. But I think that his freedom of paraphrase and example, within his inverted commas, is too large to be justified. Thus he uses the words "in one sense all existence is subjective" in rendering "De Anima" (431, b. 29). It is true that he cites the Greek text in the footnote.

Mr. Marshall's general conception of Aristotle's moral theory starts from the opposition between Aristotle and Plato, which, as he thinks, has been unduly minimized by Kantian interpreters, biased by their sympathy with Plato's doctrine of the Good. In this, and in many similar expressions, he seems to be referring to Professor Stewart's edition of the "Ethics," which has perhaps some tendency to read too much into Aristotle.

For Mr. Marshall, the opposition in question coincides with the distinction between a "relative" and an "absolute" moral standard, which again he takes to be one with the contrast between a standard which varies with circumstances, and an "absolute form" which excludes all relativity and adaptation.

"Prudence takes its color from the social medium in which it is generated and developed. This was a view widely held, and Aristotle thought that it had reason on its side. 'In the sphere of morals, in matters of justice, tolerance and the contrary,' says Socrates in the "Theætetus," 'there are those who boldly maintain that there is no natural or essential basis but that what is generally believed is true when and so long as it believed.' Such a belief undoubtedly prevailed and still prevails; and Aristotle held it, although Socrates and Plato did not." (P. 566.)

He is aware that relativity may be understood in a sense which destroys the idea of truth, but it seems pretty clear that the variable standards, which he himself affirms, must fall under this condemnation, as implying the prejudice that identity, or a universal, excludes difference.

His positive account of Aristotle's ideas is therefore at its best where the latter's dualism may most fairly be insisted on, as in the account of the intellectual excellences, and of the primary antithesis between the practical and the theoretic life. On these points he conveys an impression which might be described as a caricature of that produced by Dr. Caird's treatment of the question in his "Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers." The tendency of interpretation has of late been the other way. It is therefore not a bad thing that the charge of dualism should be enforced against Aristotle's moral theory, not merely by Dr. Caird's masterly analysis, but by Mr. Marshall's rougher attempt to assimilate the basis of the "Ethics" to modern relativism and empiricism.

For the same reason, there is some value in the treatment of "Proairesis." He rightly raises the question whether we can get out of Aristotle's "preference" anything like an account of the experience of self-determination, which, in one shape or another, a modern implies when he speaks of volition.

There are good remarks, also, about the contrast between the ancient and modern idea of statesmanship; the point being driven home by a rather cynical appreciation of the modern statesman.

I should say, then, that for a student of Greek philosophy with

idealistic leanings, Mr. Marshall's work may be useful reading, "because, look you, you do not love it, nor your affections and your appetites and your disgustions do not agree with it."

But there is something more which I feel bound to point out, though it may apply nearer home, as well as to Mr. Marshall's work. I may state it as follows. The general reader, in subjects of this kind, is wholly at the mercy of his guide. It is not merely a question of mistakes; there is a more important matter than error of detail. Even a correct account of the mere framework and outline of a difficult subject is of very little service to the non-expert reader. It is he, he in particular, who needs the most thorough and suggestive interpretation of the indications which tell how a writer's thought was for himself a living system, and so corresponds with, although it may not resemble, the living thought of to-day. This can only be given by the greatest care and the fullest sympathy; and these are just what writers for the general reader are apt to think superfluous. Why, for instance, could no ordinary translation bring home Euripides to the general reader as Professor Gilbert Murray has brought him? Because what the general reader most particularly needs is just what the ordinary translator cannot give. The obvious outline misleads him, even if it is correct; while if it is incorrect, of course he has not a chance. He needs much more help than the scholar as he is at a greater distance from the object.

For these reasons, I cannot say that I hold Mr. Marshall's book to be serviceable for the public for whom I understand it to be designed. Though right in some of his outlines, yet just where things become interesting, as it seems to me, the author becomes dogmatic and cavalier in his treatment, thinking it not worth while to be precise. Take, for example, the comment on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Form of the Good. We are told that the Form of the Good is put as an hypothesis only, and one as to the truth of which the author was doubtful, and that it rests on no evidence except Plato's imagination; and the passage concludes:

"Practical reasons are, however, beside the mark; weapons taken from the armory of sense and experience are powerless against an object so impalpable as the Platonic idea; it is as if you were to attack a cloud with a broadsword. If Plato had desired to answer Aristotle, he would probably have done so in the sense in which Hegel replied to Kant's objection to the doc-

trine of the Absolute. 'Do you mean,' said Kant, 'that there is absolutely no difference between having ten dollars and not having them?' 'Philosophy,' answered Hegel, 'has nothing to do with dollars.'

Now here, the important point to my mind is that the author has just reinforced the attitude to which the non-expert reader is inclined; and therefore he has in no way helped him to get nearer the object. If one was going to allude to Kant's criticism of the ontological argument—perhaps an unwise thing to do in a brief statement—one was surely bound to point out its real relation to such a doctrine as Plato's.

So with the discussion of the quantitative nature of the distinction between goodness and badness, carrying with it the question of recognizing something like the pure will and the unity of the moral virtues.

Here again the author brings in his antagonism to the "absolute form" of moral qualities, holding that if we deny the difference of virtue and vice to be in Aristotle's view quantitative, we are tied down to the "absolute form," and debarred from admitting degrees of goodness. It does not occur to him that a positive act, expressive of a mood or spirit, must always involve a system of quantitative adjustments instrumental to such expressions, and that Aristotle emphasizes the correspondence of "inner" and "outer" in the moral act by requiring the predominance of the true motive or principle, as alone having power to bring every detail of the action into the right proportion. (Aristotle's account of "magnificence" is an instructive example. "The churl in spirit, how'er he veil"—this and the next two stanzas of "In Memoriam," surely give the sort of meaning required.)

Therefore, naturally, he sees no point in the unity of the virtues, as implied in practical wisdom, and ventures on an exceptional piece of construing (1145 a1) in order to deny that Aristotle maintains it.

And many important and interesting questions he cuts short as futile or omits to notice. I mention a few at random: Whether value can be contrasted as absolute and relative (*τιμεον* and *τιμαινεσθαι*); the idea of natural right; whether a man has rights that his own consent cannot alienate; the objective unity of minds in friendship (where the priority of Egoism is what interests the author); the theory of leisure in relation to the attainment of the end.

Finally, in treating of Regulative Justice, he severely criticizes

Aristotle's view of punishment and damages according to the ordinary interpretation, and explains *de haut en bas* that "the true theory of punishment" is the deterrent theory, as Plato puts it in Protagoras' mouth. He does not seem to be aware that there is another interpretation of Aristotle's language, the discussion of which would have better occupied his space than the gratuitous piece of dogmatism I have mentioned. The author's detailed interpretation, then, seems to me of little value, and unreliable for the novice. But there does seem to be something of a divergence or reaction in the criticism of the "Ethics" at the present moment, and as a symptom of this, and a crude contribution to the statement of it, the work has its value.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

ST. ANDREWS.

THE LIFE OF REASON, or, the Phases of Human Progress. By George Santayana. In Five Volumes. London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1905.

This book is so wanting in clearness of thought that I doubt whether it can be of much use to anyone. Mr. Santayana usually expresses his views in words which convey at the same time several different propositions, some of which may be true while others are false. And if we read on, in the hope that these different propositions may be distinguished, we generally find that, instead of distinguishing what was originally confused, Mr. Santayana adds to the confusion by introducing other entirely new propositions which have no closer connection with the original ones than these had with one another. Such confused thinking may, no doubt, be very "suggestive"; and this Mr. Santayana very frequently is. But in order that mere suggestions may be of any use, it is surely necessary that someone should think out exactly what important truth it is that is suggested, and should distinguish this truth clearly from the other truths or errors with which it is mingled; and it may be doubted whether Mr. Santayana's book will lead to the performance of this difficult process. Again, mere confused suggestions may, no doubt, have a great æsthetic value; for confusion of thought does not seem to be inconsistent with very high literary merit. And this book certainly possesses much more literary merit than most philosophical writing. But I doubt whether it possesses enough to

compensate for its lack of clearness. Mr. Santayana seems to spoil his literary effectiveness by the introduction of matter in which he is interested for didactic reasons; while his lack of clearness prevents his book from having much, if any, didactic value.

The chief general conclusions which Mr. Santayana seems anxious to enforce are that a great deal of real good is attainable and has been attained in human life, and that real good can be thus attained not in one way only but in a great many different ways. He wishes to enforce the first point against those who hold that little or no good is attainable by man in this life. And he wishes to enforce the second against those who hold that real good is attainable only in one way, or in a strictly limited number of ways—against those who deny that there is any good at all in the majority of human pursuits. To enforce and illustrate these conclusions seems to be the object which furnishes the key to the main outline of his book. He seems to classify human thought and feelings under the five heads of Common Sense, Society, Religion, Art, and Science, mainly because he thinks that all great attainable goods fall under one or the other of these five heads, and that a great many fall under each. And part of his object in each volume is certainly to point out what he takes to be the chief goods attained by mankind in each of these five departments. Thus, under the head of Common Sense, he urges that the attainment of memory; of belief in the trustworthiness of memory; of our common belief in external things which exist even when we are not aware of their existence; and of the power of abstraction, are all real goods. Under the head of Society he urges that there is a great deal of good in various kinds of relations to our fellow-men; under the head of Religion, that there is a great deal of good in many forms of religious thought and emotion; under the head of Art, that there is a great deal of good in all the various arts, and in making life beautiful; under the head of Science, that there is a great deal of good in the discoveries of the natural sciences, of history, and of mathematics.

Mr. Santayana's main object seems then to be to survey human life with a view of pointing out that a great many different goods are attainable in it, and what the chief of these are. And I think most people would agree with him that there is a great deal of good in common sense, in society, in religion (at least in

the wide sense which he gives to the word), in art, and in science; that the chief elements in these departments which he points out as valuable really are valuable; that he has made no very conspicuous omissions; and even that where he points out a merit or defect in connection with any particular human institution, the merit or defect he points out really is *one* of the merits or defects connected with that institution. On the whole, in fact, I think his distributions of praise are commonplaces, which would meet with almost universal acceptance; though, no doubt, he leaves plenty of room for dissent as to the degree of emphasis to be laid on various details. The main point which raises his appreciations above a mere enumeration of commonplaces is, I think, the fact that he does seem to attribute *intrinsic* value to a great many different goods. The view that a great many different states of consciousness are all to be valued *for their own sakes*, and not merely as means or necessary conditions for the attainment of some ulterior good, is scarcely commonplace, because so many ethical philosophers have denied it; and Mr. Santayana does seem to hold this view. But he is not careful to tell us at all exactly which of the goods he praises have, in his view, intrinsic value, and which have not. Even among those which he praises most highly, as, for instance, the beliefs of common sense and the natural sciences, there seems no doubt that he assigns them their place in his scheme chiefly owing to their instrumental value, even if he does also allow them in some cases to have some intrinsic value. He seems to value them chiefly because they give us trustworthy information as to the conditions under which we live—information which is valuable as helping us to direct our efforts rightly toward those goods which we really can attain: he does not seem to value this information chiefly for its own sake. On the whole, I think it must be owned that he does not seem to have attended systematically to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, although he does occasionally call attention to it as important, and although he does seem to hold definitely that many different goods, and not one only, have intrinsic value.

There is, I think, only one of Mr. Santayana's main valuations which calls for special notice, because, though it too is very familiar, it would not meet with nearly such universal acceptance as the rest. This is his valuation of certain elements in religion. He seems to hold exactly that view with regard to certain re-

ligious and philosophical beliefs which is commonly called Rationalism (in the popular sense) or Naturalism. That is to say, he seems to hold not only that the natural sciences do give us "a trustworthy conception of the conditions under which we live," but that they give us our only trustworthy conception of these conditions. He seems, indeed, to hold that all religious beliefs in a God or a future life of any kind, and even all philosophical beliefs in an Absolute or world different from that conceived by the natural sciences, are not only untrustworthy but false. He generally speaks of all such beliefs as "dreams," "superstitions," or "myths." Now, even if it were granted that all these beliefs are false, it would not necessarily follow that they have no value. It is widely held that, even if they are false, some of them may have great value as supplying motives and affecting happiness. And Mr. Santayana does not seem to deny that they have had in the past, and may still have, a great instrumental value. But he does seem to hold that they would be absent from a completely rational life. Under what circumstances human life actually would be better without them than with them he does not attempt to determine; but he does seem to imply that a state of things in which it would be so is by no means beyond the bounds of possible attainment; and he certainly does hold that human life *might* be better without them than with them. Even, therefore, if he allows some value to these religious beliefs in the literal truth of things which he holds to be false, he does discriminate them from most of the other goods he values. Most of these other goods he holds to be necessary constituents of a completely rational life: he holds that human life could not possibly be so valuable without them as with them. And he denies this with regard to religious beliefs. This, I think, is the only conspicuous point with regard to which his main valuations would not meet with almost universal acceptance. Those who hold that any such beliefs are true would certainly not agree that they would be absent from a completely rational life—that human life could possibly be better without them than with them; and some even of those who agree with Mr. Santayana that all such beliefs are false might yet disagree with this negative estimate of their value. Owing to his view on this point, Mr. Santayana's attitude toward religion seems to be essentially different from his attitude toward the subjects of his other four volumes. The word "religion," in its most common use, seems to be confined

to a mental attitude which includes a belief in the actual existence of some kind of God, or at least in the actual existence of something different from any of those realities with the existence of which the natural sciences acquaint us. And accordingly Mr. Santayana is excluding from a completely rational life that which most men mean by religion, while he does not exclude what they mean by common sense, society, art, and science. The only constituents of what we commonly call religion to which he does allow an ultimate value in the sense explained appear to be the following: He makes a great point of the fact that, according to him, religious beliefs are generally, if not always, "symbolic" of moral truths; and he allows great value to knowledge of the moral truths symbolized, while the contemplation of the symbols themselves, without belief in their literal truth, often has, he thinks, the same high value as the contemplation of other poetic fictions. And beyond this he assigns great value to two attitudes of mind, which he calls "piety" and "spirituality." By "piety" he seems to mean mainly a certain kind of affectionate attachment to some of the chief necessary conditions upon which the attainment of intrinsic goods in this life depends; and by "spirituality," that attitude of mind in which every action is done for the sake of and from affection for the intrinsic or "self-justifying" goods which can be secured by its means. But he seems also to include in his conception of "spirituality" an habitual contemplation of an "ideal synthesis of all that is good"—a synthesis which is not and will not be real, and which must not (if we are to be completely rational) be believed to be so.

Besides the conclusions that many different goods are attainable in human life, and that the chief of these are such as he has mentioned, Mr. Santayana is, I think, also anxious to enforce two ethical conclusions which follow from his Rationalism: namely, that these goods are the *only* ones which are attainable by us, and that these are only attainable by the methods which the natural sciences would recommend. In this way he is anxious to condemn the attempt to secure goods in this life by methods which the natural sciences show to be unlikely to secure them, and also all attempts to secure goods in a future life by means which are not likely to secure the best results in this.

In addition to the exposition of these views, the two subjects to which Mr. Santayana gives most space are the arguments which would be necessary to justify them. He devotes a good

deal of space to arguments in favor of the trustworthiness of the natural sciences, and some even to arguments in favor of their *sole* trustworthiness; and he devotes a good deal of space to the theory of Ethics. But in treating of both these subjects, the confusion of thought of which I have spoken prevents his discussion from having much, if any, value except by way of mere suggestion. Especially with regard to the theory of Ethics, he fails to distinguish the most different propositions from one another, so that his statements of principles are full of inconsistencies. The three principles upon which he seems to insist most clearly and consistently are: That a great many different goods are attainable in human life; that, whenever anyone enjoys anything, an intrinsic good exists; and that we ought not to pursue any one good, if its attainment is incompatible with that of a greater balance of good. And it should be noticed that this last principle is inconsistent with that which he seems to declare to be *the* fundamental principle of a true Ethics: namely, that nobody is under any obligation to do any action or to pursue any end which he does not himself see to be good.

The book contains besides a great deal of matter which does not seem to have any direct bearing on its main subject—the enumeration of goods. Part of this matter is introduced by way of remarks on the various human activities, which Mr. Santayana is analyzing with a view to pointing out their merits and defects; but a great deal of it relates to a subject in which he seems to be particularly interested, namely, the primitive origins of the various human activities. On this subject, as throughout the book, Mr. Santayana makes a great many scattered remarks, which are certainly "suggestive," and perhaps (as he himself declares to be his object) "stimulating," but what he says seems to be always mixed with a great deal that is definitely erroneous, and always imbedded in a mass that is greatly wanting in clearness.

EDINBURGH.

G. E. MOORE.

THE FINALITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By George Burman Foster, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago. Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago Press, 1906. Pp. 518.

This volume should have been called Volume I, as it is but the critical part of a work of which the constructive part is to

appear soon. Lacking the explanatory number, the title is somewhat misleading, since the reader expects positive teaching, and finds only historical survey and destruction of the strongholds of dogma, with but little constructive argument. If, however, the reader keeps in mind that here the way is being cleared of presuppositions preparatory to working out a conception of God and of Christ which shall satisfy the emotional and religious demands of the modern scientific man, he begins to appreciate the fact that the work is perhaps unique and is certainly a most significant expression of the new attitude of the highest religious thought of to-day.

Above the wrangles of heresy trials and above the noisy asseverations of a ministry which endeavors vainly to convince the modern age that the old religion and the new science can somehow be patched into a seamless whole, we hear now and then a voice which dares to proclaim a progressive religion. We find now and then a mind clear enough to see the inherent antagonism between the dynamic and static views of life and religion, honest enough to admit it, and religious enough to devote all its strength to the creation of a new concept of religion, and especially of God and his relation to man. Such a spirit makes itself evident in the pages of this book, which is notable, not for the fact that it accepts and delights in the latest work in science and philosophy, but in that it cannot satisfy itself with those results alone and let the religious interest drop into the background. It must, rather, make the two interpenetrate and fuse until the cold world of modern science and philosophy has once more become a world of values, of personality, of God. To be sure, we get only glimpses of this outcome in the present volume, as the author proceeds on his critical way; but they are hints so tremendous in their implications, that they arouse the liveliest curiosity as to the positive treatment soon to be forthcoming.

Let us summarize briefly the work. The title, "The Finality of the Christian Religion," states a paramount issue, that is, whether Christianity is an absolute religion which can never be superseded, or whether, since development is the universal law, it, too, must not pass away. To solve this problem, we must first be able to state what the essential of Christianity is, and this involves first a study of its historical aspects. We must, secondly, determine the relation between the historical

or existential judgment so reached and the value judgment, and must show that the value judgment has universal validity. This is of primary importance.

The author accordingly goes on to show that Christianity in its historical aspect of authority-religion, has been completely disarmed. On all the points of inspiration of the Bible, miracle, prophecy, the transcendence of God, and the substantiality of the soul, it stands defenceless before the science and criticism of the day. Is then any religion left, and what is its finality?

This introduces the question of the test of value. The worth of a thing may be judged either from its origin, its cause, or from its end, purpose, or use. Authority-religion judged Christianity on the score of its origin, arguing that because its origin is divine, Christianity itself is divine also.

But now science declares that this origin is not divine; therefore is Christianity as authority-religion condemned before the court of reason. Pseudo-science or naturalism next steps in, and, agreeing with authority-religion that value is known from origin, it ends the matter to its own satisfaction with the statement that since religion originated in lowly form, therefore it is worthless.

In opposition to both of these, the author cites teleology as maintaining that value depends upon the end sought, and not upon origin, and that naturalism is as great a foe to progress as is authority-religion, since it subsumes the world under the concept of cause and effect alone, and admits no value judgment. It fails to distinguish description from explanation, and assumes that because it traces a series back for a distance, the first of the series is explained, whereas it is still mysterious. Similarly, it fails to see that cause and effect may be but the outside of which teleology is the inside, and that science itself is but a creation of the human spirit, and not a self-dependent thing. True science, says teleology, must grant mystery, dependence and teleology as possibilities, and must admit that the other sides of the human spirit can find as complete satisfaction in the universe as does the intellectual side in science. Among such needs is the assurance of a great and good Being.

The same conflict between the concepts of causation and teleology appears in the moral sphere; for if, as naturalism maintains, man is the product of heredity and environment alone, then the heart of the moral problem is gone. But this

view ignores man's reflective power, which makes him more than a mere phenomenon. If man were only a phenomenon, he could not know phenomena. He must also be a noumenon, a willing, originative being, in order to build up for himself the world of history, thus creating the eternal truth, beauty, and goodness which are eternity. So far did Kant carry us in opposition to naturalism, but no further; for this is far from showing that morality is specifically Christian or that Christianity is final. Here, then, the author goes on.

To naturalism Jesus is the product of his environment; but the facts do not seem entirely to justify this assumption. His originality defies reduction to the environmental factors, and demands our recognition of a creative factor in him which has no causal explanation. Science itself, since it admits anew to-day the possibility of variations or of a principle of progress, must admit such a possibility, and so cannot contradict the value judgment that Jesus is uplifted above the relativity of customary cause and effect. It is not hostile to the most recent biological science to assume the introduction of a new force; nor from the standpoint of eternity, or of the value judgment, is it of importance whether this force comes at an early or late time historically. The culmination of a symphony is not the last note. Jesus is the culmination, the living principle, of Christianity.

Is Jesus, then, the finality of religion? To answer this question, we must ask ourselves, "Who was Jesus?" Approaching the matter from the historical side, the author in a masterly summary of the work accomplished by the higher criticism, reaches the conclusion that there remains to us from the past no more than traditions of Jesus which reflect only the faith of the early Christians and Christ's own attitude on certain points. He thinks that Christ held the views of his time on such matters as cosmology, demons, miracles, and the speedy end of the world; and that probably he believed he was the Messiah in a sense other than history has shown him to be. But if Jesus was limited in knowledge, what effect has it upon our attitude towards him? Only this—that we recognize that thus Jesus could best make intelligible his relation to God; that in this way he could best sustain his own heart and the courage of his disciples; that thus alone could he exalt suffering and service over the materialism and success which were the

standard of his time. But Jesus himself still remains in the fulness and beauty of his personality.

Still, once more we must ask, "Who was this Jesus? Was he interested in the life of his time? Can he direct us in our daily living?" Most apologists have sought to answer these questions affirmatively; but once more we are compelled to say, "No," as we rebuild more carefully the conditions under which Jesus uttered the words that we believe he did utter. Not only had he no interest in science, but none in the indispensable forms of modern life—the family, education, government: such things were of no importance to him, and to imitate his attitude towards them would mean the downfall of modern civilization. What then? Is it possible that to obey his will may be to disobey his words? That his view of the speedy end of the world led to this indifference, and that to him, as to us, the essential things are love and purity of mind?

In facing these questions, the author maintains that Jesus is first and last a personality, saving us by his living love, teaching us that we cannot learn from outside what good is, but must generate the good will from ourselves by seeking a personal fellowship through love. "Faith in the infinite worth of the human personality in the sight of God—if there was anything new in the thought of Jesus, it was this."

Was this faith justified? To Jesus God was his King, but most of all, his Father. How did Jesus reach such a faith? Given Jesus, the faith was inevitable. God must be at least the highest that Jesus could expect of man; at least he must be "like man as man ought to be," and especially as humanity showed itself in Christ's own nature. God is like Jesus—such is the assertion of faith even in the face of all the disillusionment of modern science and criticism; for otherwise life is valueless, and personality of no account.

But, we have still to ask, is this practical test a valid one? Is workability the test of truth? We must await the second volume for the light it may throw on these points.

Of the critical side of the work little need be said. The demolishing of authority-religion is so completely done, even though so sympathetically, that it is small wonder the ecclesiastical press has devoted itself to the bitterest denunciation of the author. Nor is it entirely fair to criticise in a detailed way the constructive side; since the author hardly begins upon it

in this volume. At the same time, what little he does say raises certain questions for which one may fairly expect an answer.

Perhaps the most fundamental of these is concerned with the statement that Jesus is an entirely new spiritual force, which statement is supported by the argument that the new evolution itself admits the principle of progress, of uncaused variations. But would not the further standpoint of science be that every genius, indeed, every individual, is such a new force, and that future geniuses will be as great as those past—nay, that they must be greater if the principle of variation is really a principle of progress?

Again the author says, "We say that it stands to reason that perfection can come only in the future, not in the past. But when we look at things *sub specie eternitatis*, no such significance attaches to past and future." Is not, however, perfection a term valid only in time? That is, does it not imply a before? Surely it has been repeatedly shown that all attempts to attach predicates to infinity end logically in a negation of all predicates; whereas if we seek a new eternity in time, once more there is time. Logical perfection and the syllogism are the outcome of living. Our value judgment is another such outcome, and is it not inevitable that we shall judge as nearest perfection the thing which most appeals to us? Is it conceivable that a *progressive* race shall forever assign the highest value to a personality developed under conditions that are less and less familiar, less and less adapted to the service of modern living?

Two other problems that arise are those in connection with the concepts of God and of the infinite worth of personality. We admit to-day that reason is the child of living, and with this the converse—that whatever is the outcome of living must be reasonable in the end; that what life demands will find ultimately a rational explanation. Now, taking this truth, the author says that living demands a God-consciousness; therefore there must be one. It demands an infinite worth for the personality; therefore that worth exists.

Is not this a trifle hasty, however? Feeling must, indeed, be satisfied. But can we be so sure that the image which feeling attaches to its want truly represents that want? The whole progress of thought seems rather to be a process of correction of the attempts of men to satisfy this deep, underlying instinct with a specific thing. From the primitive fetish to the

God of Kant! Surely the idea of God will still alter as humanity does, and we can assert of him no invariable attributes, unless the human race has such. Personality? Why yes, if personality is the principle of growth of the human race from man-worm to divinity! If our living to-day demands the assumption of a God-consciousness and of an infinite worth for personality, then in the name of Kant and the modern pragmatists, let us assume them and be not ashamed! But let us hold them as assumptions, as working hypotheses, as faith; for how can we escape the conviction that after all they are but the objectification of our own present need? That they should be so does not, of course, invalidate their truth to us. It only keeps awake the question of their *universal* validity. It raises the problem of how development can be reconciled with finality, which is the great problem to be discussed by the author in his next volume. It raises also certain other questions connected with this, such as the characteristics of a growing God—his perfection, omnipotence, omniscience, and all the other qualities which theology has always attributed to him.

So we might go on raising questions. But enough has been said to show that in the volume under consideration one finds a combination of a genuinely philosophical and scientific temper with a warmth of religious feeling that makes the problems discussed living issues, and that gives a reasonable ground for the hope that in his constructive treatment the author will find a satisfactory solution of the problem which he has set himself.

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PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN EDUCATION. By Geraldine Hodgson, B. A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1906. Pp. 287.

So little has been written on this particular period of the history of education, that this interesting contribution to the subject is especially welcome. .

The attitude of the early Christians towards education is here depicted with no slight skill, and a strong effort is made to vindicate them from the charges of contempt of learning and neglect of education which have been brought against them by certain writers.

Miss Hodgson's main contention is that the primitive Chris-

tians were necessarily concerned with problems of conduct—moral discipline—rather than with those of intellectual education. The state of society in general was such that in order to preserve the purity of the infant church it was felt to be necessary to concentrate upon moral and religious instruction in the catechetical schools, the pupils of which were chiefly converts from paganism. It must be admitted that Theology and Christian Ethics as taught in these schools afford scope also for intellectual training, especially as the methods of teaching appear to have been sound. The Fathers themselves were, for the most part, learned men, and Miss Hodgson quotes extensively from their writings in support of the view that it was not that they despised ordinary learning, but that they felt it could not be put in the first place. We must not forget, however, that most of the catechetical schools were attended by pupils of all ages—drawn from all ranks of society—and that in many of them the course of instruction lasted only for a few years. It is doubtful therefore whether it is quite fair to compare them with schools of the ordinary type. Living in expectation of the second advent and with few prospects or desires for worldly advancement, it is not surprising that the primitive Christians laid little stress upon ordinary learning as a necessary preparation for professional or political life. The view which came into prominence in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, that classical studies, by revealing life to the pupils, afforded the best kind of moral training, largely because indirect and unconscious, could hardly be expected to appeal to those for whom the urgent need was to separate themselves from the world, and to mark out the Christian ideal of life as one quite different from that of the Pagan.

We are at the present time engaged in considering the importance of direct instead of indirect moral instruction, and it is therefore of peculiar interest to have our attention directed to those schools in which this direct training and instruction was considered all-important.

The interest and value of this educational work of the primitive Christians is brought vividly before us; but while admitting its value, we are inclined to differ from Miss Hodgson as to its efficacy, and to doubt whether this material of instruction alone would go far in preparing the pupils for a strenuous and useful life.

MILICENT MACKENZIE.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By A. E. Balch, M. A. London: Charles H. Kelly. Pp. 266.

This book belongs to a series entitled, "Books for Bible Students," of which the Rev. Arthur E. Gregory, D. D., is editor. It is not easy from a perusal of the volume before us to determine the class of readers for which it is intended. The book strikes us as being both too elementary and too advanced. For students who have already made some headway in the subject, the treatment, or a large portion of it, is too general and fragmentary. On the other hand, it frequently presupposes knowledge and ideas which beginners cannot be expected to possess.

The book opens with two introductory chapters, the first being on the value of the study of Christian Ethics and the other on the relation of Christian Ethics to other fields of thought. These are followed by three chapters which are described as "preparatory to the central or main topic," and which treat in turn of "Man as a moral agent" (ch. III), "The objective conditions of ethical life" (ch. IV), and the "Moral conflict" (ch. V). The succeeding chapters are occupied with the question of the Highest Good. After having given a brief and necessarily scanty account of the chief theories reached independently of the influence of Christian teaching (ch. VI), the author proceeds in the next chapter (ch. VII) to set forth the meaning which the conception bears in Christian Ethics. A good feature of this treatment is the emphasis laid on the social as well as the individual aspect of the *Summum Bonum*. Christianity seeks not only to provide blessedness for the individual, but also to establish a kingdom of God on earth. In addition, however, to setting up a *Summum Bonum*, Christianity supplies "a standard of conduct by which directly and immediately acts may be measured," or "an intermediate conception between the *Summum Bonum* and particular rules." This is the Christian Ideal or the Example of Christ (chs. VIII and IX). The closing chapters deal with Ethical Progress (ch. X), the Christian virtues (ch. XI), and the influence of Christian ideas on social institutions (ch. XII).

The general plan of the book, which we have outlined above, is distinctly good, but except in certain parts the same cannot be said of the execution. The unevenness of the work seems to us very marked. The treatment, which is at times lucid and vigorous, is allowed in certain places to lapse into rhetoric of a

vague and somewhat incoherent kind. The author appears to best advantage in the more general discussions or when he is occupied with the direct exposition of Christian ideas and duties. In these chapters he says much that is valuable and suggestive. Indeed, throughout the book he leaves the impression of being more conversant with Christianity than philosophy. When his treatment becomes technical, as for instance, when he essays philosophical analysis or institutes comparison between different systems, his handling of the subject is sometimes feeble and inexact. As an instance of loose and inexact description a statement occurring on page 92, may be quoted. "This is the meaning of utilitarianism—an attempt to find in all virtue and regard for others latent or modified selfishness."

The composition betrays at times great carelessness and the book contains far too many involved and awkward sentences. The following statement, on pages 49, 50, about desire, shows how careless the writer can be about his sentences. "It is frequently used as though they (sic) were conflicting tendencies to action, considered apart for (sic) their relation to the person acting." On page 45 we find "cerebral con-commitant"; on page 66 "unrestricted from."

The book contains several indications here and there of having been hurriedly written. But even as it stands, it contains much that is sound and suggestive. A thorough revision, together with the excision of certain sections where the discussion is too brief and inadequate to be helpful would considerably enhance its value and usefulness.

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THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY. By Joseph Dietzgen, translated by Ernest Untermeyer, with an introduction by Dr. Anton Pannekock. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. vi, 444.

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF MIND AND MORALS. By M. H. Fitch. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. 266.

SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. By Paul Lafargue. Chicago: Chas H. Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. 165.

These three books may conveniently be noticed together, as all are contributions to the interesting reformulation of philos-

ophy from a Marxian standpoint. The writers of all three are—pardon the phrase—exploiters of “the materialistic interpretation” of all things mundane, including those phantasms of the mind which have danced their way down the ages under the names of religion, metaphysics, and morality.

This particular materialistic interpretation, however, the reader must understand, is not the bourgeois materialism of the nineteenth century evolutionists. Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, and all their kind lived still in the dark ages of individualism, and therefore failed to see that a true materialistic interpretation of the world really could not be formulated in terms of energy and molecules. The particular turtle on which the universe actually rests is property. The institution of private property, and its complement, wage slavery, gave birth to all of man's philosophical concepts, shaped his religious dogmas, and determined his morality.

That is to say, they did all these things after the days of primitive communion had gone by. If those days could have endured, man obviously would always have been a monist; but, of course, a non-rational, uncritical one. Knowing nothing of conflict in his economic life, he could have perceived no distinctions. Exchange and private property, however, introducing the distinction (empirical) between those who get too much, and those who don't get enough, made men aware of the dualism of good and bad, right and wrong, spirit and matter, in short, of being and not being. Started on this road, he had to bring up at Kant, Hegel, and Herbert Spencer.

It's a sorry tale, but the villain has been discovered, and happier days are in sight. Private property is doomed, and bourgeois philosophy will follow it into the outer darkness. Socialism and proletarian science will unify the body politic and the human soul, the latter being, as every one will clearly see, a function of collectivism. These three little books are harbingers of the new day.

Mr. Dietzgen offers us the thesis that “philosophy was at first impelled by the nebulous desire for universal world wisdom, and has finally assumed the form of a lucid special investigation of the theory of understanding.” Particular conclusions of its lucid labors are: “Modern psychologists have at last divined, if not recognized, that the human soul is not a metaphysical thing, but a phenomenon.” “It is the merit of philosophy to

have demonstrated that metaphysics is possible only as a fantastical speculation." These prepare us for the *denouement*, namely: "Things are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are subject to continuous perfection." "Stable motion, and mobile stability constitute the reconciling contradiction which enables us to reconcile all contradictions."

Mr. Fitch is less recondite than Mr. Dietzgen, but he gets nearer to the great common heart of proletarian man. His view of man "makes him a product of nature," and "the highest code of ethics will be based on this necessity of maintaining a rational correspondence with environment." Unfortunately, Mr. Fitch does not show us in detail the fundamental reality that nature is property, and that the environment to which man is to adjust himself must be made consistently Marxian.

This desideratum is supplied by M. Lafargue, who demonstrates that the God concept is a product and necessity of bourgeois existence, and by irresistible logic leads us up to the conclusion of the whole matter, to wit: "Ethics, like the other phenomena of human activity, is subject to the law of economic materialism formulated by Marx: The mode of production of the material life dominates in general the development of the social, political, and intellectual life."

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THE NATURE OF TRUTH: An Essay. By Harold H. Joachim, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906. Pp. 182.

THOUGHT AND THINGS: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought. Or, Genetic Logic. By J. Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., etc. Vol. I. FUNCTIONAL LOGIC, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1906. Pp. xiv, 273.

These two volumes may be taken as an indication of the growing interest in epistemology among English-speaking philosophers. It hardly falls within the scope of a journal of Ethics to give a critical account of such works; and it must suffice here to give a general indication of their nature. The work of Mr. Joachim is written from what may be broadly characterized as a Hegelian or Bradleyan point of view; and this gives it a

special interest, since it has been rather the fashion of late among writers of this school to deny that there is any such thing as epistemology. The Essay is divided into four chapters: I. Truth as Correspondence; II. Truth as a Quality of Independent Entities; III. Truth as Coherence (containing two sections: 1. The Coherence-Notion of Truth; 2. Degrees of Truth); IV. The Negative Element and Error. The second chapter is concerned with the view of truth that is chiefly associated with the names of Mr. B. Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore. The reply to Mr. Joachim's criticisms by Mr. Russell in the October number of *Mind* should be noted. The third chapter is mainly concerned with the doctrines of Mr. Bradley. Mr. Joachim does not discuss the view of truth commonly described by the term Pragmatism; and it is doubtful whether the reasons given for this omission are adequate. There can be no doubt that Mr. Joachim's book is a very valuable contribution to philosophy, though it confessedly leaves some fundamental difficulties unsolved.

Professor Baldwin's book is somewhat more difficult to characterize. It is an extensive work, apparently intended to comprise several volumes, though only one has at present appeared. Its general nature is indicated by the term Genetic Logic, which brings it into close relation to the works of Hegel and Dr. Bosanquet; but the psychological and epistemological—as distinguished from the more purely logical—sides are more prominent in Professor Baldwin's book than in the Logics of Hegel and Bosanquet; and the method of treatment aims at being more purely genetic. It is a work of much learning and research, and of very considerable interest; but it will be easier to estimate its value when the remaining parts have been completed.

It should be added that in neither of these books is any attempt made to draw a sharp distinction between epistemological problems and those that belong to ontology.

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THE DISSOCIATION OF A PERSONALITY: A Biological Study in Abnormal Psychology, by Morton Prince, M. D. Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.

This book, which is the result of the continuous study of one case for a period of more than six years, together with the anal-

ogous cases which are already known to the medical profession, is the first serious attempt to interest any but the special reader in some of the problems of abnormal psychology, which present themselves particularly to the medical practice, rather than to the professor of experimental psychology. To-day the study of the causes and treatment of all kinds of nervous disorders is one of the most absorbing and important in the field of science, and Dr. Prince has perhaps gone further than any one else in America in clearing up much of the rubbish which has hindered even a slight understanding of nervous diseases. Aside, then, from the fact that the book reads like the strangest romance, it is of great interest in that it shows or suggests the causes of many of the unusual nervous states which in the brutal and egotistical push of everyday life are looked upon as simple perversions of humor, while in reality they are pathological states which careful intelligent treatment would completely rectify. From this it will be seen that the book, carefully read, will also be an aid to that great body of practitioners who are constantly coming in contact with more or less aggravated conditions of nervous instability, their only treatment of which is now by means of drugs.

It would be very difficult for anyone who believes himself *normal* to read this book with any other feeling than that, perhaps, with which he read, long ago, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: unless, indeed, he read that visionary masterpiece with the firm conviction that it was all true. True, to be sure, it was, in the sense that it presented nothing which modern psychical investigation has not proven to exist in actual life, and the case of which this book of Dr. Prince gives the full history, presents all the strange changes of personality and of character which Mr. Hyde showed different from Dr. Jekyll, except the wanton cruelty and unrestrained brutality.

The task of presenting to the public a case of this kind in such a way as to retain its dramatic interest and render it easy of comprehension, while at the same time endowing it with a sufficient sobriety to impose its really scientific character, is by no means an easy one. Dr. Prince believed that it might best be accomplished by adopting the biological method of presenting facts as they occurred, and at times determining the importance of the facts so far presented. This method, of course, necessitated a great many repetitions, and at times made the book heavy, though it had the advantage, questionable, perhaps, of helping it out of the field of evident science into that of seeming romance. I am not sure that

the interest is in this way increased, except possibly for the reader who might wish simply the thread of strange events, without stopping to inquire into the deeper psychological conditions made evident by these phenomena. But even these phenomena, in the present volume, often require some explanation or commentary at the time they are presented, and that same explanation is again necessary, or seemed so, when their relation is shown. Thus a certain amount of confusion arises from the very method which it was hoped would work toward clearness. In some instances, too, the interest the author felt in his subject led him to make digressions (such as on page 149) the only effect of which is to lengthen unnecessarily the book and distract the reader's attention, while not really making him better acquainted with the subject. These restrictions are but technical imperfections of form and manner of presentation, and do not materially lessen the interest of the book; do not at all lower the value of the subject.

The dissociation of a personality: perhaps that does not mean much to you now. Read the book, and it will mean to you then the events of six years of the strangest life of which probably there is any definite record. It is the authentic story of a young woman's body which has for five years been possessed, occupied, directed in its movements, cared for or abused, loved or hated alternatingly by three different mental entities, three different persons. That is difficult to understand; rather hard to believe. Let me explain: If you who are reading should suddenly lose consciousness completely, and a consciousness as different from yours as any you can conceive should enter your body and direct its movements, that body would certainly perform acts which were utterly foreign to your nature, and might, for the period of occupation by this strange consciousness, be quite different in its nature and in its movements from the body which reflected your mentality. So, too, it might further differ if it were possessed by a mind unlike this second as it was unlike your own. You would be likely, upon waking, upon changing from one state to another, to find what was practically permanent in you, your body, was in a position or place which you, the present owner, could in no way explain. Do you not think you would feel confused, possibly a trifle troubled, to wake to find yourself in a train going you knew not where, and going there you knew not why? or sitting on the seashore in some desolate place you utterly failed to recognize? Yet these situations are simple in comparison with the troubles a constant change of associations

would work in your social world. Now just such were the conditions of life to which Miss Beauchamp, the subject—I was going to say heroine—of this remarkable book, had constantly to adapt herself. Miss Beauchamp, or the Misses Beauchamp—for the three personalities which alternated with one another in the conscious direction of the one body which the world knew as Miss Beauchamp—were each absolutely distinct one from the other; each had its own conscious life and its hoard of memories, its likes and dislikes, its beliefs, and its friends and enemies. Sometimes, happily, these were alike, so that two, maybe, of the Misses Beauchamp had the same friend, or shunned the thing they in common held distasteful. But more often in nothing was there such accord, and much life was unlived as fast as a change occurred. Even if the three directing minds were of a common understanding in trying to lessen as much as possible the difficulties which their constant interchange imposed upon them, life would have been far less a burden to them than it actually was. Instead they were at continual strife with each other, laboring incessantly to undo the work which each had done, and each laying obstructions in the way of any progress which either of the other two had hoped to make. If you were living in the same house with such a nature, with such a person, you would probably suppress him, or else change your abode—possibly you might do both: but forced to live in the same body with an individual of so provoking a nature, to alternate with him, to come after him into consciousness, and be forced to accept all the pleasant surprises he had with much forethought arranged for your satisfaction, you would, without doubt, after a little while become most active and vindictive in the skill with which you thwarted these attacks, and planned vengeance upon your two relentless enemies. This you would surely do—unless you were an angel.

Now that is just exactly what one of these persons of the heroine's life was—a saint. A saint, an angel, they are the same thing, and neither are meant for this world, so when she had to fight against the other two for her existence in the flesh, she was at great disadvantage, and had, of course, to disappear, to become after a long while but a memory to the others, and a great pain and cause for wonderment to herself, in the rare moments when she came into consciousness. It was she, nevertheless, who as a dissociated personality, a part of the real complete person—now we have got at what she was, at what they all were—was the first

to make her appearance, and to show those conditions of hysteria and anæsthesia which unmistakably indicate a state of dissociation of consciousness. Anæsthesia, aboulia, amnesia, hysteria, abnormal susceptibility to suggestions, all these pathological states show that the mind—and this is the theory which Dr. Prince promises to develop for us in another volume—by some psychological accident has been divided into more than one conscious entity, into two or three “bundles,” shall I say? of conscious states. These mental states, dissociated from the main stream of consciousness, remain “subconscious” when not in communication with the motor and sensory centres. Through hypnosis they may become momentarily or temporarily “conscious;” for this period there is generally complete amnesia, that is, absence of memory. In the case of Miss Beauchamp, three such conscious states were in alternation automatically, and in the case of one, called in joke Sally, voluntarily, in part, at least. For though at times, and for long periods this personality was not in communication with the sensory and motor centres, was really a “subconsciousness,” still she was aware of the impressions received and the movements made by the personality which for the time was in control of those centres, and upon herself coming into possession of the body, had complete memory of the events of the body’s life while she was a “subconsciousness.” Thus it is probable that her life was continuous, while that of her companions of the body was broken by long periods of blankness, corresponding with the lapses of consciousness which occurred while either of the other personalities controlled the life centres. These two other personalities, the “Saint” and the “Devil,” as Sally was pleased to call them, because of their opposite characteristics, are the two dissociated parts of the original and normal being, whose unity was destroyed by a psychological catastrophe some ten years ago, and of which the Saint alone continued in conscious existence until 1898, when Sally and the Devil came into life as the result of events which the book relates with great fullness.

The reading or the careful study of these events, and an understanding of the psychological connection between them, will be found of much interest to all classes of readers, not alone those who are looking for tales of the strange and unaccountable in human life, but also, and principally those who are interested in all kinds of psychic phenomena and whose endeavor it is through their profession of medicine to render normal those irregularities of

mind which are in reality of a hysterical nature, and which are too frequently looked upon as a perversion of character or temperament. Just how much life is a question of mental condition, and how much it is altered by the changes which take place in the mind is most clearly shown by the event described on pages 246 and 247, which is attractive, too, because of its theatrical ending—of which, indeed, this book contains its full share. Nothing, surely, could be more dramatic than some of the scenes which the constant changes of personality present to us, and few things could be more tragic, in the inner sense of tragic, than some of the situations which these changes involve. This is scarcely the place to give examples, for this "house divided against itself" (such is the title of one of the most instructive chapters) presents complications of life which it is hardly possible to conceive unless the whole history of the case be known. Still, the final struggle between two of the personalities, which resulted in the discovery of the true nature of the case, and in the synthesis of the disintegrated parts into the original (?) whole, is sufficiently strange to be interesting, even detached from the rest of the story. These two states, Sally and the "Devil"—the other personality, the Saint, has now been absent for a long while—determine upon mutual annihilation, resolve to permit no interference from their physician, Dr. Prince, who for years has been the director of their affairs and who has prevented serious conflicts, and open their campaign of destruction. Sally, who is a continuous consciousness, even though often subconscious, and who besides is anæsthetic, has a decided advantage over her adversary. By being able to appear practically at will, and because of her anæsthesia, she is able to inflict upon the body they both occupy alternately pain from which she escapes because of her insensibility, but which, when her adversary becomes conscious at Sally's will, renders her life unbearable. This struggle lasts for about two weeks, at the end of which their common body has been brought to such a state of exhaustion that Sally herself becomes frightened at its condition, and has recourse to Dr. Prince, who ends the strife. This episode, though nearly fatal to the company, was still a happy occurrence, for it furnished data which made possible a true understanding of the case. From this time on their mental affairs begin to mend, and to-day Miss Beauchamp is practically a normal being, whose lapses into disintegration are of great infrequency, and of but momentary duration.

This book, which, as I have said, presents almost every event of

psychological importance which it has been possible to observe with any scientific exactness, contains many questions of real scientific interest, which are here merely touched upon in passing, but of which Dr. Prince surely owes us a more extensive study and exposition, such, for instance, as the relations existing between the subconscious thoughts and the speech and motor and sensory centres, suggested on page 62, or that of visions and experience, and again the subject of instability and suggestibility, which is therapeutically of infinite importance. Questions, too, of morals are also suggested, such as the treatment of Sally in the final settlement of affairs. If, as was the case, both the Saint and the Devil were forced to lose individual consciousness, to die, so that the synthesized personality, supposedly the original personality, might again exist and continue her normal life, while Sally, as truly a personality as either of the two who were synthesized, is imprisoned within her fleshly walls eternally, for she has not lost consciousness as have the others, is not a terrible fate imposed upon this mental entity? Since she must still live, and two had to die in any solution of the difficulty, would it not be better to pass over the question of what process would recreate the original Miss Beauchamp—has she indeed been found?—and what real advantage to anyone that she should be?—and give to Sally a real life, instead of condemning her to a perpetual imprisonment? Unquestionably it is of interest to know that the two parts put together made the original whole—a whole, however, that was already dead; but the interest is nearly akin to that which physicians feel in learning by experiment how much the agony of a dying man may be prolonged by the judicious use of drugs, and in its cruelty resembles the perpetuation in misery and insanity of an existence which nature, even if only left to itself, would straightway obliterate. Will society ever recognize the solely personal value of life?

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THE ETHICS OF THE GOSPELS.

In the record of the life of Jesus contained in the Synoptic Gospels, two points are fairly plain: First, Jesus regarded himself chiefly as a teacher. He was the bearer of a message, and his vocation was to deliver it.¹ "Let us go elsewhere into the next towns that I may preach there also, for to this end came I forth."² "He went round about the villages teaching."³ "He began to teach them many things."⁴ "And, as he went, he taught them again."⁵ To this great task all else was subordinate. His mother and his brethren may stand without seeking him, but he cannot leave his Father's business.⁶ His own death may be clearly foreseen, but to the suggestion of changing his course to avoid it, the answer is: "Get thee behind me, Satan, for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men."⁷ In short, the central purpose of his life was the proclamation of his message.

Secondly, among a great body of his contemporaries, the acceptance of this message was hindered by doubt as to the authority of the messenger. The scribes and ordinary teachers, of course, supported what they had to say by specific reference to the sacred books of the nation. Jesus' method was entirely different. He came, not to expound ancient records, but as a seer into the heart of truth itself. "He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes."⁸ He relied,

¹ Cf. Luke 5:42, 43.

² Ibid, 10:1.

³ Mark 1:38.

⁴ Mark 3:31-35.

⁵ Ibid, 6:6.

⁶ Matt. 16:23.

⁷ Ibid, 6:34.

⁸ Mark 1:22; Cf. Matt. 7:29; Luke 4:32.

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not upon argument from premises already accepted, whether scriptural or otherwise, but upon a direct appeal to religious and moral perception. There was on him the mantle of the old prophets. He had seen, and he called on men to open their eyes that they might see also.

Thus, for him his word was, as it were, autonomous, needing no alien support. He cannot understand why any sign should be needed. "Why doth this generation seek after a sign? Verily, I say unto you, there shall no sign be given unto this generation."⁹ To many of the Jews, however, the word of itself did not suffice to bring them where Jesus himself had been. They did not *see* that it was true. Hence, since he would not prove it, they needed for conviction that he should prove his own authority. To vindicate his message, Jesus must somehow vindicate himself.

This leads to my third point, the deep irony, as it would seem, that lies at the centre of the gospel story. There can be little doubt that Jesus did, in a measure, concede this demand of the people and withdraw his refusal of a sign. Convinced as he was of the great moment of his message, he may well have been impressed by their belief that one endowed by God with so special a trust must somehow himself occupy a special position. And so gradually his thought would turn about that great deliverer whose advent the prophets of his nation had foreseen, and the question would shape itself in his mind whether it might not be that he himself were the Messiah. Doubtlessly, he would seek the opinion of his friends upon this new idea, and, strengthened by their enthusiastic acclamation, the idea would at length become a certainty:¹⁰ he was, indeed, the Messiah, and thus the authority of his message was vindicated. Even, however, when this view of his own position was fully matured, it was not about this that he cared for the world

⁹ Mark 8: 12.

¹⁰ The question to the disciples, "Whom say ye that I am," is generally supposed to be a test of their faith. The only ground for this interpretation is an appendix that Matthew attaches to Jesus' answer, as given in Mark and Luke. The more natural interpretation would seem to be that the question was asked, because Jesus really desired to know the answer. Cf. Mark 8: 27-29; Matt. 16: 17; Luke 9: 21.

to know. Again and again, both to his disciples and to the demoniacs, and to the sick, who sought to proclaim him, "he charged them that they should tell no man of him."¹¹ For, to him the idea of the message was never lost in that of the messenger. He was the Messiah and the anointed of God; but his right to those high titles rested simply on the message that he bore. The Gospel as he proclaimed it had always, as Harnak tells us, to do not with the Son but with the Father.

Indeed, may we not say that the danger of what has been called Christolatry was foreseen and fought against by Jesus himself? "Why callest thou me good?" he said to the young man; "none is good, save one, even God."¹² "Why call ye me Lord, Lord," he asks again, "and do not the things which I say?"¹³ And yet again, when the woman of the multitude cried: "Blessed is the womb that bare thee, and the breasts which thou didst suck;" the answer was: "Yea, rather, blessed are they which hear the word of God and keep it."¹⁴ And may we not attach a like meaning to the golden word: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even the least, ye did it unto me."¹⁵ That is not an appeal to act in such a way *for the sake* of a person; it is rather an appeal to act rightly regardless of persons. And so of the thrice-repeated question of Peter, "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?" and the counsel that followed: "Feed my sheep, feed my lambs." It was his ideal and not himself that Jesus sought to make the people feel. Whatever devotion he claimed for his person, it was merely that he might pass it on to his message. The great dominant aim of his ministry was to preach of God and Right.

And so we get to the root of the great irony—that his followers came to stress those personal claims which to Jesus were relatively unimportant, to the exclusion in large measure of the weightier matters of the law. There is a tragic touch in an

¹¹ Mark 8:30; *Cf. ibid.* 9:9.

¹² Mark 10:18 and Luke 18:19. Matthew characteristically modifies this phrase. Matt. 19:17.

¹³ Luke 6:46.

¹⁴ Luke 11:27, 28.

¹⁵ Matt. 26:40.

early verse of St. Luke's Gospel in which the key to the drama is subtly suggested. To a demoniac whom he had cured, Jesus said: "Return to thy house and declare how great things God hath done for thee. And he went his way, publishing throughout the whole city how great things *Jesus* had done for him."¹⁶ The note thus struck was carried through the whole. The healings and mighty works that magnified the messenger are related in abundance by the evangelists. But that message for which the messenger came, and to which he held all else subordinate, is not thus prominent in his biographies. Even Mark is Christocentric in this sense. He does not, indeed, dwell upon the personal claims in the way that Matthew, with his eye upon Jewish converts, feels bound to do. He does not speak of "the Gospel of the Kingdom"¹⁷ or reiterate, "that the Scripture might be fulfilled which saith." Neither does he set down Matthew's appendix to Jesus' answer about the sign,¹⁸ or to the disciples who declared him to be the Christ,¹⁹ or to Peter in the Garden of Gethsemane.²⁰ But, for all this, like the other evangelists, he seeks to honor Jesus by the tale of what he did rather than to serve him by the record of his words. Again and again we read, "And he began to teach," but what he taught is not declared, and we are carried forward to something wholly alien. In the sixth chapter there are two instances of this. "And when the sabbath was come, he began to teach in the synagogue": and the verse continues, "And many hearing him were astonished, saying, Whence hath this man these things," and so on in a similar strain.²¹ And again: "And he came forth and saw a great multitude, and he had compassion on them, because they were as sheep not having a shepherd; and he began to teach them many things." Once more the teaching is omitted, and the passage proceeds to the period when the day was far spent, and the

¹⁶ Luke 8:39.

¹⁷ *E. g.*, Matt. 9:35.

¹⁸ Matt. 12:39-43. Here Luke agrees with Matthew; *cf.* Luke 11:32.

¹⁹ Matt. 16:17. Here Luke agrees with Mark.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 26:53, 54. Here again Luke agrees with Mark.

²¹ Mark 6:2.

miracle of the loaves.²² Nor are these solitary instances. It was for his message that Jesus lived and died, but it is not his message that the evangelists chiefly tell, or their successors most revere.²³

The above discussion may appear somewhat removed from the main objective of this paper—the nature of Jesus' ethical teaching. Nevertheless, it is not irrelevant. For, if we know the manner in which the records have come down to us we thereby attain a kind of viewpoint from which the relation of those records to reality can be judged. On the theory that I have suggested, for example, it is plain that such parts of the Gospels as make for the magnification of Jesus' person, though not necessarily incorrect, are necessarily suspect. The records of religious and ethical teaching, on the other hand—the Gospel, that is, of God and Right—need not be so regarded. No doubt, in certain cases, the writers would wish to justify by Jesus' words practices which had grown up subsequently in their society, and special injunctions on these heads should, therefore, be received with caution. But in matters of *general* religious or ethical import, we may suppose that the tenets of the society would be moulded by the actual teaching, rather than the records of the teaching by the tenets of the society. Such records, therefore, may be accepted as of high authority.

By this circumstance one serious difficulty is removed. Other difficulties, however, remain. The exaggerated emphasis that the Gospels place on Jesus' person, and the consequent omission, already noted, to record his words, have reduced to a very small compass the actual teaching that has been preserved. We have, therefore, to determine a body of doctrine from a small collection of sparsely scattered sayings. The problem is akin to that of the morphologist who discovers a few

²² Mark 6: 34, *seq.*

²³ It may be argued that in the record of Jesus' life, his ethical message is handed down more effectually than would have been possible by a mere transcription of his words. No doubt many of the stories of his deeds do contain moral teachings crystallized into example, but it is surely clear that they were not related with this circumstance in view. The presence, therefore, of an exemplary element in some of them can at best mitigate—it cannot remove—the irony of which I have spoken.

bones lying together, and who has external ground for believing that they all belong to the same animal. From these imperfect data the skeleton has somehow to be reconstructed. The knowledge that none of the bones is due to an alien source does, indeed, facilitate that operation; it dispenses with the difficult,—though legitimate,—circular process, which at once infers the whole from the parts, and also infers from the whole what bones are truly parts. Though, however, to this extent simplified, the problem of reconstruction remains one of extreme delicacy. It is necessarily based on half-conscious analogies, whose scope and application are doubtful. In short, the margin of error within which, in such a case as this, the historical imagination has to work is exceedingly wide. It is only on the very broadest aspects of Jesus' teaching that we can hope for reliable conclusions.

I have already suggested that this teaching fell into two main divisions—the theological, about God, and the ethical, about duty. Furthermore, these divisions were not separated into watertight compartments, but were fused and commingled in almost every parable that Jesus spoke. Time and again we are told, not only that certain things are good, but also that God will reward the righteous and punish the guilty.

With the teaching about God this paper is not concerned. But the connection between that teaching and the directly ethical sayings has led, among the less instructed opponents of Christianity, to a serious misconception in regard to these latter sayings. It has been suggested that Jesus' ethics is a mere scheme of means directed toward the personal happiness of the agent, and that for him righteousness is simply a form of prudence whereby we can flee the wrath to come.

Now this charge is ambiguous. It may mean either of two things: first, that Jesus urged people to be righteous *from the motive* of future happiness; secondly, that he urged them in words to be righteous directly, but at the same time suggested a selfish motive, and thus implied that conduct might be righteous whatever its motive—might, in fact, be righteous if merely prudential.

The first of these charges may be met with a bare denial.

Jesus did not urge people to be righteous *from the motive* of future happiness. His teaching was not, *Be righteous in order to be happy*, but (1) *Be righteous*, an ethical precept, and (2) a metaphysical statement, *Righteousness and happiness as a matter of fact lie along the same road*. It was not, Certain things lead to the agent's happiness; therefore, they are good as means: but rather, certain things are good as ends; therefore they lead to the agent's happiness. He was, indeed, at one with Nietzsche's Zarathustra: "Speak and stammer: That is my good, that love I, thus it pleaseth me entirely, thus alone will I the good. I do not will it as the law of God, I do not will it as the statute or requirement of man; it shall not be a landmark for me to beyond-earths or paradises."²⁴

The second form of the charge is more plausible, but it is not, I think, valid. Jesus certainly suggested that righteousness would promote the agent's future happiness. But this does not necessarily mean that conduct may be righteous independently of its motive. There is, in fact, a confusion here. Jesus' suggestion of the selfish motive does, indeed, imply that that motive may be *connected* with righteous conduct without destroying its righteousness; but it does not imply that the motive may be connected with the conduct, *as a motive*, without having this effect. If it be asked: "What other form of connection is possible," the answer is simple. The motive may stand to the conduct in the relation of *previous stimulus*. So standing, it does not in any way detract from the righteousness of the conduct. That this is so is universally admitted in practice. Nobody, for instance, supposes that a good man is made less good by the fact of his goodness being partly due to fear of the rod in childhood. In like manner, a forgiving spirit is still good even though the stimulus to its growth has been the egoistic motive, "that your Father also which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses."²⁵ The goodness of exist-

²⁴ Thus spake Zarathustra, p. 41.

²⁵ Mark 11:25. In the Lord's prayer, the phrase, "for we ourselves also forgive everyone that is indebted to us" (Luke 11:4), does not mean that we do this in order to be forgiven. It rather implies that the prayer is intended for the use of those only who have a forgiving spirit.

ing things is, in short, wholly independent of their origin in the past. In this sense, men *can* gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles.

Not only, however, is the case of those who hold that Jesus thought true righteousness could be motived by selfishness not proven; it can further be shown positively that, for him, righteousness based on bad motives was not righteousness at all. No doubt to a person who believes that moral goodness and badness belong to action there is no incompatibility here. There is no reason why the *conduct* should not be good, while the *motive* is exceedingly bad. But if there is one thing clearer than another about the teaching of Jesus, it is that, for him, moral goodness and badness belonged, not to actions, but to agents—not to physical movements in the external world, but to the states of consciousness of which these are manifestations. This view, as against the opposite view of the formalist, he is never tired of emphasizing. The whole elaborate array of orthodox observances was to him an obstruction and a stumbling block. Washing of hands before meat and other ceremonies, even the strict observance of the Sabbath day, are brushed aside as mere trivialities. "Hear me, all of you, and understand, there is nothing from without the man, that goeth into him, can defile him; but the things that proceed out of the man are those that defile the man."²⁶ The Pharisee's catalogue of churchmanship does not, but the publican's humility does, have honor in the sight of God.²⁷ Behind the letter of the law he goes in every case to the spirit, behind the act to the character displayed in it: "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment: but I say unto you that everyone who is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment."²⁸ The servant with two talents who had gained other two has the same commendation as the servant with five who had gained five.²⁹ It was not the

²⁶ Mark 7:15.

²⁷ Luke 18:9.

²⁸ Matt. 5:21, 22.

²⁹ Matt. 25:21-23.

action but the agent that Jesus held to be the proper subject of praise or blame. For him goodness was to *be* and not to *do* something. The act of forgiving my brother was nothing.³⁰ The number of times that the verbal process was repeated mattered not at all. The category of good and bad applied to the forgiving state of mind.

That this was Jesus' constant teaching there can, I think, be no dispute. But, if so, the idea that he thought conduct could be righteous independently of its motives is completely overthrown. For righteousness based on bad motives would loudly contradict itself. Their operation might, indeed, render action less injurious, but they could only render agents worse. The person whose state of mind is otherwise unaltered, but who refrains from committing murder from such a motive as cowardice will be worse than an actual murderer. The murderous state is present in both cases, but the non-murderer is also a coward.

"The counter our lovers staked was lost
As surely as if it were lawful coin:
And the sin I impute to each frustrate ghost
Is the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin,
Though the end in sight was a vice."

Jesus then did not hold, and the conjunction of his theological and ethical teaching does not, when properly understood, suggest, that righteousness can be based on selfish motives. Such righteousness, on the contrary, is not righteousness at all, but a blend of vice and hypocrisy. The popular charge against his teaching is, therefore, not sustained.

If, as I think it will and should be, this conclusion is accepted, we naturally proceed to inquire into the actual substance of his teaching. And here, the first thing noticeable, and often noticed, is an omission. Throughout the discourses there is practically nothing about political ethics or the right form of organization, whether among secular or religious bodies. In like manner there is nothing about the goods of art and literature that play so large a part in the ethical thought of paganism. From these omissions it is sometimes inferred that

³⁰ Matt. 18: 21.

Jesus' outlook was too narrow and onesided to have much relevance to modern problems. There is, however, an easy explanation. For Jesus the end of the world was at hand. "Behold I come quickly." Politics, art and literature are means to "ends," not "ends" themselves. The good of them resides in the indirect influence they exert on human character. But, with the destruction of the world in sight, means are idle; time for their working is lacking. Hence they may be neglected, as they are neglected in the precept, "If a man smite thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also," and in many similar precepts. To one legislating for a permanent society it would have been necessary to distinguish the spirit underlying this precept from the concrete application of it, and to show that the spirit, though in itself always good, might lead to bad results if loosened unreflectingly along the channel of natural impulse. It was because the time was short that these things mattered nothing to Jesus, and that his doctrine is exclusively a doctrine of ends.

Wherein, then, did Jesus teach that goodness, in its sense of "good as end," resides? We have already seen that it belongs to agents and not to action. Consequently the question becomes: Wherein did Jesus hold that the goodness of an agent consists?

To this question the answer that immediately suggests itself is that such goodness consists in *complete devotedness* to the ideal that each man sees before him. There must be no compromise between what we should like, and what we think we ought, to do. "Ye cannot serve God and mammon."⁸¹ "Verily, verily I say unto you except a man be born anew he cannot see the kingdom of God."⁸² "No man, having put his hand to the plough and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God."⁸³ The denunciation of the hypocrites who make prayers and give alms to be seen of men, the reproof to the man with his great possessions,⁸⁴ and the stories of the widow's

⁸¹Cf. the cleansing of the Temple. Mark 11:17.

⁸²John 3:3.

⁸³Luke 9:62.

⁸⁴Mark 10:21.

mite³⁵ and the pot of ointment,³⁶ carry the same lesson. It is brought out again in the repudiation of the idea of works of supererogation: "When ye shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it is our duty to do."³⁷ And it is driven home with all the force of a vivid illustration in the stern sentences: "If thy hand shall cause thee to stumble, cut it off; . . . if thy foot cause thee to stumble cut it off; . . . and if thine eye cause thee to stumble, cast it out."³⁸ "If any man cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father and mother, and wife, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."³⁹ The light that serves for our ideal must be followed remorselessly; no purpose of reward and no element of self-will must be allowed to intervene.⁴⁰

Now if this were the whole of Jesus' teaching, it would clearly approximate to Kant's categorical imperative: Act according to conscience. "Whatsoever is not of faith (*i. e.*, moral conviction) is sin."⁴¹ The practical difficulty in that ethic is, of course, that different men's consciences point to different things; consequently, the doctrine of the good will, though it may afford a valid canon of subjective right, throws no light on what actually ought to be done in any particular case. The theoretical difficulty is that this doctrine places the man who is faithful to a false ideal on a level with one who is faithful to a true one; and it is paradoxical to count as of equal goodness a conscientiously murderous dervish and St. Francis of Assisi.

Both these difficulties, however, may be avoided by an ethic which adds to the Kantian form the doctrine that some particular ideal is objectively true. There will, indeed, still be difficulty in balancing degrees of faithfulness against degrees

³⁵Mark 12: 43, 44.

³⁶Mark 14: 8, 9.

³⁷Luke 17: 10.

³⁸Mark 9: 45-47.

³⁹Luke 14: 26.

⁴⁰Cf. Moberly, "Atonement and Personality," p. 100, on Jesus' own complete devotedness.

⁴¹Cf. Boutmy, "Jesus," p. 139.

of truth in the ideal. It will not be decided whether a man who follows very earnestly a low ideal of what he ought to do is better or worse than one who follows less earnestly an ideal that is somewhat higher. The imperfectly dutiful lover and the imperfectly loving follower of duty will still lack an order of precedence. But at least the picture of the *perfect* man will have been drawn. There will be no indeterminateness about that.

Now, in the Jewish law, the ideal provided wherewith to fill the Kantian form was a mingled catalogue of deeds and qualities: Thou shalt not kill, thou shall not steal, but also, thou shalt not covet. In Greek ethics an advance upon this was made by the elimination of deeds. The ideal became solely one of qualities, justice, benevolence, courage, temperance, and so on. This standpoint was not, of course, in conflict with the other. It did not repudiate the fruit of conduct; it merely traced it to the root of character. It came, in fact, not to destroy but to fulfil. It did not abandon the primitive creed; but built for it a deeper foundation. The ideal presented by Jesus went beyond the pagan ideal in just this same manner. It did not repudiate the catalogue of virtues, but found for them a new foundation in the pivotal doctrine of love. Love to God and love to man; this was the law and the prophets.

This, I suppose it would be generally agreed, was Jesus' central teaching. So stated, however, it is not entirely free from ambiguities that demand some attempt at further amplification. First, and most fundamental, Is love a means or an end or both? Clearly, one interpretation of the doctrine might be: "All the old rules of conduct and all the virtues were justified as *media axiomata* to some further end. The new rule of love is justified because it subserves that end still more effectively. On this view Jesus would be understood to have accepted broadly the common opinion of his time as to what was *ultimately good*, and to have set himself to show that this good could best be reached by love-motived action.

The second interpretation is that Jesus regarded love as good absolutely and not as a means; and the third, that he regarded it as good in both senses.

Of these interpretations, the first is certainly, and the second probably, untenable. The correct interpretation, as it seems to me, is that Jesus regarded love as both a good in itself, and also a means to good.

This view, it should be noticed, may be accepted without prejudging the further question whether or not love is the only thing ultimately good. The fact that it is good as means may appear, at first sight, to imply a negative conclusion upon that point. But it does not really do so. For the good to which love in one person is a means may be simply more love in other people. It is not necessary that there shall be anything else good ultimately. It may be merely:

"One with another, soul with soul,
They kindle fire from fire."

For all we know as yet Norbert may interpret Jesus rightly when he says:

"There is no good on earth but Love, but Love:
What else looks good is some shade flung from Love;
Love gilds it, gives it worth."

We have, then, to ask that further fundamental question: Were there, as a matter of fact, for Jesus other things good in themselves besides love? That many things we superficially call good we only consider good because of the gilding love gives to them is, I think, indisputable. I am aware, of course, that the circumstance of companionship being an essential ingredient in most concrete goods does not prove it to be the sole ingredient. In many cases, however, something very much like this does seem to be proved by direct introspection. But, it is a long step from that conclusion to the broader conclusion that love is the *only good*. I do not think that we can take that step, and I do not believe that Jesus took it. Whether he believed intellect to be good in itself we have no evidence, but the whole course of his ministry goes to show that he did believe this of happiness. He sympathized with pain, and he went about healing sick people. To deny that he really cared for the happiness of others, though he acted as though he cared for it so keenly, is surely straining facts to fit a theory.

If this be so, Jesus' ethical teaching is not a rounded whole. Once grant that there are other things good besides love, and we get repeated within the domain of objective good the difficulty I have already noticed in the relation of objective to subjective good. What order of precedence have varying degrees of love and amounts of happiness? Is the goodness of the universe increased the more by rather unhappy love or rather happy indifference?

The fact, however, that Jesus omitted certain things is no reason for slackening attention on those other things that he did not omit. Given then that love is a part and an important part of good, what exactly does love mean? If any one objects *in limine* to such a question on the ground that love is a simple, unanalyzable feeling like pleasure, I can only appeal to introspection. To me it appears that love as we ordinarily understand it—I do not, of course, mean merely sexual love—is not a simple, but a highly complex state of consciousness. I seem to distinguish in it some seven distinct elements. It includes—I am not using any special order—(1) a wish for one's friend's good generally; (2) a wish in particular for his happiness; (3) admiration in some sort for some qualities in him, and a sense of one's own inadequacy; (4) a wish to be with one's friend; (5) a wish for reciprocity of affection, and perhaps some sadness at the lack of it, and even, it may be, an element of jealousy; (6) a curious reverence that erects a barrier against further intimacy, a barrier that one both wishes and does not wish to break down; (7) over and above these things an emotional attitude that does not lend itself to further description, and that may be called, perhaps, the *warmth* of affection.

I do not, of course, stress that particular form of analysis or suggest that all of the elements distinguished are always present. But that love in the widest sense can be split up into parts somehow seems to me certain. And it also seems certain that some of these parts will involve an element of egoism. The desire for reciprocity, at all events, will almost always be there, and in day dreams may betray itself. No doubt the hero *tries* to keep his heroism secret—that is part of the game

—but somehow the secret always leaks out, and the story ends like Enoch Arden.

Now if love, in our ordinary meaning, is thus complex, are we to hold that Jesus' praise of it included the whole or only a part? Did it in particular include the selfish element, or did it refer to an idealized love from which that should be purged away? I think we must say that the love he envisaged was a love wholly lost in its object, and, like his own love for men, freed from every taint of self.

But even so, the teaching is not explained. Love, in any interpretation, is not self-contained. It must be directed outward from the self to some *other*. Is it then material in Jesus' teaching, what this other is? Is the goodness of love, in short, independent of the object of love? The answer apparently is No. The right object, Jesus tells us, is God and Man, and furthermore, not Man merely, but *every* man, for *every* man is our neighbor.

The objection commonly urged against this view is that love is not a matter of will and does not come at call. This, however, is not valid. It is, indeed, true that it cannot be our *duty* to do the impossible; but still, what it is impossible for us to do may nevertheless be good. The real difficulty seems to me to be a different one, the suggestion, namely, sometimes read into this rule of Jesus, that, as between different men, our love should be *impartial*. It appears to me clear that, if the object of love affects the goodness of love at all, this attitude of impartiality cannot be the right one; for all men are not alike. It may no doubt be answered that, in actual fact, Jesus did not counsel impartiality, or at least that there is no clear proof that he did counsel it. Perhaps so; but in that case there is another gap in the ethic, for we are without guidance to the way in which our love were best distributed.

From all this it seems clear that there is not in Jesus' recorded sayings a complete ethical doctrine such as would satisfy a scientific maker of systems. This cannot be found there. But it is also true that this should not be sought there. What we may seek and do find is an unrivaled clearness of moral perception, unregarding of formulas and unfettered by tradition,

that throws into a bright light broad tracts on the sphere of good. To harden the parables into rules and the sayings into a canon of conduct is mistaken loyalty. It is to confuse intuition with that reflection about intuition which goes to make philosophy. It would imprison the seer in the pedant's *rôle*, and blur "the features of a conception, a life, a character, which the world might reverence more wisely, but can never love too well."⁴²

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REFORM AND THE DEATH PENALTY.

John Bright, writing in 1865 to the secretary of the Howard Society on the subject of capital punishment, is reported to have said: "The cause of abolition is going on rapidly over Europe, and we, stupid as we are in these things, cannot stand still." These words suggest that even the famous tribune of the people had not measured the capacity of his fellow-countrymen for slowness in legislative reform. Bright and William Ewart, Romilly, Gurney and many others in the sixties, labored hard to impress upon the English people the need for reform in regard to the death sentence. The times were not propitious and their efforts afforded no immediate result.

The moral perceptions of the more enlightened members of a nation are always ahead of its criminal code. To effect a change means, in a democratic country, to first change the view of the average citizen. No easy task, for the average man is not only conservative in his views of moral problems but to his natural conservatism is added a heavy weight of indifference that has first to be overcome. Hence, the bringing of criminal law into line with modern day ethical standards is a phenomenally slow process. Of all examples, the most striking is that of the legal penalty of death for murder.

A lawyer, no friend to the abolition of capital punishment, has written: "The necessity for gradation of the crime of homi-

"Sidgwick's Review of "Ecce Homo."

cide has been recognized for years by every judge of repute and by every student of the law."

In 1864 the question of reform was much discussed in England, and in that year Parliament appointed a Royal Commission to consider the subject. Two years later the Commission reported very strongly in favor of a system of gradation, abolishing death for crimes within the first grade, a minority report favoring complete abolition of the death penalty. But since then, that is, for nearly half a century, we have continued to pass sentences of death for homicidal crimes of various kinds, and no effort has been made by Parliament to effect the reform urgently recommended by its own commission. Truly, the Parliamentary mills grind very slowly indeed.

However, the last decade has witnessed a great growth in the humanitarian movement, in spite of much determined opposition. This movement has now become a vital part of our social life, showing itself in efforts not merely to ameliorate, but consciously to humanize, the life of the people in every direction. And it is to the impetus of this movement that we owe the fact that the question of hanging has again been pressed forward.

The Recorder of Newcastle recently urged that this question should now once more be brought before Parliament, and it is to this end that a short bill has been prepared¹ and will be introduced into the Commons at the first favorable opportunity. It would perhaps be out of place to speak here of this bill in detail. It suffices for my purpose to state that its two main points are the exclusion of women from the death penalty and the introduction of the principle of gradation as regards crimes of murder. I propose to offer a few considerations, based on some years of study of this question, which may assist in the formation of a definite public opinion.

Consider the hanging of a woman. It may be supposed that every man with a sense of justice and unbiased by sex

¹By Dr. Josiah Oldfield, D. C. L., President of the Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment.

antagonism, must feel that there is little moral excuse and much downright iniquity and stupid cruelty in such a proceeding. For in the first place, as to its justice, it is to be noted that no woman from first to last is allowed a say in the matter: the arresting, the trying and the judging, the passing of the sentence, the refusal to recommend mercy, the chaplain's ceremonial, the hanging and the burying, each item in the *via dolorosa* of the woman who slays her fellow-creature, is the deed of a man. And is not the very excuse given for refusing to women a part in the judging of crime, *viz.*, that women as compared with men are, by their very sex temperament, and physiological construction, less able to keep that evenness of mind from day to day and from week to week which it is essential for a judge to possess—is not that very fact, if true, one that would justify a differential treatment of the crime of murder by men and by women?

Moreover, there is the basic *sentiment* of sex to be considered—a sentiment, indeed, by no means to be despised. Whatever may be the right social and political relationship of men and women in a modern civilized state, let us admit that there is a treatment due to women from men which lies at the root of all chivalrous feeling, of all the higher kinds of social human life. We do not deny equality, if such be in question, because we maintain those more tender elements of life which the best type of man associates in a high sense with the society of women. He accords a treatment, partly out of respect for himself, which forbids, for example, the possibility of war upon women, and which makes an act of violence against a woman an outrage to be personally resented.

But there is another reason which would justify differentiation of treatment, and it is this: In a series of cases about to be quoted, every one may justly be put down to the morbid mental and physical conditions often resulting from childbirth, especially when taking place under unhappy circumstances. At such times many women are temporarily in a condition that no man, of course, is ever liable to be placed in.

The hanging of a woman by the judgment of men is not only an injustice—it is a disgrace to every consenting man,

a moral iniquity, leaving on the community the specially evil results which follow from the public degradation of a woman.

I suppose it is mainly because these hangings now take place within the prison walls, and not in public, that a civilized society is able to bear their continuance in the case of women with equanimity.

Murders committed by women are, with few exceptions, murders of children, mainly of infants. And where this is not the case they are but too often the result of sexual abuse on the part of men.

As illustrating the first type, I quote the following cases, which occurred in the British Isles during the last two years:

(a) Case of Susan Challis, a servant-girl, aged seventeen, sentenced to death at Strood in July, 1904, for strangling her infant.

(b) Case of Phœbe Turner, a servant-girl, aged eighteen, sentenced to seven years' penal servitude at the Kent Assizes in November, 1904, for causing the death of her infant by exposure. The girl was charged with murder, but the jury found her guilty of manslaughter, and so got rid of the death penalty.

(c) Case of Bella Brindin, at the Belfast Assizes in December, 1904. The following details are of pathetic interest in this case: "The child was born in Strabane Workhouse on July 11, and on August 6, a cold, wet day, mother and child were turned out. The mother crossed the river Mourne and walked twelve miles, reaching Cavandarragh about nine o'clock at night. She had been seen by persons with a bundle, which could only represent the child, but near the Townland she was seen coming from the direction of an old quarry-hole without any bundle. Next morning the body of the child was found in the water in the quarry-hole. Counsel said the jury might probably think that great pity should be extended to the accused, who, without a friend, turned even out of the workhouse, passed over that long journey of twelve weary miles carrying the child. She was without shelter or an atom of food, was soaked with rain, and had in the end probably reached that condition of desperation which deprived her of

that maternal instinct which she shared in common with the lower animals."¹

(d) Case of Gertrude Dyte, sentenced to death at Taunton, January, 1906, for the murder of her infant on the previous December 6th.

(e) Case of Beatrice Noble, an artist's wife, tried in March, 1906, for killing her child in Normandy.

Consider also the tragedy of the following case from St. Gall, one of the few cantons of Switzerland still retaining the death penalty :

"Frida Keller, lâchement violée, malgré ses résistances, par son patron qui la guettait depuis longtemps, accouchait en 1899 d'un garçon, à la maternité de St. Gall. Le père de l'enfant, après avoir promis d'assurer son entretien manqua à sa parole et quitta la ville peu de temps après. Repoussée par son propre père, écrasée sous l'impossibilité d'assurer pécuniairement la vie de l'enfant, obsédée toujours plus par l'idée fixe de garder à tout prix le secret d'une maternité inacceptée qui lui faisait horreur, elle est bientôt hantée par la seule solution possible qui germe lentement dans son cerveau troublé: la suppression de l'enfant. Elle lutte longtemps pour chasser cette hantise qui s'affirme et devient bientôt une résolution.

"Au tribunal, tous les témoignages sont en sa faveur: elle était douce, bonne, intelligente, économique et de bonne conduite. Elle aimait les enfants de sa sœur. Elle ne nie nullement la pré-méditation.

"L'article 133 est appliqué.

"C'est la mort.

"A la sentence, elle tombe sans connaissance en poussant un cri.

"Les gardes l'emmènent."

Two cases will suffice to illustrate the other type referred to, one English, the other German:

(a) Case of Kitty Byron, a girl of twenty-four, sentenced to death in December, 1902, for the murder of the man with whom she was living, a brute and a drunkard, whose treatment of the girl was so bad that even the judge remarked, "Everyone must sympathize with the accused."

(b) Case of a woman named Zillman. I quote a report which appeared in the *Daily News*, October 31, 1893: "To-day, for the first time for many years, a woman was beheaded in Germany. The prisoner had murdered her husband by

¹ *Daily News*, Dec. 7, 1904.

² *Signal de Genève*, Nov. 26, 1904.

poisoning him, after he had brutally ill-treated her and her children. At the trial the woman said she would reserve her defense; but she was sentenced to death, and the Emperor confirmed the sentence. Yesterday the woman was informed that she was to die. She had hoped to be pardoned, and burst into tears. She was yesterday taken to Plötzensee, where the execution took place. There she asked for coffee and a well-done beefsteak, saying, "I should like to eat as much as I like once more." To the chaplain the woman declared her innocence to the last moment. In the night she spoke continually of her miserable married life, and of her five children. This morning, however, she was quite apathetic while being prepared for the execution. Her dress was cut out at the neck down to the shoulders, and her hair fastened up in a knot, her shoulders being then covered with a shawl. At eight the inspector of the prison entered Zillmann's cell and found her completely prostrate, and not capable of putting one foot before the other. Two warders raised her up and led her to the block. Without a sound she removed the shawl from her shoulders, and three minutes after eight the executioner had done his work."

It may perhaps be argued from the fact that since, in the English cases quoted above, the women were not hanged, it is evident that we have reached a point when, as regards women at any rate, the law has ceased to be operative. The actual letter of the law, it may be said, is of little import, if the practice be just and humane. I submit that this is an error. Within the last decade several women have been hanged in England, one of the worst cases being that of the half-idiot girl, Mary Ansell. And should a murder of a similar kind occur to-morrow, what is to prevent a stiff-necked Home Secretary from taking the same line as the one then taken? Public opinion, or rather official opinion, is in such matters at much the same level in England and in America. If Governor Bell of Vermont could insist, as was the case last December, upon hanging a girl of nineteen for the murder of her husband, what is to prevent a similar act from taking place in England, if the same view of right and justice be held by some future

Home Secretary? Governor Bell, in deciding the fate of the unhappy Mary Rogers, is reported to have said, "There is one law for women and men."³ A very untrue statement, as has already been shown.

This girl had been through marriage, childbirth, the loss of her child, and separation from her husband; and, wishing to marry a man whom we may suppose she loved, connived at her husband's murder. Here, then, is a whole tragedy of womanhood, of motherhood and wifehood in a girl not out of teens; and the whole matter, with all its physiological and psychological bearings, is roughly and rapidly settled, as is supposed, by a dozen men, drawn at random, listening to the matters of fact and then deciding that the girl's neck must be broken. "She has had a fair trial," says the State governor; "there is one law for women and for men."

Put thus boldly, the ugly thing has no moral basis at all. On what ground of ethics can such an act be defended? In cold blood and with deliberate intent this murdereress is murdered, for, as Alfred Russel Wallace has said, "The quality of deliberate intention, which we always consider an aggravation of the crime of homicide, pertains in the highest degree to our action in taking the life of any criminal."⁴ And who is the gainer by such an execution in any moral or social sense? Not, certainly, the unhappy woman thus hurried out of life and given no chance of repaying the fearful debt she has incurred to society. And not society, for what community ever gained by scorning the sanctity of life in any one of its members? The plea of deterrency⁵ often urged, has a hundred

³ *Daily Mail*, Dec. 9, 1905.

⁴ Leaflet 2. Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment.

⁵ The falsity of the plea of the deterrent effect of capital punishment was illustrated by a French case last August of an instructive kind. A double execution took place at Dunkirk of two Belgians named Van den Bogaert and Swartewagher. These two ruffians had committed robbery and murder; deliberate murder that is, for the purpose of a burglary. There was no passion or hatred of an individual in their crime. If the fear of the death penalty had any effect, why did they not transfer the execution of their plot some few kilometers to the east, over the Belgian border, where their necks would have been safe?

times been shown to be false, and no one who considers seriously the circumstances of these crimes will put forward such a plea. Not, again, the person murdered in the first instance, for nought can be gained to the dead by a repetition of the crime of homicide. And not Justice, for two homicides do not cancel each other. Justice and social polity require that the criminal shall suffer to just the amount sufficient to make him sensible of the wrong done to the individual and to the community and to be reformative in nature, so that the doer of wrong may be restored to society, a member healthy in body, mind and soul. That, at least I take to be the moral basis of punishment. We must first be sure the wrongdoer is made conscious of his wrongdoing, and then, for the public weal, every effort must be made to reform him.

But it is just when brought down to this simple ethical basis that capital punishment completely fails. It is true enough that many of those who are hanged are emotionally acted upon by chaplains and others, and said to confess their crime and repent; and we hear from time to time of murderers dying confident of being shortly in heaven. But what evidence have we of, and in fact what time or environment is there for, the development of any real consciousness of the wrong done by the murderer against the community? And obviously death provides no outlet for the undoing of the wrong. Such a consciousness would, in the majority of murder cases, be the product of the continuous pressure of reformative elements, educative, social and moral, such as the right kind of penal institution might be expected to offer. And out of such a consciousness would grow an effective desire for reform, and thence a healthy condition of mind and soul that would restore the criminal to the community.

I turn now to the other proposal in the bill to be brought before Parliament, *viz.*, the grading of murder crimes. According to a report before me, Ohio has recently abolished capital punishment for murder in the first degree except for a second offense. That is practically what this bill suggests, what was recommended by the Commission of 1864. It is surely wanting in all justice and common sense that all homi-

cides coming technically within the range of wilful murder should receive the same indiscriminating sentence, and that in other homicides not technically murder the sentence should, at the discretion of the judge, vary from binding over to come up for judgment if called upon, to seven, ten or twenty years' penal servitude. What sense, what morality was there in passing the same sentence in each of the following cases, all of quite recent date?*

(a) Walter Pobble, September, 1905, for the murder of his two children. Described as a sober, industrious man, out of work for a long period. The case was described as a "tragedy of poverty."

(b) George Butler, October, 1905, for the brutal murder of a woman.

(c) Marion Seddon, October, 1905, an old woman of sixty-five, who, in dire poverty, took poison with her aged husband. The man died and the woman, recovering, was tried for aiding and abetting the murder of her husband.

(d) Frank Hansford, November, 1905, a mentally deficient lad of seventeen, for the murder of his sister, apparently done in passion.

(e) Henry Perkins, November, 1905, for a murder in a common lodging-house.

(f) Christopher Lenihan, December, 1905, for the brutal murder of a young woman in Ireland.

(g) Gertrude Dyte, January, 1906, for the murder of her illegitimate infant.

(h) John Griffiths, February, 1906, a lad of nineteen, for the murder of a girl of seventeen.

(i) Percy Murray, February, 1906, for the murder of his employer in a struggle.

These nine cases are about one third of those which occurred in the British Isles during the six months from September, 1905, to February, 1906. I select them because they illustrate some of the enormously varying types of homicide,

* Extracted from the Register of the Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment.

technically murder, all of them, therefore, involving the same penalty of death. The following four cases, in which the juries, in spite of the charge of wilful murder, gave verdicts of homicide, technically manslaughter, occurred during the same period. I quote them as showing the enormous variation in the sentences that may be given the moment the verdict is on the other side of the arbitrary line between murder and manslaughter.

(a) Richard Cosgriff, February, 1906, for killing his wife with a scaffold axe while drunk. Sentence, fifteen months' hard labor.

(b) William Beavan, March, 1906, for killing his wife at Newport. Sentence, penal servitude for life.

(c) Henry Dowdle, March, 1906, for killing his wife, while drunk. Sentence, seven years' imprisonment.

(d) Henry Stacey, March, 1906, for killing another man under great provocation. Sentence, three years' penal servitude.

It is to be particularly noted that these were not manslaughter, but murder charges, in which the juries chose to find verdicts of manslaughter, thus setting the judge free to pass such a sentence as in his opinion met the nature of each case. Of the inequality of sentences passed by different judges for practically the same offense I say nothing here, as it is not the question in point. I cite these cases in order to point out that, had the juries chosen to call these homicides murder, no variation in sentence would have been possible. In the cases of murder given above, the old woman, the boy, the young mother, the brute, the man in desperate misery, and the man in a passion all received the same unintelligent sentence.

Does the demand for gradation need a further plea? If any think so, I point to the fact that we have now arrived at a stage when the only present solution of these murder cases consonant with public sentiment is for the Home Secretary to treat some half of the sentences as merely ceremonial, and in their places to substitute sentences of his own making—a remarkable position for the most important of our criminal

laws. Thus, out of the nine death sentences given above, the Home Secretary set aside no less than six, substituting in one case three months' imprisonment and in the other five indeterminate sentences of penal servitude. And thus autocratic, administrative action takes the place of law. No one in any civilized country, I suppose, would wish to see the prerogative of mercy set aside. Without it we should be unable to right those cases of injustice which will occur, however carefully, morally and humanely the law be constructed and applied. Such cases there will be, and provision must be made for them. But no one can contend that these cases of murder are exceptional. They occur every month in regular succession, and in nine out of every ten we have the same public agitation, petitions signed by thousands, re-trial of the case in the local press, and final arbitrary decision of the politician in office for the time being. Such a process is, I submit, entirely opposed to every ideal conception of the law, its majesty and its dignity, its moral worth and its existence as a sane standard of justice within the community. Such a process destroys public respect and leads to that worst form of government—arbitrary action based on sentimentalism, without sense, without intelligent reason, and without certainty.

The stumbling-block is, of course, the survival of the old and barbarous penalty of death. While we retain this penalty within the criminal code the same difficulties must crop up, the same disbelief in the sureness of the law must survive, the same agitation and arbitrary acts.

But whether or no the time has arrived when we can completely abolish capital punishment, it has surely come when these ceremonial, sham sentences should be abolished, and, by the adoption of a reasonably graded law, the judge be given power, as with all other offenses, to pass a sentence for the crime of murder having some relationship to the case before him.

Whether penal servitude, as at present carried out, is any fit punishment, morally and socially, for murder, or indeed for any other crime, I am not prepared to say. I very much doubt it, and am inclined to believe that the only reasonable

form of punishment lies in the direction of what is known as the "indeterminate sentence." But this raises a large and somewhat complicated question of penology, and one that applies not only to murder but to all crime.

The question for the moment is the abolition of that illogical, unjust and impracticable distinction which, while considering each manslaughter case on its own merits, insists on continuing to pass the same sentence for every kind of murder —a sentence which in every other case cannot be carried out.

CARL HEATH.

LONDON.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.*

In Russia we see an extraordinary phenomenon. The justification of government is, of course, that it serves the people. It may come from the people or it may be imposed on them; its justification is the same, that it guides, directs, helps, serves. In Russia, on the other hand, we see a government that has become a great machine, working largely on its own account; its relations to the people are mainly to draw sustenance from them; it does not so much help them as make an enormous load on their backs; it exists principally to maintain itself, to extend itself, to enrich itself; it is like a foreign substance in the body politic, not the head and brain and nerves of that body, as a government normally is.

Undoubtedly the Russian government was not altogether this at the start, else it could hardly have got started. In three ways it served: it was a means of defense against the foreigner (principally Tartar or Turk); it broke the power of an ancient landed aristocracy; and it established the rude beginnings of civil order (protecting in some measure life and property). Probably by means like these it secured its remarkable hold on the reverence, even the affection and confidence, of the peasants, who, aside from the nobility (old and new) and government officials, practically *were* the people.

* An Address given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago.

And undoubtedly, in a certain elementary fashion, the government still serves the people: it is still a means of national defense and a source of civil order, whatever woful mistakes it makes both in war and peace.

But, with these qualifications, what I have said holds true. I have been deeply impressed to this effect as I have read a book¹ by one who believes monarchy still the only form possible for Russia, and parliamentary government not yet feasible.

Russia, in the political sense, is not very old, contrary to the general impression that it is an ancient and hoary empire; all there was of it five or six centuries ago was the Dukedom of Moscow. But about 1462 Duke John III began conquering and annexing the dukedoms and petty states that lay near him, and a work of conquest was thus begun which has gone on more or less continuously ever since. The result is that Russia now means one sixth of the habitable globe, a territory greater than that of the United States, and twice the size of all the empires, realms, and principalities of Europe put together.²

This succession of conquests is peculiar. It is not the work of the Russian people proper, but of an able, ambitious and unscrupulous line of monarchs, aided, of course, by an official military class. The Russian people are not naturally warlike, nor are they politically ambitious; for instance, they offered little resistance to the Norman vikings when they came down upon them, and they did make much resistance to the Mongol invaders in the thirteenth century. There has always been a party in Russia opposed to the conquests which the government has made—the so-called "Old Russian" party. In the days of Peter the Great this party was led by a son of Peter himself, who strenuously opposed his father's policy, and was beheaded in consequence. The party was for restoring the

¹ Wolf von Schierbrand, "Russia: Her Strength and Her Weakness," 1904. To this and Milioukov's "Russia and Its Crisis" I am principally indebted, so far as statements of fact are concerned, in preparing this address.

² Dr. E. J. Dillon, *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1906, p. 770.

conquered countries to their former owners, reëstablishing in Moscow the old national comfort and quiet, avoiding interference with European countries and affairs, avoiding war, and lightening the burden of taxes. Down even to the time of Alexander I, at the beginning of the last century, this current of opinion continued. It was only at the court of the Czar and its environment that Russia was warlike and desirous of glory; outside, and among the mass of the people, there was a longing to keep aloof from Europe and to be free of costly military entanglements. Alexander I himself made this confession at the close of his life: "Of glory and honor I have had enough; but when I reflect how little has been done for the welfare of the nation, the thought weighs on my heart like a lump of ten pood."⁸ It was not until Napoleon's invasion and the burning of Moscow that a change came over the peace-loving nature of the average Russian and he became warlike, though since that time a semi-religious sentiment against the Turk has been manipulated by the ruling military class so as to give support and even inspiration to two wars against Turkey.

So little has Russia, real Russia, had to do with this gigantic work of conquest that even now, it is said, the best soldiers in the army are of Polish extraction, the brain of it either Teutonic or Polish, the best portion of the cavalry non-Russian—Caucasian, Cossack, and Polish Uhlans—and the artillery and engineer corps the creations of non-Russians. The army has thus largely the air of a manufactured thing, not of a natural product and outgrowth of the spirit of the people. The present imperial house is itself as much German as Russian, if not more so. Indeed, so little is the government really Russian that for a century and a half the language of the nation has been tabooed at court; and the nobility, when among themselves, prefer to speak German or French, Russian being looked upon as a barbarous tongue, only "fit to be spoken to servants."

It is not to be denied that the conquests I have referred to

⁸ A pood=forty pounds.

have had their good side. By them a measure of order and security has been created in regions where formerly robber hordes despoiled the traveler, but now the merchant, the mechanic, the colonist, the official go about in full security of person and property. This is the same service as was done to Russia proper in the beginning. But when we ask what the conquests have cost, and who have paid for them, and who have derived the principal benefits of them, and what is the general effect of them, the answer is staggering. It would be idle to attempt to reckon the number of lives and the amount of money that have been sacrificed; figures, when they become so large, cannot really be grasped by the mind and lose their meaning. The practical point is that the Russian people, though they did not will the conquests or actively consent to them, but simply submitted and obeyed, in trustful, oriental fashion, have had to foot the bills; that they have had the burden and the loss, and the monarchy and the military and official class the chief benefits of the enterprise—the high salaries, the allotments of land, with the honor and glory thrown in; and that the general effect has been to make the separation of the government from the people greater, the autocracy more autocratic, the people more subject, to hinder enterprise and ambition, to check improvement and reform, to make the people poor and miserable and to keep them so. The author I have already referred to, sums it up when he says, "Three things only have been attained: a brilliant court, a large army, and the total subjection of every class of the people."

It is impossible to understand the circumstances that have led to the present revolutionary movement, or the motives that inspire it, unless we see and realize the working of this extraordinary government somewhat in detail. Let us consider it now, not in its conquests, but in its ordinary attitude to the people at home. I refer, of course, to the usual state of things before the convocation of the Duma last year.

In the first place, the government, though it destroyed in the beginning the old aristocracy, created a nobility of its own, giving lands, titles and honors, and special powers, in reward for military service, to a fresh set of men; and the peasant

had thus a change of masters rather than real freedom. Indeed, nothing was done to determine his rights against the new lords of the soil: even Byzantine law and Ottoman law protected the peasant, but the Russian government did not, and in time the peasants became actual bondmen, serfs.

If there is anything pathetic in history, it is the story of the Russian peasant for the last few hundred years. The pity of it is so great that the pity almost turns to scorn. The fair-speaking and doubtless well-intentioned Mr. Stolypin has admitted that "men who are compelled to live on one herring and three potatoes a day cannot be expected to understand the benefits of autocracy or the obligations of citizenship."⁴ But though they have not understood the benefits of autocracy, they have seemed to believe in it, and to meet the obligations of citizenship all the same. In the days before their emancipation, when the nobility were their absolute masters and owners, they might be whipped even to death, and yet not murmur. Now (at least till very recently), they pay without a murmur their heavy and increasing taxes (for taxes increased between 1893 and 1892 twenty-nine per cent., and between 1893 and 1902, forty-nine per cent.), and their chief sign of sense at last is that they are anxious, being already mostly insolvent, not to save anything that can be sold for taxes.⁵ The only evidence I find of any improvement in their condition is that there has been an increase in Russia generally in recent years in the consumption of sugar, though it is still only half as great *per capita* as it is in Germany and France, and not one fifth as great as in the United States. The consumption of alcohol in Russia is lower than in any other civilized country and decreasing. The peasant has meat four times a year. A Russian conservative speaks of chronic underfeeding and periodical famines among the whole peasant population in certain regions. The peasant, as he ordinarily has been, could only say, "Russia is great, and the Czar is far away." Perhaps there is something flabby and tame in his nature—as

⁴ Quoted in Chicago *Record-Herald*, Dec. 21, 1906.

⁵ Milyukov, "Russia," etc., pp. 442, 443.

we have seen, he is not naturally warlike; but I suspect more is due to his training, to the ideals which church and State alike have held up to him—and to the iron necessity to which he has simply had to submit. If you kill off men of spirit, of course you will have left chiefly men without spirit; and flogging or killing peasants has been counted no crime to the nobility. And now the government does not encourage manhood in the peasant; how can it when its whole interest lies in having obedient and submissive subjects? Some years ago, but since "emancipation," a government official made an interesting report. A Russian, I may say, has naturally a free intelligence, and, if he has a chance, is apt to see and speak the truth. The report was detailed and technical—I can only give its conclusion: "The general complaints about the lack of order and cleanliness in our villages, the poverty of the peasant, his savagery, the poor quality of the village authorities. . . all this has the same root: it is the habit of external compulsion, to which the peasant has been inured for centuries past, and which has deprived him of every trace of initiative and individual enterprise."⁶ In other words, the government has ruled the peasant for its good, not for his own. His very poverty is more or less due to the government; after paying his taxes he has not enough bread. Contrary to his natural instincts, he goes into the army willingly—even with joy. Why? because for the first time in his life he can eat his fill. It is said that nowhere else does the soldier fare better than the average common man. Even when the peasant buys liquor, he has to pay nearly two thirds more than he would if its sale were not a government monopoly. The annual revenues from this same source sometimes reach \$250,000,000, most of the enormous sum being derived from the 100,000,000 peasants. And there is this further curious fact, that while the Finance Minister devotes one per cent. of the total net returns to the temperance movement, his subordinates in the provinces do what they can to hinder this movement, place obstacles of every kind in the way of the temper-

⁶ Schierbrand, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

ance societies, the net result being that the government gets increasing sales and actually promotes drunkenness.⁷

Before turning from the peasants, let me speak of one specific way in which the government has diminished enterprise and ambition among them. It is by the system of communal rather than individual taxation. It is easier, simpler (from an administrative point of view), to deal with a community than with a miscellaneous lot of individuals; and by a system of communal rather than private ownership of land, and joint rather than individual responsibility for taxes, the government lightened its burdens. It is a question whether the Russian commune or "mir," is not, to a considerable extent, a government creation.⁸ But this is the way the system works. A lump sum having to be raised, if there are those who are not able to pay their share, then those who make a better use of their land and earn more are obliged to pay more. The result is to make the relatively successful peasants suffer for the faults and shortcomings of their less successful neighbors. I need not say that, as men ordinarily are, this discourages enterprise and prevents progress. The tendency is to a low uniform level of labor and attainment. It is significant that in certain colonies on the borders of Russia (some of Russian and some of German origin), where the government has not pushed its communal system of taxation, and has left the peasants owning their individual pieces of land, there has been relative prosperity and progress. The Mennonites were an example of this—those interesting people who a few years ago came over into Canada because, against the pledges of Catherine II, who had encouraged them to come to Russia, they were being forced into military service.⁹

I turn now to speak of the merchant or middle class, and of the relation of the government to them. As a rule, Russian merchants and manufacturers are the descendants, one or more generations removed, of peasants; for nobles, in Russia, as

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 77.

⁸ Schierbrand, p. 116; Milyoukov, p. 343.

⁹ Schierbrand, pp. 136, 137.

elsewhere, do not ordinarily engage in trade or any productive work. But trade or manufacturing enterprise requires capital, and capital means saving, and as the peasant class had ordinarily nothing to save (as already explained), the merchants and manufacturers who came from their ranks were few and far between. More than this, before the rise of the Russian State proper, there were flourishing trading towns in Russia—towns that were as free as Florence and Genoa and Bremen, and some of which belonged to the Hanseatic League, and the new absolutist rulers virtually destroyed them. Freedom and wealth meant power, and the autocracy instinctively opposed these towns, and reduced them to impotence, just as it did the landed aristocrats. As I have said, a new nobility was soon made—you can make a noble with a word or a bit of parchment—but a middle class with capital is not so easily manufactured. Russia has, indeed, never got over its initial blight in this respect, and until within forty years, the very small middle class it has had have been chiefly foreigners. The capital for trade and manufacture and almost all the beginnings of town and city life, have come from extra-Russian elements, chiefly Germanic in the North and West, and Turkish and Tartar in the East. The towns are mostly near the borders. It is idle to say that the Russian has no aptitude for trade, and a flourishing and powerful middle class is not to be expected in that country; the truth is simply that the government, by the policy it pursued, rendered the rise of such a class next to impossible.

And because the middle class of merchants and manufacturers is insignificant, the so-called working-class in the cities is insignificant, too. They do not exceed two millions out of the one hundred and thirty millions of which the Russian empire is composed. They are hardly as yet a separate and distinct class, for they are more or less made up of peasants who come in from the country for the winter months, and go back to the country in the summer. They are only slightly organized, and the attitude of the government is shown to them in that a strike constitutes a crime. When anything of this nature does occur, the authorities intervene, generally

taking the stronger side—not always that of the manufacturers—and as the intervention is generally violent, and often untimely for one or the other side, the result is general dissatisfaction. The initial protest against the manufacturer generally ends with a protest against the government, and the manufacturer often secretly joins. Strikes thus tend to become political demonstrations.

A word as to what the government does in the way of educating the people: It spends annually 40 kopeks or more a head for this purpose—20 to 30 cents. The teachers are mostly priests. The late Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod said, "Education and schooling are more harmful than beneficial for the Russian peasantry." At least as little harm is done as possible, for any attempt to go beyond the three R's always meets with obstacles from the authorities. Much religious instruction is given (I have not spoken of religion and the church, for it is mostly a tool in the hands of the government for keeping the people quiet and submissive), and a large part of the instruction is devoted to, or rather against, the "Sectarians," so-called, who broke with the orthodox State Church because of its formalism and emptiness. Particularly in the last few years (practically nothing whatever was done before "Emancipation" in 1861), since local control of teaching has almost ceased, and while the country districts pay the expenses, the government controls the teachers and the text-books, the school-teacher is looked upon principally as an agent of his government, is inferior as a rule, and the correctness of his political principles is the main object of consideration. These schools, second or third rate as they are, are only some thirty thousand in number, supplemented by eighteen thousand parish schools, whose strong point is singing religious hymns and reading medieval Slavic, with the result that not more than one peasant girl out of every seven has even a slight knowledge of reading, and in many villages not even a single woman or girl can read or write.

It is impossible to go through a list of the performances of this sham government. There is little that is sound or normal or life-giving about it. Its concern is chiefly for itself, and

to keep itself a-going. It establishes courts, and then interferes with their independence. It establishes universities, but will not allow freedom of teaching. It has not allowed the growth of a capitalist class, and there is no capital in the country to build railroads and great enterprises with; it has to build them itself, and does so either by forced taxation or by hiring capital from better managed nations. None of these enterprises pays for itself, and the interest charges that have to be sent out of the country every year are colossal. The great object of the government is money-making; and it does not make it honestly, for whatever it conducts it turns into a monopoly. It reaches out after telegraphs and mines and forests and tobacco and beet sugar, and threatens to institute a bastard form of state socialism, not to serve the people, but to keep its great *corpus*, the huge, unwieldy, all-devouring machine that it is, alive. Separated from the people, it is out of touch with them and out of sympathy. It becomes haughty, brutal. Not long ago a Russian admiral, when some seamen complained that their meat was covered with worms, said, "If the meat isn't fresh, the worms are."¹⁰

Can we wonder that a government of this kind is at last being called to account? If we were speaking of any other country but Russia the wonder would be that it had not been before. And the trouble is now that it is probably being called to account only by a few. The fatality about despotism is that, long continued, it emasculates; it enfeebles, eats out and kills out the very elements that would put an end to it. Oriental despotisms like Babylon and Nineveh fell down all together—people and crown in one mass: their very sites are almost obliterated. In Russia the protesting revolutionary element is probably an insignificant fraction of its one hundred and thirty millions of people. There is no wealthy and powerful middle class, as there was to give backbone to the French Revolution. There is no large and organized working class as there is in England and in Germany and in the United States. There is no intelligent, self-reliant farmer class, like

¹⁰ Admiral Ciukuin, quoted in *Il Secolo* (Milan), July 16, 1906.

those who at Concord bridge "fired the shot heard round the world." There is nothing but the autocracy with its officials and the army on top, and the vast mass of ignorant, superstitious, wretchedly poor, and perhaps flabby peasants at the bottom—nothing, that is, aside from a handful of men in various professions, a small class of merchants and manufacturers, mostly of foreign origin, a few professors and university students, and some nobles who, largely through residence abroad, have imbibed liberal ideas, and are ashamed to contrast progressive Europe with their mother country.

All the same, the revolution has started, and nothing could more signally prove the power of ideas than the fact that, with so little material backing, it has commenced. It is a curious and interesting fact that political liberalism before the revolution (if we call the revolution this definite beginning of last year) arose, what there was of it, among the landed nobility themselves, and was dictated, not by class considerations, but by philanthropic feelings and advanced political theories.¹¹ Even the first socialists and anarchists, men like Herzen and Bakounin, belonged among the gentry class. It is curious and interesting, I say, because there is indicated thus an element of disinterestedness in the Russian nature, a capacity for a purely intellectual point of view, that strikes the practical German or Anglo-Saxon somewhat oddly; for not only does Marxian socialism base everything on class interest, but there is a corresponding theory held by many who are not Marxians that social changes in general are produced by those particular classes directly interested in the result. But it is the same now with the revolutionary leaders in Russia as it was half a century or more ago. Stepnyak, one of the best known of them in recent years, said that no one looked seriously to the peasantry for support, that the movement was entirely an urban one, looking partly to the working people, but chiefly to the educated classes in general. These classes, he held, manage the press, sit in the Zemstvos (provincial assemblies) and municipal councils, and hold the university professorships. We

¹¹ Milioukov, pp. 225-6.

should give up, he urged, the habit borrowed from Western Europe, of confusing liberalism with narrow *bourgeois* class interest. Ours, he declares, is not a class opposition, but an intellectual opposition. How clearly the truth of this comes out when we think of those ardent young school teachers who flocked into the country districts to teach the peasants soon after "Emancipation," until they were replaced by the government by subservient priests, and again, when we think of the socialists, who took their propaganda to the peasants, only to be delivered over by them to the police!¹²

And yet, noble and generous as it is, there are fatal limitations about a purely intellectual enthusiasm. If the war were one of ideas only, such disinterested ardor might be all-prevailing in time. But the war is against power, against a great organized mass of physical force, a force which sends you to the gallows or to Siberia if you do not agree with it. The problem is to undo this fearful, irresponsible power, to have only power that is for the people's good, to put it within constitutional limits, and the only way to make sure that this will be done is for the people themselves to do it. This is the constitutional democratic theory of government, whether a nominal king or emperor, or a president, is the executive head of the State. It is to change the fundamental law of Russia that the revolution is organizing. It is a government that will be responsible to the people that is the essence of the revolutionary demand. But to accomplish this, there must be power to meet power. To establish the right of free political institutions in a university lecture, or among a pack of students, is one thing—to develop the idea and the theory, to show how reasonable it is, and how necessary to meet the present crisis it is; but it is another thing to face the solid stone wall of an autocracy, a bureaucracy and an army, and to lay it low. For that, I say, there must be power.

"Man needs must fight
To make true peace his own;
He needs must combat might with might
Or might would rule alone."

¹² Milyukov, p. 360; cf. Schierbrand, p. 230.

But where is there such power in Russia to-day? Do a handful of educated men, a few lawyers and professors and students, make such a power? Do a few liberal-minded aristocrats make such a power? Do a few scattered bomb-throwers and assassins make such a power? How ridiculous! The power must be that of the mass of the nation. The smaller the revolutionary forces are, the more violent they are, the more ineffective. When the Russian people want the revolution, they will have it without bomb-throwing and assassination, by the simple resistlessness of their might. The sort of violence we have now, and which in the popular mind is identified with the revolution, simply throws the revolution back, and shows the infantile character of some of the revolutionary forces. It is the system that needs to be changed, and how are you going to do that by picking off a few officials, or even the most prominent of them, including the Czar himself? I say not the slightest thing in favor of the Czar and his officials. I hold they have done far worse things, and committed far blacker crimes than any of these men are doing who now seek to punish them; but if it is a question of a government responsible to the people instead of absolutism, if that is the meaning of the revolution, as it was with the French Revolution, of the English Revolutions, and of our own, then these assassinations have little more to do with it, save to prejudice and hurt it, than if they were explosions in the empty air. The real revolutionary forces are deeper than those of which we hear so much. They are largely slumbering, and yet they are there, and may awake to giant strength.

Let me mention one or two of those signs, and indicate what the forces are. In the first place, there is the hatred beginning to be felt by the nation generally for its corps of officials; an authoritative writer puts it stronger. In speaking of the bureaucracy, and of the officials, as changing from place to place, and never staying long enough in a place to assimilate themselves with the population and its thoughts and wants, he refers to an all-pervading hatred for these officials as something already existing.¹⁸ Secondly, there is a gradually

¹⁸ Schierbrand, p. 275.

rising discontent in the army. In 1902, Kouropatkin wrote: "The attempts of political agitators to spread propaganda in the army, formerly comparatively rare, have, in recent times, become more prevalent, and are carried on so boldly that it is necessary to give serious attention to them." The Cossacks alone are now considered entirely reliable; sometimes soldiers have refused to fire; both in the army and navy this past year there have been instances of this disaffection; soldiers and sailors have even fired on their commanders and the regular troops. If this spirit continues to spread, the very prop of the government will be gone, and the autocracy collapse, like a building whose foundations have been taken out from under it. The army may yet be with the people, rather than against them. Thirdly, a change seems to be coming over the peasants themselves. The "intellectuals," whether liberals or socialists, have been discouraged with the peasants. They have seemed a dead, stolid, submissive mass, impervious to ideas, without dignity or self-respect. But the leaven is working even among them. The peasants do not always hand their friends over to the police now; sometimes they conceal them from the police; and when requested to give up seditious leaflets that have been distributed among them, they often answer with plain refusal. It is said that to watch them more closely, thirty-five thousand special village policemen were introduced by Plehve. Moreover, the peasants are acquiring new airs, a new demeanor: the landlords call it insolence and effrontery; others see in it simple self-consciousness and self-assertion. A government council, considering the coming elections and how to limit the power of the peasants in the next Duma, confesses that the hopes that the peasant deputies would be obedient lambs have been cruelly belied. Occasionally the new spirit goes beyond legal limits, and leads to violence against landlord property, sometimes in resentment, more often to get the wherewithal on which to live. Whatever the excesses, it is a palpable fact that the inner being of the peasantry is undergoing a change; its old apathy and submission are being broken up, and a fresh meaning is given to Emerson's saying that "Love or crime leads all souls to the good."

Another force for change is being raised up in the workingmen of the cities. Gradually, as we have seen, and without meaning to, they are being introduced to a political rôle. The first strike in Russia (one in the cotton factories of St. Petersburg, some ten years ago) had purely industrial causes; the men wanted a twelve-hour day, a slight increase of wages and so on; socialists or "intellectuals" of any kind had nothing to do with it. The socialists were rather taken by surprise. And yet strikes (of which there have been many since, despite their illegality, and 120 out of 160 successful) usually lead to political demonstrations, as I have explained; and the workingmen tend to become an organized force, which may be counted on to become a force against the autocracy.

Moreover, though a middle class has been virtually non-existent in Russia down to recent years, such an element in the population is taking form now. Not all enterprise is in government hands. Manufactures and trade are increasing, despite discouraging import duties and other obstacles. Merchants and industrial leaders can be counted on to help on the struggle for political freedom, and though this class is small, and their wealth inconsiderable, they are bound to increase.

These are the varied forces that are to give blood and substance to the ideas of the "intellectuals." It may take time for them to gain due development; the revolution may not be accomplished for fifty years, or more than fifty years; but if the tendencies are now at work the question is simply one of time. Without this development of power, the ideas of the professional and educated classes are idle dreams; there may, of course, be murders and assassinations, but it is precisely because there is not a great orderly stream of might in the nation on the side of the revolutionary ideas that the agitation takes this feverish, hysterical and really diseased form. The thing for real friends of Russian freedom is, by agitation, unselfish labor, by submission to personal loss, by surrender of life even, to educate and coöperate with all the incipient popular forces I have just described; to promote enlightenment and discontent and the revolutionary spirit among peasants, workingmen, business men and the army itself.

Thousands have done and are doing this. Gratefully and reverently I would pay them my tribute of honor and admiration. All the silent forces of European civilization are aiding them. All American ideas are aiding them. Even famine in Russia aids them, even the folly of the Japanese war aids them, even the haughtiness and the crimes of the autocracy aid them, even the weakness and ineptitude of the present Czar aids them, even the brutal Cossack soldiers aid them; the stars fight against this great Sisera, who will yet be laid low.

We must look beyond the present situation for comfort and hope, look beyond the failure of the first Duma, which did not fail (since it brought the issue squarely up of responsible as opposed to irresponsible government, and the need of change in the fundamental law), look beyond the farce of the coming elections, where, by all sorts of tricks and devices, the people are to be prevented from expressing their real will; look beyond Mr. Stolypin's specious reforms, which bind nobody and deceive but few; beyond all this, or rather, shall I not say, deeper than all this, and see the currents already at work that will bring on the ultimate victory. Some are pessimistic about Russia, pessimistic particularly about the Russian peasant; what they say is a long wail for his utter, hopeless, immemorial poverty. But the fact seems to be that he has not been immemorially poor, or immemorially a slave. It is the present Russian government, dating back not more than a few centuries, that has largely helped make him the poor, abject, submissive creature that he is (or was), and when this government and its foolish, iniquitous policies and laws go, he will rise. It will go, and the peasant will help make it go.¹⁴

"For He that worketh high and wise,
Nor pauses in his plan,
Will take the sun out of the skies,
Ere freedom out of man."

CHICAGO.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

"Since writing the above, the elections to the second Duma have taken place and the new Duma has assembled with more representatives from the peasants than before. While political habits have yet to be acquired and political capacity shown, the revolutionary spirit—the indispensable preliminary to change—has had an amazing development.

ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS.

II.

There are two ways in which economic inquiry leads up to and is connected with questions of ethics. In the first place, the action of human beings is not determined by purely economic forces. The desire of wealth is not the only impelling force, and the desire of ease is not the only restraining force in industry and commerce. Economic motives do not operate—do not even exist—by themselves. No simple description can exhaust the nature of the forces which lead men to produce and accumulate wealth or which determine the mode of its distribution. They are as complex as the nature of man and the constitution of society. Disinterested or altruistic motives intermingle with egoistic, sometimes intensifying their power, sometimes conflicting with them, always modifying their direction. *Æsthetic* appreciation, intellectual and spiritual aims, moral sentiments, and the unbending law of duty, all enter and all act, as stimuli, as restraints, as guides. And the social, political, and legal systems which these forces are constantly modifying preside over their operation, sometimes almost unobserved, sometimes defied, but never without effect. In this way the facts with which the economist is primarily concerned are merged with and modified by a larger class of facts, many or most of which, from their importance for the moral life, may be called ethical. In order to understand economic phenomena, the economist is forced to take account of this larger class of facts, and thus to broaden the basis of his science. This the modern economist has done. And he can do it without either departing from the proper method, or looking beyond the special interest, of economics.

On the other hand, when we consider the second way in which economics is related to ethics, we find that our interest is no longer merely economic. We compare the economic with the other purposes and ideals of human life. And the economic method is no longer adequate. The economist cannot

look from this point of view without becoming something more than an economist. And it is for this reason that the interference of the moralist may possibly be justified. This second way in which economics and ethics are related I have connected with the use of the economic conception of value. The "value" of anything, as the term is used by economists, has always relation to something else which can be got for it. It is an **extrinsic value**, therefore, and must depend, in the long run, upon some kind of **intrinsic value**—which I have agreed to call "worth." This dependence is not overlooked by economists, and their conception of utility covers a part of what I mean by worth. "Utility" seems to me a misleading term, both because it suggests a philosophical theory which we have no right to assume, and also because it implies a reference beyond the thing which is said to have utility to that for which it is useful; so that it is more properly a term for **extrinsic value** than for **intrinsic value** or **worth**. It is besides, as used in economics, not broad enough for our purposes. It is indeed not necessarily limited to material objects, but it does imply that close degree of connection with material objects which admits of the thing in question having the kind of **extrinsic value** called **value in exchange** or simply **value**. And the term we need is one which will apply equally to the **worth** of economic products and to the **worth** of things which are neither themselves material nor the symbols of material goods, and which may not issue in anything which has **exchange-value**. Further, the economist uses the conception in a way which is limited by the special purpose he has in view. All utilities are alike to him, provided people regard them as such. They are to be measured by what people will do or give up in order to attain them. In this sense a bottle of champagne is more useful to a man than a copy of Shakespeare if he is willing to pay more for it. If any more objective standard of utility than this is attained by the economist, it is reached simply by comparing different people's desires for things and averaging their strength. There is no other standard than that of fact, no intrusion of the alien and awkward conception of "ought" used by the moralist. On the

other hand, when we ask about the "worth" of anything (as I am using that term), whether the thing in question be material or spiritual, we are not asking how much some particular man or men in general do as a matter of fact desire it, or even what they think it to be worth, but what it *is* worth. We are seeking an objective standard of worth, which may not agree with anybody's actual conduct or even actual opinion. It is an ideal; and the science which investigates this ideal is called ethics.

It is true that there is a tendency with certain schools of thought to restrict the scope of Ethics to something less than this—to make it a purely descriptive and historical science on the same level as psychology or the natural sciences. In this view, it has to describe and analyse and trace the history of the social facts of morality as they are exhibited in customs and institutions, and of the individual facts of morality as shown in the desires, sentiments, and ideas of men. This method of inquiry has always been recognized as belonging to the work of the moralist; and it is inquiries of this nature alone that are involved in the first of the two ways already distinguished in which economics is related to ethics. It extends, be it noted, not only to the moral conduct of man, but also to his moral ideas: and these moral ideas include those judgments of worth which we have now under consideration. But it limits unduly our method of dealing with them. Ethics has not merely to trace the origin, history, and connections of these judgments of worth; it must also investigate their validity. Their place in the moral consciousness and their influence on life depend upon their claim to validity or to authority, and this claim needs explanation and criticism. We are all familiar with these judgments of worth, as they are expressed in ideas about right and wrong, good and evil, better and worse. They are as common, and perhaps as ultimate, as the judgments of fact which record our perceptive experience. The latter become the material for natural or physical science; and science is not content with treating these judgments of fact as themselves mere facts with a content to be analyzed and a history to be traced. It takes them as

expressing a meaning which has to be explained and criticized and from which generalizations may be formed. When I record my experience in sense-perception by saying that the unsupported stone falls to the ground, or that the sun moves across the heavens from east to west, these judgments of fact are received by the scientist as having a meaning; the meanings are elucidated and their validity is tested. The interest which governs science is from these elementary judgments of fact to get at the truth as to what really happens and how. With this may be compared the problem of the moralist. He also is presented with a number of judgments of immediate experience; but these are judgments of worth, not of fact. His main interest—like that of the scientist—is not in the origin or history of these judgments, but in their validity. The validity of judgments of worth consists in their giving a true account, not of what happens or how, but of the worth or good of things. And the moralist must therefore try to arrive at true and general statements as to the worth of things—statements which should serve the purpose both of distinguishing good from evil, and of estimating degrees of goodness. He seeks a standard and scale of worth on which all facts and factors of human life may be measured.

The point which I wish to enforce is simply this: that while economics deals with actual processes (or, in some cases, hypothetical processes) and has no other interest than to understand the way in which wealth is as a matter of fact produced, distributed, and consumed, ethics is concerned with an ideal of worth or goodness, and its interest is to know what things are good and what evil, and amongst the former what their degree of goodness is. When ethical principles are applied to economic material we should be able to arrive at some results both as to the worth of the product—wealth—in comparison with other things which may have worth for man, and also as to the worth or moral quality of the various processes which, in different industrial orders, are involved in its production and distribution.

Ethical principles are, unfortunately, the subject of endless controversy; and, from the nature of the case, the moral-

ist has no body of facts, such as the economist has, to which he can refer in case of dispute, so as to settle the question at issue, or (if that be not possible) to explain why the data are insufficient to settle it. Facts alone cannot determine their own worth; and ethics accordingly is at a disadvantage—the sport, alternately, of paradox and of platitude. Avoiding controversial questions so far as possible, I shall try to prepare the way for ethical reflection on some features of economics, by summing up certain characteristics of the scope and methods of ethics, which will in part bring together points already suggested and in part lead on to their application. Of the scope of ethics something has already been said; but the three following points may serve to make it clearer.

(1) The leading conception of ethics is that of worth or goodness. The question about the worth of anything may begin by being a question of economics, or it may begin by being a question for some other study. But it always ends—if we look to the end—by being an ethical question. There are, no doubt, many kinds of worth. The economic “value” (*i. e.*, exchange-value) of a thing is a kind of worth; but it is extrinsic worth and rests upon something which is valuable for its own sake or has intrinsic worth. The utility of a thing (as the economist uses the term) may be said to be this intrinsic worth; but this utility does not comprehend everything in human life which is worth having or being or doing: or if it be broadened so as to include all this, it is just the ethical conception which we are seeking to explain. Commonly it is said that there are three leading and distinct kinds of worth: æsthetical worth, which belongs to the products of nature and art in so far as they realize beauty; intellectual worth, which belongs to propositions and systems of knowledge in so far as they are true; and moral worth, which belongs to conduct or character in so far as it is good or in accordance with duty. But there is a larger meaning of “worth” in which the ethical includes the other two aspects. Beauty and truth have indeed an independent validity as ideals; their nature and their worth do not depend simply upon their being contributory to good conduct. But they do contribute to the

worth of life. They are themselves good, and thus require to be taken into account in a general theory of goodness. And ethics, in the widest but yet a strict sense, may be defined as the general theory of goodness. This view of ethics I adopt here, because it is only when no element of goodness is excluded from our purview that we can hope to reach a scale of worth, and thus to do justice to the place of economic goods in the individual life and in society.

(2) This is the second characteristic of ethics: it looks at life as a whole. It attempts to organize the whole of our experience from its own point of view. In this it is distinguished from most other sciences, which are deliberately restricted to a limited group of facts, or to a special aspect of facts, and which owe their strength to this restriction. Chemistry, zoölogy, economics are examples. But there are also sciences which attempt a comprehensive view, a synopsis, of the whole of things—or of such a large subject-matter that it may appear to be the whole. Thus physical science, in its widest sense, aims at a systematic account of things as a whole under mathematical conceptions; history, if we take it in its widest sense, and do not restrict it to human society, also aims at presenting things as a whole whose successive stages are governed by the law of evolution. Ethics is capable of a similar comprehensive interpretation. It attempts to organize the whole of experience under the apparently alien conception of goodness. This ethical ordering of phenomena, if it is to reach even a moderate degree of success, must not be carried out in disregard of either the analysis of the forces which determine the actual condition of phenomena, or the laws of their historical development. At the same time it brings into our consideration of facts an entirely new point of view, and its organization of them is necessarily a complete reorganization.

(3) This leads to the third characteristic of ethics. It is the science of an ideal. Kant says it would make no difference to ethics, even if it were established that a truly good action had never once been performed in the world's history. This is a hard saying, and yet, when we reflect, we must admit its

truth. We do not find our ideal in the facts; we judge them by it and try to put it into them. A thing is not good because we see it done; but we say that it is good because we see that it ought to be done. And we do not get a standard and measure of goodness from observation of the way in which events have happened or do happen, or from conjecture regarding the way in which they are about to happen. We must be on our guard against two prevalent fallacies, which may—with an apology to political parties—be called the Conservative fallacy and the Radical fallacy. The former is the less common of the two in present-day thought; but its influence has been great and is not yet exhausted. There is still a tendency to regard methods as right because they are the customary methods of the community; and if they have descended from the “good old times” and are backed by the “wisdom of our forefathers,” it seems almost impiety to question them. And there is nothing which can trace more respectable or ancient descent than just this mental attitude itself. It has its value also, as a force making for order and continuity in human development. But, if there were no counteracting force it would spell stagnation; and it rests on a basis of theory which—venerable as it is—can only be described as false. It assumes a perfect or best condition of man as having really existed in the past; and it looks on the subsequent course of human history as a gradual departure from this state of primitive excellence. Unless this assumption be made—and it is no longer made—there is no ground for maintaining that a thing is good simply because it is actual or even because it is old. The dogma from which the Conservative fallacy drew its strength has now disappeared from our explicit thinking; but the mental attitude corresponding to the dogma remains and has to be guarded against.

What I have called the Radical fallacy is much more prevalent than the conservative, and needs to be even more carefully guarded against, perhaps because it is more nearly allied to truth. It places the perfect state of man and society in some distant future of the race, instead of assuming that it existed in the past. And while the Conservative fallacy re-

garded each change in the social order as a step further away from the golden age, the Radical fallacy assumes that it is a nearer approximation to the best state for man. Now we may confidently maintain that a very much better state than the present is possible for mankind, without any change in the general laws of nature and social conditions than experience has already shown to be practicable. We may also reasonably hope—though perhaps we cannot definitely prove—that the economic and other forces which fashion history will tend to the realization of that better state: that, on the whole and in the long run, change is really progress. But the Radical fallacy consists in assuming that every change is a progress. The former fallacy assumed that "whatever is," or rather that whatever was, "is right"; and could only defend the view by the fiction that man and society were once perfect and have been constantly degenerating. The new fallacy assumes that whatever is about to be, or is likely to be, is right, and supports this noxious and immoral doctrine by appealing to our belief in progress and our cherished hopes for the future of the race. The doctrine is immoral because it makes mere succession in time the arbiter of what is right or wrong, and it is noxious because it is used so as to prevent men from opposing tendencies which seem to them evil, and to induce them to coöperate with tendencies which are of doubtful worth. Progress implies change, but not every change is in the direction of progress. If we believe in the progress of the race we must not think of it as running in a straight line or even (as some have imagined) in a spiral. There are many backward-pointing loops in the course of history, and genuine progress can sometimes be realized only by opposition to the forces which for the moment—indeed for periods which are long in the life of the individual—seem to be in the ascendant, and to be carrying all before them.

It is because these two corresponding but opposed fallacies tend to warp our thinking that it is necessary to emphasize the ideal character of ethics. Fact is one thing, and worth is another thing. A method or an institution is not good be-

cause it has been of old, or exists now, or seems likely to come into existence soon. Nor is a method or an institution any the worse because it has never existed, is not now, and has little prospect of immediate realization. As Kant held, good is good even if it has never been seen on earth. But this dictum must not be misinterpreted. The realm of goodness is not divorced from the realm of reality. Were it so the moralist would be "as one beating the air." The consciousness of goodness—the belief that a thing has worth or that something ought to be done—is itself one of the motive forces which guide the course of history. It is indeed of varying efficacy in different people and in different circumstances; but it is capable of becoming the strongest of all the powers that struggle for mastery in human conduct.

The above may serve to make clear enough for our purposes the scope of ethics and the general nature of its application to economic processes. But a further question remains as to ethical method: how are we to arrive at that discrimination of the good, and that scale of worth, which ethical judgment requires in order that its application may be free from doubt? There is no general agreement of experts as to the correct answer to this question. Ethics is a subject in which there is a great deal of dispute about general principles and not nearly so much dispute about particular judgments of worth. And what I have to say in answer to the question must be said in a few words, that we may not drift into a purely philosophical discussion.

(1) We are all aware that we pass ethical judgments, or judgments of worth, sometimes quite instinctively, at other times with but little reflection. As soon as we know the circumstances, we pronounce with confidence as to the good or ill of an action. Were these judgments always correct, no ethical difficulty would ever arise. But they are not always correct. Men make mistakes about good and evil just as they make mistakes about what they see and hear. They are also willing to correct their own mistakes—and still more willing to correct other people's mistakes—in both departments. They revise their ethical judgments in the light of

fuller knowledge of the facts and better insight into moral character. They strive to avoid contradiction between one opinion and another, seeking a coherent view in morals, just as in science one tries to get a coherent view of the real world. When we modify—as we often do—our first judgments as to what takes place in the world around us, the modification is due to a desire for intellectual coherence or harmony and to the discovery of a discrepancy between new knowledge and our old opinion. From their observation of the phenomena of dawn and noonday and sunset, men judge and believe that the sun moves across the heavens from east to west. Gradually knowledge accumulates and is systematized, and men are forced to admit that their first judgment was a misinterpretation of experience—that the apparent movement of the sun is in reality a movement of the observer himself and his own particular planet. It is seldom that ethical science requires so great a modification as this of our primitive moral judgments. But they are corrected and systematized in a somewhat similar way. Each new experience leads, or may lead, to a moral judgment; and we seek to avoid contradiction between these; and, when contradiction appears, to correct our estimate by a better understanding. In the long run, science has no other test of truth than the coherence of all his records of experience in a consistent system of interpretation. Perhaps the test of moral truth is similar—a system of moral judgments which covers the whole of life and which is free from internal contradiction.

However this may be, it is clear that we must not be allowed to contradict ourselves; and the further we can carry out any judgment to its issues in comparison with other and related judgments, and do so without contradiction, the more likely is that judgment to be true. The bare consistency of a judgment with itself is of no value. If I say, "this is right," and you say, "this is wrong," each of us may reaffirm his own position, and so far be self-consistent, and there is no solution of our difference. But if you are able to show that your judgment in this case fits harmoniously into a whole system of judgments, by which you can give a coherent moral

interpretation of things; and if I cannot do the same for my assertion, then your judgment has stood the test, and mine has not. This is the kind of coherence that we want; and it requires a wide outlook. To judge wisely we must make our outlook wide in two respects—in range and in duration. We must not limit ourselves to one bit or aspect of what appears: we must take account of its surroundings and of all its aspects. And we must not think of its present appearance or immediate effects only; we must follow it out into its remoter issues, in order to understand its true nature. A simple illustration will bring out my meaning. A hundred years ago—more or less—at the time of the rapid growth of the factory system, it was customary for manufacturers to hire children out of workhouses, and to set them to long hours of work in the factory, taking the whole responsibility of the care of these children, but housing them without any regard to decency, and allowing them to grow up without any moral or intellectual education or any care for their physical well-being. It is now a matter of common agreement that the conduct of these manufacturers was bad. The measure of that badness one hardly ventures to describe, their share in the business being so shocking to the moral sense of the present day. And yet, in other respects, the guilty manufacturers do not seem to have been any worse than other people, or than the manufacturers of to-day. They seem to have thought that their conduct could be defended, indeed that it was right. And it was possible for them to think so, because they took narrow views, and also short views of the facts. They had been told by the economists that in business a man's sole duty was to look after his own interests; and they had learned the lesson too well. They took narrow views of the facts. Could they have heard the cry of the children, or felt a tithe of their misery, or realized their degraded lives, they might possibly have acted as they did act, but they would not have been able so easily to convince themselves that all was for the best, or that their action was right. And they took short views. They did not realize that the arrested development of the children sapped the stamina of the race, and dried up the springs

of future industrial production. So closely are industrial factors connected with the physical and intellectual, moral, and social well-being of the people as a whole, that whatever affects the latter is certain in time to react upon the former. We shall find indeed that economic prosperity cannot be long divorced from moral and social well-being, and we are now becoming convinced that it will not survive physical degeneration or intellectual indolence. All are parts or aspects of a life, and to understand this life from any one point of view we must understand it as a whole. We shall have tested the validity of our judgments about the worth of any part of it when we are able to make a coherent system of judgments from which nothing which has worth is left out. But this test is not easy to apply; it can never be carried out completely. And we may be inclined to ask whether there is no other guide in morals.

(2) There is another method of easier application and of no little value, though not in the end independent of the former. And this is the appeal to the moral judgment of the good man. In matters intellectual we are guided more than we know by the opinion of experts, even although these experts have to form their opinion from material open to us all. So with morality. The moral views of the best men at any time can never be safely neglected and will nearly always prove a trustworthy guide. It may seem more difficult to recognize the experts in morality than it is to recognize the experts in science. But that is largely because there is a less marked separation there between experts and ordinary men. The opinion of the good man on a question of conduct appeals to the average man with a conviction and an intimacy which the opinion of the clever man on a question of science does not produce. The ordinary man is not much concerned with science; but he is very much concerned with conduct, and in the constant habit of appraising its worth. He is seldom mistaken in the men whom he calls good; and their view of the good, when it is made clear to him, usually awakens a response in his own conscience. There is, indeed, much greater uniformity in the moral inheritance of men at a given period—of which moral inheritance conscience is the repository—than

in the intellectual inheritance which is expressed in science. And as a consequence, the difficulties involved in the basis and method of ethics lead, less often than one might have expected, to conflicting estimates of good and evil.

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WOMEN AND DEMOCRACY.

"I come round to my old argument; if woman be allowed to have an immortal soul, she must have, as the employment of life, an understanding to improve."—MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT. "The Rights of Woman."

"We are women, Mr. Beamish, but we have souls."—GEORGE MEREDITH. "The Tale of Chloe."

When the idea of Democracy first took hold of the modern world, it brought with it to many minds the demand for the independence of woman. To many minds, but not to all, and this because the strongest arguments for that independence are bound up with the fundamental conceptions of the democratic ideal, and not with the secondary advantages of a democratic state, and there are always minds on whom the second have far more influence than the first. It is probably for a similar reason that the political enfranchisement of woman has made so little headway in Europe during the last century. For this has been a time of detailed work in legislation, rather than of far-reaching ideas.

In fact the supporters of democracy might well be divided into two classes: those who look to it merely as a barrier against oppression and idleness, and those who hold, over and above all this, that even an ideal despotism where there was no idleness and no oppression would in itself be inferior to an ideal democracy simply because it is better that every individual should direct himself rightly than be so directed by others. Those who grasp this ideal of self-government as more than mere good government hold democracy to be something more than a mere political system, as Maine thought it, and its goal

more than "la carrière ouverte aux talents," as Napoleon phrased it.

Further, this power of self-direction, being a good for man as man, they take as an ideal to be desired for all men alike.

This, of course, as has been pointed out again and again, is the true meaning of the demand for "equality:" it is not the ridiculous fancy that everyone has equal abilities, but the conviction that every one's self-development, whatever their abilities may be, is in itself to be taken as of equal importance. No one can have a special "right" to self-development and self-direction any more than to the enjoyment of pleasure or the exemption from pain. It is, of course, quite possible not to accept this conception of the absolute worth of each individual. It may be said, as Aristotle said, that merit alone confers a special claim to special privileges, that it is just in itself that those who have great abilities should receive great powers; or again, as Nietzsche seems to hold, that it is a better thing that there should be a few remarkable men than that the mass of mankind should be lifted a little higher than they could otherwise have been. But this is not the democratic conception. For democrats the justice of any such privileges is only a rightness of means, a necessary arrangement to stimulate the apathy of men's hearts or to put the tools where they can be used to the best advantage for all. The only justice that is an end in itself is the justice that allows no man to be slighted or superseded, the justice of the old utilitarian formula, "Everyone to count for one and no one for more than one," the justice of Kant's "Kingdom of Ends."

In the clash between individuals, inevitable in this imperfect world, one individual, it is true, may be sacrificed for many, but never for one alone. Where we seem to choose one before another, as in the case of shipwreck, we are really guided by a consideration of the effect that the abilities of each will have upon the world afterwards. If the two men stood alone in a material universe there could be no rational choice between them. Self-direction, then, like all other ultimate goods, like the rest of virtue and like happiness, must be shared, so far as

possible, between all men alike, and every man if he forgets this need of sharing is lacking in his duty.

But how far is it possible? Here, for practice, come the crucial questions that divide modern political thought. All men, plainly, are not capable of self-direction in the same degree; why, then, should we give them the same powers? No doubt it would be a desirable thing for everybody to develop a sense of beauty, but that is no reason why we should encourage every tyro to exhibit his daubs. But to this the democrat answers that life in a society is not, at any rate not in the modern world, a craft like painting, to be taken up or laid aside at the individual's discretion. It is, practically, forced upon us all. So complex and closely inwoven have social activities come to be that none of us can move a step without affecting the rest. In days when a household was really self-sufficing it might have been possible for a man, and a woman, to direct their own lives according to their private affections alone. But now to buy the simplest garment is to raise a hundred questions about employment and its conditions: to invest a pound is to do the same. Further, and this clinches the matter, the organization of this vast and intricate system is wofully defective. Did it all run smoothly, were injustice and oppression reduced to a minimum, it is conceivable there might be no pressure on the conscience of the average individual to take any part in public affairs. He might leave trade disputes, as he leaves now ordinary cases of policing, to be dealt with by competent experts. But such a state of things, if ever attainable, is certainly not ours. We are all caught in the one huge tangle, and must choose between being passive instruments of cruelty or struggling, however lamely, to make things better.

Here, of course, the opponent protests again that tangles are usually made worse, and not better, by lame struggles. But he forgets the alternative: he forgets that it is only by individuals shutting their eyes that they can believe nowadays that they have no responsibilities, that they can fancy they may, somehow, slip out of the social and political order, or rather at once stand aloof from its duties and take part in its privileges. The only possible justification for such *intransigence* in our

world is that we are practically incapable of action, that, like idiots, we cannot open the eyes of our mind, try as hard as we may. No doubt the details of political action must be settled by experts, but every broad question of right and wrong, touching as it does the lives of all individuals, must come up for settlement before them, on pain of stopping their growth. The line may be hard to draw, in fact many of the hardest problems in constructive statesmanship gather round it, but still the main principle is clear. It is no answer to say that the individuals will often decide wrongly; of course they will; the vital question is whether it is not worse for them to give up the attempt to decide at all and so be left like puppets to the opinion of others. Not like puppets, is the reply, but like children; and this may be a valid reply for certain stages of civilization. But here, in modern Europe, where the main outlines of every large question are discussed up and down the country, it is practically impossible for "the man in the street" not to form some opinion, right or wrong, upon them. The question is whether that opinion is to have a voice.

The eyes of the people, in short, are beginning to open. It may be doubtful what use they will make of their sight, but it is a serious matter to bid them shut again. For no faculty can grow except by use, and all use in this world must be paid for by mistakes. "Es irrt der Mensch, so lang' er strebt." If self-direction in the right way is the ideal, it can only be reached by blundering efforts in the wrong. There is sound political philosophy in Browning's view that man is set here

" . . . not to make, but grow,
Yet forced to try and make, else fail to grow."

These are the old principles of democracy; I have tried to restate them here, time-worn as they are, because the mere statement of them puts us in the right attitude for the question of women's enfranchisement.

The connection is essential, and yet it is constantly missed. The real convictions at the back of the demand for women's suffrage are just these: that women, like men, are bound to take part in modern life, that, like men, they are bound, if they

open their eyes, to realize that their action has social and political consequences, that they must choose between shutting their eyes again and trying to use them properly. It is not to remedy any especial abuse that the franchise, for instance, is most needed: it is to develop the characters of women. The important questions are not solely, or mainly, whether it will better or weaken their external position; whether it will affect legislation for good or ill; we have to ask as well what good it will do to their own natures.

And, from the democratic point of view, the final question is of supreme importance. To those who value individuality above all things, who would rather see individuals struggling along on their own feet than propped up by others, who would prefer them to realize that their actions had consequences and that they must use their own judgment, even if they choose the wrong consequence, and use the judgment foolishly—to thinkers of this temper, and they are the true democrats, the mere fact that women are not allowed officially to exercise that judgment and control that action is in itself a grave evil. Is it an inevitable evil? If so the dangers on the other side must be graver still. It is this that determines the attitude of such observers as they look at the main features of the actual situation. For instance, they may hold that the grant of the franchise would probably bring little external change; in some matters, as in the case of children and the sick, women's advice might be of special help; for certain abuses, such as drunkenness, increased attention might be roused; on the other hand they see the danger of a large apathetic electorate, capable of being roused at times by an eager canvass to take a line not calculable beforehand.

But they see also, and this for them turns the scale, the pressing need that women, like men, and more than men at present, should realize that in the modern world they must either be citizens or ciphers. They see the weight of a false education, heavy still in spite of a great advance, burdening our young women at the most malleable period of their existence. They are still taught, not in so many words, perhaps, but more insidiously, by the steady pressure of a social and political system, that their

business is simply to be attractive or domestic. At a time when we try to turn a boy's mind to an idea of public service, we encourage our girls to think of nothing but being as pleasant and looking as pretty as they can. We have the full spring-tides of nature to work with; and we turn the energy into a channel where it may flow most readily at first, but where it will never find full satisfaction. All who are not driven by the pressure of poverty we keep idling, waiting for husbands (the very way to check all spontaneity of feeling), "waltzing for their livelihood" as Byron told them. What natures could stand this sort of life and keep any genuine vigor? What intelligence is there that does not rust unused? And all educators of youth know how hard it is to rouse an active interest in work when participation in it is denied. They are met by the blank sense of the pupil that the path is closed, that time is better spent in turning where an opening is to be found.

But if we tell our girls, with the force of actual and definite demands behind us, that they are members of a great community, and not only of a home, that they must live as such members if they are to live as reasonable beings at all, then we may hope to see better things. Not at first, no doubt; advance, especially advance that depends on the development of nature, is always slow. But those who believe in progress at all, and there are few of us who do not, must recognize that one of its great factors is the growth in political training from generation to generation of one class and another. The class of sex can hardly be taken as an exception unless it is held that the feminine intelligence is so low that it cannot advance at all, or at least that it cannot advance except at the cost of personal attractiveness and to the prejudice of work in the home. This fear is certainly felt by many who look with alarm at any increase in sturdy independence and with consternation at a disinclination to marry. And there can be no doubt that the opening of other careers to women and other interests does limit the desire for marriage: women are less likely to marry now, as so many of them have done in the past, for the sake of some definite work in life: more and more the best of them will only marry for love.

This is matter of most serious concern to those theoretic reformers, who, like Mr. Bernard Shaw, try to persuade themselves that men can be bred as cattle are bred, that the advance of the race demands the disregard of the individual's affections as mere romantic irrelevancies. But there are others who are not ashamed to take the "romantic" view: they are prepared to turn the tables on those who appeal to the "life-force" and "Nature's laws" by pointing out that Nature herself has linked the impulse to propagate the race to the most intense personal affection: she could scarcely have given a clearer sign that the advance of the race is to come through the advance of the individual. Those, therefore, who believe in the value of individual affection between men and women will think they have ground for their refusal to purchase any apparent advance by its sacrifice. On the contrary they will be glad to see its claim acknowledged more and more and its standard raised higher and higher even at the cost of long delay, privation, and waste. Of all the possible gains that the modern world has attained above the ancient they hold the gain of love among the few the value of which is not doubtful.

Again those who believe with Clough that human beauty and grace are grounded in utility and reason will be little disturbed at the disappearance of the refinement that comes from doing nothing if they can hope for the refinement born of doing things well. They will look with a tolerant eye on the slight roughnesses that come with every change and every advance, in the art of life as in the other arts, especially if the advance is from the dapper and the trim to the free and unconfined. Far from wishing to see women turned into men they believe that the full differentiation of the sexes can only be reached if each sex thinks for itself; they believe, in short, that it is only conscious intelligence that can understand the hints of Nature and complete her work. Are this belief and this hope justified? It is only experiment, after all, that can give the answer. "Not argument but effort shall decide." And it will be a long experiment, made, doubtless, with many blunders and much waste. The great problem for modern industry in general, the problem how to insist on work and yet prevent overworking, is

perhaps greatest of all in the case of women. And no one would have the heart, or the audacity, to undertake the experiment at all without a reasonable vision of the prize to be gained. It is here that incalculable service has been done by the great imaginative writers of our day who have conceived such a type of woman.

Among these George Meredith stands chief; others have contributed hints, but he has formed living figures of women who, brimful as they are of the charm of sex, learn to stand on their own ground, to think for themselves, to possess a "slender unbendingness that is their own."

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THE STATE ABSORBING THE FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH.

The ancient State, whether Greek, Roman, or Oriental, always included religion within itself; the triumph of Christianity was accompanied by divorce between church and State, owing to the fact that Christianity declined to be a national religion, declaring its mission to be to all men, of whatever race or allegiance, and that the State then dominant over the whole historical world was so utterly hostile to the principles of the new religion that no alliance was conceivable; the only possible relation between the two was enmity and mutual opposition.

The legalization of Christianity under Constantine was an external and political union; the church still carried on its peculiar work with its own resources and in its own way. The papal ambition for temporal power, and the interminable struggle between church and national governments mark the abnormal and transitory order of things. Moreover, from now on, owing to the example of Christianity in claiming universal allegiance, and the evident right of any true religion to claim such allegiance, no new cult could refrain from making the same pretensions; and within Christianity itself, every dogma and sect was bound to assert its exclusive right to

credence and homage. Thus was the possibility of union between the State, to which all men owed equal allegiance, and the church, within which men differed and disputed, rendered indefinitely remote. Protestantism is the great manifestation of this idea, and disestablishment—the abolition of even the shadow of union between church and State—has always been one of the conspicuous results of Protestantism.

There seems as little hope of a union between the actual church and the actual State now as at any time in history; the whole external trend of events is in the opposite direction: France is the most striking example; Spain and even Italy seem to be preparing to follow; England is showing a similar tendency in the bitter opposition to anything like church domination of the public schools. Does this mean that the actual gulf between political and religious life is deepening, and that the old synthesis of Greece and the Orient is never to return? In other words, is humanity never again to unite in one organ all the essential and universal processes of its community life? The external movements seem to point in this direction; and doubtless he would be a rash prophet who would pronounce dogmatically on a question so shrouded in perplexing and even inscrutable conditions. There seem to us, however, to be some powerful considerations on the other side, and to these we wish to call attention, and to suggest a conceivable outcome.

First, there is in the thought of the day a marked change from the former bitter and relentless strife between minds of different religious opinion; sects of Christians live in a new peace and amity; the former stress upon disagreements has almost passed away. This fact is so patent as not to need any exposition, but is so widespread and deep-rooted, and so pertinent to our present theme, that it cannot be too strongly emphasized. Moreover, Christianity has made remarkable overtures of peace to other faiths, as the Congresses of Religions and Liberal Religious Leagues, and other similar organizations testify. Missionaries go with quite another attitude to-day from that taken by the emissaries of the cross of previous generations; the leaders of the denominations advocate

building upon the foundation laid by the native cult. In the whole world of religious thought and action there is a conspicuous and remarkable *rapprochement*, as every one must perceive who watches the signs of the times. What does this mean? Is it possible that a day is approaching when the civilized world will attain practical unity in religious faith? And how would such a condition affect the relation of church and State?

Secondly, and we surmise, more significant still, the modern State has for some generations been taking upon itself functions which in all earlier periods of the Christian era were performed by the church. Four of these functions may easily be distinguished. The first is that of *education*, by all ancient thinkers considered the duty and prerogative of the State, but through all the earlier part of the Christian era assumed and later jealously vindicated by the Church. America, it is true, knows little of the control of the church in education, owing to the late origin and peculiar sources of our national life and spirit. When the Declaration of Independence was signed the rise of the modern State had already begun. The American Revolution and the founding of the new nation were deeply infected by the religious as well as the political free-thought of the French Revolution. But the authority of the church over all education is as familiar and essential in European history as it is foreign to ours. The Catholic Church still maintains the principle that dominated all medieval and early modern education, namely that all control belongs to the church; the State may, and no doubt should, contribute to the support of schools, but has no right to dictate a single point of policy or practice. Catechetical schools, cloister and cathedral schools, in all their types and variations, exemplify church control and church support; even the palace schools of medieval times, though maintained by the temporal sovereign, were planned and conducted by clericals. There is here neither space nor necessity for longer discussion of this fact: it is one of the prime differences between ancient and medieval educational systems and theories; it penetrates all the forms and methods of education, dominating

aim, instrumentalities, and results. It had its all-sufficient reason for being and is not to be denounced, but rather to be reflected upon as a significant concrete phase of the evolution of education and an instructive sign of the trend of that world movement.

The daybreak of modern life and thought saw the faint beginnings of a new idea—or rather the renewed and enriched form of the ancient idea—that education is a universal interest and hence is the duty and prerogative of the whole people as such, namely, the State. The outlines of this development are familiar to every student of education. Prussia created the first actual State system, under the leadership of Frederick William I and his successors. Perhaps the National School law (*Generallandschulreglement*) of Frederick the Great, issued in 1763, may be considered the *magna charta* of the State school system. From this time on the control and support of schools has been continuously and inevitably passing out of the hands of the church into those of the temporal power; the whole history of education in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is characterized by events which are landmarks of progress in this direction. Never before have these events been so numerous and striking as in the last half century. England has gradually shifted the weight of public education from church to State, and is now in the throes of a final completion of the task; France has driven out the congregations and even abolished religious lessons in the schools, putting in its place moral and *civic* instruction. Italy and Spain are giving unmistakable signs of following in the same path. Speaking generally, until two hundred years ago the church built and maintained schools, trained and authorized teachers, planned courses of study; to-day the State does all these things as its manifest duty and prerogative, and even asserts its right to dictate to schools supported by the church.

Public opinion has changed in the same direction: to-day the Protestant world is practically unanimous in declaring for State education, and the ranks of the Catholics, under the standard of church control, are suffering constant and increasing defections. In the very strongholds of the Catholic Church

the Catholics themselves are demanding the establishment of schools both supported and controlled by the temporal power.

In the province of higher education the movement is no less marked, though naturally somewhat later in its stages. In this respect America is perhaps the most striking instance: the denominational academy and college are notoriously yielding place to the public high school, to the non-sectarian college, and finally to the State university, which is for us the ripest and most conspicuous manifestation of the general movement from religious to State control.

Still another relevant fact is that the teacher is no longer clergyman or church functionary, but layman and State officer, a change which took place so early in our own history as almost to escape notice, but which is yet incomplete in England and Germany, as well as in other European lands.

The facts here suggested in bare outline constitute one of the most important movements in the history of education since the Dark Ages, and present a transformation of mighty influence and deep significance. The process has often been accompanied by strife and passion; it has run close to the middle of the stream of intellectual evolution—in the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, and in modern times in the renovation of nations, particularly of Germany after Jena and of France after Sedan. It figures largely in the present affairs of England, France, and Germany. As for ourselves, we may well question our complacence when we take reasonable account of two great facts: the situation and views of our Catholic fellow-citizens, and the decadent state of religious life and culture.

It seems clear, then, that the transfer of the task of education from church to State is already far advanced, and is for the present at least moving swiftly toward completion.

The State moreover has now assumed a responsibility in the advancement of knowledge, which the church has at times largely borne. But the activity of the church in this field was never very much in earnest; it lay rather in the preservation and transmission of learning than in the discovery of new truth; being indeed in some sense an accidental activity, due

to the fact that for some centuries the church was the only possible dwelling-place and refuge for men who loved knowledge for its own sake.

The second great function of the church which is passing to the State is *charity*, meaning thereby all forms of material relief for poverty and destitution. The ancient world knew practically nothing of this activity, but was wont to abandon the weak and defective of all sorts to the destruction which untrammelled nature visited upon them. Christianity ushered in a new era, and the church was the universal dispenser of aid to the needy. Most conspicuous was the charitable work of the monasteries, into whose coffers—in the days of their prime—poured a golden flood from many sources; to their doors came the weak, the sick, the impoverished, and received food, clothing, and when necessary shelter and nursing.

In more recent times the church organized and systematized its charity in the forms of hospitals, almshouses, asylums, refuges of all sorts, which were maintained by religious funds. Closely akin to this work is the great labor performed by the church for the education of the poor, which we have already implied in the foregoing discussion of education.

The church has by no means abandoned its charitable work, and the world cannot afford to have it do so; its works of relief still meet a need which no other agency satisfies. But it is long since the State began to engage in the work of charity, and the total of its activity in the field already far surpasses all the work of the church. To trace the development of the relief work of the modern State would require the expert knowledge of a student of economics and political science, and would fill many pages; but the most familiar elements of the present condition are full of significance and will serve our purpose. In place of the doles from the monastery gate we find the municipal agencies for relieving the destitute. The ecclesiastical almshouse has given place to the poorhouse or farm. It is a striking commentary on the new condition that the very police station has become one of the regular channels of State relief.

It cannot be denied that hitherto the spirit of State charity

has been very different from that of the charity of the church. The nameless horror felt by the more worthy poor at the idea of becoming dependent upon municipal relief indicates the harsh and forbidding impression too often produced by this new activity of the civil power. But this does not affect our present theme, and better days are already with us; the State is gaining tact and sympathy in its charitable work; the alliance and coöperation between civil authorities and various voluntary philanthropic bodies, especially the Associated Charities, indicates the trend of progress and will hasten the advance.

The contrast between present and past is nowhere more clearly manifested than in the care bestowed by the modern State upon the distinctly defective classes—the blind, the deaf, and the feeble-minded. What did the civil power in Greece and Rome do for these stepchildren of nature, to say nothing of those more deeply wronged by her, the insane? The grave doubts rising in the minds of thoughtful men in these days as to the wisdom and ultimate social benefit of some of the State's measures of aid and relief, does not affect the significance of the work for our discussion; it is not objective value and wisdom that concern us, but motive and aim. What the church, with its limited resources and authority, strove feebly to do for the defectives, the modern State does with abundant forces, and, we trust, with increasing wisdom and perception.

The third function of the church which is manifestly being assumed by the State is not so clearly defined as the first two, but may be denoted in general as the *defense of the weak against the strong*, whether the strong in question be the hand of the ruler or the law, or simply any unauthorized tyrannical power. The most conspicuous example of this function as discharged by the ancient church was the right of sanctuary, a bungling method indeed, as likely to shield the villain against merited punishment as to rescue persecuted innocence, yet always a protection of one who was for the moment weak against a stronger foe. It was a beneficent institution in those days of violence and uncertain legal justice, often preventing irrevocable injustice, and still oftener securing the delay without

which calm adjudication is impossible. Other manifestations of the mitigating and mediating function of the church are not lacking, which though less formal and striking than the institution of sanctuary, are no less indicative of the place the church held.

The modern State has assumed this function completely. No human being within its pale is too poor or too insignificant, nay, or too guilty, to receive from it protection of property and person. To the innocent and too often to the guilty the detention prison and the court of justice prove a more effective and far more available sanctuary than did the altar steps of the Middle Ages. The accused or suspected person is jealously guarded against violence, and is granted a speedy and impartial trial; indeed we can hardly say impartial in the case of English and American judicial procedure, for the accused has every possible advantage: the benefit of the doubt, exemption from testifying to his own hurt, the right to counsel whether he can pay for the service or not, and a right of appeal, which, to say the least, is all that could be asked. Thus has the civil power assumed and enlarged the function of the church in vindicating the weak against the oppression of the strong, even where the strong in question is the punitive authority of the State itself.

Much more might be cited here: laws regulating the hours and conditions of labor, the liability of employers, the guardianship of minors, and other similar activities. In addition to all this, we note that in a certain sense the mantle of St. Francis, beloved of the birds, has fallen upon the modern civil power, with its humane officers and numberless enactments in behalf of the sub-human creatures!

Finally, we come to what we take to be the very central function of the church—the *care of men's characters and lives*. Even here there are signs that the State is engaging in the same work. The church indeed aims largely at the future life; this the State cannot do, but must confine its attention to the life here and now; yet within this limit the State is unmistakably concerning itself with the characters and destinies of its individual members. Its *educational activity* is partly devoted

to this end; and the great interest shown in the introduction of moral instruction in State school systems indicates a movement in this regard. The modern State has also undertaken the *reformation* of criminal or otherwise defective moral natures—a work in earlier times entirely entrusted to the church. One very recent example of this—lying close to the educational field—is the juvenile court, with its renunciation of the old punitive motive and adoption of the ideal of redemption. The whole conception and method of these courts suggests the religious spirit and almost startles us with its indication of the spiritualizing of the civil power.

Closely allied to this are the new methods of treating condemned persons by the indeterminate sentence and the parole, in which again, the idea of social vengeance is superseded by that of social care and the desire to reform and re-instate.

The assumption of this function by the State is doubtless in its first stages, and naturally so, for it is far easier for the State to assume such external duties as education, charity, and the defense of the weak, than for it to gain the inspiration and sensitive tact necessary for this last task. But the enthusiasm which has greeted the juvenile court and the more humane methods of correction augurs well.

So much by way of a hasty and partial survey of functions of the church now in process of transfer to the State. A remarkable fact concerning these transferred functions is that the spirit of all of them is *love*. The State has always embodied power, and the idea of the State is defined largely by its exercise of force; the church has always embodied love, and has only falsified its own nature when it has sought to exert forcible authority. The ancient State knew nothing of love except selfish care of its own ruling members; religion, and preëminently the Christian Church, have propagated the new ideal. But when the State performs the labors of love, what can be the explanation except that the State is receiving an endowment of the spirit of love, or, to put the matter less figuratively, that men are now finding in the State an organ for the expression of the philanthropic love which they formerly expressed through the church? The fact seems un-

deniable, and is worthy of the most serious attention. The modern State is completely distinguished from the medieval and the ancient State by works of love, and therefore it necessarily must be credited with the spirit of love. It seems equally certain that the process of transformation is going rapidly forward. Consider the gulf between opinion and practice in the days of "Manchester Liberalism" and in these days in which we live—the change is nothing short of a revolution.

If the past and the present are such as our survey indicates, what of the future? If we could dare simply to extend the line of actual movement into the years to come, we might say, the State will in time become fully inspired by the motive of love, and long-suffering mankind will then for the first time rejoice under a rule both potent and benignant. To complete the dream we need only add the realization of the "federation of the world and the parliament of man." What were such a State save the realization of the yearnings of all high souls, the Kingdom of God upon earth? Such an outcome would be the justification of the process which split civil and religious functions asunder at the advent of Christianity, and showed the world such a dramatic, too often tragic, parallel existence of the two powers; for we should see that only through this process could the two elements of power and love be finally united in one body, the new church-state.

The great argument against the spiritualization of the State is the obstinate and obtrusive fact of the hardness and materialism still deep-rooted in the nature and conduct of States, most conspicuously manifested in the horrible phenomenon of war. It cannot be denied that the waging of war is a breach of the State's love for its own members as well as for the race. Over against this must be set the great movement for peace which is one of the most characteristic achievements of our own day, with its astonishing success in replacing war by arbitration, a success which has paled the hopes of its adherents and made foolish the scepticism and scorn of the reactionaries.

Of deep significance is the decay of ecclesiastical dogma and observances in all civilized lands, a fact declared most loudly by

the friends of the church. Germany, France, England, and our own country, as well as less important lands, report the same general condition. The world cannot exist without the love of which the church has been the bearer. If the decadence of the present ecclesiastical institution is to continue, then must some other form, possessing strength and proportions adequate to so great a task, take its place. What form so natural and appropriate as the State?

A sign of the trend of world thought may be seen in the spread of socialistic ideas. Socialism is nothing more than a dream of a political system endowed with all the power of the historic State and all the love of the historic church, and hence we need not wonder at the boundless enthusiasm with which men have embraced and served the socialist ideal. By the spread of socialistic ideas we do not mean simply the growth of socialist parties, a striking phenomenon in itself, but the permeation of all political and social science and thought with elements of socialism. To-day conservative and academic circles approve with untroubled hearts doctrines which would have horrified our grandfathers.

Universal education would be an essential part of the realization of such an ideal as we have suggested, not indeed such predominantly intellectual and technical schooling as now prevails in civilized lands, but a richer training, cultivating the feelings and the social will, such as the inspired teachers of all times have proclaimed. The church has been the organ through which labored the comparatively few whose hearts were touched with the fire of divine love for mankind. Should there come a time when all normal men and women will possess this birthright of the human soul—love for the race—is it not more reasonable to suppose they would exercise that love through the body politic, to which all belong by birth and dwelling than through a body they must *join*? The State is the form through which individuals express activities which all share in common; the church has always been a medium through which the few expressed an activity which marked them as peculiar and distinct.

The ideas expressed in this article are in no wise hostile

to the church as it exists, and certainly not to the church as it has existed and wrought. The church was the organ and exponent of love for centuries, while the State embodied only force and oppression of the weak by the strong. The church fed the hungry and clothed the naked and nursed the sick, when the State had nothing but contempt or neglect for them. The church built schools and provided teachers for the poor, as well as the rich, when the State had forgotten even what the ancient State knew and practiced as its educational duty. The church, as the corporate form of Christianity, has bestowed upon the modern State all that is best and finest in its spirit and activity. No changes which the future may bring can dim the brightness of these services.

The spirit that is working in the world and whose record is the history of man, never comes to destroy, but always to fulfil; not one jot or tittle of the true message and significance of the church shall pass away till all be fulfilled. But there is also a law that one form must increase and the other decrease. If the State should ever, in the course of ages or centuries, undertake all the labors of love which hitherto have been chiefly performed by the church, the Divine will not have vanished nor been diminished, but will only have clothed itself with a new and more adequate form.

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STUDENT SELF-GOVERNMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Among many students and at many institutions of learning an unfortunate misconception of college spirit has long prevailed. Too much stress has been laid upon the outward things: some students, if their conduct be a true criterion, would apparently conceive of college spirit as consisting in the disorderly rush and a general spirit of boisterousness on public occasions, in the inconsiderate hazing of fellow-students,

or the ill-advised pilfering of the tableware of fashionable cafés; other students of a more responsible character would be inclined to denominate as college spirit the yell and the song and the general enthusiasm that goes with the football game or the field day. But if you were to approach the man of saner mind and healthier judgment—the man who leads the way in student activities, and whose word is as the voice of one having authority in the councils of his fellows—if you were to approach this type of the college man, and ask him candidly what college spirit is, he would hardly be inclined to accept the first or the second view just mentioned: he would probably regard the rush and all else akin thereto as a form of college barbarism, and while he would no doubt assign to the college yell a very high and worthy place in student life, it would not be as college spirit itself, but rather as a healthy expression thereof. Then he would put into two words his own conception of college spirit as *unselfish service*—unselfish service to his alma mater, the doing of everything in his power to advance her welfare, and the leaving undone all those things, however innocent in and of themselves, that would mar her good name. The leaders, if not the general student body, in our higher institutions of learning to-day, are coming to feel that in their keeping is the honor of the university, and that the charge is too sacred a one to be lightly exposed to danger. At the University of California, recent years have witnessed a remarkable growth in this sense of responsibility on the part of the students. They have participated in a rush, perhaps of the harmless order; and the next day have seen it proclaimed in headlines throughout the land as "a riot at the university." The experience has been painful but not fruitless. Out of it all there has come a finer love for the university, and a truer devotion to her interests; the inner meaning of college spirit has laid hold upon the minds and hearts of the student body as never before. The natural result has followed: there has been a steady and persistent advance in student self-control; and in the wake of student self-control has followed almost inevitably a large measure of student self-government. The members of the faculty are not really anxious to exercise a

domineering sway over the students; it is not pleasant to play the part of the policeman; the duty is one imposed perforce upon the instructor by the wilfulness or thoughtlessness of the student. Once the students themselves give evidence of an honest desire to serve the highest interests of the college, and of the capacity to give effect to the desire, the faculty is ready enough to retire and leave the field of government largely in the hands of the students.

This is in broad terms what has taken place of late at the University of California. It may not be amiss now to explain the process in more detail. Just how has it come about? Naturally the first condition of a successful student self-government, as of any government in which large numbers have a share, is the creation of an effective public opinion. This has been no easy task at Berkeley. The absence of a dormitory system and the widely scattered homes of the students have been formidable obstacles. The lodging houses and fraternities are distributed throughout the length and breadth of Berkeley; and a considerable number of the students live in the neighboring cities of Oakland and Alameda, or even across the bay in San Francisco. Various agencies, however, have combined to offset this and other serious obstacles, and to build up an effective student public opinion.

And first among these agencies I would mention the honor societies, notably the senior honor society. Its chief motive for being is the encouragement of unselfish service to the university. This ideal of service is the very soul of the organization, the source of its power and energy, the splendid purpose which stimulates the members to press on in their high calling. The power of the organization for good is indicated in part by the kind of men who make up its membership—men of different ages and different walks in life, yet all of one mind in their common love for the university. Members are of three classes: senior students who have shown signally their desire to serve the university unselfishly and have met with some measure of success therein; alumni whose interest in their alma mater has continued beyond the day of graduation, and who are always willing to do for her what they may;

and members of the faculty whose field of service to the university is not confined within the walls of the class room, but who welcome every further opportunity to minister to her welfare, and who are above all in cordial sympathy and close touch with the lives of the students. It will be readily conceded that this combination of what may be called the service-loving members of the student body, the alumni, and the faculty, has within it the possibility of great good to the university. The society has given and is now giving splendid impetus to the up-building of a sane and sensible student public opinion. Its student members, stimulated by conference one with another, and guided in part by the counsel of their elder brothers, serve as a nucleus around which the wider and more comprehensive student public opinion may grow and gather strength. The meetings take the form of dinners held twice monthly. And what a goodly company it is that gathers about the board! From the alumni come two or three superior judges, a leading lawyer and doctor from San Francisco, a journalist, and a group of young business men; and from the faculty there come the professors of English and history, and mathematics and zoölogy, all of them eager to know "their boys" better; and among the student representatives are numbered the football and the baseball captain, an athlete or two from the track, the leading debaters, and the editors of the college journals. When the repast is over and the chairs pushed back and the cigars lighted, there is free and earnest discussion of college problems. Everyone says what he honestly thinks. All questions are attacked in the spirit of men searching for the truth. And when the truth has been found it is gladly accepted, and there is an understanding, which becomes the public opinion of the senior members, and is carried by them to their fellows in the university. It is all done quietly and unostentatiously. The men leave the meetings increased in the wisdom that follows an honest search for the truth; and as they go in and out among their fellows in the daily round of student life, they are as leaven in the lump—a wise public opinion is gathering headway.

The fact that there is but one senior honor society is a great

boon to the university. The existence of two or more such organizations is conceded to be an affliction in some eastern colleges. The one society is immeasurably more useful than two or three, whose influence for good is materially hampered by their unfortunate rivalry. It must be stated, however, that there is a junior honor society and other bodies, with whom there is no natural call to rivalry, whose efforts are directed to the accomplishment of the same good end sought by the senior order.

It is then with this little company of devoted undergraduates in the honor societies that a sane and effective student public opinion has its beginning. Thence the movement extends to the whole class. In this larger group, a public opinion becomes a possibility largely through the operation of the system called senior control; which means simply that the men of the senior class feel peculiarly responsible for the right conduct of all the student activities in which the undergraduate body participates, especially for guarding against anything that would be detrimental to the university. The senior class thus acts in a sense as a brake against the hasty and oftentimes irresponsible actions of the lower classes. The system came into vogue two or three years ago by the mutual consent of the classes. The freshmen were somewhat hesitant about it at first; but when they became convinced that the seniors were not seeking to assume a domineering attitude, they readily gave their sanction to the movement. Precedent seems now to have made senior control a permanency. That they may act wisely and effectively, the seniors feel the need of arriving at a reasonable uniformity of judgment on current questions. This end they have accomplished through the institution of what is known as "senior singing." It provides for a weekly assemblage at which all senior men and only senior men are welcome. At the first meeting of the semester, a leader of senior singing is elected, who is able to start the college songs and preside informally. Between songs the men take up for careful consideration various student problems, and after free discussion usually arrive at an understanding, and agree upon a course of action to be followed consistently. For a long

time the meetings were held at a place dear through long association to all college men—the steps of old North Hall. But the gatherings here were naturally subject to frequent interruption during the winter season. The success of the senior singings has, therefore, been vastly increased since the recent erection of Senior Hall, a building reserved exclusively for the men of the graduating class.

This hall is a structure erected entirely of redwood logs, and equipped with furniture in keeping. There is a large loafing and meeting room where the daily papers and the current magazines are always available. At one end is a huge fireplace, piled high with logs in winter time, which adds greatly to the comfort of the room as a place of assemblage and recreation, where the men can read and talk and experience the joys of good fellowship. The men of the graduating class have here opportunity to know one another, the first step in the development of a student opinion. Senior singings, as I have said, are now regularly held in the hall with a very gratifying increase in the attendance and general interest. Shortly after the completion of the structure the plan was inaugurated of holding a senior dance once a month in place of the singing. On the last such occasion the President of the University, the Dean of the College of Mining, and several other leading members of the faculty were present, and participated with the students in the discussion of moot questions. The seniors have responded in large numbers to the call of their president to make these monthly dinners a standing engagement. Through the combined agency then of the senior singings, the special monthly dinners, and the informal gatherings of the men in groups during all hours of the day in Senior Hall, the senior men have cultivated an advanced public opinion, and have been able to act as leaders to the other classes.

What the honor societies and the senior meetings have done for the development of public opinion in smaller circles, the student mass meeting has done for the undergraduate body at large. The name is sufficiently descriptive—it is a meeting called by the president of the associated students, open to

all men in the university, held in the largest auditorium on the campus, and largely attended. Here matters of student procedure and policy are freely discussed from the floor by any students who choose to speak. Certain moot questions are first taken up, and men who have carefully gone over the ground in advance, lead in a thorough discussion of the topic. Afterward everyone is invited to speak as he is moved; the response is generally very gratifying. It may not be amiss to refer briefly to some of the topics taken up at the last meeting. The question of a student hour was one. The experience of the students in endeavoring to arrange class meetings had shown that there was practically not a single hour of the week, with the exception of Saturday afternoon, that was not occupied by university exercises of some character. After extended discussion it was declared the sense of the student body that there should be once a week, at least, a student hour free of all lectures and recitations. This action has been reported to the President of the University and the faculty schedule committee; and there is now every reason to believe that before long a student hour will be granted. At this same meeting the question of the justice of a recent suspension of a student was taken up. The suspension had been recommended by a student committee (of which more is to be said later) to the President of the University. A petition had later been circulated urging that the sentence be recalled and the student be readmitted to college on the ground that his offense had not been serious enough to warrant suspension. The chairman of the student committee was asked to explain the grounds on which the suspension had been recommended. This he did; and speakers from the floor made careful presentation of the other side of the case. After the whole situation had been canvassed, the consensus of opinion was clearly in favor of endorsing the action of the committee.

A remarkably interesting incident occurred just at the close of the meeting. A student in the audience took the floor and said that a dispute during the day over respective rights had led to a fistic encounter between a freshman and a sophomore. The affair had not been especially serious, but he under-

stood that the college daily was preparing to publish an account of it in the morning; the outside press in the vicinity would take up and exaggerate the incident, he felt sure, and eventually it would go all over the State proclaimed in headlines as "a riot at the university." That was what had happened in similar cases in the past, he said; it would happen in this case. He therefore moved that the editor of the college daily, who was in the audience, be instructed to "strike the story out, even if he had to leave a whole column blank"—it was then 10.30 P. M. The response to this appeal was good to behold; a dozen men were on their feet at once demanding that it was the plain duty of the students to see to it that the harmful "story" was suppressed. And the editor so promised before he left the hall.

This great gathering of students was, I firmly believe, one of the most eventful meetings in the history of the university. As expressive of the faith which the students have in the institution, let me quote a recent editorial utterance of the college daily paper: "During one of the most critical periods of last term the president of the student body called a men's mass meeting in Harmon Gymnasium that did more to give the student body unity of interests than any rally California ever held. The fellows began at that time to realize that student opinion might become something leading to tangible results. Some of the problems that confronted us at that time were settled effectively as a result of the meeting. . . ." The cases that have been cited above are illustrative of some of the problems that were thus effectively settled. They indicate further how well the mass meeting is helping to form an effective student public opinion. It is the youngest of the three agencies mentioned which are serving this good end. The movement starts among a few leaders gathered in the honor societies, spreads then to the graduating class through the senior singings and the instrumentality of Senior Hall, and finally reaches the whole male student body in the mass meeting. President Wheeler in his last biennial report expresses it as his conviction that the conjunction of Senior Hall and the student mass meeting are "likely to solve the problem of how to create

a public opinion among the students, even better than could the much commended dormitory."

To sum up the situation briefly, it may be said with assurance, I think, that a real and effective public opinion has been steadily forming in the student mind. It is a public opinion that promises well for the future good of the university. The students generally are seeing things in their right perspective; there has been steadily opening before them a vision of the fuller and truer meaning of college spirit; and they have happily come to measure contemplated actions by their probable effect for good or for ill on the university. Not that we do not still have an occasional outbreak; not that the students do not now and then in a moment of haste yield to the old instincts and pay homage to the god of the old-time college spirit; but certainly the leaders, if not the general student body, have come to a realization of what things are worth while, and have voluntarily annulled many of the old traditions of disorder. First the old Bourdon celebration—an annual burning in effigy of the author of a despised text-book, which regularly ended in a general class rush and a disorderly outbreak—was done away with. Soon after, the Charter Hill rush was likewise ended. It had long been a regular custom on the eve of Charter day (March 23) for the freshmen to chalk their class numerals on a large scale upon the hillside, west of the campus. It was the joy of the sophomore to stop this proceeding. The inevitable result was a clash on the hills. Perhaps it was not very harmful in the old days. But when the classes came to number several hundred each, the meeting on the hillside was apt to be not altogether gentle, and injuries of a serious character to life and limb were likely to be the outcome. The faculty tried to end the rush. In a measure they succeeded; they at least reduced the numbers of those participating. But somehow the more daring spirits found that the playing of electric lights on the hillside and the prospect of collision with the faculty as well as the opposing class added a keener relish to the evening's entertainment. It was an achievement of a rare order to come out of an adventure like that with a whole skin. So it was only when the students them-

selves resolved that the rush should stop that it did stop. Men who found a peculiar joy in daring the faculty, were not willing to face an enraged student public opinion. The freshmen and sophomores called separate meetings and, guided by the counsel of the upper classmen, agreed to join in the work of erecting on Charter Hill instead of their class numerals a large cement "C" standing for California. In that task they spent Charter Day. All morning from the streets of Berkeley you might have seen a goodly company of men plodding up and down the hillside carrying cement to their fellows who were shaping the "C" on the summit. It rained all day too; but the men did not mind that; there is a certain inspiration in doing something worth while, against which the elements cannot prevail. Then the emblem was painted gold—California's color. On the eve of the last intercollegiate football game it was illuminated with electric lights; and in the darkness of the night, with the hillsides invisible, it appeared an immense "C" suspended in the heavens, a symbol of the peace restored between the classes and of a truer devotion to the college. So ended the Charter Hill rush. So have ended many of the old traditions of disorder.

I shall mention one more incident as evidence of the presence and effectiveness of a student public opinion at the University of California. In the spring of 1903 there was a track rally. At its close large numbers of students under the influence of an over-exuberant enthusiasm for victory, invaded the town of Berkeley and boarded the local train. One thing led to another. Hardly knowing what they did, the students took full possession of the train and a thoroughly disreputable disturbance resulted, though the press report of a "train wreck" was of course an absurd exaggeration. But the very next morning—and this is the point I desire to emphasize—the students themselves, before the faculty could take any action, had called a meeting and had there by common consent admitted that the action of the preceding evening was wrong. There was no disposition to assume an independent or indifferent attitude, or to shirk the responsibility. One speaker tried to shift the blame to the freshman class and a dozen men were

on their feet in an instant protesting and insisting that "we are all responsible for this misconduct; we should all share the results for better or for worse." Resolutions were adopted deplored the occurrence of the evening before, and steps were taken for raising subscriptions to pay the railroad company in full for the damage. I do not know of a better example of an alert student public opinion of a right order, spontaneously expressed, and effective in bringing about immediate action.

It would appear from what has been said thus far that the progress of student public opinion has resulted in a very gratifying development of student self-control, and has thereby prepared the way for a considerable measure of student self-government. It now remains to explain more definitely the working of this student self-government. Some reference has already been made to the system of senior control. It implies a responsibility on the part of the men of the senior class for the maintenance of good order in the university. The seniors, with their larger measure of experience and their maturer judgment, are regarded as the natural leaders. It is their right, or rather their duty, to use their personal influence for the suppression of disorders of any kind liable to occur on the occasion of class meetings, elections, or other student events. If the trouble be in the nature of a rush, for instance, they warn the underclassmen to desist, and if warning be insufficient, they sometimes take occasion to remove the offenders forcibly. It is generally considered best, however, to avoid anything like a resort to violence; particularly flagrant offenders are brought to justice through another channel; they are haled before the Undergraduate Students' Affairs Committee. This committee has its being under the sanction of an organization representative of the student body as a whole—the Associated Students of the University of California. Its members, five in number, and all seniors, are appointed annually by the president of the Associated Students. The aim is to select representative men of ability, good sense, and soundness of judgment, who can be counted on to render impartial judgment on questions that concern their fellow-students. This year, for example, the committee consisted of the editor of the students' weekly maga-

zine, the president of the graduating class, two seniors of wide experience and proved ability in committee work, and the president of the Associated Students, acting ex-officio as chairman. It is the function of this committee to summon before it students accused of an infraction of well-recognized rules of the university; to examine them thoroughly, to hear their own statement of the case, and to compare it with what other witnesses have to say, to collect and carefully weigh all other evidence pertinent to the case, and finally to make recommendations based thereon to the President of the University. It is singular testimony to the wisdom and good sense characterizing these recommendations thus far that every one of them has been received with favor and acted upon promptly by the university authorities. The first noteworthy case was that of a man who had for some time been systematically pilfering from the lockers of the students in one of the college buildings; at last an unusually large theft led to careful investigations and the culprit was detected. He was immediately summoned before the Undergraduate Students' Affairs Committee. The evidence against him was presented and he confessed. The committee recommended that he be expelled and presented the reasons therefor to the authorities, who promptly dismissed the offender. A case of equal interest occurred last semester. The offense was a particularly flagrant one connected with rushing. The following recommendations of the Students' Committee, as submitted to the President of the University, are explanatory of the incident: "That Mr. —, a sophomore in this university, be suspended for the remainder of this semester, and that this action be made public. These recommendations are based upon the following charges, which Mr. — before this committee admitted to be true: First, that he wilfully took part in two rushes this semester, knowing that the wish of the President of the University and of the senior class was to the contrary; second, that he repeatedly returned to take part in the rush of August 24th, after having been repeatedly warned by seniors to desist, and in open defiance of their requests; third, that he helped to precipitate the rush of September 5th, by assisting in the stealing of the

ballot box, and that he took an active part in the rush that followed; fourth, that he apparently has no clearly defined idea as to the right and wrong of the question of rushing and that he regards the prestige of class to be of higher value than the honor of the university. For these reasons the committee believes that Mr. —— should be allowed to sever his connection with the university for the rest of this semester." The offending student was suspended.

The case traced from start to finish is an admirable illustration of the excellent fashion in which the different elements in the system of student self-government work together. First of all, the senior men, acting under the authority conferred upon them by the now well-established system of senior control, warned the offender repeatedly that rushing was a defiance of university regulations and urged him to desist. That failing to have the desired effect, the man was summoned for a hearing before the Students' Committee, the evidence for and against him was impartially considered, and the recommendation of suspension was submitted to the President and acted upon. It was felt by some afterward that the action had been hasty and ill-advised, and a petition was therefore circulated and signed by many students requesting for several named reasons the reinstatement of the offender. The committee thereupon explained at length the grounds for its action at a meeting of the senior honor society; and the members, after a thorough consideration of the case, justified the stand of the committee as wise and commendable. Finally the matter was taken up in the great student mass meeting; everyone was given opportunity to speak as he was moved; the whole case was thoroughly worked over; and the upshot of it all was a resolution adopted with few dissenting voices that it was the sense of the students of the university that the committee should be upheld.

These recommendations, it is to be noted, came from the man's fellow-students. Not a single member of the faculty interfered one way or the other. The whole conduct of the case is an admirable illustration of an effective, workable form of student self-government. Disturbances of this order used

to be handled by a Faculty-Students' Affairs Committee; that committee still exists and still has nominal functions, but it has been very largely relieved of its work by the prompt and successful way in which the Students' Committee has dealt with troubles similar to those mentioned. It is not a pleasant thing for the faculty to wield the big stick; it much prefers that a serious-minded group of students should look after the maintenance of peace and order in the undergraduate body. And so the Students' Committee, while having no official recognition and no legal status on the books of the university, is yet doing a great work, and doing it well. The students are able to ferret out evidence more successfully than professors, and their decisions are more likely to be acceptable to the general student body.

Plans are on foot at present to render the Undergraduate Students' Affairs Committee an even more effective organ than it now is. The president of the Associated Students hopes to enlarge the scope of its activities so as to make it serve the purposes of a grand jury for the student world. In fact it has already begun to act in this capacity. Rumors have been afloat to the effect that there has been some misappropriation of funds in the management of one of the college papers. The committee has therefore called before it parties able to furnish inside testimony, is giving the persons implicated an opportunity to clear themselves of suspicion, and is providing for a thorough hearing of the whole case. Similar action will be taken on other questions. The effort will be made to cleanse the whole public life of the student body, and to insist upon a straight and honorable management of all student activities.

It is my hope that what has been said in this discussion may serve to convey some notion of the nature and growth of student self-government at the University of California, and of the student public opinion and self-control whereon it rests. It has all meant much for the university; it is destined to mean more. Highly favored is that university whose alumni have their alma mater always in memory and who delight to do her honor; but more richly blessed is the university whose students, while they are students, and before they have

left the college halls, conceive a right perspective of what makes for her upbuilding and her highest good—more to be desired are they than beauty of campus or stateliness of buildings. During the trying days of last April and May, when earthquake and fire had smitten this western land of ours so sorely, the students of California responded loyally to the call to service, and gave generously of their time and talent to those who were in need. And with the doing of duty there descended upon them a new vision of the beauty of college spirit as the spirit of unselfish service, of whole-souled devotion to the university, standing for what is good and true. When the students have taken unto themselves this high concept and are ready to act in accordance therewith, who shall deny them the right of self-government? For theirs will be the rule of justice and wisdom and righteousness.

FARNHAM P. GRIFFITHS.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

THE ELEVATION OF THE COLLEGE WOMAN'S IDEALS.

There is probably no subject of more vital concern to society than the ideals of its youth. In estimating their importance, a large place is properly assigned to those held by young women, since to them is entrusted almost entirely, especially in America, the education of children both in the home and the school. Not only will college girls guide their own lives by their ideals but they will impress those ideals upon their associates and upon the children whom as mothers or as teachers they are training. It is therefore of fundamental importance to society that the ideal of its women should be a worthy one, and a part of education might well be devoted to this end alone. We may even go so far as to say that if our education does not succeed in implanting a high ideal, it is falling short in the most fundamental respect of all.

It seemed to the writer that it would be valuable to discuss the ideal woman with some college juniors and seniors, about seventy in number, and with that in view, such questions as the following were asked:

Who is nearest to your ideal person?

What occupation do you wish to follow upon leaving college?

What position of honor would you most like to hold?

Would you rather be the best loved person or the best?

Which do you consider of the most importance: honesty, love of humanity, self-control, chastity or justice?

What do you consider the greatest vice?

Considerable valuable work has been done by Messrs. Jegi, Munroe, and Taylor in determining what occupations children below the age of fourteen choose. The answers which they received vary but slightly from those which I obtained from college girls: thirty-five per cent. of the latter choose to be teachers, three per cent. mothers, nine per cent. music teachers, six per cent. artists, and about ten and a half per cent. doctors, nurses and concert singers. Small numbers want to be kindergartners, librarians, settlement workers, and authors.

The college students omit some occupations which figure largely in the choices of the younger girls such as dressmaking, stenography and millinery, since they would not have come to college at all if they had intended to take up such work.

The percentages are so nearly alike in the professions common to the younger and older girls, that one wonders whether the ideals of youth in regard to occupation change much after fourteen years, or whether by that age the tastes of the average girl have developed enough so that her choice of a life work remains constant so far as its form is concerned. The fact that over one half of these students have desired the given occupation for three years or more, strengthens this supposition. I should be the last to assert that a girl of fourteen understands fully what is involved in her choice, its content, the joys and sorrows that accompany it, but still, may

she not be, by this time, enough of a personality to make her choice?

The motives for choosing a given occupation are not many in number. Two fifths choose because they like it best, and one sixth because they are best fitted for it. None admit that money determines their choice, though one sixth feel it incumbent upon them to earn their living. Four or five choose because of the opportunities offered for doing good, and about the same number for the sake of the self-culture to be gained.

The remaining questions were planned to ascertain the qualities which the students admire most in women, and to test any one answer by its harmony with the others.

Nearly three fourths have as their ideal a friend, while only four take a historical character. The qualities of this ideal friend vary considerably, and fall into three groups, each group chosen by nearly the same number of students: an altruistic ideal, with breadth of view, tolerance and unselfishness as the qualities most admired; a broad personal ideal of sweetness and strength of character; a narrow personal ideal, with brightness, attractiveness, good looks, popularity, and social influence as the desired traits.

For the most important virtue, a little more than one third take honesty; one fourth, love of humanity; one sixth, chastity; and one fifth, self-control. One sixth consider dishonesty the greatest vice; one third, drunkenness; one fifth, impurity of life or unchastity; and one fifth, murder.

It is interesting to notice how few of these students hold to the traditional idea that chastity is a more fundamental virtue for women than love of humanity or honesty, and that only two out of the whole number choose justice. Justice seems too cold and abstract a thing to appeal to them, whereas love of humanity implies an impulsiveness of action more in accord with the magnanimities and ardors of youth.

The reason for the choice of a given virtue or the condemnation of a certain vice, is the same in the majority of the cases, namely, that the virtue or vice in question, leads to all the others. One half of those who consider murder the worst

sin, assign no reason, while most of the rest say that it takes a life and breaks a commandment.

In answer to the question as to whether they would rather be the best person or the best loved, one third say that they would rather be the best, and two thirds the best loved. Comparatively few have definite ideas of the position of honor in the world which they deem most desirable, for one third do not answer the question, and one fourth say they have never thought of it. Those who do answer, vary considerably in choice, only small numbers choosing any one thing.

To sum up the general trend of the papers, we find first, a strong tendency through all of them to avoid the purely theoretical. Only seven and one half per cent. have no preferred occupation, as against sixty per cent. who have no desire for great honor; only six per cent. have a historical character for an ideal, as against seventy-three per cent. who have a friend; only thirty-two per cent. desire to be the best, as against sixty-four per cent. who desire to be the best loved. In the second place, we find their choices determined by the usefulness to the person choosing, the desirable virtue being the one which will, indeed, aid the individual in serving society, but which will more especially bring her power, influence and happiness. In the third place, three ideals stand out distinctly: the altruistic one, the broad personal one, the superficial personal one.

If these results are typical, certain ethical problems in education might well be reviewed in their light.

If the average student avoids the purely abstract in favor of the concrete in her choice of ideals and honors, we ought first to question whether this is desirable, and then how to combat or encourage the tendency. But little discussion is necessary on the first point, since it is evidently conducive to the greatest social efficiency for people to choose such ideals and occupations as are practicable. We may wonder whether the personal ideal will be as high, of course, and I myself find a strong regret in my mind that so few of these girls have been thrilled and dominated by the stories which they must know of women who have become famous. Perhaps it is true

that he who is guided by the lives about him acquires the greatest social ease, and yet, is not this age between eighteen and twenty-two the age when a divine discontent with the persons and conditions of the prosaic world would augur better for the later standard? Even those who dream most highly and ardently of their own possibilities too soon trail their golden ideals in the dust!

I may be quite wrong in my general theory—I am speaking now only on the basis of personal experience and observation—but it seems to me that there ought to be some courses in our colleges or some place in the scheme of college life for the systematic cultivation of an enthusiastic belief in a high ideal as the goal for the person's work. The average person needs to be stirred, to have his imagination quickened, to have his emotions aroused, in order to do the best that is in him. Do our colleges thus awaken the imagination and impulses of their students along ethical lines? On the contrary, I believe that any college instructor who is able to get into close enough personal relations with the students so that they will talk freely, finds a confusion of some ethical distinctions and an insensitiveness to others that supply constant food for thought. To illustrate: I was speaking in one of my classes about the best manner of preparation of a paper which the class was to pass in. The paper was simply a summary of an article, nothing requiring original thinking, but only selection of the important topics. After I had finished, one of the excellent students in the class said to me: "Well, now, it will be all right, won't it, for two of us to work together, one reading out loud, the other taking notes, and the two using the same notes?" She could not see that the person who took the notes would practically write the papers for both, until I asked her how much difference there usually was between the notes and the finished paper, when she realized that it was principally a difference of copying. I should say that her sense of honor is as high as that of the average student, but she had not stopped to distinguish between the kind of work done by the one who read and the one who wrote. In the same way, students frequently do translations together,

one wielding the dictionary, and the other making the translation. In mathematics also, one student may state the method of solution of a problem and the other do the mechanical part. It is difficult in many cases for the students to see that one of them loses all the reasoning involved in the lesson, and that he deceives both himself and the instructor into thinking that he is stronger than he really is.

In their relations to their fellow-students, we also find moral dullness or lack of thought resulting in injustice, either in the direction of too severe condemnation or too great leniency. The moral attitude which can condemn the sin and yet cure the person is even rarer among young people than among the middle aged. This is, of course, to be expected, but the practical bearing comes here—that the years of high school and college life are preëminently those in which to cultivate ethical appreciation, and it is the place of the teacher as well as of the home to do this.

We ought, as far as possible, to rouse admiration of some great hero or heroine, but if most students are not reached in this way, the only other way open to us is to cultivate a high standard in public opinion as to what the ideal character and virtues are, so that each student will feel the force of that public opinion bearing upon himself.

Within the range of my own observation, the most effectual way in which this can be done is to place responsibility upon the student-body in all possible ways, and then to have the fullest possible discussion between instructors and students of the ethical problems which naturally arise.

For example, three years ago we introduced into this college, first the system of student government, and a year later, the honor system. Student government made the student-body responsible for quiet and order in the college at all times and upon all occasions. An instructor became simply a resident, who had only the same privilege of complaint to a proctor or other officer as any student had, and she also might be "proctored" if there was an unseemly noise issuing from her room at improper hours.

The honor system made each student responsible for the

prevention of cheating, both in examinations and in daily work, each student taking a pledge neither to give nor to receive help, and to report any student who did either, to the Self-government Board. All the officers under both systems are elected by the students.

In the case of the administering of government and the preservation of order, the first result was some reluctance on the part of students to be proctors, since to them fell the disagreeable duty of administering the law. They might offend their mates, not only by the mere fact of rebuking them, but by their manner, and they would be mercilessly criticised in either case. But by means of discussion among the students, certain distinctions were brought out. The proctor who was good-natured and let her corridor make all the noise it desired, was in the end criticised by that very corridor, or if the corridor did not mind the noise, it was forced to have regard to the rights of the corridors below and adjoining, both of which objected to midnight revelry. In one or two cases, the proctor was called before the Self-government Board, and admonished to do her duty. So nothing was left for the proctors but to administer the law, and it became an object of study with them to keep both a quiet domain and the love of their subjects, that is, to cultivate an inoffensive manner of correcting transgressors. This accomplished a remarkable stiffening of the moral backbone of most of the students, for in the course of a year and a half, from one third to one half of the students are likely to officiate as proctors. One noticeable result of this is that students are now much more outspoken in their condemnation of certain classes of misdeeds, and yet there is a greater solidarity in the student-body as a whole.

The moral effects of the honor system are to a considerable degree unsettled as yet. It has led to a more severe condemnation of the girl who unquestionably cheats in examination, and has lessened the amount of such cheating, if it has not entirely eliminated it. On the other hand, it seems to have brought up numerous questions of casuistry as to what constitutes cheating in class work. Of course, there is a double stimulus for such casuistry in the pledge not to cheat

nor to allow others to do so. If it is not cheating to write an English equivalent above your German or Latin word, how comforting is the thought! Or if cheating consists only in referring to the *book*, then your next-hand neighbor who glances at her *notes* now and then need not be reported. Then too, when is it cheating to study together? And is it cheating for one girl to give another points for a paper?

I am not entirely sure what the outcome of the plan will be. The duty of reporting a student seen cheating has been most hard to impress upon the students generally, and even where they recognize its necessity, they feel it to be so disagreeable that they will evade it as far as possible. They will take the front seats in the examination, or they will turn their backs upon the rest of the class—in every possible way they will make it impossible for themselves to see anything that may be going on. There are, of course, some students too acute and too conscientious to do this, and so far they have furnished the needed check. It remains to be seen whether their influence will be the dominant one.

A third ethical factor was introduced into the college this autumn in the form of two clubs for social purposes, organized with a charter from the faculty, conferring definite rights and making certain requirements. The most important of these was that each club should devote itself to the broadening and uplifting of the social life of the college, that it should seek out the lonely girl who made friends slowly, and endeavor to bring out her good qualities.

A host of questions at once arose here. In the first place, what should be the qualifications for membership in these clubs? Whenever a lonely, unattractive girl, a misfit, was found, should that qualify her for the club? If not, then how is the club to help her? But if such girls are taken in, then in a year or so the club will consist only of misfits, eccentrics, weak girls, and will be in no condition to help anyone else. On the other hand, if only strong girls are chosen, those left out must feel that an odious comparison has been made, and must resent it. Discussion has been fast and furious, and is by no means over, but opinion seems to be on the whole, set-

tling down to this conclusion: that in the light of its ideal, the club is a nucleus of workers toward the end of developing the capabilities of every girl in college. If a girl has reached the point where she can show her ability to help others, she will not be a drag to the club. Until that time, each girl in the club should make it a point to become acquainted with her, and to give her the pleasures and advantages of the club house as far as possible. The question of what constitutes eligibility for the club, is, of course, the one which determines its value as a moral factor in the college. The ideal that was, and is, held up constantly, is the altruistic one mentioned above, with service to their fellow-students as the practical test. There is no doubt that many of the members held in the beginning to the superficial personal ideal for their club girls, and that some still do. They would have made election to membership dependent upon liking, so that the club would have become but a coterie of friends. At present the larger ideal is the dominant one, though, of course, it remains to be seen whether it will be so when the newness of the clubs has worn away and public attention is not so much concentrated upon them as at present.

A fundamental question might well be raised here, as to whether such a basis of membership does not make the girls prigs. One might, however, question in the same way, whether election to a debating society does not make the person over-proud of his powers of argument, and so on through the list. As matters stand, at present at least, the members who tend to exclusiveness, to feeling themselves better than the non-members, are finding in most cases that the club cannot use them in its work, that is, cannot appoint them on committees, and so on, or through them become acquainted with other desirable girls. Doubtless the students cannot fail to recognize that some of them have more influence and ability than others. Such things are known whether there are clubs or not. The club, if its ideal is realized, will simply put such influence and ability to work in the interests of every student.

To get back now to the point from which we digressed, the influence of these three factors, the self-government system,

the honor system, and the social clubs, has been to bring out in one form or another nearly every important moral problem that one meets in life, and to make it a problem upon which practical issues depend. The moral sense of the student-body has been roused and sharpened and its ideals made both higher and more definite. Much still remains to be done, as this article shows, in merging the social into the social ideal, but the method tried has been found valuable. One who mingles with the student-body here can trace the growth of the ideal woman, not only in the raising of the aspirations of the students for themselves, but in the increasing *esprit de corps*, the overlooking of superficial faults and the lending a hand to overcome them, the prompt, unsparing, but impersonal criticism of selfishness and insincerity, and so on. The necessity of working together in order to make the administration of the Student Government Association and of the honor system a success, has been here the principle of union. Now the club life, with the still closer relations which it effects, should complete the work of uniting all the students in college into a band of lovers of the ideal in each other, seekers after social righteousness.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By Dr. Harald Höffding, Professor in the University of Copenhagen. Translated from the German Edition by B. E. Meyer. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1906. Pp. viii, 410.

There is an unmistakable directness of touch in the argument and analysis contained in this volume, which removes it from the sphere of mere speculation and gives it a characteristic quality of personal conviction. The effect on the reader is such as to disarm criticism from the outset and produce an attitude of respectful acquiescence. The author has written out of the fullness of his own experience of life, in the hope that it may be of significance to others to know what he has learned. And no one who is aware of the perplexities of the religious mood can read his sympathetic interpretation of its meaning without being grateful for this balanced and well-ordered statement of his conclusions. We may add to these general remarks that Prof. Höffding is singularly fortunate in his translator, who has produced a most readable rendering of the German version.

The interpretation of religion throughout the volume is governed by a single conception, which Prof. Höffding calls the "conservation of value." This conception he considers the fundamental "axiom" of all religious experience. The aim of the writer is to describe, to illustrate, and to justify this "axiom," and to show how it has operated in the formation of definite religious belief. From the outset he puts aside the attempt to connect the philosophy of religion with a general philosophical system; for "the work of the philosophy of religion will be most productive when religion and its manifestations . . . are illuminated by a process of philosophizing of which the main occupation is to decide whether or no we may expect to arrive at a conclusion" (p. 4). His position on this question of method does not seem altogether clear or consistent; for at one time he speaks of the religious problem as "falling under the fundamental problem" (p. 13); at another time of an "analogy" between the philosophical and religious problem (p. 385); while again throughout the work he seeks to maintain that there is continuity (p. 216), or at least no discontinuity, between the notion of "existence" and the security of the values on which religious experience lays stress.

Indeed, he goes so far at one stage in his discussion as to make the remark (which I take to be general), that "we shall always expect to find the development of religion based on a certain conception of reality. Man can have no religious feeling until he can to a certain extent systematize his observations of the world" (p. 137). Moreover, his own argument rests, as one might suppose, on some philosophical basis, a basis which at one point he speaks of as that of "critical monism" (p. 89). But while this seeming inconsistency hangs over the process of the discussion, and in a manner perhaps threatens the safety of his conclusions, Prof. Höffding is at any rate quite frank in admitting the limitations within which he works. He prefers to confine himself to an empirical analysis of the content of religious experience, an empirical verification of its first principle (the axiom of the conservation of value), and a psychological description of what that principle means.

He divides his discussion into three stages. In the first he examines the logical significance of the principle of value and of the conservation of all values, and distinguishes it from the logical character of the principles by which we endeavor to meet the difficulty set to the human mind of holding to unity in the midst of diversity. This constitutes the epistemological part of his problem, which he calls "Epistemological Philosophy of Religion." In the second stage he states the content and substance of religious experience as it has historically appeared. He gives what, roughly speaking, may be called a psychological analysis of the religious mind, and shows what is meant by its fundamental axiom, and what this involves. This discussion forms the "Psychological Philosophy of Religion," and is on the whole the most important section of the work. In the third stage he traces the connection between religious value and that other sphere of experience where the idea of value plays the chief rôle in forming the experience—morality. This part he calls the "Ethical Philosophy of Religion."

If we take the axiom as the centre of the whole discussion, we may say that the first section considers its formal character as a principle of experience, the second its material content, and the third its efficiency as a specific ground of activity.

The axiom of the conservation of value is conceived by the author after the analogy of the conservation of energy in physics. It asserts the "continuous conservation of value throughout all

transformations," just as the conservation of energy asserts that energy is never lost from the physical system by any process of change, but only transformed. It does not affect the axiom to say that increase in value is or may be a condition of its being preserved; for constancy of value and conservation of value are not the same thing. All the values that have existed may be conserved as well as the increased values which may arise in the course of experience. "Conservation" means that no value, whatever it be, utterly perishes from the world. "Value" again denotes the "property possessed by a thing" of either giving "immediate satisfaction" or "serving as a means of procuring it" (p. 12). Immediate value is the primary end, and by "primary" is meant first in importance, because conserving the ultimate and simplest needs of man. All other values are "mediate;" they are conditioned by the character of immediate values, and lead to the attainment of them more or less consciously and directly. The "needs," which determine what is to have value, themselves depend on man's "nature"; and as the needs vary indefinitely, values vary in quality and character with them. The "conservation" refers to *all* values, mediate and immediate. Since value thus covers all possible forms in which satisfaction can be obtained by man in his various relations to existence, it follows that the conservation of all values implies or is even "a form of the principle of the continuity of existence" (p. 216). It means that "fidelity prevails throughout existence," for "fidelity is conservation, continuity throughout all changes" (pp. 134, 216). Such conservation or fidelity is the axiom of religion, the "content" of religious "faith." Or, in other words, the religious attitude of experience rests upon and presupposes that the values which man assigns to existing things in virtue of the satisfactions they afford, will be guaranteed by the nature of existence itself, that they have an objective basis and justification, and not merely a subjective significance.

Now, there is no doubt that this does describe an essential element in the experience of religion, and is a legitimate way of stating its point of view. It has the merit of being comprehensive enough to include all types and forms of religion and to distinguish the religious mood *per se* from any other form of experience. For all other moods, science, morality, etc., are concerned in finding or creating values, not in conserving them, and certainly not in conserving *all* values. Indeed the other moods

may even proceed best by correcting and suppressing what has acquired a value; whence arises the conflict between the religious and *e. g.* the scientific mood. It gives also a concreteness and definiteness of character to religious experience which in these times of uncertainty the religious mind may very readily welcome. The great difficulty which the religious mind has to face is undoubtedly how to determine, and be assured of, the objectivity of the content and consequences of its "faith," how to be confident that its assertions hold of an objective ground, and are not the creations of subjective desire or imagination. Some kind of reciprocity between objective and subjective there must be in religion as in every mood of concrete experience; for, only if this reciprocity is found, is our mood a "reality," instead of either confusion or illusion. The object must be in some sense "independent" of us as well as related to us, if our experience is to be reliable and valid. In science and morality this objectivity of content is easily tested: for the objective world of "fact," the things perceived, and the social order, at once assert themselves over against our individual ideas, and our individual whims; and either check or confirm their course in very definite and determinable ways. But who is to tell us if our religious ideas are "correct," that our religious emotions are "justified?" The object to which we here stand related seems either to make no definite response, or to make a response only in such universal terms that every case is satisfied equally; each individual's interpretation of the response is as valid as another's, and is asserted to be so. But this implies that we seem to have no restraint whatsoever on our affirmations or denials, and no confirmation of their claims. Hence the liability of the religious mood to mere caprice in its assertions and its aims. There is undoubtedly here a real danger unless we have in some way a determinate relation on the part of the mind to a determinate object which in some sense is "independent" of it. Prof. Höffding's conception of a principle of the conservation of value does seem to indicate such an objectivity, and seems also to provide for the subjective variety of experience so characteristic of the religious life.

Yet it has to be noted that its very meaning seems to deprive it of any regulating or controlling efficacy on the religious mind. It does not prescribe what is or is not to have a value for religion. On the contrary, this is determined apart from religion, as such, altogether. Religion stamps with the mark of

finality or absoluteness what is *on other grounds* a source of satisfaction. Religion claims as a permanent factor in the nature of things what has to begin with a value for the individual life. It gives the form of eternity to a temporal validity. All the positive content of religion is derived from sources outside the religious axiom itself. More than this, it presupposes "that we have discovered by experience that there is something valuable" (p. 217). But if so, we come dangerously near to destroying any claim the religious mood has to be anything of significance in experience at all. For if the axiom does not *constitute* value, since that is settled by the nature of the satisfactions of which the individual is the source and the test; and if the axiom does not *regulate* what is to be regarded as of value, since that is done by other spheres of experience, what does the axiom do? It becomes a purely formal precept without any content of its own at all. If so, its objectivity seems to have no real effect on the individual life; for an objectivity that is not effective as a check or restraint on the course of the mind's conscious states is as good as non-existent. Nothing then separates it from either illusion or caprice. Moreover, on this view it is only the *claim* of the individual religious mind which saves the situation and creates the religious mood. This makes religion both in content and form purely subjective. Such a result, however, is directly opposed to the very meaning of the religious mood. For this seeks to give permanent objectivity to what has otherwise a value; and the religious individual appeals to the axiom to sustain his belief in any value that enters his life. Clearly, therefore, the axiom must derive its meaning from some other source than the individual mind. For if the position of the latter depends on the nature of the former, it is logically impossible to create the axiom from the individual mind.

This indeed comes out in Prof Höffding's further analysis. He maintains "that the axiom of the conservation of value is a form of the principle of the continuity of existence" (p. 216), i. e. has its ground *beyond* the individual mind in a wider form of existence. Elsewhere (pp. 134, 186), he identifies the principle of the conservation of value with "God" in the religious sense. And, generally, he argues that the scientific and religious moods would be reconciled if the principle of the unity and continuity of existence, which the former takes as an axiom and

seeks to establish in detail, were to coincide with the axiom of the conservation of value. Interpretation and estimation could then be identified. This certainly gets over the subjectivity of the axiom. And even if the ultimate reconciliation were in the long run an ideal to be aimed at, or yet never achieved, the objectivity would at all events be secured.

But such statements and suggestions as those just referred to, cannot be said to carry us far towards a solution of this difficulty, when we seek to make the trend of Prof. Höffding's argument consistent. The above expressions would seem in their very nature to carry objectivity with them, and secure the validity of religious judgments. "Existence," "Reality," "God," are surely "objective" if anything is. Prof. Höffding, however, not only does not find the content of the religious life from such a source, but, by his very interpretation of them, makes any use of them as the objective basis of religion impossible. For they themselves are subjective conceptual constructions. "Conceptions of existence" lie at the basis of religions, and the different conceptions of value help to determine different religious standpoints (p. 113). "The development of religion" is "based on a certain conception of reality." "Man can have no religious feeling until he can to a certain extent systematize his observations of the world" (p. 137). And if anything is needed to emphasize this subjectivity we are told that our conception of existence is never completed, and is necessarily incomplete (pp. 32, 259, 264), nay even "that our concept of reality is itself really an ideal concept" (p. 247). The religious mind undoubtedly seems to look on "God" as objective, as a supreme object of all judgments; and in discussing the religious life of different peoples, Prof. Höffding certainly seems to take the term in this sense. But in his own view, God is really the "predicate" of all religious judgments (p. 187). How, if this is so, he can at the same time speak of this as "that which supports and comprehends within itself all values" (p. 180) is difficult to see.

Moreover, even if we take Prof. Höffding at his word, it is not possible to make the argument quite convincing. Conceptions of existence give, he says, the basis of religious value. Such conceptions presumably must be, or claim to be, true, and so claim to fall within science. Yet he maintains (p. 244), that "if we could or ought to uphold no other views of existence than those which scientific inquiry can construct and prove, then the axiom

of the conservation of value must fall to the ground." Or, again, take the statement "the process of existence might be continuous without any continuity of value" (p. 245), and compare this with that above given: "the continuity of value is another form of the principle of unity in existence." Indeed the importance of conceptions of existence in the shaping of the religious life seems reduced to very little indeed. For, from the point of view of science, religion seems to get a living as best it can from the crumbs which may fall from the well-supplied table of the scientist. "If it be supposed that the innermost essence of existence¹ is exhausted when its empirical contents has been reduced to relations of identity, rationality and causality, then there is no room for faith. But such a view is insusceptible of proof. There always remains the possibility that the great rational and causal web of interrelations which science is gradually exposing to view may be the framework or the foundation for the unfolding, in accordance with the very laws and forms discovered by scientific inquiry, of a valuable content. The axiom of the conservation of value need assert nothing more and nothing other than this" (p. 245). "*There always remains the possibility,*" may not the other possibility be true as well? What is "at least possible" is separated by only a very sharp edge from the impossible. And how can the "axiom of the conservation of value" draw any content from such a "possibility," still more furnish any "vitality" of belief, or "produce" or "increase" value in the way Prof. Höffding describes elsewhere. Is religious experience to be based on taking a "perhaps" seriously for fact? The crumbs no doubt are always possible; but what if the rich man at the table of science is too careful or too well-mannered to drop any?

It seems ungrateful to make these complaints regarding an argument so rich in instruction; but it is difficult to get rid of the conclusion that from first to last the substance and form of religion have, on Prof. Höffding's theory, no genuine objective basis or immovable ground at all. We may call such a view as his "psychological," or "subjective" as we please; the name is not so serious as the positive result of the interpretation. And all the further development of his principle in the discussion of concrete historical religions, doctrines and procedure, bears out the

¹ What is meant by the "essence" of what is at best a concept?

same result. The applications of his theory, it should be said, form in some ways the most interesting and illuminating part of the work. We find here many of his best *aperçus*, which concentrate into a pithy expression the rich wisdom of a deep experience of life.

Perhaps Prof. Höffding seems nearer to the solution of the difficulty above referred to, and nearer also to the heart of his own position, when he deals with the bearing of religion on morality in the last part of the work. He points out on pp. 223-24 that the "ideal form of the axiom of the conservation of value . . . may be regarded as a kind of extension of the highest ethical principle." And again "religion tends to appear as a projection of the ethical." The values of religion are secondary and depend on certain primary values, since religion presupposes the experience of value, of those primary values "our experience of life has taught us to know and maintain." What these latter are is not and apparently cannot be definitely determined. "The values in the conservation of which a man believes will be those which he regards as the highest. These, however, differ widely in different cases among different men living under different historical conditions" (p. 218). When "we inquire as to the value of the faith in the conservation of value, the answer cannot be given by religion only . . . The necessary condition for the justification of religion is that neither force nor time be withdrawn from ethical work. On the other hand religion will gain in positive value if it can be seen to be a condition which enables us to produce and discover values within the world of experience" (p. 331). Thus it is maintained that "religion in its historical development, as well as in its motives, its contents, and its value, points back to ethical presuppositions, even when it has all the appearance of serving as a basis for ethics" (ibid). The "superstructure of a religion will depend on the ethical standpoint" (p. 374).

It appears, then, from this that the ultimate ground of religion is the ethical life, and that religion is also an "extension" of it. Now, undoubtedly this gets rid of the above subjectivity characteristic of this interpretation of religion. For thus there is introduced into the religious life the objectivity which comes from the compulsion of the social order and of our relation to other men. And in the realization of the ethical ideal "ethics itself becomes religious; for it is here working for the all-holiest"

(p. 375). "Religion and ethics ultimately meet in the conception of the holiest" (*ibid.*). The ethical includes the religious.

It will be noted how closely this is akin to Kant's conception of religion and also to the later Greek view of religion. Indeed in the working of this out, "we must always find our greatest model in the Greek way of life."

The difficulty that here remains is (1) to explain away the apparent circle in the argument that religion depends on and gets its justification from ethics, and yet that ethical values are conserved in and by religion; and (2) to assign on this view any proper and peculiar function to religion at all. It seems a mere confirmation of what ethical values determine; it is living *sub specie aeternitatis*, the same experience that is primarily lived *sub specie temporis*. But a value is none the more valid and none the more valuable because it is conserved. Indeed it is not valuable because it is conserved, it is conserved because it is valuable. Moreover, a value need not be conserved at all: it will remain a value none the less. "Value is not absolutely dependent on its own conservation" (p. 272). This may not seem quite consistent with Prof. Höffding's other contention that the axiom of religion maintains that no value altogether disappears from existence; but at any rate it is true. What then does religion specifically consist in? In stamping finite values with the hall-mark of eternity? How from such a formal principle is it at all possible to develop the rich and varied content of religious history and religious experience? But if it does not consist in thus giving finality to the temporal, in, so to say, giving the finishing touch to finite experience, it is difficult to see what is left us, or from what source it will draw the inspiration for its unique position in human life. The difficulty is only increased when we gather from another passage that there may be no necessity for religion in the ethical life at all. "Ethically considered the command is 'make life, the life thou knowest, as valuable as possible.' Whether the striving to fulfil this command necessarily presupposes a belief in the conservation of value in a certain definite form, is a question which will receive different answers from different persons according to their differing experiences" (p. 381).

Finally, there is some justification for raising the further question as to the source and goal of the values which are conserved. And here Prof. Höffding's answer is a little perplexing after all that he has said about the necessity for scientific explanation on

the one hand, and the importance of estimation or evaluation on the other. He says in one passage: "I for my part see no reason why we should demand at all costs an answer [to the question, "whence comes the valuable and whither goes it?"] which shall take us beyond what science can teach us by means of its latest hypotheses" (p. 376). Yet in another passage he says, "It may be that poetry is a more perfect expression of the highest than any scientific concept ever could be" (*ibid.*). Surely both these statements cannot be true at the same time. Both no doubt may be complementary; but in that case the first should certainly be qualified to admit of supplementation. On his view it seems absolutely essential to take up *both* positions, and not one to the exclusion of the other. Even so, we have no reasoned solution of the situation created from the first by distinguishing and indeed opposing explanation and estimation. And such a solution one may fairly expect from a philosophical interpretation of religious life. No doubt the "last word" in any interpretation "must lie with personality." What one feels is that, for religion, this seems both the first and the last word and ought to be so considered in determining the nature of religious experience.

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STOIC AND CHRISTIAN IN THE SECOND CENTURY. A comparison of the ethical teaching of Marcus Aurelius with that of contemporary and antecedent Christianity. By Leonard Alston, M. A., sometime scholar of Trinity College. Melbourne: Burney Prizeman, 1904 and 1905; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.

A comparative study of Stoicism and Christianity, in the spirit of modern historical research, objective, impartial and sympathetic, is a *desideratum*. We are still in the stage of preliminary investigations; and the best-equipped student would long hesitate, were he asked to define the place actually held in the Græco-Roman world by the two religious faiths in the days when they were rivals. Whoever presents new material, or a more perfect interpretation of already known facts, renders a real service. There is no reason why an author should not confine himself to the second century, if he chooses to do so. That is the period when these systems came into conscious conflict with each other. Nor

is the choice of Marcus Aurelius as a representative of Stoicism infelicitous, if a single thinker must be chosen.

The present writer, however, cannot but regret that Mr. Alston deemed it expedient to introduce only one Stoic, even though it be the noble philosopher on the Roman throne, while selecting quite a number of Christian writers as representatives of their faith. It would not have been necessary to go back to Seneca and Cornutus. But if Caius Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Dio Chrysostomus who still flourished at the beginning of the second century had been accorded a place beside Marcus Aurelius, the total impression of Stoicism would in essential respects have been modified. It is a significant fact that the Stoic, Dio Chrysostomus, condemned slavery as contrary to the laws of nature and urged its abolition, while Christian teachers recognized the institution and only counseled slaves to be obedient and masters to be kind. It is well to remember that Musonius Rufus was opposed on principle to war and advocated peace between nations, even when it was exceedingly unpopular to avow such convictions. Nor should the attitude of this philosopher on the question of marriage be forgotten. Against the Christian idea of celibacy as especially holy, and marriage as a concession to the weakness of the flesh, he held marriage to be the normal thing and regarded it as a man's duty, if qualified by nature for it, to take a wife and bring up children. If suppression of greed, envy and jealousy, and active sympathy with the poor, the weak, and the erring are not emphasized in the wise emperor's *Meditations*, they find expression in the lectures of Epictetus preserved by his disciple Arrian.

The Christianity of the second century is represented in this work by some of the so-called apostolic fathers and some apologists earlier than Tertullian, Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria. It is difficult to see why such eminently characteristic writings of this century as the Fourth Gospel, the Deutero-Pauline Epistles and the Catholic Epistles are not included. The ethical teaching of Gnostic Christians might also have been profitably considered. Nevertheless, the importance of the apostolic fathers, among whom modern editors are inclined to reckon some of the early apologists, is so great, that there would be little disposition to find fault with the author for confining himself to them, were his treatment of these teachers marked by sufficient thoroughness of research and appreciation of their distinctive messages. They are indeed quoted on various topics, both in Greek and in English,

but there is only scanty evidence of a real scholarly occupation with their writings. "Barnabas" is introduced to the reader in this fashion: "A single epistle of moderate length bearing the title 'Epistle of Barnabas,' and probably written in the last quarter of the first century, was formerly ascribed to the companion of St. Paul. It is a crude composition allegorizing the Old Testament writings from a strongly anti-Judaic standpoint. The author shows much false modesty mingled with spiritual arrogance." Comment is unnecessary on this piece of description, which is characteristic. Mr. Alston haughtily declares: "We shall steer clear of the folly of treating the 'Meditations' of Marcus in the spirit of a German professor handling the mysteries of Hamlet." (p. 24). He has much to learn yet from the manner in which a German professor is accustomed to handle a historic subject.

The spirit in which he approaches Stoicism manifests itself at the very outset. Things were in a bad way in the second century. "No wise traditions," the author says, "of philosophical or historical insight and of the ultimate criteria of truth had survived the revolutionary changes wrought by the Roman legions. . . . Once the path of duty was clear . . . Now there were no duties save negative ones and passive ones. War had been an acknowledged evil, but peace had come to be an evil scarcely less. Under the shelter of the Pax Romana had come into being a moral chaos unknown before." As if Stoicism itself were not one of the best evidences that the noble traditions of the past had survived, and as if the comparative freedom from internecine strife and wantonly precipitated war were not one of the many indications of the moral uplift witnessed by this century! Besides, the Christian student of the twentieth century who feels that without indiscriminate shedding of blood there can be no rescue from a moral chaos, should be reminded by the proud titles of Trajan, Hadrian and the Antonines, that the dogs of war were not kept in leash any unreasonable length of time. Professor Dill is criticised for "translating the rhetoric of the schools into the rich phrases of the New Testament, slurring over all characteristic differences."

The differences are emphasized by Mr. Alston. In doing so, he often shows much acuteness of judgment, and sometimes presents the contrast very clearly without any attempt at evaluation. Most frequently, however, there is an apologetic strain, and not seldom a modern sentiment is arbitrarily read into the Christian phraseology. A few quotations will suffice to show the strength

and weakness of his treatment. "Marcus Aurelius never stops to ask whether virtue is worth while" (p. 39); "much as the miser, who in the beginning may have sought money for some definite end, comes at last to give himself over to money-getting in complete forgetfulness of the purposes which money serves, so Marcus becomes an uncompromising pursuer of virtue for virtue's sake" (p. 211); "Marcus Aurelius, lacking the belief in a future life, not able to conceive of the soul as distinct from matter, always conscious of the shortness of life, and despising actual mankind . . . , can only look inward for approval" (p. 56f.) ; the Stoic conceives of the world as "controlled and permeated by impersonal reason acting according to laws, in the scientific sense of orderly sequences" (p. 125) ; Marcus Aurelius "gathers the fairest illustrations that he knows of what is honorable and pure and lovely and of good report, that he may think on these things" and "there is something almost pathetically effortful in this enumeration" (p. 130f.).

On the other hand, "moral progress in the world, as a whole, is the life and hope of Christianity" (p. 42) ; Bishop Ignatius exhorts his readers to unity, obedience, submission to authority, particularly to that of the bishop, as he who doeth anything apart from the bishop is not clean in his conscience, "and all this with a view to the higher service of humanity as a whole" (p. 772f.) ; the Christian believes in "the presence and activity of the personal Governor who punishes and rewards, and wishes to obtain both virtue and the ultimate reward of virtue" (p. 125f.) ; and the Christian sees in Christ the concrete ideal, "whose approval is the approval of already perfect humanity" (p. 56), the exemplar, "with no uncertain outlines, fixed and unchangeable, without rival or equal," and "is absorbed into his ideal" (p. 132f.).

If this book should lead the author, or some of his readers, to undertake, in a more adequate manner, a comparative study of Stoicism and Christianity, it would not have been written in vain.

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NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION. By John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, Doctor in Letters, Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College in Cambridge. London: Edward Arnold. Pp. 299.

A dogma is defined as "any proposition which has a metaphysical significance." A proposition has metaphysical significance if it is

"an expression of the ultimate nature of reality," whether its acceptance depends on metaphysical considerations or not. "The assertion of God's existence is equally a dogma whether the believer has arrived at it by argument or accepted it by tradition or feels an instinctive and irresistible conviction to believe it." There are other definitions, but the one given, Dr. McTaggart thinks, accords best with the ordinary use of the word. It embraces all propositions called dogmas, even those in the Christian creeds which have reference to historical events; since their claim to be called dogmas, rests upon the fact that they assert that these events (*e. g.* the Crucifixion) exercised a unique influence on the relations between God and man.

Religious dogmas are those whose acceptance or rejection by any person would alter his religious position. Religion itself, the author thinks, may best be described as "an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large." Objection might be taken to the definition of religion as an *emotion* resting on a conviction of a *harmony*, etc., but it is scarcely necessary to discuss it, since the author's arguments do not turn on the words we have emphasized. He is concerned chiefly with the *convictions* on which the emotion depends.

In the first two chapters the Importance of Dogma and the Establishment of Dogma are discussed. Then follow chapters on Human Immortality, Human Pre-existence, Free Will, God as Omnipotent, A Non-omnipotent God, Theism and Happiness. The freshest, most interesting, if not the most convincing parts of Dr. McTaggart's philosophy are the discussions on Human Immortality and Human Pre-existence. These dogmas, Dr. McTaggart thinks, can be proved only on *a priori* grounds. In the present volume various objections to these dogmas are examined—not perhaps the objections which are most serious from the modern scientific standpoint—and some empirical arguments are adduced in their favor. But empirical arguments cannot establish them: they require a system of metaphysics. Such a system he has already published in his "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology." In that work he argues from the principles of Hegel's Philosophy that human selves or persons are eternal. They are fundamental differentiations of the absolute. Moreover, only selves (the term is not confined to human beings) exist. All other things are differentiations of selves. The Absolute, the unity of the whole,

is not itself a person, or in any way conscious. It exists only *for* the selves as conscious beings. The unity of the universe is a unity of finite persons or selves.

We are not satisfied that the non-personal character of the Absolute follows even from Dr. McTaggart's principles. And the author himself does not seem to be fully satisfied with his demonstration. But we cannot enter into that question here. The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further must refer to the excellent discussions in the "Studies" itself. There is one point, however, to which we must refer, because it is raised in "Some Dogmas of Religion" also. The Absolute cannot be a person, it is held, because personality involves an *other*. But the *other* involved need not be other than the person. Subject implies an object, the ego a non-ego, but the person is not to be identified with the subject or ego. A person is a duality of subject and object in unity. And there is nothing impossible in the notion that the Universe is such a duality in unity. Some such notion is involved in the conception of God as an eternal Trinity in Unity—a conception which Dr. McTaggart does not mention in this book as one of the dogmas of religion, although it is put forward expressly by theologians as meeting some of the objections which he raises to the theory of a personal God.

Knowing Dr. McTaggart's views on the personality of the Absolute, we could expect nothing from him but destructive criticism of Theism. And this is what we get, and it will doubtless cause Theists to reflect on their position. The book would have been more useful, however, if the author had addressed himself to his task with a little more sympathy and understanding. Few modern theists, we imagine, would claim the "theistic" views here criticised as their own. Indeed, the reader gets the impression sometimes that the writer is simply indulging in logical trifling, that the discredited theistic doctrine is unworthy of serious consideration and may be caricatured to any extent. What other impression is possible from such paragraphs as the following: "An omnipotent person is one who can do anything." "Now suppose that God had willed to create a universe, and had not willed that the law of Identity should be valid. It seems that we have no alternative but to be inconsistent or to be completely unmeaning. To suppose that the universe would not have been created, although God had willed that it should, would be

inconsistent with his omnipotence. But the assertion that the universe could be created without being a universe, and without being created is surely unmeaning. And yet how can the universe be the universe, or creation be creation unless the law of Identity be true?" "Again is there any meaning in the supposition that God could create a man who was not a man, or that he could create a being who was neither man nor not man? But, if he could not then he is bound by the law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle, and, once more, he is not omnipotent." (Pp. 202, 203.)

When theologians talk of omnipotence with reference to God there is a "universe of discourse" implied. Further, omnipotence is an attribute of a Personal Being, in organic relation with other attributes: and when God is said to possess it, the meaning surely is, that there is nothing which can prevent Him realizing any purpose which His wisdom and goodness, e. g., decide Him to attempt. But Dr. McTaggart takes omnipotence in an absolutely abstract sense. It is the omnipotence of nobody; and our author amuses himself by conceiving this nobody turn somersaults in nothing.

This arbitrary abstract method of criticism seems to us to vitiate a good deal of the book. It is undeniably clever, and very many good things are said; and it fully sustains Dr. McTaggart's reputation as a clear thinker and a lucid writer; but much of it is likely to produce irritation rather than reflection. Popular conceptions of Theism are examined and, chiefly, antiquated methods of establishing them. Of course, an author has a perfect right to choose what he will discuss, but he has no right to assert finality of his conclusions until he has covered the whole ground. We should have thought that Professor Royce's "The World and the Individual," e. g., would be examined before the paragraph on p. 260 were written with its assumption that the only reasonable alternatives are, "A non-omnipotent God—a person who fights for the good and who may be victorious," and "an omnipotent person to whom good and evil are equally pleasing." The paragraph referred to is the following: "That is all that the doctrine of a non-omnipotent God can give us—a person who fights for the good and who may be victorious. But it is at any rate better than the doctrine of an omnipotent person to whom good and evil are equally pleasing. And it is fortunate that, as we have seen, the more attractive of the two ideas is also the

more probable. Indeed, when the non-omnipotent God is also taken as non-creative, there seems to me, as I have said, only one reason why we should not believe in his existence—namely, that there is no reason why we should believe in it."

But our dissatisfaction with Dr. McTaggart's philosophical method is deeper than this: The adequacy of its fundamental conceptions may be called into question. His definition of religion as "an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large" offers a point of departure. This definition is interesting and led us to expect that our author intended to consider dogmas in relation to our emotions. We expected him to show us what dogmas are necessary in order that we might have the most comprehensive, rich and harmonious emotional life. But we were disappointed. Religion, although "almost the best of all earthly things" (p. 298), has no claim to reality. "The more complete religion is not necessarily the more true, for it may assert a harmony which does not exist" (p. 11). The only kind of harmony that we can assert to exist is a harmony which is deduced from certain abstract conceptions. That a dogma or set of dogmas fails to satisfy our emotional nature, or even our ethical demands, is nothing. The universe may be intolerably bad—in tolerably miserable or intolerably wicked—but it cannot be illogical. It is assumed *without proof* that the universe respects some of the claims of our nature. An examination of the phenomenal world does not verify the assumption that the universe is completely rational, still we cling to our faith and pursue our investigations. The existence of ignorance, error, unsolved contradictions are not allowed to throw doubt on the proposition that "the real is rational;" but a toothache or an ungenerous thought is enough to break the backbone of a direct faith in the goodness and wisdom of things. It is utterly unreasonable to assume, in the face of appearances, that the nature of the universe is such that a wise and good man may find himself in harmony with, or that a man who is not good and wise may become so could he discover its secret. Reason must first show that goodness and happiness are involved in the conception of a universe. It is clear, Dr. McTaggart argues, that the universe does not respect all our ideas, what right have we to assume that it respects them at all until we can prove it? But the universe does not respect all our intellectual claims, yet he assumes that it is constituted in accordance with logical principles.

If a class of men (among whom is Lotze) say that they have a conviction which profoundly influences their whole lives that "what is greatest, most beautiful, most worthy, is not a mere thought," it is scarcely philosophical to dismiss their statement as our author does, with the remark that it is merely of autobiographical interest and "revelant as a contribution to statistics." Their conviction may not be a sufficient reason for others to believe the same dogma, but it certainly ought to be sufficient to make a philosopher inquire what is involved in it, and what it points to. These convictions are often the most essential facts in a man's autobiography and must be known if his life and teaching are to be properly understood. And the philosopher is more profitably employed in analyzing the lives men actually lead and in rendering them intelligible in relation to the universe than in laying down the methods by which men should live, thus reconstructing them from the foundation. Such analysis is likely to modify the convictions and might, possibly, lead them beyond themselves into something more profound.

This, however, is not Dr. McTaggart's view. No man, he says, "is entitled to believe a dogma except in so far as he has investigated it for himself. And since the investigation of a dogma is a metaphysical process, and religion must be based on dogma, it follows, further, that no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study. The result is sufficiently serious. For most people, as the world stands at present, have not the disposition, the education, and the leisure necessary for the study of metaphysics. And thus we are driven to the conclusion, that whether religion is true or not, most people have no right to accept any religion as true." "The result may be evil, but that is unfortunately no ground for denying its truth." (Pp. 292, 293.)

Many, however, will, on this ground only, deny its truth and refuse to admit the claims of the metaphysician. The prophet will still proclaim his message and people will hear him gladly. The mystic and the poet will seek other sources of inspiration; and even the practical man who has no time, even if he had the ability, to investigate his creed, will lay hold on something by which he can live and realize the meaning and worth of his life. The fundamental article in Dr. McTaggart's creed—metaphysics is the only religious authority—has not been demonstrated. Consequently it is not irrelevant to quote an opinion by another meta-

physician:¹ "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."

"In the fitness of time it may be possible to hold beliefs with intelligence as well as conviction."² That time is not yet. Meanwhile the serious theist is conscious that the reasons he offers for his convictions are unsatisfactory. If he reads "Some Dogmas of Religion" he may be compelled to review his reasons, or to seek better ones. And since "the finding of those reasons is no less an instinct" than the disposition to believe, he will doubtless be grateful to so eminent a critic as Dr. McTaggart for all the help he is able to give him.

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PROBLEMS AND PERSONS. By Wilfred Ward. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. liv, 378.

Mr. Ward's book is a blending of philosophy and biography, and is well represented by its title. If the atmosphere of the book—to use a phrase of which the author is somewhat fond—is tinged with his definite religious and political convictions, it is refreshing to escape for a moment from the dull gray light of "pure reason," into something more human. It is useful for the student of ethics to be reminded of the great traditions and forces which have done so much to mold the spacious present. For Mr. Ward has something new and intimate to say about several men who did much to determine the course of the nineteenth century; men who embodied its aspirations, beliefs, its scientific advance and historical sense: Tennyson, Newman, Huxley, Renan. Even now they belong to the past.

Mr. Ward finds a parallel between the theory of evolution and the development of dogmatic theology, and so unites the attitude of faith with the acceptance of natural truth as revealed by scientific method. For knowledge itself in all its branches is a case of "organic growth." And so the varied utterances of "the time-spirit of the nineteenth century" are harmonized. Like the instruments of an orchestra which taken severally are harsh or strident, yet blend sweetly in a symphony, so the storm and stress about which the nineteenth century talked so much,

¹ Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," preface.

² Carveth Read, "Metaphysics of Nature."

is almost forgotten as we trace out the meaning of its intellectual life: the critical temper which canvassed and remolded nearly every tradition and institution of the west. After the negative attitude of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth accomplishes the movement of thought by a synthesis in which the critical method replaces the previous dogmatism, whether positive or negative; and it is the author's business to show that a new affirmation of dogma is possible under these conditions.

Mr. Ward will naturally be concerned, therefore, with attempts like that of Mr. Balfour to reinforce authority. In his essay upon "The Foundations of Belief," Mr. Ward defends against Mr. Balfour the bold use of the reason which is necessary, even at the level of sense perception, in the perpetual transcendence of sense impression; and differs only in degree, as we pass from sense-perception to its higher flights. After all, it is a practical reply to those who attack the reason in the name of practice, that the reason is all we have of its kind, and that like other parts of the human outfit, it has served us in the past and will do so in the future.

The first comment upon such a controversy as this would be, I think, that the disputants failed to define their terms adequately. It is quite true to say with Mr. Balfour that mere reason has its serious limitations. In other words, a purely formal logic cannot be applied directly to any complex subject, such as historical investigation. Theory and fact are relative to each other. The reason which in the beginnings of science was purely formal, that is in Greek science, is gradually trained by contact with its subject matter, until it has become almost identified with its subject matter. Thus astronomy is now almost entirely a deductive and formal discipline, and displays thought almost in its purest form. And the self-contradiction which Mr. Balfour discovers in the reason cannot fairly be charged to reason in formal logic, for there the very criterion applied by reason is consistency with itself. Contradiction arises when reason goes beyond itself and is occupied with real problems. And while human reason has solved innumerable contradictions, there will always remain a work for it to do. But not only is reason implicated with its context in the objective universe of thought, it is also implicated with other phases of conscious life. Purpose, pleasure, and desire blend with every movement of reason throughout all its history. Mr. Ward's acquaintance with the Aristotelian and scholastic logic has laid

bare to him the inherent weakness of Mr. Balfour's method. The merit of Mr. Balfour and also of another writer with a similar purpose, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, is that they have begun a discussion of which they have scarcely anticipated the issues. The old demarcation between the theoretical and the practical reason, is passing away. If with Mach we regard each scientific generalization as a practical expedient to the economy of thought, so we are bound to listen to the defenders of ancient institutions when they speak of a similar use of generalizations in the field of practice.

Nor, on the other hand, do I understand the use of Authority by Mr. Ward. The use of the term seems to be derived first of all from its application to the teaching of Jesus, and then to the power which he is stated to have conferred (Matt. x: 1) upon his disciples. From this the mediæval church derived the ministry of Peter and his successors. Such, I take it, is the leading meaning of the term Authority as employed by Mr. Ward. And I conceive that a fallacy lurks in the transition from this use to other uses. Hence, when he speaks of "corporate convictions which may act on individuals as authority," I frankly confess that I do not understand. If by authority is meant that we take many statements on hearsay from other persons, the reason is not everywhere dispensed from its task of investigating the origin of its ideas. And although, of course, very few persons are called to this task, these at least will not accept statements on mere hearsay, and, therefore, will to that extent not be influenced by authority. The exact relation between knowledge and authority, is a familiar topic of discussion and will remain so. In the spiritual life it is also one of the most difficult problems. For that reason, it is better sometimes to forget that it exists. "We live by admiration, hope and love."

Perhaps, after all, one may do injustice to the reason. Not only may we forget that reason is implicated in its subject matter: we may forget also that it occurs in individuals. Further we may forget that individuals, in order to be most effective, must be incorporate in a society of some kind or other. The misuse of reason may arise in individuals from a previous excesss of credulity which has been unchecked by logical method. This is Plato's view. ("Phædo," 39.) But if with Mr. Balfour, we deprecate reason too much, we paralyze it. And here I should like to quote Mr. Wilfrid Ward's striking account of Mr. Balfour's attitude

towards reason. "An uppish man of real ability is often made far more useful by a certain amount of snubbing, which teaches him the necessity of working in harmony with others, and the value of self-distrust. But the point may be reached at which he becomes disheartened and useless; and so with Mr. Balfour's treatment of Reason." (P. 171.) If Mr. Ward intended by this passage to explain Mr. Chamberlain's relation to the late Premier, he stops just where the theory becomes interesting.

And the corporate use of the reason is instructive, both in its advantages and its defects. So far as reason is concerned with objects abstracted from their human bearings, so far as reason can be separated from its ethical applications, then there seems no limitation to the combined effort of scientific men and thinkers everywhere to understand the world.

But there is something more. To quote Mr. Schiller:¹ "Is it really all that we need demand of our experience that it should be an ordered whole? Do we not demand also that its order should be worthy of our approbation?" That is to say, we pass judgments of value which cannot always be reconciled with judgments of content. And for my part I find a specious paralogism in most attempts to reconcile these two kinds of judgment, as though they could be unified in any process of thought. In some respects the objective system of physical science has solved some of the perplexities of the moral judgment, but it has created fresh ones also. The intellectual repose of most persons, however, is not broken by perplexities such as these: custom and tradition guide them. Or they may even yield a conscious submission to any system of experience in which this conflict is least prominent and least disheartening.

And so lastly we may dwell with interest upon Mr. Ward's last article: "The Life of Mrs. Augustus Craven." This biography, we gather, shows Mrs. Craven as a mind in which political insight and social gifts were joined with a deeply religious nature. Her book, "*Le récit d'une Soeur*," unveils an ideal of family life which can scarcely be surpassed. Without subscribing to special religious formulae, the student of ethics, and of ethics as applied to education, will do justice to the "grace and dignity of the catholic mind" as displayed in this book. He will try to retain amid the baffling present this delicate perfume of the past.

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¹ *Mind*, July, 1905, p. 368.

INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS. By D. H. Macgregor, M. A. London: George Bell & Sons. Pp. IX, 245.

This book will at once take rank among the best of those that have appeared under similar titles. The philosophical side of the subject, which is of importance as the question of combination trenches upon ethics and general social affairs, is as fully treated by the author as economic aspects. The chapters on combination as a "representative method" and "public policy," and the appendix to Part I on "Fair Price," may be cited as striking instances of the breadth of our author's envisagement of his subject. As to "fairness of price," the conclusion is reached that "generally, the fairness of a practice in industry depends on some view of the final aim of industrial activity . . . the fair principle being not 'what the trade will bear,' but 'what can be afforded for that trade in view of the whole wants of the community.'" To this general criterion three special maxims are attached: "First, that it is unfair to create a false impression . . . ; second, it is ethically more important to treat all buyers alike, than to treat some of them uniformly for the former practice affects their existence, while the latter presupposes it . . . ; lastly, fair trade requires that competition should take place through the consumer; for it is thus that capacity to measure service can alone be measured, and it is unfair to prevent the application of the test. Thus all means by which rivals are prevented from access to the consumer would be condemned, such as by boycotts or corners or other methods of resource or bargaining" (p. 112). Side by side with these views, as naturally linked on to them, the last words of the book may be quoted: "If the combination movement comes to realize itself fully in time, so that industry concentrates to a high degree its strength, its risks, its powers for good and its powers for harm—then, to revert to the metaphor of leadership, a nation's best hope is 'that a better conception of the place and dignity of industry may induce the best men of the nation to become captains in the war.'" But our author is by no means an alarmist as to the future.

Among sociological opinions one of the most interesting, because it bears upon the teaching of a school which has won public attention, relates to the degree of kinship between the "trust movement" and "municipal socialism." "Neither inductive nor

deductive reasoning can be used," Mr. Macgregor sums up, "fairly to assimilate the industries in which the problems of combination are pressing, to those which already have silently come into the hands of public authorities . . . the difficulties of such a transition from combined production of transferable goods to State ownership, are too lightly passed over . . ." (p. 230).

I have found some difficulty in Mr. Macgregor's pure economic treatment, which is sufficiently abstract to be reduced to diagrams—but what abstract treatment ever avoided perplexities entirely! For instance, on page 83 the double boycott is dealt with and what the argument comes to in effect is the following: A sells materials to B only and B buys only from A. Suppose diminishing returns applies to A's business and all similar businesses. Then the magnitude of A's output is such that his marginal cost of production equals that of everybody else. Now, taking the business carried on by B as subject to constant returns, it becomes evident that the magnitude of A's business will be as before and that this will settle the magnitude of B's. So that if A could have supplied more than B's wants, B will grow proportionally, and *vice versa*, contract. The argument is perfectly clear, but how frequently does it represent facts? Would not the size of B's works have some determining influence, so that A would be forced, if he produced coal for example, to buy another mine. It is evident of course that A cannot put pressure on his present mine or mines, as that would raise his cost of production. Why should he not buy a new mine? Actually would he not do so in the event supposed?

Space forbids that I should enter into detail with regard to increasing returns; but I may remark, firstly, that if A is beyond a certain size the assumption of increasing returns seems unnecessary, and, secondly, that figure 4 might be taken as practically impossible for reasons given by Professor Marshall when he explains why one firm does not grow into a monopoly in industries subject to increasing returns. Of the latter point Mr. Macgregor takes cognizance, for he says that "increasing cost may soon come into play as regards A's output." I am not able to accept wholly Mr. Macgregor's diagrammatic illustrations of the boycott, but it is impossible for me to give reasons here without repeating the figures and entering upon a technical discussion which my readers would find tedious.

No student of combinations can afford to dispense with this

book and no reader will fail to learn from it. Copious material has been used, but it has been so adequately digested that the reader will nowhere find himself overburdened with detail, though the touch of reality is preserved throughout by the illustrations selected. The arrangement suits well the method of treatment; as it will indicate the scope of the work the former may be described in the author's own words: "In Part I are analyzed the factors of competing strength, in order to study the effect of combination on each of them . . . Part I is on the whole a deductive study; in Part II are considered more inductively the present-day conditions which have fostered industrial combination, and have led it to take such different forms in America and on the Continent. In Part III some questions of public expediency come up for brief treatment." The questions thus arising in Part III are "the natural effects of combination" and "public policy" (a chapter already referred to), and the treatment though brief, is lucid and most suggestive.

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University, Manchester, England.

THE MYSTICS, ASCETICS, AND SAINTS OF INDIA. By John Campbell Oman. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905. Pp. xvi, 291.

The author of this book was formerly a professor of natural science in the Government College, Lahore. His acquaintance with the people of India dates from boyhood and he has already written several books on Indian life and literature. The present volume is a "study of Sudhuism, with an account of the Yogis, Sanyasis, Bairagis, and other strange Hindu sectarians." He uses the word Sudhu as a general name for any Hindu ascetic, monk, or religious mendicant. In Chapters I-IV the reader is made acquainted with the leading ideas of Sudhuism and introduced to the Sudhus themselves as they appear at the present day. Old Indian dramas and tales are drawn upon in Chs. V and VI to show that Sudhuism has been an ancient and persistent feature of Indian life. In Ch. VII we have an account of some of the fundamental doctrines of Hindu theology, with a brief sketch of their history. Ch. VIII contains a description of the principal ascetic sects and their subdivisions, also an account of the Yogis (those who seek after the mystic union of their own souls with the soul of the universe), and of the Yoga system.

In Chs. IX-XI the author relates his personal experiences of Sudhus, good and bad; and in the last chapter there is a discussion of the significance of Sudhuism, and some reflections on the probable influence of British rule on its future.

Mr. Oman has given us a very readable book, abundantly illustrated with photographs and drawings. His purpose is serious. He thinks that in studying Sudhuism we are studying the embodied spirit of the East. Sudhus come from all ranks of life, and from all the hereditary castes into which Hindu society is divided, and among them are found all shades of religious opinion and of philosophical speculation. They command the respect and even the veneration of the multitude of their countrymen. And if Carlyle is right when he says that the manner of men's hero-worship is the innermost fact of their existence and determines all the rest, then so far as we understand Sudhuism do we discover what is most characteristic and fundamental in Indian life.

Mr. Oman's treatment is popular yet comprehensive, and on the whole sympathetic. Sudhuism, he says, "has undoubtedly tended to keep before men's eyes, as the highest ideal, a life of purity, self-restraint and contempt of the world and human affairs. It has also necessarily maintained amongst the laity a sense of the righteous claims of the poor upon the charity of the more affluent members of the community." It has engendered and favored a spirit of tolerance and tended towards the recognition of the equality of all Hindus. On the other hand, the "detachment from human affairs which Sudhuism demands must have been at all times adverse to patriotism in any form, and there can be no doubt that it is largely due to the subtle effects of the spirit of Sudhuism upon the characters of the people of India that that country is so easily governed by a handful of foreign officials and a few thousand white soldiers." "Naturally every one who believes that the chief end of man is to *produce things of various kinds* grieves over the deplorable waste of productive energy represented by the Sudhu population of India." One twentieth according to some, one eighth according to others, of the entire population are mendicants. The industrial waste is not, however, so large as appears at first sight; for amongst these are to be found the religious and moral teachers of the people; in their ranks also are the paupers who in other countries are supported by taxation, and many who under other conditions might become dangerous vagrants.

The ways of a large section of the people of India are very different from ours. Our prosperity does not seem to excite their envy very much. And it is perhaps a little disturbing to our Western complacency to learn, that those of them who visit us call our restless activity madness and think our philosophy of life crude and elementary.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

Cardiff, Wales.

LE PASSIONI. Di A. Renda. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1906.
Pp. viii, 123.

Dr. Antonio Renda feels that psychology at the present time is too much inclined to leave the study of the passions to *dilettanti* and story-tellers. As an instructor in psychology at the University of Messina, he approaches the subject from a professional and purely scientific standpoint. His most important conclusions are that the passions should not be regarded as peculiar psychic phenomena in the life of the affections, but as special variations of personality, affecting the ordinary mental processes, and that they belong to an intermediate zone between sanity and insanity, exhibiting pathological conditions and forming transitional stages to more morbose manifestations, as shown by the history of individuals and families. The influence of Lombroso is naturally felt throughout the discussion. But the author is well versed in the older philosophical literature dealing with the passions.

Having defined sensations and emotions and differentiated from them the category of the passions, and having indicated the importance of studying the passions as facts, as distinct from their ethical valuation, Dr. Renda shows the insufficiency of the current estimate and presents his reasons for regarding them as states of personality exhibiting in various degrees a morbose character. The analogy between passions and mental diseases, already suggested in antiquity by Plato, Zeno, Hippocrates and Galen, and confirmed by Moreau, Maudsley, Descuret and many others in modern times, is here carried to a point where the passions appear as nothing but manifestations of incipient mental disease. Interesting illustrations of the physiological concomitants, causes, or effects of the passions are given on pages 81ff. That diseases of certain organs should so frequently accompany the prevalence of certain passions, that the autopsy of five hundred and forty-four

bodies of suicides at Würtemberg should have revealed lesions of the brain in two hundred and sixty-five cases, and diseased physical conditions in all the others, and that among a large number of homicides examined the majority suffered from heart troubles, are facts of very great significance, however they may be interpreted.

While passions are not inherited, Dr. Renda maintains that the pathological conditions that tend to develop them or result from them are transmitted by heredity. Instructive examples are found in such families as the Julians, the Plantagenets, the Capets, the Medicis. Possibly the author is a trifle too ready with his epithets. When splendid courts are transformed before his eyes into insane asylums where each inmate wears his own tag, the reader may do well to guard his historic judgment by remembering the general conditions of society, the prevailing view of the world, the abnormal position of privileged families, and the changing standards of sanity. But the abundant material which we are fortunate enough to possess for the lives of certain royal families unquestionably tends to strengthen Dr. Renda's contention as to the nature of the passions.

To the numerous systems of classification of the passions proposed by earlier philosophers Dr. Renda adds one that has much to commend it. He recognizes three classes: 1. Constitutional passions, such as ambition, avarice, envy; 2. the antagonistic passions, such as love and the passion for gambling; 3. the substitutive passions, such as fanaticism, hatred, jealousy. Another division is proposed on the ground of their psychophysiological characteristics into (a) expansive passions, like ambition, love and fanaticism; (b) depressive passions, like avarice and nostalgia; and (c) mixed passions, like envy, gambling and jealousy.

It is to be hoped that the author may find it possible to discuss, in a larger work, such topics, scarcely touched upon in this book, as the mental hygiene necessary to defend man against the assaults of the passions, the medical and psycho-therapeutic treatment best adapted to conquering them or mitigating their effects, and the most effective manner of dealing with these mental diseases when they are of such a character as to constitute a menace to the peace and safety of society.

This little book is so admirably adapted to serve as an introduction to a serious study of the passions, that it would be well if, in a

subsequent edition, the author would furnish full and accurate references to the works of many writers mentioned in the course of the discussion.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

THE FAMILY. By Helen Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906.

This book is a sociological study in which the ethical interest is clearly recognized throughout as the dominant interest. It is the history of an institution considered as embodying certain moral ideas. In tracing the development of the Family, in examining its various forms, and in tracing its relation with other institutions, Mrs. Bosanquet keeps unfalteringly the human point of view. The book is quite uncontroversial in tone, there is a total absence of polemic writing, but all the more striking on that account is its effect: for, by mere maintenance of a point of view which no one can deny to be the most important point of view, Mrs. Bosanquet gives us a most weighty criticism of, and a powerful antidote to, that wrong focusing of attention, whether economic or biological in character, which has obscured judgment on social problems for many years. The book is divided into two parts: The first part is historical. The Family is traced from the earliest times—"no race has been found in which it does not exist;" it is considered in relation to industry, to property, to the State. The second part treats of the Modern Family—its bases, economic function, its constituent parts, its outlook.

The writer is, as is fitting, in strong sympathy with her subject. "No people has advanced far in civilization in which it (the family) has not been highly organized and firmly knit together." If the Family comes together for the sake of life, it must remain together for the sake of good life. In its history we find it using Industry and Property as means for the development of its life, its unity, and its stability. We see family life in turn affected by the development of Industry and by changes of various kinds in the laws relating to Property. Of special interest in both these respects are the studies of the Patriarchal Family in Russia and in France, and of the feudal laws in France and in England. The Modern Family has, Mrs. Bosanquet maintains, "freed itself

both from the spiritual tyranny of ancestor-worship and the material tyranny of landed property, but has inherited and preserved the best traditions of both." "Its strength lies in the fact that in it we are attaining, on the one hand, to a higher knowledge of the true spiritual forces which bind the generations together, on the other to a better theory of material property. . . . The recognition of the fact that a more unfailing source of material prosperity lies in personal qualities than in either land or money, has enabled the Modern Family to maintain itself independently of inherited wealth," p. 336. "From time to time," says Mrs. Bosanquet, "the state has made strenuous efforts to mold the Family according to its needs; but ultimately the State itself must always be molded by the Family, since it is in the Family that the citizen is made." Family-life the nursery of good citizenship; personal quality the determining factor in social life; these are the two most frequently recurring notes in this admirable treatise: they form together its *leib-motiv*.

Of causes militating against family life at present, Mrs. Bosanquet finds that "personal defects of character stand, of course, preëminent," p. 338. She also finds "the Family failing and perverted: (1) Wherever the burden of maintaining it is transferred (to any great extent) from the strong members to the weak;" (2) "wherever there is an extensive reliance upon external sources of maintenance." "It is to this evasion of the responsibility which is the strength of the Family that we mainly owe the degenerate family-life which is characteristic of the worst, not necessarily the poorest, parts of our towns," p. 340, and wherever, as in large towns (3) there is "the habit of facile and superficial intercourse which grows up when people are herded together in very close quarters."

The book is not an exhaustive history of the Family, in all its various forms and stages, even so far as that history is to be found in all the varied writings and records of research on this subject. It does not even pretend to give to English readers a synopsis of that literature which exists—for the most part in German or French. Incidentally, much is done in both these directions. But the aim of the book is something different—it is "to bring together the materials for an estimate of the meaning and importance of the Family as an institution in human Society." This aim it very adequately realizes. With an easy, luminous style, ready but unobtrusive humor, and a warmth that grows into

eloquence, almost into passion towards its close, the book is in its fundamental attitude an admirable contribution on a most important subject.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION. A STUDY IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

By E. S. P. Haynes, late scholar of Balliol College, Oxford. Issued for the Rationalist Press Association. London: Watts & Co., 1906. Second and Popular Edition, pp. 92.

Many interesting points are raised in this essay, and some interesting things are said, but there is a curious sense of inconclusiveness throughout and the conclusions reached are not convincing as an adequate account of the matter. This is partly due, no doubt, to the complexity of the subject, of which, to do him justice, it must be said that Mr. Haynes is quite conscious; and indeed this consciousness is one of the merits of the book, reinforced as it is by wide and alert reading. But the chief cause seems to lie in the omission to state clearly what is perhaps the greatest argument against persecution.

This is simply that it is not justifiable to punish men for doing what they think right, however mistaken, in the same spirit as we punish them for doing what they believe to be wrong. The battle for toleration is, in short, a battle for liberty of conscience as well as for liberty of thought. There is a passage at the end of the book that makes one inclined to say that Mr. Haynes has not only not stated this principle; he has not even grasped it. He contemplates, apparently, with equanimity, "the State occasionally inflicting small fines in the police court on priests who frighten sick persons with fears of hell, just as it now pursues this policy with women who make money by telling domestic servants their fortunes" (p. 85). But this comparison entirely misses the vital point: no one tells fortunes from a high sense of duty; while no one, except from such a sense, it may safely be said, preaches now or is likely ever to preach again the unpopular and terrible doctrine of hell.

To overlook this principle is to obscure the historic outlook. Mr. Haynes starts with pointing out, well and clearly, that the facile theory which makes toleration and skepticism stand and fall together cannot be right. "This would involve putting men

like Socrates . . . into the same category as Pyrrho . . . " (p. 11). But in the main he can only supplement such a confessedly inadequate view by the conception of an "implicit" as distinct from an "explicit" skepticism, and even this conception is blurred for the reader by a double use of the word "skepticism;" sometimes it seems to mean the inquiring spirit of free speculation (e. g., on p. 83), sometimes (e. g., on p. 11) the conviction that no substantial truth on religious matters is attainable by man.

Yet Mr. Haynes sees and points out that it was to men like Thomas More, Oliver Cromwell, and the Quakers, men of the most intense religious belief, that the cause of toleration owed its great advances. Why? Simply because they saw (what, by the way, Marcus Aurelius did *not* see) that once men's hearts were in the right place, they should be left, as far as possible, free to do what they themselves believe to be their bounden duty. No doubt the belief in everlasting hell and in an infallible revelation hindered recognition of this. If there was an infallible revelation, it was bold to believe that some men could not discern it if so they wished; and again, if all men had only one chance of discovering truth in this life and must, if they missed it, perish everlasting, it seemed running a fearful risk to let "pestilent heretics" spread their poison, and not root them out while there was yet time. Doubt, therefore, on these two points did clear the way, but none the less, neither the belief in "exclusive salvation" nor yet the disbelief in conscientious error is inevitably bound up with the conception of revelation, as even the high Catholic doctrine of "invincible ignorance" clearly shows. It is more than half a compliment to Mr. Haynes' work that a criticism of it inevitably tends to pass into a discussion on the whole subject; but there are a few places (e. g., on p. 66) where a severe critic can only deplore that his hatred of priesthood has betrayed him into begging the question and assuming, as a basis for discussion, that the arguments of the "skeptic" are irrefragable and the conclusions of the "believer" idiotic. This is the kind of writing that tempts one to call a Rationalist press rather rationalistic than rational, and a writer like Mr. Haynes ought not to countenance it.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

London.

IDOLA THEATRI: A Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism. By Henry Sturt. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xvi, 344.

Mr. Sturt in this book endeavors to further the cause of Pragmatism by a vigorous criticism of rationalistic thought and an exposure of the fallacies under which it labors. In chapters I-VI he examines these "idols of the theatre" in their bearing upon the several philosophical disciplines and thereafter proceeds in the four remaining chapters to a detailed criticism of the writings of T. H. Green, Mr. Bradley, and Professor Bosanquet.

Philosophy, he holds, is peculiarly liable to suffer from the passive fallacy owing to the philosopher's severance from active life, and by the passive fallacy we are to understand "the inclination to overlook the kinetic and dynamic character of human experience." Closely connected with the passive fallacy are certain more special tendencies, the *Idola Theatri*—intellectualism, absolutism, and subjectivism—and these still further hinder a due appreciation of personality as the fundamental principle of philosophic interpretation. Intellectualism, "the attempt to explain everything in terms of thought or reason, to the neglect of other sides of our experience," while a serious hindrance to a sound logical theory, fails most signally in Ethics. Intellectualist Ethics, while recognizing the importance of social loyalty, misinterprets conscience and free will. The chapter on Absolutism is, in the main, an attack upon Mr. Bradley's doctrine. Mr. Bradley, by conceiving the absolute under the form of feeling, is charged with making it irrational, and his protestations to the contrary cannot be allowed. The fundamental errors are his failure to prove the absolute (ch. IX) and his defective account of the relational concept (ch. V). As regards the latter concept, it is urged that "the relational form is a fundamental and essential characteristic of personality," and "a personal idealist must treat the relational form as valid of the real world just because it is essential to personal experience."

The later chapters are devoted to further detailed criticism of T. H. Green, Mr. Bradley, and Professor Bosanquet, with a view to convicting these thinkers of the fallacies discussed in the earlier chapters. It may be doubted whether Mr. Sturt's interpretations of these writers are always quite just.

Green's "Prolegomena," in the earlier metaphysical chapters, Vol. XVII.—No. 3.

is affected by Intellectualism and Subjectivism, yet neither of these attitudes is in harmony with the ethical doctrine of the later chapters. His intellectualism, it is urged, prevents Green from reaching the theistic position he desired to occupy and his subjectivism renders it impossible for him to get beyond an egoistic formula of morality. "When the form of moral activity is regarded as the quest of self-satisfaction the element of love or charity can exist there only by accident," and again, "to the self-satisfaction moralist it is logically an accident that man is social and can only satisfy himself by taking interest in society and its members."

Mr. Bradley's "Principles of Logic" is subjected to a somewhat severe handling in ch. IX. His account of Judgment, we are told, ignores its active and creative side. "The simplest action, mending a quill pen, for example, involves judgments in which we do not offer ideas to reality to accept or reject, but in which we impose ideas on reality; Mr. Bradley gives no account of such judgments." Purpose and plan, the essential features of reasoning, are disregarded in the doctrine of Inference, which is further held to overlook the importance of Induction. Neither Mr. Bradley nor Professor Bosanquet recognize the importance of Sensation, and in consequence they fail to bring together Knowledge and Reality. A special chapter is devoted to showing the dependence of the Oxford thinkers criticized upon German Idealism.

Mr. Sturt has produced a book of vigorous and suggestive criticism of current thought and especially of the logical and metaphysical doctrine of Mr. Bradley, who has to bear the brunt of the attack upon "Anglo-Hegelianism." One could wish, however, that the standpoint of personal idealism had been more fully indicated.

A. MACKIE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES, BANGOR.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: A NEW CRITICISM. By Frederika Macdonald. Two volumes. London: Chapman & Hall. [Throws some startling new light on certain passages in the life of that great and greatly troubled man.]

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: Adam and Charles Black.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. By Professor George Stuart Fullerton. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

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COMPARATIVE RELIGION. Its Genesis and Growth. By Louis Henry Jordan, B.D. With an Introduction by Principal Fairbairn. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

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WOMAN: HER POSITION AND INFLUENCE. By James Donaldson, M. A., LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Pp. 278.

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MORALS IN EVOLUTION. *A Study in Comparative Ethics.* By L. T. Hobhouse, Late Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, formerly Fellow of Merton College. Part I, pp. xvii, 375; Part II, pp. vii, 294. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1906.

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SOCIAL WORK: A NEW PROFESSION. ROBERT A. WOODS, South End House, Boston, Mass.

GREEK THOUGHT-MOVEMENTS AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS. W. R. BENEDICT, University of Cincinnati.

EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL METHOD. H. W. WRIGHT, Cornell University.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT IN THE CHILD. M. V. O'SHEA, University of Wisconsin.

THE ETHICS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. HENRY S. SALT, Humanitarian League, London.

SIN AND SACRIFICE. J. LINEHAM, Streatham, S. W., England.

VOL. XVI. No. 2. JANUARY, 1906.

THE DANGERS OF DEMOCRACY. J. S. MACKENZIE, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

ETHICAL INFLUENCES IN UNIVERSITY LIFE. CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY, Harvard University.

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1907.

THE RELATION OF THEOLOGICAL DOGMA TO RELIGION.

Anyone who carefully observes the intellectual currents of our time must see that theological dogma is in a state of decay. It is slowly disintegrating, acted upon by various solvents, not the least important of which is the struggle of conflicting dogmas with each other. But, above all, dogmas decay by a law of their own nature. They have had their rise and culmination, and they must have their fall. The change is slow, but it cannot be prevented; and we have now reached a stage at which many people are asking not whether some particular dogma must go, but whether any theological dogma is necessary to religion.

Much has been written on the subject of religious evolution. In a recent important and suggestive contribution to the discussion,¹ Dr. McTaggart analyzes three dogmas which have been more or less closely identified with religion, namely: A Personal God, Free Will, and Human Immortality. With regard to the determination of the will, it seems to be a pure question of fact with which science ought to be competent to deal, and, if not already settled, it is probably in a fair way of being settled. This and the other two dogmas are examined at some length, and the conclusion is drawn that they all stand upon an insufficient basis of probability. The last of the three seems to Dr. McTaggart to have a little life in it yet,

¹ J. E. McTaggart, "Some Dogmas of Religion."
Vol. XVII.—No. 4.

but he admits that "there is no reason for a positive belief that immortality is true."

For the present purpose, it is immaterial whether we agree with these conclusions or not. They are results which have already been reached by many others. The significant fact is that certain dogmas which have long been regarded as fundamental postulates should, in the minds of any considerable number of earnest and competent students of religion, after passing through various changes of form, finally reach the *nirvâna* in which they disappear.

No attempt is here made at a detailed examination of Dr. McTaggart's treatment of the subject. The reader is referred to the book itself. But some brief reference will be useful. Defining dogma as "any proposition which has a metaphysical significance," and religious dogmas as "those whose acceptance or rejection by anyone would alter his religious opinion," he is convinced that on matters of dogma we cannot dispense with proof. Regarding some dogma as necessary to religion, he recognizes nevertheless the shifting and transitory character of the former.

"For centuries to come," he says, "we must resign ourselves to the admission that where we have dogma we shall have division." We may lose some dogmas altogether, but we do not lose them until they have ceased to be of use. Religion is, in itself, a desirable thing, but no one dogma can be regarded as essential to it. "Religion is clearly a state of mind. It is also clear that it is not exclusively the acceptance of certain propositions as true. It seems therefore that it may best be described as an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large. The phrase 'a true religion' is scarcely accurate, since religion is not a system of propositions, but an emotion." Yet that emotion is the result of an intellectual process. "No man is justified in a religious attitude except as the result of metaphysical study." "We need for religion to be able to regard the universe as good on the whole, and it does not appear that we could do this except on the basis of a general theory as to the ultimate nature of reality."

This at first sight seems a formidable statement; yet probably everyone has some theory as to the ultimate nature of reality. And presumably we all think the world good as a whole—good enough at least for us to continue to live in it; good enough also to have maintained its existence. Apparently we cannot help this feeling. There is a vital connection between us and the world analogous to that which is seen in the composite corals, where each corallite is connected with the whole by a communal structure. It is well, however, that we should not think too highly of the world; for we need to regard it as improvable in order to call forth our energy to the task of endeavoring to make it better.

Religion is perhaps the most profoundly significant fact in human experience; and it should not be altogether impossible to understand its nature—that is, what it is to all men, and has been at all times. The first thing which strikes us, with regard to it, is that it has both a permanent and a temporary character: the feeling appears to be constant, although the object perpetually changes. For scientific or historical purposes we have to take note of such differences as meet the eye. Each religious group or species is spoken of as *a religion*, each variety as a sect or denomination. Yet even in external peculiarities there is much general resemblance. In preserving the relics of the saints and attributing to them supernatural efficacy, the native Australian and the Roman Catholic are at one. The medicine-bag of the North American Indian, curious as it seems, is found in one form or other all over the world, even in the phylactery of the Jews; and a medicine man, whether in Africa, Australia, Greenland or Siberia, has to perform tricks of legerdemain or produce "spiritualistic" phenomena. And beneath all differences of form it is generally admitted that there is something characteristic of man which has given consistency to the historic religions. This thing we find it very hard to define. Its very simplicity, perhaps, has baffled us, its very depth eluded our analysis. Religion has been defined as various things. Perhaps one of the least illuminating of modern definitions is that of Prof. Tiele, who says, "The true essence of religion is found in the religiosity or religious frame

of mind." It is "the aggregate of all those phenomena which are invariably termed religious in contradistinction to ethical, æsthetical, political and others" ²—which reminds one of the famous definition of an archdeacon as "a person who performs archidiaconal functions." Most of the definitions, however, seem to fall under two heads:

1. Those which make religion consist essentially of belief in one or more supernatural, superhuman or invisible beings.
2. Those which regard religion as an emotion toward the universe, or love of a moral ideal, or a perception of the fitness of things. As it does not necessarily exclude things "ethical, æsthetical and political," it may be called the ethical view.

Strangely enough, however, Tiele brings in the ethical element as characteristic of all the higher religions.³ As we shall presently show, it is found in one of the lowest of all religions. In the first class, religion is a belief or opinion; in the second, it is a state. In the first, religion leads to "doing the will of God" or "pleasing God," or influencing God; in the second, to doing right. In the former, man sees his own image upon a background of the supernatural; and the belief that this is a reality is regarded as religion. Advantage has been taken of this by legislators, to ascribe to their laws a divine origin.

These definitions suffer from another disadvantage: they are based on phenomena which are always changing. The changes have been regarded as a process of evolution, but the evolution is that of theological ideas rather than of religion. Thus, man is represented as passing from magic, through animism and polytheism, to some one of the many forms of monotheism, and resting there. The earlier forms are apparently regarded as of use or as true only in reference to some final mode of thought. Thus, for a hundred thousand years, possibly, man has pursued illusions. The function of each theological conception has been to change into some other. But that process apparently has not ceased, as is proved by the varying beliefs held even by writers on the subject. We do not know what the next change is to be; but it is immaterial, as "religion" is

²C. P. Tiele, "Elements of the Science of Religion."

³*Op. cit.* p. 63.

resolved into a succession of impermanent forms, the meaning and object of which elude our grasp.

The other class of definitions seems as a whole to fit into the facts better, and to indicate some stable and constant element which has survived through all theological changes. To this class Dr. McTaggart's definition apparently belongs. It is clearly out of the first class; and the harmony of the individual with the environment seems to be of the very essence of morals. It should be noted, however, that Dr. McTaggart would not define religion merely in terms of virtue or morality. He thinks that such a definition labors under the disadvantage of having two terms for the same thing. If religion be, as the Epistle of James says, active sympathy and purity of life, if it be merely enthusiasm for virtue, why not use words which are wholly unambiguous and drop the word "religion" altogether? There is much in this; but after all it is more a question of words than of things. If goodness, kindness, generosity, purity, love and so on, are things beautiful and excellent in themselves, they are not made better or worse by calling them religion; and much has been done in the name of religion of which we have reason to be ashamed. Yet it may be asked whether it may not be convenient to have one term which will not only cover all those qualities of character, but also help to explain them. For all religions are right in intention, and in that sense, and in that sense only, true. The motive is of the essence of the act; and the motive of religion has always been good, so far as it has expressed common action.

As things are best studied when reduced to their lowest terms, we might define religion as the instinct which impels all beings to seek that which is regarded as best. In its rudimentary forms it does not require us to assume more intelligence than we might expect from an average robin, or from a child who chooses the largest or the most highly colored of a number of apples. Indeed, the principle may be recognized at a still lower level in the cells of the human body to which we do not assign intelligence at all. We do not, of course, call any of these acts religion. The desire to act for the good of the community does, however, appear to be present in the actions of

the social insects, and in that we seem to have the germ of religion. Even the desire to "better one's self," to get on in life, might be described as an inverted form of religion: the energy and enthusiasm are there, but they miss their proper object. And thus this primal energy will go wide of the mark unless it is guided by intelligence and sympathy. It may be said to be religion which impels a man to save the life of another at the risk of his own. We say it is a natural instinct. Precisely so; because religion is natural. It is the world-spirit moving in us all—the universal inspiration. In this particular case we do not call it a religious act, because we give it a more definite qualification; but it seems to spring from a religious root, inasmuch as the more noble of two alternatives is chosen, and there is also the intelligent perception of an aggregate of which the individual is a part. This, however, is but an elementary form of the religious impulse: its higher forms appear in a continuous series of acts, adopted as the result of deliberate thought or flowing naturally from character.

Dr. McTaggart's definition of religion does not seem to be really inconsistent with the above view, although he says, "To do what I think right is obviously very different from the possession of an emotion which arises from a conviction of my harmony with the universe. Nor are they always found together." The act and the emotion, however, may only be different stages of the same thing. The true perception of my relation to the whole, and the internal impulse, become naturally translated into act accompanied by emotion. It is, of course, the breadth and clearness of the perception which give the highest value to the religious act.

So far, then, as we have been able to trace it, religion, though springing from the lowly root of a primitive impulse, becomes clearly articulate when it reaches an emotion and a desire which take account of the individual's relation to the whole, and therefore involve propositions which have a metaphysical significance. In this sense dogma may be said to be "necessary to religion." But of course that does not necessarily imply *theological* dogma. The genesis of this is known. It appears to have arisen from the play of the imagination upon an im-

perfectly known group of facts, producing an ever-changing phantasmagoria or a moving picture, answering to the development of experience and the changes in society; but, although it has largely determined the forms of religious activity, it does not constitute religion or its fundamental or essential principle. Mythology, magic, theology, even politics, have all come within the sphere of religion, but they have not created religion, nor do they appear to be necessary to it.

It will be sufficient for the present purpose to refer more particularly to the part which has been played by theology. It has been a considerable part, so considerable that it has perhaps received undue attention; and it cannot be denied that theological ideas have added largely both to the complexity and picturesqueness of religious forms. These ideas, inasmuch as they were inevitable, must have had a use. They seem to have been the horn book out of which man has gradually learned to spell the word "civilization." Imagination to him in early times was far more than fact. Indeed, for him it *was* fact. He

"Delightedly believes Divinities, being himself divine."

Theology took the part which is now played by medicine, government, the drama, and even football or horse-racing. Dice-throwing, or divination, was once sacred, and it is still part of a sacred ceremony in Tibet, where a lama annually beats a devil or ghost-king by means of loaded dice.⁴ It is no wonder then that religion (theology) has been said to have sprung out of "a threefold illusion—the erroneous extension of the idea of personality, the confusion between concomitance and causality, and the failure to distinguish between dreams and reality."⁵ And we cannot understand the dominant influence which theological and mythological ideas once exercised upon religious ritual, until we fully realize the nature of the illusions out of which they arose. The most important of these was the belief that the world was peopled by spirits. All the phenomena of nature were spiritual and personal—the rivers, trees, mountains, rocks, earth, sky, ocean, etc.—besides which the dead continued

⁴L. A. Waddell, "The Buddhism of Tibet."

⁵Count Goblet d'Alviella, "Hibbert Lectures," 1891, p. 295.

to live on, frequently with increased powers or even elevated to the status of gods. The world to early man consisted of men, ghosts, spirits and gods; and so the area of his relationship, and consequently of his moral activities, was widened. All were members of the same commonwealth. The juice of the grape produced its sacred exaltation equally upon gods and men. The gods of Babylonia fortified themselves for their contest with Tiamat by drinking wine and mead.⁶ The gods were called in to witness treaties: "The oath is taken in the presence of Zeus, Hera and Apollo, of the god of the Carthaginians, Hercules and Iolaus of Ares, Triton, Poseidon, of the gods that accompany the army, and of the sun, moon and earth, of rivers, harbors, waters, of all the gods who rule Carthage, of all the gods who rule Macedonia and the rest of Greece, of all the gods of war that are witnesses of this oath."⁷

The judicial oath has not yet passed out of vogue. Our jurisprudence is still leavened by theology. Children are sometimes not allowed to give evidence until they can say who will punish them if they tell a lie. Yet we can clearly see that theology is one thing and law another. In like manner theology may be distinguished from religion. Theology is the outcome of a reasoning process. Whether correct or incorrect, there is no moral value in it. But it is not difficult to see the moral purpose behind religion. It was concern for the general well-being not only of the human society but of the spirits and gods also. Is hospitality a right and proper thing? Then the gods must be asked to share all the food and drink consumed; and not only so, but, on account of their superior rank, they must be served first; and so arose the customs of sacrifice, libations and first-fruits. Do we respect the old, the virtuous, the powerful? Then respect must be paid to the gods.

We must consider, moreover, that man believed himself to be dependent upon spiritual powers for every necessary of life,

⁶ L. W. King, "Babylonian Religion and Mythology." Cf. Judges 9:13, "Should I leave my wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees?"

⁷ Polybius. A treaty between Rameses II and the Hittites is couched in similar language (A. H. Sayce, "Early Israel").

for success in every undertaking, even for rain and sunlight. "Except Yahweh keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain." Consequently means must be taken to ensure the continuance of the food-supply—a vital matter to us, but of overwhelming importance to early man, considering how ill-equipped he was for the struggle with nature. Hence, the New Hebridean prays to the sweet potato as he plants it, and planting is preceded by fasting and other religious exercises.⁸ In Papua "the preparations for dugong- and turtle-fishing are most elaborate, and commence two months before the fishing is started. A head man is appointed, who becomes *belaga* (holy). He lives entirely secluded from his family, and is only allowed to eat a roasted banana or two after the sun has gone down. Each evening at sundown he goes ashore and bathes on the point of land overlooking the dugong fishing-ground. He dips his head in the water three times and throws medicine into the water."⁹ The Ainu prays to the bear and millet cake which supply his table, and to the fire which cooks them.¹⁰

The tribes of Central Australia, whose theology, if it exists, is of a very rudimentary character, depute to each totemic group the duty of seeing that the particular object (animal or plant) which it represents shall be fruitful. This is done by the religious ceremony of the Intichiuma. Considering the difficulty of procuring food in so arid a region, it can easily be understood that the performance of these ceremonies is a religious duty because it is first a moral or social one. As to the method employed in all these cases, we have a survival in the petition, "Give us this day our daily bread," in "grace before meat," and in the ecclesiastical blessing of herring-nets, etc.

All this is necessary for the ordinary daily needs of the community. And, if a man be a benefactor who makes two blades of grass grow where one grew before, those also must do the community a service who keep it from starvation. The savage does his best, for he is in deadly earnest. It is frequently neces-

⁸ S. H. Ray, *Journal Anthropological Institute* (1901).

⁹ R. E. Guise, *Journal Anthropological Institute*, N. S., Vol. I.

¹⁰ "Batchelor," "The Ainu."

sary to the working of a charm among the Australians that blood should be made to flow,¹¹ and it is customary for one man to shed his blood to "strengthen" another man. But, in addition to these quotidian requirements, there were times of drought, famine, plague or war, when still more powerful measures were required. It was then that people gave to the gods of their best human offerings to secure the salvation of their country. Such sacrifices were acts of moral heroism when voluntarily made; and only an exclusive regard to their theological aspect makes us overlook their profound ethical significance. The theological element in religion only comes in when men are in the theological stage.

The moral element is sometimes very clearly seen in the initiation ceremonies of primitive people. These appear to be designed mainly to impress the neophyte with the seriousness of life, to teach him contempt of pain, fortitude and self-control, and to make him a useful member of the community.¹² Among the Australian natives oral instruction is given by the older men. The rules taught in southeastern Australia are: (1) to listen to and obey the old men; (2) to share everything they have with their friends; (3) to live peaceably with their friends; (4) not to interfere with girls or married women; (5) to obey the food-restrictions until they are released from them by the old men.¹³ Here is a very respectable pentalogue; and the best comment on it is perhaps the remark of Mr. Howitt, who witnessed the Jeraile ceremonies: "That week passed without a single quarrel or dispute."

The ceremonies connected with burial would afford a further illustration. These are services or acts of kindness to the dead, and expressions of the grief of the living. The grief of the savage is often intense. In the New Hebrides the widow is

¹¹ Spencer and Gillen, "Native Tribes of Central Australia." See also I Kings 18:28. Mr. S. Baring Gould mentions a curious survival in Brittany, where the farmers go to a church and fight with cudgels, crying out, "Give us wheat!" "Give us wheat, oats, and buckwheat!" "Drive away the frost." ("A Book of Brittany.")

¹² For the New Hebrides, see Codington, "The Melanesians," p. 89. See also Spencer and Gillen, "Native Tribes of Central Australia."

¹³ A. W. Howitt, "The Tribes of Southeast Australia."

secluded for one hundred days, except that she goes daily to weep at the grave-side. The relatives also seclude themselves, and the whole village weeps. Food is placed on the grave.¹⁴ In the Binbinga tribe (Central Australia) the flesh of the dead person is sacramentally eaten. The bones are preserved, and a fire is kept burning. After the lapse of a year, there are more solemn performances, and a party is organized to punish the supposed bewitcher of the dead man.¹⁵

These examples will probably be sufficient to show that religion in the form of moral earnestness, or a desire to do the best for the whole community, is found where men are in the magical or non-theological stage, and have been, therefore, said to possess "no religion." This continues through the theological stage. The savage often fears and suspects rather than loves his deity, but he wishes to do justice to him. "Don't trouble about us," is an African's prayer. The Khonds argue with the rain-god, presenting him with eggs, arrack, rice, and a sheep, and point out to him that the seed will rot in the ground, men and cattle and wild animals must die, unless he speedily sends rain.¹⁶ Yet the deities cannot be ignored. Egypt was ruled by gods of whom the king was an incarnation.¹⁷ In West Africa "native tribal government and religious and social life are inseparably united."¹⁸

It will, of course, be readily conceded that the omission of the theological element would have greatly simplified the methods of religion; yet it is needless to speculate on what would have happened if the nature of things had been other than it is. When men were unacquainted with the nature of a headache, and sought relief by wearing their wives' headgear, how unreasonable it would have been to expect that they should grasp the nature of existence! Yet mythology and theology did an important work in the development of the human mind. They satisfied for a time man's desire for knowledge. They

¹⁴ Codrington, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ Spencer and Gillen, "Northern Tribes of South Australia."

¹⁶ Tylor, "Primitive Culture."

¹⁷ A. Wiedemann, "Religion of the Ancient Egyptians."

¹⁸ R. H. Nassau, "Fetichism in West Africa."

produced tribal or national cohesion; but at the same time they often intensified race-hatreds. They encouraged the growth of a false morality; and, as theological dogma developed, it stifled thought, became often hostile to the religious spirit, and in the end seriously retarded the progress of humanity.

It has been put to the credit of theological dogma that it has built noble temples and cathedrals. That is true; although it is also true that theology has pulled them down. Theology in fact developed with the growth of society in a political direction. The temple became the symbol of the state; and the modern cathedral is after all but an attenuated survival of the temples of ancient Egypt, the Ziggurat of Babylon, and the Teocallis of Mexico. We could well dispense with many a noble edifice if the poor might be decently housed. Theology certainly did answer to a craving in man's mind for the vast; but its use was temporary. We have temples yet, and might have more were not warships so costly; but they are temples of art, science and legislation; and there is no reason why we should not have more temples of religion. Early Buddhism, which proclaimed that the desire for heaven was a fetter to the soul, has left in India some of the finest specimens of architecture in the world. And the principles which inspired the builders of those temples may be illustrated by an extract from one of the inscriptions of Asoka:

"Religion is an excellent thing; but what is religion? Religion is the least possible evil, much good, pity, charity, veracity, and purity of life. The organization of religion is thus the chief duty of government. For that purpose the king appoints inspectors, *distinct from the clergy* and the religious orders, whose work is of a higher importance than religious creeds and practices, namely, to promote humanity, good behavior and reverence. For this is the rule: government by religion, progress by religion, security by religion."¹⁹ Asoka evidently lived before his time. He seems to have been the first builder of hospitals.

It may be worth while here to consider the claim that has

¹⁹ Burnouf. See Rhys Davids, "Buddhist India."

been set up, on behalf of theological dogma, that it has been, when thoroughly believed, a source of mental support, as indicated by the expression, "the consolation of religion." Indeed, Dr. McTaggart admits that, in seeking a reconstruction of religion, we want "something which brings with it rest and peace and happiness." The demand is a reasonable one, although it should not be unduly pressed. Increased knowledge and sensibility always bring a possible increase of pain; and it is one of the functions of religion to give us equanimity of mind and power to endure pain. Theological dogma, on the other hand, acts somewhat as a narcotic or stimulant. It is a rather dangerous ally; and is a not inconsiderable cause of insanity. Other things also will afford a similar support. The anarchist will face suffering and death as heroically as did the Christian martyrs. The native Australians gash the body, and purposely keep the wounds open, merely to express grief for a deceased relative.²⁰ They are proud of their scars; but there is no theological implication in this whatever. Vambery relates that a dervish of Tebriz, who had a strong opinion respecting the Caliphate, took a vow thirty years ago that he would never utter any word but that of Ali (the son-in-law of Mohammed), and he had apparently kept his vow.²¹

But is it a fact that theological dogma has usually brought peace and rest and happiness? Prayers addressed to the demon of plague or the goddess of smallpox are not particularly restful. A bad god is usually prayed to in preference to a good one. In an old Babylonian fragment a man complains to Ea, Shamash and Marduk, that a spectre has fastened itself upon his back.²² Had he known that it was merely lumbago, he would have been spared much disquiet, and would have sought out a proper remedy. Few poetical compositions are more pathetic than the Penitential Psalms of the Babylonians; and it is something for theology to have inspired such poetry; yet there is no doubt that it superadded to the pain of disease much distress of mind. The belief in the spiritual origin of disease must have

²⁰ Spencer and Gillen, *op. cit.*

²¹ A. Vambery, "His Life and Adventures."

²² L. W. King, *op. cit.*

been a perpetual terror, even when disease was not actually present. And theological dogma has not improved. To the troubles of this world it has added those of the world to come; and our real consolation is that we no longer believe it. It does not, however, leave us in peaceable possession even of this world. A Christian missionary, writing of South Africa, says, "Wars, drought, famine, pestilence, locusts, cattle plague; does it not seem as if the Almighty is recalling himself to a generation that was forgetting him?"²⁸ A decidedly unrestful belief, which attributes to the Almighty a character truly diabolical, and should dispose us to agree with Dr. McTaggart when he says that "no religion at all is better than a bad one."

Yet religion without theological dogma should help us to do away with many of the evils of life which are of our own causing, and to bear with equanimity those which are inevitable. In this respect we may learn even from the savages, whose initiation ceremonies, which include fasting and the infliction of severe physical pain, appear designed to train the youth to bear suffering with fortitude or indifference. And there remains the positive element of religion—the joy which arises from a felt harmony between ourselves and the universe. The intense love of good, and the strong desire to do as much good as possible, must surely bring with them a satisfaction more deep, real and lasting than any artificial consolation. What joy can equal that of the discovery of truth or the consciousness of having done good? And if a higher sympathy bring us new sorrows, a higher philosophy will help us to bear them.

Irrespective of all this, one is sometimes tempted to ask whether we are quite satisfied by being entirely happy as the result of favorable external circumstances. It was long ago said that it is better to suffer than to commit injustice. There is a certain noble satisfaction in suffering persecution, opposition, and even neglect. "So persecuted they the prophets that were before you." It measures the value of our work; and when we are conscious of the amount of suffering that there is in the

* Coillard, "On the Threshold of Central Africa," 1897.

world, it is something to feel that at least we have shared what we cannot remove.

Another thing should be borne in mind, and that is the tendency of dogma to disappear, often when it is most wanted. Even if a drug be beneficial, it is of no avail when we have run out of it. Excess of ritual and dogma seems eventually, in all progressive communities, to provoke a reaction: In Palestine we see the protests of Isaiah, Micah and Jesus; in India the equally strong protest of Buddha. In modern times the old dogmatic theology has become transfigured or lost in philosophy. The idea of God, after passing through a variety of changes, has finally become an abstraction, a metaphor, or a memory. The gods have become fewer, less exacting, and ultimately less terrible. At a certain stage they melt into poetry or pass away altogether. This result of "evolution" is sometimes overlooked. The process does not end in some fixed type of theological thought, but in the disappearance of theology. One of the most significant facts of modern times is the growth of agnosticism, which is rapidly becoming a literary fashion. Agnosticism is not a religion: it is merely an attitude toward dogmatic theological affirmation; but an agnostic need not be and usually is not without religion. Indeed, so far as a person is agnostic, he should be the more susceptible to religion; his spiritual vision will be clearer, and he will be the better able to realize the possibilities of religion; for a higher order of action is possible to one who is no longer actuated by fear of punishment or hope of reward.

It has long been said of theological dogma that it is necessary to morals, and that the framework of society would dissolve if it be removed. This is rather curious when at the same time morality has been denounced as a sin. The fact is that morals existed before theology. The influence of the latter has been to give an artificial sanction to right action, and also to create artificial vices and virtues. Doubtless theology, while meaning well, has largely tended to make man selfish or to emphasize the lower form of morality, which consists of compliance, under the influence of hope or fear, with a written or unwritten code. Where there is obligation, external constraint, or the sense of

duty, there is no virtue or merit. This lower morality is that out of which religion enables us to rise; for religion teaches a man to give not the minimum but the maximum of service that is possible. Nor does it appear that dogmatic forms of religion have ever achieved any remarkable success. Papal Rome was never particularly pure; and the doings of the Camorra in Naples reveal an almost incredible state of moral turpitude. We may contrast this with Buddhism which, even when mixed with animism, seems always to have had an influence for good.

In connection with this point it is interesting to note the social and moral characteristics of races which have not yet arrived at any very definite theology, and have the most hazy ideas of the survival of human personality. Cranz found the Eskimo quite unable to understand the doctrine of human depravity. But we find that "the Greenlander's language is devoid of any real words for scolding. The slightest harshness in speaking is considered as an offense."²⁴ "The Greenlander is the most compassionate of creatures with regard to his neighbor."²⁵ Catlin said of the Mandans, "A better, more honest, hospitable and kind people as a community are not to be found in the world." He uses similar language of the Crows.²⁶ The Tchuelches of Patagonia are described as kindly and gifted with fine qualities of body and mind. Mr. Prichard mentions an instance: A strange Indian had shared his evening meal. The next morning he had gone, and all the horses were missing. They had strayed a long distance, and the Indian brought them back and went his way.²⁷ The pygmy Akkas of the Belgian Congo are said to have even no fetich rites. They become very angry at the merest suggestion of theft. Their courage is admirable, their contempt of death supreme. When they need bananas they help themselves, but always leave an equivalent in meat.²⁸ The natives of Niué are "honest, energetic, friendly and good tempered. Seduction, which was severely punished in

²⁴ Rink, "Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo."

²⁵ Nansen, "First Crossing of Greenland."

²⁶ G. Catlin, "The North American Indians."

²⁷ H. H. Prichard, "Through the Heart of Patagonia."

²⁸ Burrows in *Journal Anthropological Institute*, 1899.

heathen times, is no longer resented.”²⁹ They have now learned to swear upon the Bible.

Such instances might be multiplied. The subject is a large one, and cannot be fully treated here. Physical conditions and racial character are no doubt important factors; but it is, to say the least, remarkable that wherever we study simple people who have not been spoiled by contact with Europeans, we often find even more than we associate with the word morality; and that occurs quite naturally, and not as the result of any dogma. This fact of itself is sufficient to show that morality has no need of theology.

It is not necessary to make invidious comparisons; yet they will sometimes force themselves upon us. The relations of Europeans with less cultured races have almost invariably been to the discredit of the former. We need not refer to the crimes of white settlers; but better things ought to be expected of the missionaries. Yet in 1811 a Mr. Janz annexed a territory in South Africa without mentioning a single word about the Bushman proprietors.³⁰ A controversy then arose between two rival missionary societies respecting the land. In spite of the suspicion felt regarding Europeans, one cannot help feeling sometimes that a white man is perhaps safer in the heart of Africa than in the heart of London or Paris or New York. To some extent, doubtless, this is the price we have to pay for increased social complexity; and perhaps we must take account of the fact that the success of the dominant races is partly owing to their lack of some of the virtues which we notice in savages. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the vices of modern society; but the fact remains that eighteen centuries of theological dogma have not done for us in some respects so much as nature has done for the savage. The tendency on the whole has been to suppress that intelligence which is the foundation of all morality, to set nation against nation and sect against sect, to harden the feelings and suppress the finer motives. No society thrives upon a despotism; nor can humanity ever reach its goal under a spiritual despotism.

²⁹ B. Thomson in *Journal Anthropological Institute*, 1901.

³⁰ Stow, “The Native Races of South Africa.”

What will remain to us when theological dogma is gone? The answer to this question should be easy. As a matter of fact it does not die until its work, whatever it may have been, for good or ill, is done. It departs because for us there is no longer any use for it. There is for it no more marching or counter-marching: it is dead. All that we can do is to decently inter it, and if possible prevent its ghost from rising again. What is left? All the inheritance of the ages of wisdom and culture. All the energy which theology once so largely absorbed and diverted from practical and practicable ends. There remains

"The primal sympathy
Which having been must ever be."

"Love will not cease. There are other persons to love; and the non-existence of God would leave it as possible as it was before that love should be the central fact of all reality."⁸¹ We were told on high authority that love to God and our neighbor comprehended the spirit of the Jewish religion. We enlarge that idea by turning it into love of the all. We may still cherish that love. To determine what exists is the work of intelligence; and, so far as our life is concerned, we can only benefit that which is known to exist. A personal God, if such should exist, would be only too glad to see men turn away from the vain attempt to benefit him to the beneficent work of aiding and uplifting mankind.

The reality is still left us when the illusions have faded. Religion is left; and religion as here understood is the most potent and most beautiful thing in the world.

"Religion involves believing in something good; and the belief in religion is itself something good."⁸² Truly so; and religion is more than the belief in it. We need hardly trouble to ask ourselves whether we believe in it. We may or may not believe in the air we breathe. It supports our life all the same; yet an intelligent knowledge of it enables us to obtain from it the fullest advantage.

Religion can have no quarrel with theology as such, and can

⁸¹ J. E. McTaggart, *op. cit.*

⁸² J. E. McTaggart, *op. cit.*

do either with or without it. As Hercules is Hercules, even when clad in rags, so religion has always made itself felt and recognized even under the most adverse circumstances. In the darkest theological night it has, in St. Francis Assisi, Thomas à Kempis and others, inspired beautiful lives. Theological dogma would have kept Europe in perpetual night, but it was saved by religion. The love of the highest will always lead man to something higher than he has yet attained—to something at least that is good, beautiful and true.

“Nothing is indispensable perhaps or even necessary; and it may well be that if the joy of doing good for the sake of good were taken away from the soul, it would find other purer joys; but in the meantime it is the most beautiful joy we know; therefore let us respect it.”²³

O. A. SHRUBSOLE.

READING, ENGLAND.

SOME FACTS OF THE PRACTICAL LIFE AND THEIR SATISFACTION.

We distinguish two activities in our lives, the intellectual and the practical. In the former we seek the connection of facts according to law; in the latter we seek to realize ideals: the aim of the one is knowledge; the aim of the other is righteousness. In each of these activities we are successful only in part. There are contradictions in the intellectual realm, disappointments in the practical one, and no hope in either for any immediate change. But the failure in the practical world has disturbed man far more than his ignorance. Historically speaking, in the estimation of man *to do* seems to be more important than *to know*. From the very beginning he has been assured of his ignorance in the midst of an intelligible world, but his records show him bearing that ignorance and the pains and untimely deaths resulting therefrom with fortitude and equanimity compared with his anxiety over what seems to have been for him a more serious business—the attainment of righteousness—or, as he has been pleased to term it, his

²³ Maeterlinck, “Wisdom and Destiny.”

salvation. He has put forth no *knowledge by faith* to satisfy him for his inevitable lack of knowledge, but in the earliest records of Jew and Brahmin we find glimpses of a *righteousness by faith*; and now for nearly a thousand years in this Western world, which seeks its ideal through effort, it has been a source of satisfaction for men and has gone unquestioned as a great religious doctrine having its basis in revelation. Has it a basis in the practical life, and what is the satisfaction in it in terms of that life?

I.

We seek to do well and we fail; these are the outstanding facts in the life of man. The end he aims at may differ and does differ to such an extent that we find the stigma of vice in certain countries upon actions which in others are deemed the highest virtues; but this variation of aim is, after all, superficial compared with the fact that wherever we find man we find that he has an aim: we find, indeed, the thought of duty owed to himself, his fellow and his God. So, too, the fact that in his own experience the rules he makes have no congruity is superficial to the fact that there is no period of his life when he is not called upon to fashion his actions by a rule that makes for something better. From the moment he is aware of himself he grants imperfection; acknowledges, too, a command, peremptory but reasonable, to be done with it; and with this command there is in every man a level of dishonor below which he *would* not fall, and an ideal of virtue toward which he strives.

But he fails in both directions. In spite of his efforts, down below the level he goes at times and the face of the sun is a frown for him; he shrinks from the look of a little child. Or if he be one for whom the mere holding of his place in the moral world is no longer the problem, one whose aim is to incorporate some of his ideal, to him as to that other there comes a great disappointment. With high purpose he begins the work which leads to the perfect way, but ere long the startling fact confronts him that he is doomed to relative failure; he never reaches perfection, nor can he. Not that he never

achieves success. He does; but these partial achievements, while at first they seemed to hasten the coming of his aim and to give him a right to be termed at least a follower, seem rather with the days but to intensify the brightness of his ideal, magnify his own imperfections, and list him first of offenders against the law of his life.

This is not encouraging. To be born into the far country is bad enough, but to be doomed to failure, when in obedience to an unconditional law he seeks the home that seems just beyond, is enough to paralyze the efforts of the most heroic. Still that way, spite of its disappointments, lies man's satisfaction. History and insight tell him this. Reason about it as he may, call himself a fool to fight a losing battle, or console himself with the thought of a day when he shall be done with it, he yet turns again eagerly, and has always so turned, to this digging business where his heart is, and in reality hates the coming of the years that menace his activity.

II.

This ceaseless attempt and no less ceaseless failure have puzzled mankind, and since the beginning have given to him his most vital and most absorbing problem: How can his salvation be accomplished? How overtake the Higher? How be rid of his imperfections? In the attempt to solve it, humanity (for wherever found, man is confronted with the difficulty) is now divided by two diametrically opposed practices, that of the Oriental world and that of the Western. When the Oriental world awoke to the necessity for reconciliation between its own idea of moral rectitude and its own crookedness, it strove first to effect this through an expression of the desires, but later decided that the desires of man, being always accompanied with the pain of non-fulfilment, ought to be repressed. This they set themselves to do, and that way salvation lies for them to this day.

In this manner they of the Orient look at the problem. Although the West is near enough them now to know they are not altogether different in kind from us, to believe that even they may, with their longer experience in living, have much to

tell us; still that nearer view but confirms the fact that negation is the principle of their ethical life, a principle which, in the face of the facts of that life, is not an approach to the solution of the problem there, but an inconsistent attempt to be rid of it; the will to repress the desires being itself a desire. Moreover, the attempt has resulted not in a riddance but a shift. And in the new problem which now confronts and has for so long confronted the Oriental, he has to admit failure. He cannot rid himself of desire. He tries, has tried for thousands of years; but his records show him admitting a failure and trying to satisfy himself therefor. The result, then, in the Oriental world is not a solution of the real problem, but the substitution for it of another, which, though related to the facts of the practical life,¹ and interesting as serious and earnest effort to find satisfaction therein, is not the real problem at all; so far as that is concerned he gives it up.

The Western world, unlike the Eastern, has always clung to the belief that its salvation lies in an *expression* of desires. Its civilization is the outcome of a union of two earlier civilizations, Hebraistic and the Græco-Roman, each of which met and grappled with the facts of the practical life stated above. In one way their efforts at solution were total failures; in another one of these streams contains glimpses of the solution or satisfaction which later it formulated more definitely and handed on to the Western world that to-day considers it the true one, viz.: the Perfection by Faith. Let us consider each of these earlier streams.

In the Greek world the earliest records show an ideal of right in the minds of men and an effort to attain it. True, the ideal was crude. In it justice, humanity and gratitude went hand

¹ It is interesting to note how the Oriental satisfies himself for his failure to repress desire. In the Upanishads of the Orient, poems which address themselves to just this problem of how a man is successfully to repress his desires—the problem of salvation for him—we are told that though his salvation consists of a reunion with the Divine Atmen, or Soul of the World, a union which ostensibly means a cessation of all activities, the man is still a prey to desires: he still acts. But these acts are not those of himself now; that self, linked with the Divine, is perfect, and these straggling sins, the result of old habits, are not counted against him.

in hand with gross immoralities. Moreover, an age wherein man believed himself the sport and plaything of the gods could not contain much serious moral effort. But ideal and effort were there, nevertheless, and gradually the one became more refined and the other more serious. Out of the imaginative mass of mythology, the best passed into poetry, religion and art, expressing the fact that man ought to devote himself to duty, to achievement of righteousness; and this fact, Plato, critic of mythology, poetry and philosophy, sums up by saying that "man ought to become like God as far as this is possible: and to become like Him is to become holy, just and wise." Of this effort before Plato we must record failure, if the serious and earnest effort after him, as expressed in Stoicism, Epicureanism and Neo-Platonism, be any criterion. For these failed. The Stoics and Epicureans strove to bring themselves up to God by acts of wisdom. To know that satisfaction consisted in virtue and that the senses contributed not toward this; to have as the Stoics a contempt and as the Epicureans a control of these: this was their aim. They failed. After long years of effort we find their failure acknowledged in Seneca: he could not become a wise man himself; he despaired of ever finding one in the world. After them the Neo-Platonics—a school which flourished in the first and second centuries of our era—had a different conception of the relation of the Deity to the world. While the Stoics and Epicureans conceived God permeating the world, the Platonists were firmly convinced that He was irrevocably separated from it. Hence, their effort to approach differed from the Stoics. They could not bring themselves up to God; they hit upon the plan of bringing God down to them by a vague theory of angelic emanations forming, as it were, a kind of ladder whose rungs became gradually less perfect as it approached the world. This was the final theory in the Greek world as to the way in which man could attain his ideal. Like the others, it failed. Assuming as they did the externality of the Divine, no ladder could ever reach striving man; he held out his hands for Deity in vain.

The Jew in the very beginning of his history had raised

the question of the Perfect One. Their leaders, by direct communication with the Divine, received His commands, formulated them and resolutely sought to realize them in the life of the nation. "And it shall be righteousness unto us if we observe to do all this commandment before the Lord our God, as he hath commanded us." Whatever failure was in store for him, however strongly he might feel his inadequacy to keep the law or his inability to reach the Perfect through a strict observance of it, the Jew (like the Greek), in contradistinction to the Oriental, believed that his salvation lay in expressing himself through effort. He accepted the fact of his practical life that he ought to strive.

And so he did, with the great failure as a result which is known to history by the name Pharisee. In obedience to the Divine command, the Jew set himself to observe the law with a zealous conformity, which his leaders strove to show ought to be the outcome of a spirit of reverence and love. Later, the great temptations to which the people were subjected, both from within and without, forced the leaders to put the law in a book and centralize the worship, and these changes led gradually to a conformity which grew less and less intelligent. The loss of nationality in 586 B. C. seemed but to intensify the zeal of this people to preserve for the world the law and the religion for which it stood. Though the Judean state was gone, the policy of Ezra-Nehemiah, under the influence of the writings of one known now in their history as the Deutero-Isaiah, changed that Judean state into a church, its people into a religious congregation bent on preserving and keeping the law. Isolation and observance were the keynotes of that policy based ultimately on the great necessity placed upon mankind to seek the Perfect, and one great outcome of it was the Pharisee of our era, dead to the spirit of the law, zealous in preserving all its forms and incorporating new details, and above all with showy punctiliousness and merciless arrogance striving to keep both new and old. He failed. As the laws representing perfection incorporated increased in bulk, so did the necessity for further revelation. Arrogant and gnat-straining, the Pharisee, product of a youthful view of a universal human

problem, became the object of Christ's severest denunciation, the synonym for dead conformity, and a standing example of the impossibility of attaining the perfect by way merely of the law.

But there were in that Hebrew world suggestions of another way of salvation. It is written in one of their books that Abraham "believed in the Lord and he counted it to him for righteousness." This is the earliest glimpse among the Jews of that satisfaction for the moral life which later became so universal in the Western world, but it does not seem to have been prominent in their thought up to New Testament times. The supposition that one could overtake his ideal by *doing* had to be worked out on the boards of time to its logical absurdity in the Pharisee, before Man, with the honesty of himself, turned to another way. Here and there, however, we find reference to it, as, for example, in the book of Habakkuk: "Behold, his soul is puffed up, it is not upright in him; but the righteous shall live by his faith." But, in the main, the thought of the Jew up to New Testament times regarding the practical life included an idea of a perfect righteousness, even God, outside of and beyond man, but revealed as to His will in tables of law; and the further idea that he ought to keep this law. He failed, but he strove, nevertheless, and in time developed the Pharisee and the reaction against him in Paul.

Paul saw the problem presented by the facts of the practical life very clearly. He knew its history, too, both in his own nation and among the Greeks. No one can read the first eleven chapters of Romans without noticing that the spectacle of a world, past and present, groaning and travailing for a perfection without avail, touched him very deeply and made him embrace the faith point of view as a world gospel (Rom. 1:16, 17) with an enthusiasm born of personal conviction and a world-wide sympathy. The law of struggle for a Higher is in every man's heart; so, too, is the inevitable failure (Rom. 3:23). The righteousness by faith turns a man from the spectacle of his own failure to keep an implacable law (Rom. 3:21) to that of a perfect achievement, *viz.*: Jesus Christ,

who becomes the man's own righteousness *because he identifies himself with that perfect achievement.* And in thus bringing into prominence the faith point of view he does not relieve man from struggle or cast disparagement on the law itself. The latter comes from God and speaks against sin (Rom. 7:7-17), and the former must be eternally kept up (Rom. 8:13).

Not the accomplishment of the righteousness of God, but faith in the righteousness of God is, then, according to Paul, the satisfaction of mankind. This was a new way. The old way, for his own race (and, indeed, as we have seen, for all races), was by doing the law. "It shall be righteousness unto us if we observe *to do* all that the Lord our God commanded us" (Deut. 6:25). But now, according to him, we reckon that a man is justified by faith apart from the works of law (Rom. 3:28). Faith in the Perfect One is the perfection and satisfaction for the one who (in obedience to a law of his being) is struggling without avail to reach perfection. It is true that this perfection was embodied in Jesus Christ. But the content of the perfection was not the vital point: it was the *identification of the man with the perfection* (Rom. 1:21). Thus the satisfaction becomes a universal one. Wherever a man aims to do well, the good news of the gospel, embraced to-day by the whole Western world, is that he is at present in some way considered perfect. "Yet not I live but Jesus Christ" (The Perfect One) "liveth in me." And so wherever a man aims to do that which an awakened reason tells him he should do, at that moment the object is a very present reality to him; and this view is borne out by a psychological analysis of this belief in a perfect righteousness.

III.

Belief in a perfect righteousness is always a belief in an idea. The content of this idea varies with climate and tongue, and has an objective reference; but no matter what the objective reference is, the idea itself is always in the consciousness of the one who is the subject of the belief. Moreover, the essential element in belief is an act of will, the former differ-

ing from mere will-act in that the object of the belief or faith is one considered by the believer to be his highest good. One may will, then, without faith, but one cannot have faith without an act of will. Psychologically, then, when one speaks of a faith in righteousness, he means an act of will, the object of which is an idea of righteousness.

In the consciousness of the one who has the faith-righteous experience there are, then, two apparently contrasted ideas, one of what he ought to be, the other of what he is; each of which (upon further analysis) means psychologically a group of more or less intimately related ideas and feelings, one group in close connection with the struggle to attain, its partial successes, its inevitable relative failures; the other in similar connection with a state where there would be, if you please, no disappointments, no failures. When Tennyson considers these two states he expresses a universal human desire:

"And ah for a man to arise in me
That the man I am may cease to be!"

We might (following Tennyson), call the states, then, two selves—"Self B," the struggling self, and "Self A," the perfect self—and state this human longing as one to be rid of "Self B" with its dissatisfaction and failure and to live always "Self A."

There has been an effort in modern psychology to show the origin and development of these two so-called selves. Into the particulars of these efforts we need not here enter. It is enough to say that they are generally considered not two separate selves, but, as it were, two poles of a single axis to which we give the name "Ego." When we speak psychologically of "Self B," then, we do not mean that it is unconnected with "Self A." Each, on the contrary, involves the other; and when we so speak, it is but a convenient way of stating that for the time being we accentuate that particular pole of the Ego.

The two selves are distinguishable, however. One of the chief distinctions is temporal: "Self A" has a future reference, and "Self B" belongs more to the present. There is another: the "Self A" is always unfolding. A content and a

relatively definite outline it has, as an object of desire, but the moment that definite aim is reached another looms up or we find that what seemed our complete aim was, indeed, only a part. The *not yet* is still characteristic of our state. It is this elusiveness of the ideal in actual experience that cannot be analyzed psychologically. Life is a dynamic process and psychology can deal only with the static. We can take a cross-section of experience and analyze it, but in so doing the psychologist knows he is far removed from the actual experience itself.

In the cross-section of experience before us, known as the faith process, then, we have the "Self A" which the "Self B" desires to incorporate, but which is *not yet* incorporated. It is still future. If this temporal difference were overcome, then the man would, to a certain extent at least, arise in me and the man I am would cease to be. Can we overcome this temporal difference?

There is a psychic phenomenon which has an effect on our temporal process; it changes futures into presents and presents into pasts; and that phenomenon is a will-act, the essential part of an act of faith. That which rings the changes in the temporal processes, giving to them the so-called temporal stages, is just the ceaselessly recurring series of will-acts of the ideating subject; indeed, the future means for us just that in connection with which we may exercise our wills; the past that upon which we have already exercised them. When we will any end, be that end one chosen out of many competing ones or the only one meditated, that end is not future in the same sense as it was before the act of will, even though the realization be yet far away in time. Psychologically, an act of faith or will changes a conscious future into a conscious present; brings it in from the more or less vague marginal region of consciousness to which we give the name "future," into the focal point of consciousness to which we give the name "present." In the cross-section of experience which we can analyze psychologically, the faith process makes "Self A" a present fact. What man has faith in is not future but present.

IV.

This result of psychological analysis whereby the temporal aspects of these two selves are exactly the opposite of what they at first appeared to be, receives corroboration from other sources. History, for example, is explicable only in this way. Look at history from the standpoint of the growth of liberty. Such a growth can be explained only as an expression of an idea or ideal of liberty in the minds of men. Both the idea and the expression thereof have always been of a gradually unfolding nature and have always been near each other in time; but the point of import here is that the idea has always preceded the expression. Primarily there is always an identification of men with the idea in such a way as to make it a very present dynamic of its subsequent expressions; in no other way can we explain the facts in the history of men.

This view has been taken, too, by philosophers, poets, and consciously or unconsciously, by men of science as well. The belief in a regular and orderly sequence of phenomena, a belief which every scientist has, makes of that sequence a very present reality for him, which explains all his efforts to express that order in the scientific world.

"All I could never be,
All, men ignored in me,
That, I was worth to God,"

Browning makes his Rabbi say; and Kant's dictum, "The understanding makes nature," and the Hebrew wise man's saying, "As he thinketh in his heart, so is he," are familiar to all philosophers.

V.

From this it follows that when one identifies himself with his ideal by an act of will or faith, he makes that ideal a present fact. It is not a secondary affair, either logically or temporarily, but the most primary and fundamental part of him. If all men without exceptions will ideals; if we count it true that the break to self-consciousness in the life of man as race or individual is a break to duty, to the desire for good,

to faith in good; then that which he has faith in and has always had faith in—the “Self A”—change as it may with clime or tongue or even with different periods in the life of a single individual, is his real self. If, on the other hand, we count it true that the break to self-consciousness is a break to evil and that at some later period a man identifies himself with the good, just as soon as he does so, that good, the “Self A,” becomes a present fact. In either case it follows that the problem of his practical life must be restated. It is not one of how he is to incorporate that which is outside of and future to him, but of how he can, in the face of a hundred oppositions, express what he really is. And the answer to the problem is that he can never completely so express himself. Struggle as he may he fails to express in the majority of cases even the self of which he is aware; or should he—rare soul—succeed in expressing it, he finds it was but a partial revelation of his real self; and so the old problem presents itself again. In actual experience he stands, as it were, between the *not yet revealed*, and the *not yet expressed*; and the willingness to seek both the further revelation and the further expression—the open mind and the willing heart—is his righteousness by faith. His real self is the perfect self perfectly expressed.²

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We thus see that the doctrine known traditionally as the Righteousness by Faith has a basis in the facts of universal

² In the ethical world the situation is wonderfully akin to that in the intellectual one. Accepting ourselves as we are, we find in the latter a demand for orderly and regular sequence of phenomena; in the former a demand for perfect righteousness. We cannot ask (*i. e.*, it is useless) why we have these demands, or why they are not at once fulfilled; why both demands should meet with an opposition which makes their slow fulfilment the outcome of a continuous and never-ending struggle; but accepting ourselves, believing in ourselves, we must struggle to make, in the one case phenomena and in the other case actions, conform to these demands; else intelligence is ignorance and righteousness is unrighteousness. Thus the theoretical understanding makes the nature of ideas; the practical understanding the nature of actions. The scientist's real self which he accepts, which he has faith in, is the universe of orderly and related phenomena which he is trying to make objective as knowledge;

human experience. It is a satisfaction for the problem which these facts present. As human beings we will ideals: the Righteousness by Faith is a revelation of the knowledge that the ideal is not an external, as was formerly thought, but an internal—my real self—to be expressed; not a future which molds the present but a present which is the dynamic of all futures; and it calls upon man to live in the ideal for satisfaction in the never ending struggle to express it. In the language of religion, "for me to live is Christ;" in the language of ethics this means, myself is not the struggling, imperfect self merely; this, indeed, is but the partial expression of that partly revealed perfect self which I really am.

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS.

III.

After what has been already said, the most obvious method of procedure might seem to be to lay down certain ethical principles and then to apply them to economic material. But in this case, as in many others, the most obvious method would not lead to the most fruitful results. Ethical principles do not exist in the air ready to be let down upon any material, economic or other. They are simply the form of the moral life; and it is not easy to separate form from content. The economic content of social life is, as we have seen, already steeped in moral sentiments and ideas: so that economic facts always bear upon themselves the impress of the individual and social morality of their time. The better plan is therefore a different one. Economic

the practical (in the Kantian sense) man's real self is the perfectly expressed self which he is trying to objectify as righteousness. To afford some satisfaction to man for the failure to meet with perfect success in the practical expression of himself we have the strange theory of righteousness by faith: why we have not had a knowledge by faith to satisfy him in the intellectual world it is difficult to say; perhaps he deemed righteousness the more important.

questions should be reviewed not from the purely economic point of view, but with a more comprehensive outlook. Not merely wealth should be taken into account, but everything which gives worth to individual and social life.

To carry out this plan would require a revision of economics from the point of view of ethics. This I do not attempt at present. But some estimate of a more general kind may be offered of the worth or ethical value of the economic factor in life as a whole—its processes and its resultant goods.

This economic factor cannot be separated out from among the other factors in human life, so as to leave a remainder consisting of intellectual and moral, æsthetic and religious factors, which we may regard as of greater dignity or worth. The economic factor enters into or works alongside of all the others. They cannot maintain themselves without it to support them. The so-called higher functions are built upon a basis of animal wants and satisfactions; and man cannot be a philosopher, artist or saint or even a good neighbor, if food and other wants of the body be not supplied. Further, the higher life, at which he strives and to which he attains, tends to keep itself going, as it were, by help of material products such as books and pictures, churches and alms. Even our most spiritual activities tend to issue in a material embodiment, in something which it is possible to buy and sell. This does not prevent us from distinguishing the economic aspect from other aspects; but it does show the difficulty of marking off any class of facts or activities as the product of either aspect alone. It shows also how it is possible for different practical attitudes to be adopted to the question of the relative values of the different factors or aspects of human life.

Everything that concerns us, however refined or spiritual it may be, rests on a material basis and tends to express itself by material products. Our primary wants are for those material things which preserve our animal existence; our primary satisfactions consist in the attainment of these things. New wants and new satisfactions arise with the growth of the individual and of society. Civilization transforms all things, obscures their origin, and may even invert their uses. Knowledge itself

was first prized because it showed men how they could get what they wanted; cleverness because it enabled them to get it. But mental activity produces mental desire; and to know things becomes an end in itself: until to some life itself may seem to have worth only in so far as it enables them to seek and find truth. The history of moral and æsthetic and religious ideals may be similar. All may have begun as assistants to the life of sense and animal wants; while they end by dominating and perhaps despising them. Is it not possible then to question this inversion of values and to say that the material factor (of which economics can give us the measure) is not only the primary but also the most important, and that its subordination to the others is the result of a subtle illusion? This attitude can hardly be said to find explicit expression and defence as an ethical theory. But yet it is a possible attitude, and it cannot be denied that men often act as if it were valid. It might be called materialism in morals or ethical materialism. It does not follow from the metaphysical theory of materialism, however. It would be possible for the latter to be true without the former being thereby justified. The mind of man as well as the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth might owe its being to nothing more than the accidental collocation of material atoms; and yet we might maintain—as so many materialists have done—that the structure of things is not a sufficient guide to their importance: we might even hold that those things which are furthest removed from the primitive atom are the best and worthiest. In so doing we should be only carrying out the distinction between existence and worth. But materialism in morals would give this highest place to the things which affect the senses; all else would be regarded as subsidiary or unimportant; the exercise of reason, the play of imagination, the creations of art, all that morality can do or religion can give would have worth only in so far as they ministered to material wants. The "transvaluation of all values" would be complete; and the ideals which have spiritualized human development would be recognized as illusions or as hypocrisy. This estimate of the worth of life has, as I say, never been put forward as a definite ethical theory. And yet its invalidity does not admit of direct demonstration

like the invalidity of some fallacious reasoning. It is an ultimate point of view regarding the worth of things; and it can only be tested ethically in the way already suggested. We must ask the questions, can it be made finally coherent without disregarding essential facts? and does it awaken a responsive echo in the trained moral consciousness? To the latter question the answer is easy. And if we ask the former question, the result will be the same. The view could be carried out systematically only by annulling or ignoring almost all the facts of morality; for they consist most prominently in the condemnation of that very preference of the material to the spiritual on which this view would rest its interpretation of moral values. It is hardly necessary to discard this theory; for it is not definitely held. But with its fall, there disappears the only ground for the depreciation of any good or desirable object because the value of its material embodiment may be slight, or for estimating the importance of human activities by the material products in which they result. If Economics is concerned with that aspect of things which is capable of measurement in terms of money, then this economic aspect cannot be taken as the only—or even the chief—standard of worth.

While Materialism in morals exaggerates the importance of material goods, it is equally possible to depreciate them unduly, as is done in the ascetic attitude of mind and by the ascetic theory of life. Ethical materialism which makes its appeal to the sensuous factor in life has produced no philosopher (unless perhaps Nietzsche); but it is different with Asceticism: its appeal is to the spirit against the flesh, and it has found many exponents amongst the spiritually minded. It has on its side a respectable body of supporters amongst those men whom the ordinary consciousness reveres as of high—albeit of too high—morality. Nevertheless its defect is in essence similar to the defect of ethical materialism. It disregards or condemns a whole region of worth: not indeed those things which a cultured conscience holds to be of *most* worth, but yet things which every unsophisticated conscience shrinks from denying to be of any worth whatever. Thus it cannot make of itself a coherent system of worths without an arbitrary exclusion of certain fac-

tors. More than this, contradiction lurks in its restriction of worth to the spiritual ; for the spiritual life needs the support of a material basis, the assistance of material instruments. Ascetic systems have often seen this ; but in maintaining that the body and things of the world are only a clog to the soul and that the only worthy life is a study of death, they have adopted a conclusion which cuts away all ground for holding that there is any worth at all in the world or to be got from it. If, on the other hand, the higher spiritual activities of this life have any real worth, how can we deny worth also to the material conditions which make the functioning of those activities possible and efficient, and which give them the instruments necessary for their expression and development ?

They must have an instrumental value, at least. And this instrumental value will vary in degree according to the measure in which any material products or their relative processes tend to promote these higher objects of satisfaction or to make their attainment throughout the community more general. The assertion, then, that there are human goods which are of higher worth than any value which can be measured in money carries with it no necessary depreciation of economic goods : it implies that these latter have at least the kind of worth called instrumental. And this indicates a method by which their worth (or part of it) may be estimated.

To illustrate this, an example may be taken from the question of the hours of labor. In any industry there is a physical limit to the number of hours during which the average citizen or laborer can work ; there is also a lower limit than this after which the extension of his working time would not pay his employer : what the workman produced would either not pay for keeping the workshop going during the time, or would lead to so much exhaustion as to injure his next day's work. This is the economic limit to the length of the working day. From the point of view merely of quantity and quality of product, it would be bad business to have a longer day. But this is not the limit commonly arrived at by working men or by their champions ; nor are these the sole grounds for the limitation. The workman wants to be something more than a working machine,

to have some time over and above the period of physical exhaustion which he can call his own and in which he may cultivate and enjoy his manhood. Amusement—relaxation—may be, often is, all that he seeks; and when this is the case, the fault may be not so much his own as that of the social conditions which have given him no other ideal than amusement. But, as we all know, this is not always the case, and his leisure is often spent in cultivating intellectual and other interests which lie outside his daily toil. The purposes for which he demands that his hours of work be somewhat less than the economic limit would fix, are thus of a very varied and mixed character; and it may appear strange to call them ethical. But at least it will be admitted that it is desirable that he should have leisure for developing and tending the higher life in himself and in his family and surroundings; and these are ethical grounds in the strict sense; and they point to an ethical limit to the number of working hours which it is desirable to fix. This is an instance of the way in which economic conditions are estimated or valued by a standard which is not itself economic, or at least not purely economic.

We may put aside, therefore, both ethical materialism according to which the material goods, with which economics is chiefly though not solely concerned, are the only things worth having; and also the view of asceticism according to which material goods and the processes by which they are acquired are only a clog and hindrance to that which is truly good. And we may now proceed to bring together certain propositions regarding the relation in which economic goods and processes stand to the worth of life as a whole.

1. The "higher" or spiritual activities of man and their satisfaction depend upon a certain competent measure of material goods. Life cannot be so split up into sections that one set of activities—intellectual or artistic, for instance—can go on in entire independence of material wants and satisfactions. It is true, however, that certain activities and satisfactions are, both in degree and in directness, less intimately connected with the material factor than are other wants and satisfactions. It is also true that this characterizes the activities which the modern

conscience regards as the highest. All this is obvious from what precedes and needs no further elucidation.

But it is more difficult to say what measure of material goods is requisite. We can say, however, that poverty puts difficulty even in the way of the ordinary social virtues and makes the cultivation of art and intellect almost impossible. On the other hand it may be asserted with almost equal confidence that super-abundance tends to much the same result, though in a different way. It removes the ordinary stimulus to industry and it tends to concentrate the attention on the things that money can buy. Heroism may indeed be found at both extremes—more commonly at the lower, though it is less noticed there. But there is no absolute mean state of worldly circumstance, of which we can say, this is the state most conducive to virtue. High thinking needs plain living, but it may be assisted by the wealth which can command leisure and the instruments of scientific inquiry. What amount of wealth he can control without being turned from the highest of which he is capable depends upon each man's character and surroundings. Upon them also depends the degree of poverty a man can stand without his moral nature being bruised or crushed by it. The worth of wealth, whether little or great, in any particular case depends on the purpose for which it is used and the manner in which that purpose is carried out.

2. Wealth is always the result of work; but it may not be due to the work of the person who possesses the wealth. He may have inherited it. It is a curious and suggestive fact that almost every Utopia has proposed to do away with the private inheritance of wealth, but that it has been allowed in every known state. Whether the statesmen have all been wrong and the Utopians right is hardly a question for the ethics of economics. At any rate it need not be discussed here. Only it has to be pointed out that there is one element in the worth of wealth which does not belong to inherited wealth. The wealth which a man gets by his own exertions carries with it a certain moral worth: it is the reward or recompense of labor, and as such has an educative effect: both stimulating to work and dignifying the work.

It is trite to speak of the moral value of work. But even so trite a subject deserves remark, when connected, as this is, with so much prejudice and confusion of thought.

Work is so often severe and distasteful that the perfect or paradisiacal condition of man has been pictured as free from it. And the law by which nature requires the strenuous labor of man before it will yield him the comforts and conveniences of living has been regarded as a harsh fate due to some primeval curse. But this is to overlook the function of work in the moralization of man. The inhabitant of a paradise would not be recognized by us as a moral being. It is the remark of a writer on ethics that "wherever man can support life without labor, on the natural fruits of the soil, and climate does not make clothing and shelter an urgent necessity—as *e. g.*, in many of the South Sea Islands, *morality* lags far behind all the other factors and forces that make for civilization. The virtues of sympathy and neighborly kindness have arisen always where the stern necessity of existence makes every man the rival and competitor of every other, not where nature gives each an abundance of all that he requires."¹ The growth of the moral virtues depends upon the fact that the objects of desire do not fall into our hands as the wish for them arises in our hearts. The notion of property, for instance, would never be formed if every want were automatically supplied by nature. And "where there is no property" as Hume said "there is no injustice," nor is there any justice. We must remember that the same circumstances which make the virtues possible, give opportunity also for the moral vices. Each development of the material side of civilization is attended by a special modification of character, partly good and partly evil; each economic condition has its own characteristic virtues and vices.

No detailed reference to this correspondence can be made here. The present point concerns the moral value of work in general. Now there are certain features in the economic development of society which have favored the view that work is of instrumental value only, and that his lot is most worth having

¹ Wundt, "Ethics," Eng. tr., I, 295.

who can escape it. As to this, two things may be noted: On the one hand we must remember that modern industrial conditions have arisen directly out of a condition in which slavery and serfdom were part of the social order. Slavery arose almost everywhere when men settled down into the agricultural state of civilization. The ranks of the slaves were, as time went on, recruited from amongst prisoners of war. So that the harder work of life and manual labor generally came to be performed by a subject and despised population. Even when not performed by slaves it was looked upon as slaves' work. This is characteristic of the ancient civilizations from which our own has descended. It is especially characteristic of Greece and Rome from whom we have, in large measure, derived our ideals of a worthy life. The other feature of economic development which I have in view as pointing in a similar direction is the system of private inheritance of wealth, and the stimulus which has been given to it by modern financial conditions. When an inheritance consists of lands or the fruit of land or other marketable goods, some care and labor are required in their management, that their value may not disappear or deteriorate. It is not quite the same when the inheritance is in scrip. Invested moneys may take care of themselves, if well invested; otherwise, no doubt, they are apt to take to themselves wings. But the inheritor of a fortune in government stock is as free as man can be from any necessity for exertion of any kind. And when there is a considerable class who are free from the necessity of working in order that they may eat, they are likely to invent a theory of life to suit their own case. In this way currency is given to the view that the ideal social condition is one in which certain men or classes are free from all work—or at any rate from the harder kinds of work—and that it is for others to provide them with the means of life and enjoyment.

This view I may call the aristocratic view. On the one side it implies that the material goods with which economics is mainly concerned are not the only worthy things in life. We may find the best expression of this in the theory held both by Plato and by Aristotle that the final purpose not only of in-

dustry, but of the state generally, is to give leisure and opportunity for that higher life which they identified with philosophical speculation. But we do not need to read between the lines to see that they regarded this higher life to be (as indeed it was) possible only for a few. The brightness of their picture is set off by a dark background. It is borne in upon us as we read their descriptions that their ideal citizens—though they may fight for their country and undertake judicial and political business—are never contemplated as under the homely necessity of making their living. The whole industrial fabric had as its foundation a substructure of necessary work which was looked upon as beneath the dignity of the free citizen. They did not regard the “laboring poor” as capable of the virtues which they have recorded for all time as the praise and glory of man’s nature. They found slavery established in their midst, and it seemed to them capable of easy justification as a natural system. (From their day to that of Adam Smith, and indeed till our own day, many fallacies have been comfortably covered up by the term “natural.”) The notable point is that they assumed without question the excellence of a social system in which the higher life was possible only for the few, and only through the unrelieved toil of the many. The contempt of manual labor and also of retail trade which distinguishes the greatest classical moralists had no doubt other supports than this: it was backed up by observation of the rudeness and ignorance of the laboring classes, and of the petty interests of the traders. But in the main it rested on the Aristocratic fallacy—the assumption of a “natural” distinction of classes, only the smaller of which was capable of virtue or of the more dignified pursuits of life.

The older aristocratic view had, however, its good side—in it duty was the correlative of privilege. Slaves and artisans made it possible for the citizen to be undisturbed by trivial economic cares; but he was expected to play his part as a citizen and as a man to display the noble virtues. It was certainly an ingenuous view of the philosophers to look upon the supreme purpose of the state as being nothing less and nothing else than to provide the philosophers with leisure in

which they might philosophize. But it is important to remember that the older aristocratic sentiment, along with its depreciation of manual labor and of retail trade, always professed to acknowledge the responsibilities of the favored few.

It may be doubted how far either of these positions is adhered to by the modern aristocratic sentiment of business and finance, which has taken the place of the older. We all talk of the "dignity of labor"—paying this much homage to Christian influence. Or, perhaps, I should say that the modern depreciation of labor comes not from the aristocrats but from the spokesmen of the laborers who have got tired of other people, who hardly know what work is, talking about its dignity. A writer who is pleased to expound what he calls the "Religion of Socialism" says that "To the Socialist labor is an evil to be minimized to the utmost. The man who works at his trade or avocation more than necessity compels him . . . is not a hero but a fool from the Socialist's standpoint."² The workman (or his self-appointed spokesman) has heard that labor is an evil and beneath the dignity of the free man; and he proceeds to apply the lesson to himself. Against this view may be set the wise reminder of Prof. Nicholson:³ "Some of the moralists of to-day, in their treatment of labor questions, would do well to look back to the medieval ideal. They would discover that many of the noblest and most sympathetic of men—men who showed their sympathy not in writing but in life-long action—looked upon labor as an element of duty and spiritual well-being; they did not regard it as degrading in itself, or subversive of the higher morality, but rather as a healthy foundation of the spiritual life."

In respect of ideal aspirations and the sense of responsibility there is also a change. The older aristocratic sentiment on this point undoubtedly deteriorated in course of time and with the change of social conditions; and it is to this deteriorated sentiment that modern men of wealth have fallen heirs. This powerful class will no doubt work out some theory of the worth of life to suit its own circumstances. Mr. Carnegie (who

² Bax, "Religion of Socialism," p. 94.

³ *Economic Journal*, VII, 543.

thinks himself a democrat) has already given expression to a view of the kind in his "Gospel of Wealth," and his view is essentially aristocratic in its sentiment. The rich are God's elect (meaning by "God," the struggle for existence); and they are to act as minor providences, extending the field of the struggle, and seeing to fair play, by the provision of free libraries and universities, so that all may have an equal chance at starting. Even in this expression of it the aristocratic sentiment has a certain moral value, though that value may be inadequate. It is only when wealth is not recognized as entailing responsibility, when the plutocrat does not admit duties as the necessary correlate of his privileges, that the theory is fundamentally immoral. And this latter principle is not often definitely maintained, though it is frequently acted on.

The real objections to the aristocratic principle are, first and chiefly, that it restricts not merely a competent supply of economic goods, but a reasonable opportunity for intellectual æsthetic and spiritual development, to a small minority of the population; and secondly, that it gives no security against the anti-social and immoral use of their special privileges by this small class of wealthy people.

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HAS SOCIOLOGY A MORAL BASIS?

In the history of philosophy the science of morals preceded that of sociology. As the science of human conduct, it is the first parent of every science, present or future, which treats of the actions of men. Sociology and its branches or departments have only statistical value unless they make inductions from their researches with a view to racial benefit, and the making of these inductions is necessarily moral. Morals, if their progress had not been arrested by the search for sanctions, and had they not been entangled for so long in the web of metaphysics, would have embraced these new developments, and it is very doubtful if they do not embrace them still. There

are social as well as individual morals. The former may be claimed to be an extension of the latter; and if we used the term social morals to convey what we mean by sociology, we should not, so far as I understand the significance of sociology, be labeling it quite erroneously. If sociology has not a moral purpose, it is an intellectual endeavor to obtain data as to the behavior of men in society and would take rank with other branches of human knowledge having no direct bearing upon the welfare of humanity. If, on the contrary, sociology has a moral purpose, then it appears as a branch or offshoot of the moral stem.

If we consider that effort of sociology which aims at the improvement of the race by means of eclectic mating, we shall see at once that beneath the genetic process advocated there is a moral purpose. The advocates of eugenic practice, that practice whereby a good heredity is sought by the marriage of the most efficient, physically and mentally, and the consequent elimination of the physically and mentally most deficient, have avowedly in view the general improvement of the race and not the mere gratification of the breeder's pride or of a scientific curiosity. They desire to increase the happiness of men by the removal of one of the causes of their suffering and also, if I am not mistaken, to increase their general potentiality. In order that a selected posterity may attain to a high condition of mind and body, they are prepared to enforce, by law if needful, the celibacy of all who do not reach the standard that they would establish. They would, in fact, control the instinct of perpetuation. What is being done in society to some extent by natural discrimination on the part of marriageable individuals, what is being done by curative and preventive medicine, by sanitation and hygiene, by the general development of mental enlightenment, they would achieve by what they conceive to be a more radical and expeditious method. They wish to found what appears to them to be a higher, more accurate and more scientific standard of morality than any that has been offered. They seek to create a genetic conscience which will cause men to subordinate their passions to the welfare of the race, and in so doing they may be teaching sociology; but they are certainly

introducing a new sanction in the moral field. They are working in reality to establish a new value of a moral nature. After the creation of the eugenic conscience, each marriage would be judged according to its racial value, and what does this amount to if not to the establishment of a new sanction? Again, eugenics say to the individual, "When you marry, think above all of the race," and if the individual inquires, "Why should I do that?" the reply will be, "Because you *must* assist the perfection of the species." And what is this if not an obligation? Sociology, it may be said, desires to inaugurate a new morality, but morals have all through their history evolved new forms. If a system be devised for the better study of the growth of towns, such as that which in England has been given by its author the name of civics, it may claim to be pure sociology if it stops at the surveys destined to enlighten us as to the habits of town-dwellers, but when it proceeds farther, as it does, and we are informed that this study "prepares for social service," it is very evident that we have here an endeavor to accumulate material destined to show us what we, as citizens, *ought* to do to increase the welfare of society. And here again we come face to face with a moral obligation, so that sociology here has only been acting, in a sense, as an advance agent for moral science. It has been maintained that sociology is a necessary foundation for ethics, because the ethically right must be consistent with the conditions and laws of social development. Now it is evident that if sociology is the foundation of ethics, it must have preceded ethics, since a foundation must precede in time that which is built upon it. But if, taking the natural course, we go back to the origin of society; we shall find that men, living in single families, in places where the physical features of the country afforded shelter, and widely separated from their neighbors, would first observe rules of conduct dictated to them by their experience of life in the presence of untutored nature. Those rules, fundamental in character, would be mainly ethical. No doubt considerations of a sociological nature would follow hard upon them as soon as the dispersed families formed clans, and then ethics would have to adapt themselves to those considerations. But what I wish to emphasize is that ethics, the

science of individual conduct, in the natural order of events, preceded sociology, which indeed only became recognized as a separate science less than a century ago.

A great many attempts have been made to define the difference between morals and sociology. By some, the two sciences have been held to be almost identical; by others, morals have been said to be a more concrete science than sociology, concerning the individual rather than society as a whole. In my view, sociology arose out of the complexity of social evolution. As the world became more populated, it became of human interest to study the relations of man to group and of group to man, and of group to group, their tendencies and predilections, while morals remained concerned primarily with the relations of man to man and the judgment which, according to various standards, were to be passed upon them. Often the ethically right and wrong are scarcely distinguishable from the sociologically right and wrong, if such a term is permissible. Where a man, for instance, possessing a beautiful park in the most beautiful and salubrious spot of a locality, throws it open to the public, he performs an act which is right from a moral, altruistic point of view, and it is equally right from a sociological point of view, supposing sociology to have in view the welfare of large numbers, as it must if it have an altruistic purpose.

It would be morally wrong for a man to induce another to partake of noxious food; but it would surely be a matter of grave sociological import if many were engaged in inducing the public generally to consume such food. Otherwise, sociology, inquiring into the habits of men and coming across a certain category of men engaged in foisting unwholesome food upon the public, would merely register the circumstances.

And does not the constantly exhibited fineness of the distinction between ethics and sociology, ethically considered, point to the fact that there are not two sciences, but one? If there are two sciences, then ethics and its more extended form, social ethics, must constitute one, and pure statistical sociology the other; and in treating of the subject matter of either, it should be clearly stated which is meant. Nothing but confusion of

ideas will result from the system of indiscrimination hitherto largely employed.

When the London Sociological Society was founded, numerous meetings were occupied in attempts to define sociology, and so great was the uncertainty as to the meaning of the word that on one occasion the chairman himself proclaimed his doubts of the existence of any science of that name. Why was there this uncertainty? Largely because it was not sufficiently understood whether sociology possessed a moral side or character or whether it was solely a descriptive science.

If sociology, embracing anthropology, confines itself to collecting instances of the ways of savages, to studying the acts of men in history and the manners and developments of contemporary society, then it has distinctive scope; but when, as before remarked, it is made apparent that it does all this with an eye to social reform, then it partakes of the nature of ethics. If sociology is to establish a claim to independence, it should, it seems to me, investigate society, past and present; discover laws if possible, and then deliver the results of its labor to morals for valuation. But this it does not generally do. There is no absolute need that it should do so; only if it does not, it ceases to be sociology proper and becomes social ethics. Suppose that sociology has no moral basis or intention and that its main purpose, as its name would seem to imply, is to discover laws of social evolution; is it not apparent that unless it does this with a view to predict the future, it is merely a description of laws apparently in operation at various periods, and is chiefly of historical interest? But if it does attempt to deduce the future from the past and present, it is attempting the impossible, seeing that human conditions are subject to change from agencies not known to the predicting generation, and that they vary with the whole course of intellectual development which cannot be pre-ascertained. In this form it seems a thin and somewhat delusive science, having no more useful object than the classification of human tendencies at separate periods. Suppose, to take a familiar example, in the time of Louis XVI of France, a sociologist, arguing backwards to the time of Cromwell, discovered that it was a habit of governments from

time to time to execute sovereigns, and that, therefore, all sovereigns when they ascend the throne are exposed to the risk of execution by a vote of the majority of the nation's representatives. But to-day monarchs in civilized countries have lost the absolute power which they once possessed and which was the cause of the resentment they excited; and in addition to this, governments have become more humane. They *depose* kings and exile pretenders to the throne, and the time may come when kings will have altogether ceased to be. How can sociology formulate any laws with the shifting sands of human things? It is not possible. The present cannot be as the past, and the future will not be as the present. For the reasons above stated, sociology as it is studied appears to me to divide itself into two sections, which I would name moral sociology and statistical sociology. In the former division I would place all studies of the habits of men in society, which have as their ultimate object the amelioration of the human state; and in the second all those which have no such end in view. If this division were made, it would soon become evident, I think, that by far the greater attention was bestowed upon the former section. Now, as the former can be shown to be a branch of morals, it follows that the latter, which has the most claim to be called sociology proper, is in reality a science of but small extent, and that that sociology which embraces both and which yet wishes to be considered as a distinct science, is placed in a dilemma. If it shakes off its connection with morals it disappoints the aspirations of many of its students and reduces its human value; if it remains partly of a moral character, then it loses a portion of its independence.

Is there any way out of this *impasse*? None but by acknowledging that sociology is a bipartite science, one part independent and the other a branch of morals. But sociologists appear by no means disposed to adopt this course, and are frequently seen to assert instead a claim to substitute sociology for morals altogether, treating the latter as an obsolete and vexatiously complex science which it would be advantageous to lose. This claim may be disregarded. However much its sanctions and its principles may change with the general evolu-

tion of thought, there must always be a science of conduct that will form one with the body of ethical knowledge which has preceded it. If it is attempted to discard this ancient science in favor of one which values less and describes more, trusting to the acquired force of civilization to guide human action on the best and fittest path, then reliance is placed upon an influence which has been seen to be uncertain. Nevertheless, if morals are to avoid becoming to some extent as stationary a science as logic was before attempts were made to adapt it to the requirements of modern scientific investigation, they must undoubtedly lay claim at least to partnership in the ethics of sociology and continue to exercise their traditional functions of valuation in respect of all new social ideals, either spontaneously evolved by society in progress or offered by individual social reformers.

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THE OUGHT AND REALITY.

Physical science attempts to describe reality in terms of three dimensions or independent variables, *viz.*: time, space, and energy. The philosophic meaning of these I have attempted to define elsewhere.¹ If we look a little more closely, however, we shall find that another dimension is implied besides those it avows, *viz.*: that the universe is amenable to ideals; that the flux of things has meaning. This tacit demand, which is the very spirit of science, cannot be reduced to mere monotonous uniformity; it has nothing to do with spatial distance; it is not accounted for by the mere transmutations of time, which must, on the contrary, be evaluated and given direction from another dimension.

True, materialism has always insisted that such a dimension is superfluous. But materialism makes far too great demands on our credulity: Reason grafted on chaos by accidental

¹ See especially the author's monograph, "Time and Reality," No. 26 in the *Psychological Review* Monograph Series; also his articles on "Space and Reality" in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. III, Nos. 20 and 22.

variation, ideals superimposed upon the chance play of atoms by accident, and this the truth, the absolute truth about it! Far saner seems to me the attitude expressed by Plato in the *Meno*: "That we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think we ought to inquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no use in knowing and no use in searching after what we know not; that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power." For must not the materialistic assumption that truth is an accident prove suicidal to materialism itself? Materialism, too, is founded upon a faith in ideals. Democritus, no less than Plato, tries to penetrate beyond the mere seeming, though for the former the real truth is atoms and the void, for the latter, the idea of the good. We must somehow provide for value and significance in our world. Else why philosophize? If truth is an accident, if the flux of things has no absolute direction, then truth and error, virtue and vice are the same, and it becomes as absurd to speak of a materialistic philosophy as of any other kind. The same accident that makes ideals can unmake them. I cannot conceive of truth as even an ideal limit in such a world.

To have truth and worth in the universe it is not necessary to be "stoppers of the universe," but it is necessary that the process should be in some way selective. As in the dark all cows are gray, so in a flux without direction there can be no valid distinction of values. I cannot agree with many venerable thinkers that only a static universe guarantees worth. On the contrary, I cannot see how ideals or worth can have any meaning in a static world. In such a world everything is, as it were, dumped together, and error and evil, in so far as they exist, have as much claim as truth and goodness. Ideals can only have meaning in a selective process. Even the ideal of uniformity can have meaning, as Poincaré has shown, only in a universe of flux. For it exists in the service of prediction, and what prediction could there be in a still-born world? Flux on the one hand, and an absolute direction eliminating what is contrary to it on the other: that is all the guarantee we need.

This direction is not constituted by what each individual desires. To make the satisfaction of impulse its own criterion would destroy all criteria. For impulse is legion, and life would resolve itself into a chaos of conflicting desires; into what seems to each individual moment. If satisfaction is the test of worth, then whose satisfaction, that of the pig or the man, the fool or Socrates? The worst tragedy of all perhaps is that some are satisfied when they ought not to be. The optimism that the satisfaction of impulse is its own guarantee, presupposes a pre-established harmony between inclination and right, the individual and the whole, the present and the future, which has not been attained and which can only come by the accommodation of impulse to a standard more objective than itself. The limit which in the end determines worth must itself be independent of impulse. It must determine survival. That definite lines of conduct exist must somehow be due to it. This is real idealism, as opposed to naturalism under whatever guise, idealistic or materialistic. Naturalism makes the Ought a mere function of what is. On the contrary, it must legislate to that which is. What pleases may not be what ought to please, and if we indulge in tendencies that ought not to please us, we do so at our own peril.

Santayana holds that the ideal must be the outgrowth and index of impulse; else there could be no false judgments. But how could there be either true or false judgments if impulse is its own criterion? These involve a reference to a constitution beyond impulse. I am quite ready to admit that ideals appear at a certain stage in the biological series; but when they appear they appear as leaps, not as mere products of the past. But why do such leaps rather than others have survival value? This must be because the universe somehow has a direction of its own. It is not accounted for by mere chance. If ideals cannot pass upon impulses unless they grow out of them, they surely cannot do so if they *merely* grow out of them. They must have their own credentials. Strange that thinkers who ridicule Plato for hypostatizing the Idea of the Good, which when properly understood is more than an

hypostasis, should find it so easy to hypostatize the mechanical ideal of atoms and molecules!

To say with the Hegelians that the ideal is already implicit or potential in the impulses must mean very much the same thing, if it means anything. That impulses are good or bad is hardly implied in the impulses. The question of worth can only arise when impulses are evaluated according to a context. That the impulsive satisfaction has worth in the end is not due to its being desired, but that it fits an objective constitution, present and future. This gives "immortal intent" to the process. That the eternally prudent may be sacrifice, that what it aims at cannot as such survive, can be no part of short-sighted impulse.

Hedonism when sorely pressed must have recourse to "on the whole and in the long run," not realizing that it thus abandons satisfaction or pleasure as the ultimate standard, and substitutes a selective constitution. It is this, and not the mere subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which decides what structures can survive and therefore what pleasures can survive.

Neither does self-realization furnish a standard. Consistently stated, it is simply natural history, not ethics. Perhaps the most picturesque statement of this doctrine is the speech of Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*. The myth of the division of the double men and double women and the men-women and each half longing for the other, signifies that love, or the yearning of the soul, means self-completion or the attaining of one's own, the complement of one's being. But there are many types of selves, and each type desires its own fulfilment. If self-realization is to be the criterion of life, what self is to be realized, the baboon self, the pig self, or what sort of self? If all but human selves are to be excluded, what sort of human self? Not the criminal self nor the insane self, surely? Only a normal self could be the standard. As Plato says, It must be a very wise man who is to be the measure. But what is normal?

Psychologically viewed, the ego may sometimes aim to realize or define itself. It may aim to realize social institutions. It

does aim to realize its own tendencies, egoistic and social. But what determines the worth of the activity is not the mere realization of tendencies, but its conformity to the ideals of the race and ultimately to the direction of history. Perhaps such a self has no business to be. Its whole universe or perspective may be sordid and mean, its complement brutal. In that case the ethical process is not self-realization, but the elimination of that type of ego. The doctrine of self-realization, tacitly at least, assumes a pre-established harmony between the ideals of the individual and the whole, or that if each one desires his own realization he at the same time desires the good of the whole. Such a fallacy could only be maintained by such ambiguous shiftings as that between the real good as opposed to the apparent, the true to the actual, the eternal to the temporal, in all of which it takes no great insight to see that there is a reference to a constitution beyond the individual ego.

Even biologically, self-realization can hardly be seriously maintained. We have become so constituted as a result of the demands of the universe upon us that we respond in certain ways. To look out for ourselves is only one of the many demands that are made upon us. Our adjustment in the nature of things is largely institutional and must become more so as a result both of biological and social heredity. To fit into institutions, present and future, must, therefore, be the biological test of an ego worth preserving. The test in the end is extra-individual. And as institutions too are subject to the law of survival, the test becomes extra-institutional as well. It again implies the attribute of absolute direction. A man, moreover, who should be as self-conscious as the self-realization theory demands would be a pretty sickly and clammy sort of specimen. Not of self-completion but the yearning for the Good, to refer to Plato's *Symposium* again, is true realization.

Since Spencer's time it has been fashionable to speak of ideal activity as adjustment. It is not always clear what the adjustment is to. It must be to some sort of environment. But what is the environment to which the soul must adjust itself? It is not merely present sense-perception surely. The

adjustment must be to the future as well as to the present, *i. e.*, the present ideal attitudes must fit into the future process of life. To hold that the ideal is at each stage of the process a mere function of the *is*, the result of the accidental shooting together of the various tendencies of human nature, and also hold that it controls these tendencies, is even more incredible than the materialistic statement that the ideal is a mere epiphenomenon, irrelevant to the going on of the real process. But the latter bankrupts all truth-seeking and all ideal endeavor. Epiphenomenon is after all only a technical name for a lie. Why should the mechanical process produce something which does not express its real nature, has nothing to do with its existence, an unaccountable illusion?

The most important part of the adjustment of civilized man is to the institutional ideals of the race. These furnish a provisional measuring rod for individual life. But social agreement, while on the whole a safer test than individual desire, is not absolute. Can any thinking man be satisfied in merely obeying the oracle of Delphi, "to worship the gods according to the laws of the land"? Socrates may have meant to do so, but the Athenians were right, that he introduced strange gods, new ideals hostile to their conventions. Every institutional embodiment of the Ought is relative.

Neither can reason furnish an absolute criterion. Sometimes, indeed, the individual is wiser than society. Else there could be no progress. As Heraclitus says: "It is the law, too, that we obey the counsel of one." But individual reason at best is dependent upon its historic setting. It is limited by the axioms of the past, the ideals and sentiments of the age. It very easily finds arguments for the stake or the golden rule, the Inquisition or the French Revolution, according to its setting. An appeal to pure reason cannot lift us above the relativity of history.

Even if there is a more comprehensive reason than human reason; granting that such a reason can know the total object of science, the present constitution of things, with its laws and uniformities, in a real time world such as ours, even such a reason could not read off the future. Its attitudes toward

the future would still be postulates; and nothing would seem more certain than the transformation of present meaning. Even such a reason would presuppose direction, beside present omniscience for the validity of its judgments. Its judgments would have to fit into the future as well as the present to be absolutely true. How much more evident must it be that *our* reason does not constitute its own world, present and future! We cannot now be said to mean what we do not mean; and when a richer meaning supplants the poorer and more selfish, that is not because we meant more than we meant or because we wanted failure when we sought success. Paradoxes do not explain. Something must really have happened. And in the Ought process the superficiality of our former insights has come to light. If we learn modesty in regard to truth as we have it, that is not because we know more than we know or possess an absolute truth, but because we have learned from the past that our truth, however satisfying for the time, is provisional. There is a constitution which transcends our purposes whether individual or social. This selects or eliminates in the course of the process.

Our demands and postulates that there ought to be meaning and worth—demands which antedate our scientific constructions and our practical and aesthetic purposes—these are not simply the result of experience, because experience only comes to have meaning and value with reference to them. Provisionally we may regard them as biological categories. They do appear in the evolutionary process. They are involved in race experience and have been forced upon us by race survival. But this only pushes the question back. Why are they conditions of race survival? For we must look at these conditions not only from the point of view of the individual, but of the whole process. They must somehow be involved in the constitution of reality throughout the time process, thus to condition reflection and life alike. They are the manifestations or incarnations in history of the eternal Ought, which is with us always from nebula to society, for even the astronomer and the geologist insist that their facts must have meaning.

Evolution itself must derive its meaning from such a conception of absolute direction. Even such fragmentary cumulation of significance as we find would otherwise be meaningless, for we could have no reason for supposing that the later is any better or truer than the earlier, even on the whole and in the long run, or that the process ought to be read one way rather than the other, unless we assume such a direction. This is the real measure of the process. As regards the pre-rational stages of the process, whether individual or racial, cosmic or human, these would be irrelevant to reason unless they somehow prefigured or were prophetic of reason. That there shall be reason cannot be an accident, if we can reason about things. When at last man awakes from the long slumber of the ages, pregnant with tendencies which ages of selection have forced upon him independently of his individual will, "he lays his hand on his bosom and feels it is warm with a flame out of heaven"—a yearning for that which is not and yet gives meaning and value to that which is. It is this which makes the time process ever mean more than it knows—not *its* wisdom, but rather that in spite of its blindness it comes to fit into a larger pattern. This makes the present, in so far as it is meaningful, fulfil the past in so far as it was meaningful; and as the checkered woof of the time process emerges out of its instinctive darkness into the future, it furnishes the warp which insures a continuous whole.

This Ought or direction cannot be a product. Reflection cannot create this Ought, this demand for meaning and unity, for it presupposes this very demand. Neither can time create it, for time has no direction, knows no ideal. It can but transmute endlessly that which is, each after its kind. What shall survive, if anything but chaos, must be left to another principle. For "time," as Heraclitus has so strikingly put it, "is a child playing draughts." In the flux of process, individual desire and social institutions, intuition and reflection, prove alike relative. What remains is only the direction. This must be absolute, else there is no meaning. This is the absolute ontological limit of truth and worth, forced upon the indi-

vidual by the constitution of reality and the necessities of life, not a mere ideal positing.

Without an absolute direction I do not see how validity is possible. Any theory of the universe which distinguishes degrees of truth and worth, which holds that one state of consciousness may be better or truer than another, such a theory implicitly refers to a standard, a measure more comprehensive than each individual's momentary feeling or view point. To deny this is to land in skepticism with the contradictory implication of a standard more absolute than all, unless indeed we carry out our skepticism to the extent of denying the validity of our skepticism and so commit suicide. We may lay it down then that all evaluation, skeptical or believing, implies a standard transcending the immediate moment and valid for all. But the question remains: How must we conceive this standard? I see only two possibilities: We must either assume with the absolute idealist a complete, all-comprehensive, eternal consciousness, or an absolute direction. Of the former we must even now be sharers or possessors. We must move according to its logical necessity; we must unravel its logical categories; in the consciousness of its completeness we realize our finite fragmentariness. This hypothesis has been more fully discussed elsewhere. Suffice it here to say that if the universe is thus complete and perfect, it is difficult to see how this consciousness of fragmentariness or finitude should ever arise. Moreover, as the necessities of our existence call for adjustment to a world in which change and plurality with all their darkness play an important part, it is difficult to see of what use such a perspicuous hypothesis can be.

If we take the universe, on the other hand, at its face value and acknowledge it for what it is—a stream of processes—then we must seek for another standard. As this standard cannot be comprehended within experience, individual or social; as it cannot be regarded as an accidental product of the process and yet cannot be merely external to the process, we must seek it in the direction of the process. If the process has an absolute direction dictating, not what can arise, but what can survive within the process, then the significance of

the process as a whole, reflective or non-reflective, is guaranteed. And while we cannot read off an absolute truth when we do not have it, we have in this a limit, which however much it transcends our finite moments, yet furnishes the possibility of evaluating our finite degrees of truth and worth. The limit as posited by us partakes, indeed, of the finitude of our positing, but the conception of this limit, however it may vary with human experience, becomes effective none the less for our comparison. And on the absolute reality of the limit must depend in the end all validity, however relative, of truth and worth.

It is evident, therefore, that the concept of validity has a real basis only in a world which has absolute direction. If the process of the universe is merely a chance affair, no ideals can be enforced or be binding, whether mechanical or ethical. Science in such a world would have no guarantee for its ideals of simplicity and unity any more than ethics for its ideals of worth. What keeps warm the passion of science for these ideals is that in spite of the complexity of the world, growing ever more apparent in the course of new discoveries, the facts can be more and more sorted under common principles; the Chinese puzzle of a world does seem to indicate that some parts belong together, and the faith in spite of failure ever springs up afresh in the truth seeker's breast that the rest will yield to the same ideals.

Whether the time process has always been conscious of direction is not the question. This, while genetically interesting, has nothing to do with the reality of direction. We have not always been conscious of space and time and other characteristics of reality, but they have none the less conditioned behavior until we acquired the tools for recognizing them. So direction must have operated before the consciousness of it, to give significance to process when we come to reflect; and for that matter to bring about reflection. For why should we raise the question? The problem is, can we express direction or meaning as mere chance or happening on the one hand, or mere habit or uniformity on the other? It seems to me to involve another dimension besides these. Even

a mechanical ideal implies the faith in meaning. If there was a time when reality was conscious of no meaning, it must at least have had a definite direction toward reason. The process must shoot into reflection by a law or tendency which reflection in retrospect can see to be inherent in the nature of the process, and not as a result of mere chance. Otherwise reason loses all validity as well as efficacy, and the mechanical ideal becomes merged with the rest in the general chaos.

If it is the limit of an absolute direction that gives meaning to our finite and fleeting oughts, our relative ideals, must not the limit, then, be as real as the terms it limits? If we take the straight line and the varying curvatures of which it is the limit, the straight line is surely as real as the curves. I am speaking here of reality, not of worth. The straight line and the circle are worth more or are more significant than the multitudinous curves, but that is not the question here. If we grant the reality of our finite purposes, must we not grant also the reality of the limit which conditions their significance, which prevents their being swamped in absolute relativity or brute chance? Must not direction, without which process is unintelligible, be as real as the process? If it is helpful, moreover, to suppose that there is somehow in the universe such an ideal limit which regulates worth and survival; if even the nebula and biological evolution seem to involve such a direction to be intelligible; if when it becomes conscious of itself in man, it can control, and make significant, facts and impulses; if truth itself is more than an accident and we are not deceived that there can be approximation toward a whole of truth, goodness and beauty, then this limit cannot be merely our fiction, but must be involved in the constitution of the process.

I cannot see how the pragmatic movement, led by the brilliant James, can get along with less than this concept of absolute direction. If it believes that process is amenable to purposes and can be guided by purposes, that the test of ideals is their workableness, it must somehow account for the presence and place of purpose in the process. That the process is through and through reflective is a violation of the prag-

rnatic principle itself, for there are surely some facts which we need not and cannot recognize as purposive. We seem, therefore, to be in a dilemma: Either we must accept materialism, that ideals are accidents and have no efficacy in the process; or we must hold with absolute idealism that there is no process, but that the universe is one complete whole, the purpose eternally fulfilled. In the former case truth becomes merely an illusion. In the latter, truth becomes inaccessible and the world as we have it is illusion. The only way we can steer safely between the Scylla of materialism and the Charybdis of static idealism is by keeping before our minds the concept of absolute direction. This makes purposive significance possible without stopping the universe. It also pieces out the ideal beyond our finite purposes instead of making it a mere unaccountable fragment in the process without any setting in the universe as a whole.

The perennial problem of the one and the many finds its only intelligible solution in the assumption of such an absolute direction. The dialethic whether the universe is really one, and the many an illusion—or whether it is really many, and the unity an illusion—has been waged long, though with bloodless damage to both sides. The atomists of all types, whether believers in the quantitative entities of Democritus or the spiritual monads of Leibnitz or the qualities of Herbart, have found it necessary to account for the apparent continuity and unity as arbitrary and seeming. The monists again, from Parmenides down, have been equally forced to sacrifice the apparent plurality within the world. Brave souls who have had more respect for the facts than for logical consistency have compromised and admitted both the one and the many with varying emphasis according to their peculiar bias. One thing is certain, that on the basis of a static conception of the world, the problem of the one and the many remains as impossible as ever.

Nor is a dynamic conception of the world by itself any more satisfactory. That the universe is process or transformation does not tell us anything about its relative unity or plurality. Process in itself may mean greater chaos as well

as greater unity. It furnishes no guarantee one way or the other. It tells us nothing in so far as it is a mere time process about its *whither*. And still we insist that our world shall be a whole and not a mere chaos. This is the eternal inspiration of scientific research as well as of practical life. Yet how ridiculously meager is the evidence for our faith. Klein-peter tells us that his master, Mach, proceeds inductively as regards this unity, while philosophy proceeds deductively. That is amusing! Have the fair maiden's dreams of love, and her golden hair flying in the breeze, and the Kansas prairie dust-storm all been comprehended within one inductive unity? That they ever will be so is an audacious dream.

We are agreeing now that if there is to be any unity it must be a teleological unity. The dust-storm can only be understood as one with love's fair dream when they can be seen as part of one purpose. Plato felt his way toward such a teleological unity when he crowned his hierarchy of Ideas with the Idea of the Good. But the dynamic cement of process was lacking, and the loose stones would not hold together. If we assume the attribute of an absolute direction, it seems to me we shall have the necessary regulative principle. Granting on the one hand a universe of flux with ever new variations, and on the other an absolute direction, selective or legislative to this flux, in eliminating those transmutations which do not fit its direction—granting this not only as an experiential but as a cosmic principle, and a degree of unity at any one time would be guaranteed and in the long run the successive stages of the process would show cumulative significance, with a backward and a forward reference. Such a universe, too, with its original diversity of stuff to be transformed, with the possibility of ever fresh variations, not precluded by such uniformity as exists in the transmutations—such a universe would also account for the outstanding plurality and opaqueness in any given stage of the process. And as the process, moreover, is as eternal as the direction, the pluralism could not disappear, though perhaps it might grow more articulate and so make disjunctive judgments of the future more possible.

The conception of immortality again can be given real meaning only if we assume the attribute of absolute direction. Mere existence and the tendency to persist *in esse suo* cannot guarantee immortality. The question is not, does an individual desire to persist? Or does he have a specific content? But is he worthy to persist? Is the content significant? In the history of art and institutions, as well as in the history of thought, we learn that only those structures and contents which fit into the future of the process can survive. But if worth is to be a condition of survival, the process must be fundamentally and absolutely selective. It must have absolute direction.

Powerless indeed is this Ought to create its special content. It cannot work *in vacuo*. The grist which it shall grind must be furnished by process. This is the result of free acts of willing subjects; or, lower down, of chance variations, the inwardness of which we are ignorant. Nor can the Ought arrest the flux, nor annihilate its space conditions; but within this process it can determine that what shall survive must have worth, the particular richness or coloring of it being due to the process out of which the Ought selects. The universe indeed becomes other for our earnestness or frivolity, our strenuousness or laziness. But this, at least, is true: that what survives must be in line with the direction of the process. The tragedy, moreover, lies not only in willfully missing the good, but in intending the good, and because of ignorance of the complexity of life and of the future, doing the evil; and the well-meaning man having to proclaim in the tragedy he has wrought: "Das ist nicht was ich meinte."

With reference to the stuff aspect of reality, the finite structure, with its content and uniformities, its impulses and meanings, at any one time, the Ought is non-being, *i. e.*, it is not stuff. And yet it can be no less real than being, for it determines its meaning and survival. It cannot work independently of the finite, but in the transmutations of that which is, it asserts its supremacy, for nothing can have meaning, and nothing in the end can be, without it. It determines the survival of stuff and ideals, which, for the time being, belong to

the stuff side of things. For our ideals are structures striving to reflect or embody eternally the infinite direction. But their eternity is only intended; it is not real.

The Ought is eternal. Since the Ought is not stuff, mind stuff or any other stuff, it is not subject to time and process. Only stuff is transmutable. Having no content, not being itself stuff, for it determines the survival of the stuff-transmutations, the Ought itself is not subject to transformation. It remains eternal in the flux.

With Heraclitus I would agree that this direction is "the divine which feels all human laws." It is "the common" in the sense that it is valid for all and binding upon all, as opposed to the many who live "as if they had a wisdom of their own." Yet it is not the common in the sense of the identical, either in the many opinions or in the historic process. What is common to the savage and the civilized man, to the fool and the wise man, would be pretty thin and meaningless. On the contrary, it manifests itself in the concrete process of history, in the real flux which is not merely a rearranging of bits of substance or mathematical models, as the atomists would have it. It is no doubt true that the common, *i. e.*, the institutional heritage of the race is, on the whole, the safest guide of life. Institutionality is the result of workability for the time being. But if the direction were merely the common, history would be a mere dead level without movement or progress. Its flashes of light must come first of all to the individual.

It is the *道*, the path, of process and survival; but not the path in the sense Heraclitus meant it—an upward and downward path, from fire down to water and earth and up again, "fixed measures" being exchanged, a merely circular process in which nothing really happens. Not so with the real time process, where all uniformity or stuff is relative and permanency is merely an ideal limit. In the Protean guises of this process the Ought asserts itself ever and anon. And while it cannot stop the process, it determines what can have meaning and existence in the process. It is not the projection of the ideals of the individual or of the race at any time. Nor

do they intentionally point to it. They point to their own realization except as they qualify themselves: Not my will, but the eternal Ought be done; and in so far they are contentless. The pointing or direction lies in the destiny "which shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will," not fatalistically, but by eliminating those free acts or accidental variations which do not fit its direction. The Ought, like the voice of Socrates, only speaks in the negative. Its content is ever changing and ever new; or rather, it has no content: and yet though non-being, it determines the survival and meaning of that which is. It is the direction of history: and yet for us it is ever born afresh out of the process it determines. It has no concrete being except as it is thus embodied in the fleeting moments. It thus furnishes the direction in the trackless void of the future as it is continually incarnated into the finite. It thus throws the searchlight of truth ahead; and yet at every moment it is a new, because finite, searchlight, with a new color and radiance, always, however, determined by the same Ought.

The Ought is creative, but it creates not by production but by elimination. It is creative as the artist is creative, *i. e.*, by selection. It is superior to "essence," *i. e.*, to truth and beauty, for example, as historic products, because it determines their worth and survival. It gives beauty to the perishing things of earth. It is both the "heavenly pattern" and the artist. It is a real or ontological factor of the world, as Plato held. What Plato failed to see is that the Good can only create in a flux world and has no other content but the flux. Moreover it cannot be an Idea, because then it would be an essence and relative to itself. No wonder Plato feels dazzled and confused. It is transcendent and infinite. We can only grasp it as a limit. But as such it conditions all our thinking and conduct. It is not, moreover, a mere abstraction. It operates in the concrete world of process. Only thus could it give significance to process. If Plato could only have made use of the conception of struggle and evolution (already dimly outlined by Heraclitus), then the world of flux and the Idea of the Good, could both have been accorded their due

reality. He would not have had to confess failure as he does in the *Parmenides*.

If we cannot give any definite content to the conception of absolute direction; if it remains for us merely the demand for law and worth; if, to use Plato's metaphor, we cannot look upon the sun itself, what is its child, its phenomenal manifestation? What evidence for its existence in the finite, structural world do we have? As we have developed the feeling of extensity with complex instinctive coördinations to meet the reality of space; as we have developed the sense of duration with complex structural adjustments for measuring the flight of time process; as we have developed the feeling of effort to symbolize energy, so we have developed the feeling of Ought, with its tendencies and sentiments, and its sanctions in social institutions, to meet the demands of this fourth attribute of direction. That in the nature of things, just because the process is infinite and our ideals are part of the process, our ideals must be finite, does not invalidate the evidence of the *feeling for ideals* so important for the race. That, moreover, these sentiments and ideals are growing more essential and more adequate to meet the requirements of life must strengthen the faith in their efficacy and objectivity.

It is, indeed, as Kant maintained, the categorical imperative. It commands unconditionally. It does not grow out of our inclinations and impulses, but it determines the worth of these. Its sublimity surpasses the starry heavens, for the whole cosmic process is subject to it. In its consciousness we are mighty and free. We are part of another world to which the stuff world is subject. It is not the good will, but it determines whether wills are good or not. But just because it is an absolute limit; because all our finite ideals are relative to it; because it is the *rationale* of history and not its product, therefore no specific content can be given to it. The maxim of universality and all other maxims are but relative to it. We can only characterize it in the most general terms, and those, too, are finite. It means orderliness and comprehensiveness in the regulation of individual as well as social life. In Professor Palmer's apt phrase, "It is the law that there shall be law."

Perhaps that is the safest determination we can give, in terms of reason, of that which transcends and determines reason. Its concrete content must come in every age from its finite setting in human institutional life and in the individual soul. Thus we are able to meet our concrete duties in our generation.

The ideal must become concrete, as Kant saw, by being realized in a kingdom of ends. This is not so simple as Kant thought. For Kant every individual is a little god or absolute, legislating for all men and the universe at large. But on the one hand the individual historic will is not autonomous, it must accommodate itself to the institutional life of the race; and the two may clash. Human beings, even when they think themselves most rational, do not legislate in the same way, and life must proceed by compromises. On the other hand, the institutional heritage is not final. The individual may be wiser than the institution. But both are subject to the eternal Ought; this alone is an absolute categorical imperative.

Like the First Mover of Aristotle, the Ought does nothing. It only remains itself. It does not itself move. It is not the cause of movement, however, but it determines by its existence the direction and worth of the historic process, and thus accounts for progress. Unlike Aristotle's God, too, it is not only transcendent but ever incarnated afresh into the finite, *i. e.*, it is the meaning we discover in the finite, but more besides. Else the finite would have no significance. Only thus could the yearning in the finite for the complete and whole originate. In being thus incarnated ever anew into human lives and the order of history, it can say with the Christ, "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." It is the Spirit of Truth which guides and shall guide us in all truth.

This conception agrees with the Thomistic as against the Scotist position, *viz.*: that God himself is determined by the norms of goodness and truth, *i. e.*, by the Ought, rather than that these norms are the arbitrary result of God's willing. God on this theory would become the concrete, finite and individual embodiment of the Ought. In this lies his power as well as his goodness. But more of that elsewhere.

With Hegel I would agree that history has cumulative meaning. This holds, however, in the long run, and not always in the sense of logical continuity. History is a real process, not merely a system of logic, a scaffolding of categories. It cannot, therefore, simply be read off by logical implication. History is real happening with real tragedy and real success. It might have a different content and thus must be studied empirically. What the *Ought* determines is that what survives must have worth.

With Fichte I would agree that the universe has a transcendental constitution. But this constitution is not merely a transcendental system of knowledge, a *Wissenschaftslehre*, not even Fichte's, which he thinks our free wills reject to their own damnation. The universe is not so much an ethical system as an ethical process. That which is "over-individual," to use Münsterberg's picturesque term, is the direction of this process; and we are not merely view points within a system, but real actors determining the content and so the character of the world. It makes a difference how we will or fail to will to what the ethical process can realize.

The ethical process cannot be like the Buddhist Karma, for if life is simply the causal result of what precedes, there can be no attainment of an ideal; there can be neither good nor bad, but simply the automatic record of the cumulative result. Life must remain imprisoned in the iron grasp of the past. No, causality itself must be relative. There must be some fluency in the process. But most of all, the criterion must not be simply a product of the past, but an independent variable in order that it may pass upon causality and flux alike. The Karma permits of no salvation; no waking up from the evil nightmare. The horrible dream must go on.

The faith in an absolute direction furnishes a sufficient guarantee for our ideal striving. This is not a mere Utopian or *laissez faire* optimism. There is real evil in the world, real maladjustments, false view points. But though the wicked flourish like a green bay tree, their type shall not prevail. The servant of Jehovah shall eventually triumph, though perhaps through labor and suffering. The righteous remnant shall

survive and inherit the kingdom. Only the just state can maintain itself. And because the mills of the gods grind exceeding fine, though perhaps slowly, we can afford to be tolerant and to wait. "Let the tares grow with the wheat until the harvest." And the harvest is the sifting of the progressive process itself. In view of our ignorance of the future, our motto, just as far as decent living together permits, should be: Judge not. Let it be. The divine direction of history will see to it, in the struggle of ideals, that the superficial and ephemeral are eliminated. Thus man can labor and wait with confidence as regards the final outcome. And if he is made of the right kind of stuff he will be willing to have his ideals, yea, even himself, eliminated if unworthy to survive. In this willingness, at least, he will prove his superiority to chance.

Will the kingdom not of this world and the kingdom of this world ever be one; will stuff and Ought, the traveler and the path, ever blend into one unity? Will the third kingdom, prophesied by Ibsen in his "Emperor and Galilean," the kingdom of God-Cæsar or Cæsar-God, ever come? Not while the world is process. So long as there are transformations, so long must the mills of the gods grind, and so long will the content and meaning of the world be ever new. No, to make circumstance plastic in the service of the Ought is the task and the joy, too, of life, at least of healthy life. The real other, the completer life, is not an absolute system of truth which we now possess and intentionally hide for the purposes of the game, as the most illuminating present advocate of absolute idealism, Professor Royce, seems to hold; but the yet unborn, the insight we have not seen. Any theory which ignores this must make history and duty a mere farce. The universe is process, but through the process the Ought sets the conditions of survival and meaning.

There will always be tired souls, who want rest above all other things; but this must be a rest which the world cannot give, a rest in seeking and realizing the ideal. The satisfaction we *now* seek may itself in a further stage of the process be seen to be relative and unworthy. To stop at that

would be lazy, cowardly and immoral. The real satisfaction lies ever beyond in the Ought. Art tries to steal from the fleeting moments of life their meaning or significance and frame it, and it rests us for a moment. But this satisfaction, too, is relative. The songs of our childhood satisfy our soul no more. The satisfaction of the Greek world is not our satisfaction.

The only way, finally, which I can serve the eternal Ought is by serving for the time being the Ought incarnated in my meaning and in human history. To quote Heraclitus again, "It is not meet to act and speak like men asleep." Whether we are awake or asleep, whether we think or dream away life, we are subject to the law of change, and the law of direction. But if we think, we may enter into the eternal in some degree by striving to understand the direction of things and guiding our lives accordingly; we may become creators instead of mere bubbles on the stream. By acting out my best purposes, by living my highest insight, there shall come, perhaps through failure, perhaps through partial success, how, I do not know, new insight, new capacity for work, love, and appreciation. The eternal Ought will see to it, if we are sincere, that we do not permanently miss the path in the trackless unknown. But our illumination must be the Ought as now incarnated in human history. The next incarnation will come in the fullness of time. The voice out of the dark is enough for the next step.

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SOME ESSENTIALS OF MORAL EDUCATION.

The chief end of education has been variously designated, but there is a growing consensus of opinion that this end is found in a noble manhood and womanhood; in short, in the formation of character. It is probable that if we communicate to the word "character" a sufficient content this designation will hold. "By its ethical influence a system of education must stand or fall," writes Kappa, in a terse sentence whose very pointedness and brevity seem to preclude even the possibility of contradiction.

Yet this writer, in his delightful and searching book, "Let Youth but Know," remarkable for its clear vision and sanity on present educational problems, and for its suggestion of a curriculum inspired by a "religion of the intellect," seems to offer us a different end in education when he tells us that "the fundamental task of a liberal education" is "to awaken and to keep ever alert the faculty of wonder in the human soul." This end, however, is not a different one in Kappa's mind. He has merely borne us along to the borderland of religion, which the moral life must touch for its deeper sanctities, and by the "faculty of wonder" he understands that "overwhelming conception" of the mystery and vastness of the universe, in the infinite and in the infinitesimal, which is in effect moralizing by rendering every mean thought and ignoble action utterly inept and ludicrously out of proportion. In the present writer's view, too, the faculty of wonder must be inherent in the character attained; otherwise the goal of education has not been won.

The aptitude for wonder in the little child finds fitting expression in the well-worn and little-understood couplet:

"Twinkle, twinkle, little star,
How I wonder what you are!"

One of the writer's earliest recollections is of standing at the bottom of an entry by the back gate of one of those tiny houses that line—innumerable and in wearying monotony—the streets of our large towns and of looking up through the

iron hoop that formed the segment of a circle at the top of the gate at the blue sky above. He cannot say why this indelible impression was then made on his mind. But the fact remains.

The same faculty of wonder in the adult Wordsworth refers to in his memorable line:

"We live by admiration, hope, and love."

Even "love is not love" if it be not capable of this subtle sense. In the greatest this faculty of wonder culminates in awe; that terrible power that hides in silent souls and flashes riving forth only in emergencies that stir the very depths of the heart. "Mere morality," writes Edward Howard Griggs, "would mean cold conformity to intellectually recognized principles of conduct, with no touch of enthusiasm, no sense of the infinite reach of life, no atmosphere of wonder and reverence. Such morality is obviously inadequate to the ends of human life, and moral education must include the task of cultivating the higher religious attitude."

"Moral education," to be adequate to the ends of human life, "must include the task of cultivating the higher religious attitude." Here again, how impossible it proves to be to draw those sharp dividing lines, so alluring to the merely mechanical intellect, so amenable to easy and fictitious verbal triumphs, and to front once more the stupendous fact, so crushing to our smaller vanities, that there is no break in the seamless robe wherewith the universe is dressed. The facile distinction between moral education on the one hand and religious education on the other is drawn readily enough, and has its conveniences; but to conceive that at such and such a point the one ends and at such and such a point the other begins is to disrupt the universe. Moral education without vista is no education at all; it is truncated pedantry. Moral education only then begins to exercise its more potent ministry when it confronts and astounds and overwhelms us with categorical imperatives whose origins are wrapped in mystery but whose obligatoriness upon us for this very reason is immediate and certain and bows us in submission and awe.

The moral education then of which we speak, and the "character" in which it culminates, must be conceived as embracing in their content an element, which, for want of more adequate words to express it, we call wonder, reverence, awe; an attitude of the soul which proves to be the Bridge of the Gods to the highest Realities.

One more element we presuppose as inherent in the "character" in which moral education finds its culmination, namely, that passion for human service which spends itself and is spent for others without miserly calculation or circumstantial prudence; which with a pure disinterestedness repays the debt it owes to humanity and is ready at any moment to merge its own in a higher blessedness. This also has no word adequate to express it. It is more than conduct. It is that which inspires conduct, the dedicated spirit that loses itself and finds itself in the love by which the servant of man enriches his fellows. The moral education that inspires a due sense of wonder, reverence, awe in the contemplation of this mysterious and vast universe of being, and a disinterested passion for the service of our kind, is alone adequate to the ends of human life.

Nor must moral education be conceived as too specifically moral. We must live resolutely, not only in the Good, narrowly conceived, but in the Beautiful and in the True; in short, our only sanity is discoverable in living in the Whole. For, wherever we tread, above us are the infinite reaches, and below us, invisible, the fathomless depths, forever humbling to the finality of our moral, æsthetic and intellectual judgments. And if it be true, as in the deepest sense it is true, that the "pure in heart see God," Herbart uttered no less a truth than Christ when he said that "the stupid man cannot be virtuous." The artist too intent upon the æsthetically beautiful, the thinker too intent upon the intellectually true, the moralist too intent upon the morally good, each in a sense too specialized, all wander in bypaths of a narrow world; they do not march along "the grand roads of the universe" that lead to perfectness and that lead to God. We should see life steadily and see it whole. The education of the past, especially in our primary schools, has been too specifically intel-

lectual, and if we have succeeded in producing a shallow smartness, an automatic dexterity, and even a clever criminality, there is little cause for wonder. "Knowledge is vicious if the aim be not virtuous" was long ago said by Plato. The pendulum is now swinging with considerable velocity the other way. And we have to be on our guard no less against any tendency toward a paltry priggishness, a puritanic ugliness, and a pharisaic sterility. It appears now probable that intellectual education and moral education are on the way to a due balancing in our schools; but true equipoise and wholeness will only be found when we summon not only the good and the true but also the beautiful to our aid. Art has not yet endowed our schools with loveliness, and until she arrive the final aroma, bloom, and quality—the "atmosphere" that alone justifies all—will be lacking. For education is concerned not with the intellect and with the will alone; it should take due account also for its surest effects of those emotional and spiritual affinities from which only art may win the subtlest response.

By the ministry of art I mean—to take a concrete example—that in our large cities the common school should not be a barrack-like fortress, with bare, lofty, rigid lines of brick, and gray, hard, asphalted playground, devised for mere utilitarian economy, but a veritable oasis apart, green with grass and trees and gay with flowers, where slum and tenement and flat and street would be forgotten, and to which, in later years, the grown man and woman would revert with yearning tenderness as to a place where beauty, with many endearments without and within, softened and subdued the more bracing intellectual and moral atmosphere and discipline, and linked with gracious touches and treasured associations the present and the future. The artists of the past, they who builded our solemn temples, they who wrought into their madonnas the divine in womanhood and made glorious music echo and re-echo through vaulted aisles, consecrated to the church their high genius and talent. The great artists and creators that are to come will dedicate not only to the church but to the common school their highest and their best.

We are here in the incalculable regions. We may measure intellectual advance with approximate accuracy; we may even calculate with some measure of precision the grades of character. But we have no gauge for the soul; this may flash forth at any moment, when the eliciting circumstance is to hand, and baffle all our presuppositions and plans. Our only safety lies in enveloping the child not in school only but in the home and the social environment amid which he dwells with countless influences of the good, the beautiful, and the true, and in awaiting from him the inevitable response. The child goes forth every day, and the first object he looks upon that object he becomes.¹

The problem of moral education is, then, more than the problem of the school and the teacher, of the minister and of the church; it is, above all, the problem of the parent and of the home, of the social environment and of the nation as a whole. The moral atmosphere of a school may be never so bracing, yet its efficacy will be marred and even rendered nugatory by contamination in the home; and even when school and home and church combine in all wholesome ways for the moral welfare of the child we have still to take serious account of the blasting influences of a pernicious social environment, of unnatural surroundings, and of the stress and storm and temptation that may come and batter against him in the struggle for life in our present economic order.

Most powerful of all preservative moral forces is the true parent, with veracity, integrity, and affection in the home impregnating hourly and daily imperceptibly through the years; there is no armor like to this with which to front the bludgeonings and the subtler and deadlier allurements of life. But next to the wise parent there is no other influence to which we may with greater security entrust the child with all its fine sensitiveness than to that of the true teacher. It has been said that "a schoolmaster can revolutionize a town in twenty years." In our increasingly complex environment this is not so true as once it was. We have to reckon more and more with other

¹ *Vide* Whitman, "A Child Went Forth."

weighty factors that must necessarily coöperate with the teacher if his efforts are to be attended with success, among the chief of which are, we repeat, a healthy home, an enlightened church, natural and beautiful surroundings, and the quickening and ameliorative influence of accompanying social reform. Through all these, and not through the school only, through the home, the church, the street, and the child's whole environment, must goodness and beauty and truth make their constant appeal to the child. Mere cloistered influences suffice not; they must be all-pervading and all-operative; not for this hour or that hour, but for all hours; not for this place or that place, but for all places; not for such and such circumstances only, but for all circumstances. The sanctifying influences of art are not for the church only, as in the past they largely were, nor for the school only, nor for the home only; they must speak through the interests and habits of a people in all their walks and ways. The clergyman is not the only moral reformer; the parent and teacher are becoming more and more conscious of their own moral responsibility toward the children and the coming generations, and will devolve it less and less on any intermediary; and in the long run this moral responsibility will be recognized as the valued prerogative of the people as a whole.

Our concern here is mainly with the teacher. At present, so far as the great majority of the children of the nation are concerned, it is to him largely that we must look for rendering them susceptible of response to the highest influences that emanate from the national life. He may be in this in no small measure usurping the peculiar privileged responsibilities of parents; but this is an exigency of the situation. And, among other things, it is to be hoped that he will do something toward creating the parent that is to be, the father and mother who realize from whom the most vital moral influences may permeate the child, and who duly prepare themselves for their parental and priestly functions. He may seem also to be usurping the province of the minister of religion; but this is another exigency of the situation. As the State has discovered that it cannot securely rely upon the parents and the churches

alone for the education of its coming citizens on the intellectual side, so it is now discovering that it cannot securely rely upon the parents and churches alone for their education on the moral side. The State itself is becoming more and more the parent and priest of its children; and we may look to it to nurture in the nation itself a loftier conception of parenthood.

But the chief servant of the State in this regard is the teacher, and on him more than on any other the destinies of the future wait. In large measure, we have said, he must combine in himself not only the teacher's but the parental and high priestly function. He has not only in his charge a dawning intelligence, but a soul's welfare. For five hours a day, for five days a week, for some ten years the child is his, plastic to every impression; not less sensitive must he be than the potter with delicate fingers at his wheel turning dull clay, with unerring touch, to form and worth and loveliness. Of these seven millions of the nation's children now malleable in his hands, of this raw material, what products shall he make? Here are five hours almost daily—often more, for the true teacher does not content himself with school supervision only: is familiar in the home, at games, and in the main interests of the child's life outside the school. To what account shall he turn them? These school hours too are not hours during which mere desultory and haphazard influences are at work, but hours during which definite conscious efforts are directed toward the child with a clear view to the realization in him of certain well-conceived ends by maturely planned processes. Compared with such efforts as these, fully and consciously made, and extending over so long a period of time each day, even the parent's more vital and individual influence, as a rule cursorily exercised and without well-planned purpose and scope (many fathers see very little of their children), may appear small. And when the size of classes is greatly reduced, as must inevitably sooner or later be the case, making it possible for the teacher to give individual attention to each child; and when the teacher is required, as even now in the schools of the State he is required, more or less, to have as clear a conception of the purpose of moral training and as intelligent

methods for carrying it out (paying due regard, for example, to the capacity of a child for moral ideas and impressions at succeeding stages of his growth and following a comprehensive and thoroughly systematized plan), as are required of him for the intellectual side of his work, we are placing in his hands a power of most momentous national significance. And, ere long, knowing how much we depend upon him for the nation's moral welfare, and how significant of the most vital results his office may be, we shall honor his calling among the highest, permit only such to be dedicated to it as have the highest intellectual and moral worth, and remunerate them, so far as we can remunerate them, in such a way as to clearly reveal our recognition of their high value to the State. There is demanded of the potter the most sensitive delicacy of touch in the manipulation of his clay at the wheel; of the teacher there is demanded a far subtler delicacy still. The potter knows beforehand the exact form the clay shall take; the teacher may work to no set pattern in his mind, and must be eager only that the true individuality of the child shall harmoniously unfold. This separate individuality of each child is sacred and the true teacher will, above all else, respect its sanctity. To this end it will be necessary for him to know not only something of the science of education, a science that is rendered possible only by the unity of human life, the likeness of each to all and the common universal experiences of the race; but he must know something too of the art of education which recognizes with no less insistence the uniqueness and separateness of each individuality, the element of the incalculable and the untried which gives life richness and variety. Upon a due balancing of the methods of science and of art, upon a due recognition of individual and universal claims, upon the well establishment of the fundamental moral principles common to humanity and the conserving at the same time of individual moral judgment and the encouragement of individual moral initiative, the success of a teacher will depend.

With such a view of the teacher's function and mission, especially as the State confers upon him more and more parental and priestly powers, as he becomes more and more

not only an intellectual but a moral educator, as he takes more and more account of individuality in the child and becomes an artist and not merely an artisan, and as we look more and more to him as the main ultimate safeguard of the nation, it becomes imperative that for an office of such untellable significance he shall have the most thorough intellectual and moral training before there be entrusted to him for pilotage "young lives . . . like a fleet of ships . . . soon to sail out over the measureless seas on the soul's voyage."

We are only now, at length, beginning to recognize the moral significance of the common school, the sacred apostolate of the teacher, and to realize that he, or she, who ministers behind the teacher's desk stands on consecrated ground.

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SELF-REALIZATION AS THE MORAL END.

The purpose of this paper is avowedly polemical. I desire to vindicate the principle of self-realization as the moral end against certain types of negative criticism. The critics whom I have in view are of diverse schools; while they concur in rejecting self-development as the standard of conduct, they are by no means agreed as to the alternative. There is even a school of writers who have made up their minds that no satisfactory alternative exists and that every basis of morals which has yet been propounded is either "false" or "inadequate."

I propose (1) to give a brief outline of the destructive criticism to which the principle of self-development has been subjected, and (2) to point out the considerations which in my opinion render the whole criticism futile.

The argument may be summarized thus: To define a man's "duty" as "the fulfilment of his function as a member or element in a social whole," is to enunciate a true but a wholly unimportant proposition. It is in fact a sheer platitude. "Duty" may well be identical with "function," but what we really want is a definite and detailed account of what man's duty or func-

tion is. To substitute the one word for the other simply restates the problem. We desire a definition, and the theory puts us off with a synonym.

Further, if we attempt to apply the principle as a criterion in any concrete case, its utter barrenness is at once revealed. For it casts no light on any real difficulty; it gives no guidance in any genuine perplexity of conscience. Imagine Jeanie Deans in "The Heart of Midlothian," deciding for or against the tempting falsehood by asking, "Will it help me to realize the true self?"

Moreover, even if the principle were not open to the objections already mentioned—even if it gave clear and unambiguous replies to those capable of interrogating it, we might still fairly urge that it is far too recondite in character. If no man can understand and do the right until he has made an "accurate and adequate analysis of circumstances," and has correctly formulated his "station and its duties," morality becomes dependent on intellectual acuteness. Once more in the history of Moral Philosophy we are offered the preposterous doctrine that virtue is a species of knowledge.

Lastly, what shall we make of the conflict between self-realization and social justice, between self-assertion and self-sacrifice? For these cannot be completely reconciled: the attempt to smooth away the difficulty by appealing to the "real" as contrasted with the apparent self is the obvious expedient of those whose theory must at all costs be maintained.

Thus the main criticisms which the principle has to meet are four:

- (a) It states a barren truism—moves ever in a vicious circle.
- (b) It is vague and inapplicable in concrete cases.
- (c) It reduces virtue to a form of knowledge.
- (d) It conflicts with the most patent fact of the moral life, *viz.*: the worth of self-sacrifice.

Those whose favorite reply to a philosophical theory is to represent it as an idle platitude would do well to remember that in the early days of utilitarianism Macaulay analyzed the whole doctrine into two propositions: (1) a theoretical: happiness is happiness; (2) a practical: a man should never omit when he

wishes for anything to wish for it, or when he does anything to do it.

These two indisputable truths supported, in Macaulay's opinion, the whole fabric of the system; its details were reached by what he himself called "sleight-of-tongue." Whatever he may think of utilitarianism, I do not suppose that anyone is likely now to imitate Macaulay's method of criticism; and I venture to suggest that it is *prima facie* improbable that the school of writers represented by T. H. Green have been simply manipulating with more or less dexterity a purely verbal proposition. The principle we are considering declares that rightness of conduct is determined by a man's place in the social whole and by nothing else; so that duty can be completely deduced from a perfect knowledge of the interrelations of the social organism. It is an evidence of the transformation which moral reflection in this country has undergone that this doctrine should now be declared a barren tautology. It is moreover an evidence of the extent to which the moralists of the present day have become oblivious of the controversies of the past. One thing is certain—if this be a truism it is a truism of unexampled fertility, for it cuts through at a stroke all theories which base duty upon any external will, human or divine, all that divorce the morality of an action from its consequences, all that find the vindication of the moral life elsewhere than in reason. All these positions have been earnestly maintained; and however strongly we may dissent from the great historical systems identified with them, we must at least respect them so far as to admit that they are not disposed of by the mere reiteration of a verbal tautology.

But those who urge that the principle of self-development is a platitude rely chiefly on the illustration of concrete cases. They demand from the moral standard clear and unambiguous direction in every "conflict of duties." Their tacit assumption is that so long as any casuistical crux remains unsolved, so long as the standard of moral reference fails to give a decided deliverance in any concrete difficulty, the philosophical problem is still unsettled. The criterion we have been applying must be stigmatized as "inadequate."

It is a curious fact that this objection should be urged mainly by that school of moralists against whose own system it can be retorted with the most deadly effect. We generally hear most about the inapplicability of the doctrine of *εργον* from utilitarian writers; and surely if there is any oracle of moral guidance which is absolutely dumb and worthless in the face of a genuine "perplexity of conscience," it is the principle of "greatest happiness." It would be very easy to reply to the witticisms of this school by considering how much better we succeed in a concrete case by invoking the hedonistic calculus. But I do not press this; for I do not admit the validity of the argument from practical usefulness, even if proved against the moral theory I support, and hence I am not entitled to use it against the theory I deny. I am, however, justified in pointing out that even if it were valid it would cut as strongly against any other standard as against that of self-development.

Now, I admit that in actual concrete life we shall often look in vain to the principle of self-realization for guidance. It is often difficult, sometimes impossible to apply it directly. But I deny that in this fact lies any decisive reason against accepting it as the moral standard. For we are not entitled to make any such demand on the standard as this view would imply. We might even have expected *a priori* that the true criterion of rightness would, when combined with imperfect knowledge of circumstances, yield ambiguous decisions; and we ought certainly to look with suspicion on any standard which offered us a cheap and easy infallibility.

Two elements must enter into the ultimate solution of any problem of the moral life. We must have (1) a correct standard of reference, and (2) a complete knowledge of the material upon which our standard is to decide. Unless both conditions are fulfilled, antinomies are not only possible but certain. And the second condition is one which for finite intelligences can never be fulfilled. This does not mean that a finite being as such is incapable of the perfect moral life, or in other words that sin is a necessary form of finitude, for the moral life is not created by ethical speculation; it is the presupposition, not the product of moral philosophy. But it does

mean that for finite intelligence the rational character of all the phenomena of morality can never be completely vindicated.

To the physicist it often happens that his calculation becomes so enormously complex as to baffle every attempt at a definite result. The particle whose path he wishes to calculate may be acted upon simultaneously by so many competing forces and may be subject to such varied laws that the most expert mathematician is bewildered; and his conclusion, if he reaches one at all, is discredited by the experimental facts. He does not, however, on this account call in question the great principles of his science; he does not indict the law of gravitation as "inadequate;" he does not cease to respect those foundations of mathematics on which all his progress in the past has rested, simply because the complexity of the universe has been too great for him to unravel.

But surely the subject matter of physics is simple when compared with the vast and complicated material of the moral sciences; and in the problem of conduct more than anywhere else we must look for that infinite intermingling of causes and of circumstances which can set calculation and prediction at defiance. For the unknown factors of physics must be few indeed when compared with the unexplored elements of the spiritual life of man; and he who would advance in this great speculation must in the face of moral paradox cherish an unquenchable faith in those principles which have in the past given him all the light he has.

I suggest, then, that the vagueness and ambiguity with which our principle has been charged arise not from any defect in the criterion itself but from faulty and incomplete analysis of circumstances. But, apart from this, it seems inevitable that the ultimate standard should be more or less unfit for immediate everyday application. Without going the whole way with the pragmatists, we may admit that necessities of action determine very largely the route taken by theory; the call of the moment is too imperious to give us time for going back to first principles, and all safe short methods are to be welcomed. What we want for life is, as has been pithily said, a moral ready-reckoner; but in morality, no less than in arithmetic, such an instrument can-

not authenticate itself: it is valid only so far as it can be shown to be grounded on an *ultimately* valid basis.

We are told, however, that there is an insoluble contradiction between self-assertion and self-denial. Here, it is objected, the moral life seems to break asunder. It is perhaps a little daring to suggest that the illicit demand for omniscience lies at the root of this famous antithesis, especially when one remembers the commanding philosophical genius under whose sanction the argument has come to us. It has been emphasized and illustrated with all Mr. Bradley's matchless power. Yet we shall have missed the main lesson of the author of "Appearance and Reality" if we have not at least been taught to "call no man master." And with all the reverence due to so great a name, I must urge that Mr. Bradley's argument does seem to me to rest upon a confusion of thought. Surely it is precisely such a conflict of motives—all in their own places worthy—that finite intelligences ought to expect; it is precisely here that inadequate knowledge of circumstances, incomplete analysis of "what the self is and involves," must necessarily issue in ambiguous direction—and that without in the least discrediting the validity of our criterion. As has been well pointed out by a brilliant critic of Mr. Bradley, the whole antithesis arises from the confusion between "good" and "right." Incompatible objects may all alike be good; only one can in the given set of circumstances and for perfect knowledge be pronounced right. And for such knowledge it seems to me certain that the supposed self-denial is but a form of self-realization.

One objection remains, and it may be dismissed in a few words. It is said that our theory regards morality as a function of the intellect rather than as primarily dependent on the feelings and the will. We have long been familiar with the demand that account should be taken of the emotional and volitional elements in our nature; it is actually becoming necessary now to protest that, for better or worse, man has also an intellectual endowment which must not be completely ignored. And in what sense does our principle, more than any other standard, make morality an affair of the intellect? On any view of the philosophy of conduct, the criterion, whether intel-

ectual, sensitive, or volitional, must be clearly apprehended, not by those who simply act upon it, but by those interested in formulating its theory. If one reproached the utilitarian with attributing to the "plain man" an elaborate system of hedonistic arithmetic of which everyone knows that the plain man never dreamed, he would certainly be reminded of the difference between a principle implicitly assumed and a maxim explicitly stated, or of the distinction between the route by which a belief is reached and the arguments by which it is justified. The reply would be final; but it can be used with equal if not greater force for the doctrine here defended.

I have made no reference to the positive merits of the system in question. It would not, I think, be difficult to show that the principle of self-realization meets and solves various problems which other theories leave untouched, or touch only to confuse. It would be easy to exhibit the inconsistencies and failures of competing schools. Of this aspect of the case I have not chosen to speak. But it is undeniable that in recent years we have been confidently assured that the ethical system known as Neo-Hegelian is discredited by its own inherent difficulties. I have taken up some leading points urged against it and have shown, as I think, that their plausibility arises from confusion and that they are very largely resolvable into illicit demands for omniscience. It can be no valid argument against a philosophical doctrine that it leaves unanswered questions which no sound system for finite minds could possibly answer, and which only a shallow and inadequate theory would attempt to answer. And the difficulties which beset the theory I have been considering are difficulties which must necessarily beset the true solution if found, and which anyone who understood the conditions of the problem might easily have anticipated.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE.

In view of the rapid progress made in recent years in Psychology, as evidenced by the continuous and ever-increasing output of books, monographs, articles and journals covering a wide range of subjects, it is worthy of note that practically nothing has been written upon our most common, everyday mental experiences, such as hope, disappointment, despair, modesty and shame, arrogance and pride, patience and endurance, friendship and loyalty, courage, ambition and very many others. Only one writer, a German,¹ has made a careful study of prejudice. True, Bacon incidentally touched upon the subject in his "Novum Organum" under the title *Idola*, but his treatise in the interest of inductive logic can hardly be called a psychology of prejudice. Novelists, who are sometimes excellent psychologists, have also studied the theme, but rather in the synthetic way of art than in the analytic way of science.

The reason for these omissions cannot be that the subjects are too difficult, or unworthy of study, for psychologists have busied themselves with more difficult and less interesting topics. It must be the very commonness of the subjects. Science, it seems, has generated a tendency in her devotees to study only those things which are invisible to the naked eye. With telescope and microscope they go about discovering new facts, but like Thales they are constantly overlooking wells of knowledge that lie immediately before them. Prejudice, for example, because of its universality and ubiquity in the stream of consciousness, does not attract these psychologists' attention even while more obscure mental processes are being carefully teased and analyzed.

Another cause is the time-honored fallacy that "acquaintance with" is synonymous with "knowledge about;" that what is most common and familiar is best known, especially if its name has long been incorporated in our working vocabularies. Nietzsche has well said: "Wherever primitive man put up a

¹ L. B. Hellenbach, "Die Vorurtheile der Menschheit."

word, he believed that he had made a discovery. How utterly mistaken he really was! He had touched a problem, and while supposing that he had solved it, he had created an obstacle to its solution. Now, with every new knowledge we stumble over flint-like and petrified words, and, in so doing, break a leg sooner than a word." Everyone is acquainted with prejudice, if not from personal experience, at least from observation of others, but few have given the subject sufficient thought to have knowledge about it. Such knowledge, however, is important, and should be disseminated, especially among the young, because of its great ethical value.

It was said that prejudice is universal and ubiquitous. Taken literally, this statement may be difficult to substantiate, but allowing ourselves a little poetic license we might go even so far as to speak of a cosmic prejudice in the sense in which philosophers prate of a cosmic consciousness; in other words, we might maintain that this psychic flaw runs through the whole warp of the universe. Indeed, we unconsciously do this whenever we personify nature, and speak of her likes and dislikes, as her abhorrence of a vacuum, her favorite ways of accomplishing results, her ultimate purposes with regard to that particular species of animal called man, etc. The late Mr. Davidson took Professor James to task when the latter spoke of "the order of Nature" as mere *weather*, "doing and undoing without end," contending that "even the weather reveals an harmonious spiritual intent, in that it contributes to the development of spiritual beings by supplying their bodies with food."²

But whether nature be prejudiced or not, whether her "spiritual intent" be "conscious purpose" or "immanent teleology" (this the metaphysicians must settle among themselves) it is certain that the creators of nature, the gods of the various peoples, from the earliest, most primitive times down to the present, have had their prejudices without number. Even Jehovah, the god of a people relatively high in the stage of religious development, had strong prejudices against all who

² INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. VI, p. 233, 1895-6.

were not fortunate enough to be born of His chosen tribes. Indeed, an unbiased god would not be worshiped or prayed to, for he would have no personality, no individuality, no human attributes, and be as abstract and colorless as law, or being, or the absolute, which no people have ever truly worshiped. Now all living things which have individuality and personality are limited, and biased by reason of their limitations; which is as true of anthropomorphic, personal gods as of men and the lower animals. Whatever is limited is separated and in a measure alienated from all external to it. The skin, for example, forever sets off and separates that which is within from the rest of the external world, and the organism thus bounded reacts not to the whole external universe, but only to those few scattered bits of it which possess that which the organism needs for its sustenance and development, and for which it has the proper receptive organs. To the remaining fullness of the universe the little organism is dead. The world of the amœba for example, while amply sufficient for its needs, is infinitely smaller and simpler than that of the dog; and that of the dog proportionately smaller and simpler than the universe of man. But even man, with his wonderfully developed nervous system and its end organs, cannot respond to all the forces of nature, nor know it in all its fullness. The organ for vision, for example, can only respond to luminiferous vibrations of from four hundred million millions to eight hundred million millions per second; the auditory organ responds only to air vibrations of from eight per second to forty thousand per second; and the skin is unable to recognize as separate touches, taps more than ten per second, or feel a weight of less than two milligrams on the forehead, and fifteen milligrams on the inner surface of the fingers. There is left, then, a whole world of vibrations and specific energies and an almost infinite variety of possible sensations, which are unknown to us because we lack the organs to receive them. Going from the sensory to the border line of the psychical realm, we find there similar limitations, such as the different preferences for colors, geometrical figures, sounds, tastes, touches, and odors. The thought we wish here to emphasize is that the minds, or, better,

the nervous systems of the newborn, animal as well as human, are not indifferent, impartial *tabulae rasæ*, but are active, creative, and to a large extent "set" by very many more or less developed instincts and tendencies inherited from immediate and remote ancestors, which determine not only what impressions shall be received and what rejected, but also in what manner they shall be received, and what reactions, mental and physical, they shall call forth. We recreate the universe, each in his own limited, imperfect way, and no two are exactly alike.

But we must leave this wider consideration of the subject, interesting as it is for speculation, and limit ourselves to a study of prejudice in the sense in which it is more commonly understood, namely, as an *undue* prepossession in favor of, or against an object, being, or thought. Professor Patrick, while not attempting in an article on the subject to give an exact definition of prejudice, says, it is "an individual deviation from the normal beliefs of mankind, taking as the standard the universal, the general, or the mean."³ This limits him to prejudices of the intellectual type—to what may be called Noetic prejudices. But even within these narrow confines his statement will not hold, for it is equivalent to the now obsolete phrase, *Vox populi vox dei*, and the inference that those who do not subscribe to the *consensus gentium* are prejudiced heretics. According to this, Socrates, Jesus, Galileo, Bruno, Luther, Darwin, and a host of other reformers and innovators were prejudiced, which is manifestly absurd. Prejudice does not consist in deviating from a popular standard of any sort, but, as has been said, in an *undue* prepossession in favor of or against anything, be that what it may, a man, or his doctrine, or the color of his hair. It will be noticed that we do not limit prejudice to excessive antipathy, as is generally done, but make it include excessive propathy or predilection as well. Any inordinate reaction of the higher centres to an object is prejudice.

Here we must define the meaning of prepossession and determine when it becomes excessive or undue. To take the

³ "The Psychology of Prejudice," *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 633-643.

latter first: we certainly cannot maintain that prepossession is undue when it exceeds that of the people or the average man. The people have never been the criterion of truth, as history, especially the history of the warfare of science with theology, abundantly shows. The criterion is rather to be found within the individual himself, in the effect which his prepossession produces on his life and his general development as shown in his works and his daily conduct. If his prepossessions militate against his normal development mentally, morally, or physically, they are excessive and abnormal; if, on the other hand, they are conducive to further development, to a better *Aufklärung*, and to the discovery of truths which later generations will accept as such, they are productive of positive good and must be considered normal, regardless of the views of the people. As a rule, only time, "the final judge of appeal from the verdicts of successive ages," can determine whether or not an individual was justly considered prejudiced by his contemporaries, and not infrequently do we find one generation erecting costly monuments to the memory of those whom a previous generation burned at the stake or otherwise maltreated and dishonored.

Bearing this criterion of excess in mind, we may now take up the consideration of the psychological meaning of prepossession. In his study of prejudice Professor Patrick finds that it is but a popular name for that which is technically known as apperception. Prejudice, for him, is synonymous with apperception, and his article is consistently little more than a popular description and explanation of the latter. Once more we must take issue with our author. Prejudice is not apperception, but rather an arrest of it; a refusal or inability to apperceive. Apperception is a normal process by which the mind grows step by step and learns the unknown by means of the already known. So long as the apperceptive process is allowed to function normally, the individual develops and is in no danger of becoming prejudiced; it is only when the apperceptive process is arrested or interfered with that the danger arises. A little child sees an oblong watermelon and calls it a large pickle. This is apperception, but not prejudice. It would become prej-

udice if the child should insist on calling it a large pickle after it had been told that it was a watermelon; that is, if it should voluntarily arrest the normal apperceptive process. "Suppose," says Professor Patrick, "a plot of level ground in the suburbs of a city. A college student riding by apperceives it as a possible ball-ground; a young girl, as a tennis court; a speculator, as an addition for town lots; an undertaker, perhaps, as a possible site for a cemetery."⁴ Here, again, there is no prejudice. The young girl, the speculator, and undertaker would be prejudiced if they should refuse to grant to the college student that the plot was also good for a ball-ground, and the college student would be prejudiced if he did not admit to the undertaker that it was suitable for a cemetery, provided, of course, that the plot was suitable for all four purposes. Apperception causes each to consider the ground from a particular point of view; prejudice disables them from considering it from any other point of view, even after it has been clearly pointed out. The point I wish to make clear is that apperception and prejudice are not synonymous, that the latter does not normally grow out of the former, but is only related to it negatively or contrarily. By prepossession, then, we mean disordered apperception; apperception that has been loaded, as it were; not pure apperception, but apperception in which there are unduly strong volitional and emotional ingredients. The unduly prepossessed individual either cannot or will not apperceive properly; he apperceives only as suits his purpose, which has been determined by his will and desire. Professor James shows this clearly in his essay on "The Will to Believe"⁵ An hypothesis, he tells us, which is alive to an Arab is stone dead to a Christian; he simply will not entertain it for a moment. It does not fit in with his system of beliefs and theories, and therefore he immediately rejects it without stopping to examine its claims for his acceptance. That is, he willfully refuses to apperceive it properly in relation to his religious beliefs. This is true not only of the unlearned, but even of many who have been trained in logic and the exact methods

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 634.

⁵ N. Y., 1898.

of science. A leading biologist, writes Professor James, once said to him, "that even if such a thing (as telepathy) were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature, and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits."⁶ His interest in science prejudiced him against anything which threatened to overthrow its conclusions, even though that something were truer than his science. He could apperceive as science only facts of a certain order. Even Clifford, who at great length proves to us in his convincing style that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence," does so, as Professor James shows, in the interest of his anti-Christian doctrines. No evidence that a Christian could array would be considered sufficient by him. "Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start." In other words, as the race has so truly said, "There are none so blind as those who will not see."

Here we see clearly the emotional and volitional roots of prejudice—roots which penetrate and ramify the whole soil of subconsciousness, vitiating our thinking and determining our attitude to the various phases of our environment. Were we passionless, without love or hate or fear or anger or desire or interest, we might coldly apperceive all things properly and be without prejudice. But Nature has not seen fit to evolve us thus; these emotions, desires, interests, and will-acts have proven necessary and valuable not only for our development from the lower forms of life, but for our continued development as human beings; for our commercial, industrial, political, even our scientific progress. But, what is normal and beneficial in a certain measure, becomes abnormal and injurious when that measure is deficient or excessive. "Error and evil are located in deficiency or excess. Even excess in virtue is evil, an excess of humility being abjectness; of courage, rashness; of prudence, cowardice; of patience, indifference; of economy, parsimony; of generosity, waste; of

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

deference, obsequiousness. And so also an excess of learning is pedantry; of ease, idolence; of comfort, self-indulgence; of zeal, fanaticism. Right and justice are found in moderation—in the golden mean, in the true balance—between overdoing and underdoing, going too fast and too slow."⁷ *Prejudice is located in deficiency or excess, and it is not a product of apperception*—this is our thesis.

What then is apperception? Many psychologists, even at the present day, are unable to rid themselves of the old "faculty psychology" conceptions, according to which the soul is a mosaic composed of separate bits of "sciousness," differing in intensity, extensity, and quality, but belonging to one or the other of several well-marked modalities or faculties. The sum of all these bits of "sciousness" is consciousness. Accordingly, we have among other faculties the apperceiving faculty, with its numerous apperception-masses, which send out their tentacles, as it were, and seize all those objects or bits of "sciousness" within their reach for which they have the proper digestive organs. In this way a simple and beautiful system is wrought out, but like other things beautiful, it does not bear close inspection. It disintegrates the unity of the soul and makes it a compound composed of separate, distinct parts, instead of a combined effect of countless and subtle psycho-physical processes which are going on all the time. An effect is immediately materialized by these apperceptionists and associationists, and placed in the soul mosaic according to its modality. Thus we have love, fear, anger, hate, joy, wonder, awe, admiration, etc., which are but effects of psycho-physical processes, materialized into bits of "sciousness" and placed together in what may be called the emotional region of the soul. So, too, with percepts, concepts, images, ideas, longings, desires, actions, etc. They conceive of the soul, we repeat, as a mosaic, and not as an ever flowing stream fed by many tributaries and rivulets, and colored and intrinsically affected by the nature of the soil through which these pass. Apperception, according to them, is a dis-

⁷ Orlando J. Smith, "Balance, the Fundamental Verity," p. 43.

tinct mental process, an agent functioning in its own, definite, machine-like way whenever an appropriate stimulus is given. Holding these views, it is readily seen why prejudice is confused with apperception. A man is prejudiced because the apperception-masses which he has accumulated in his lifetime react partially and unfavorably to a given idea or situation. Thus the undertaker's apperception-masses compel him to see in a plot of ground a suitable cemetery site; the girl's, a tennis court; the college student's, a ball-ground; and the speculator's an addition for town lots. But this, as was said in the beginning, is not prejudice; it is normal apperception. It may lead to an erroneous, partial view of things, but not necessarily to prejudice. Apperception, as we understand it, is an instinctive judgment of resemblance between a given object and similar objects previously experienced in a definite *milieu*. The undertaker sees in the plot of ground a cemetery because it is similar to other plots which he has known as cemeteries. For the college student the plot is similar to baseball grounds he has known, and so on for the others. The judgment is logical and correct within the limits of the experiences of each. But in prejudice, the judgment is neither correct nor logical even within the above limits; it is willfully warped and, as a rule, in spite of one's better reason. Apperception is simply an economical mode of psychical adjustment to environment in light of past experience. The child learning that a certain quadruped is called "horse," applies the same name to a similar quadruped, adding that it has horns in like manner. The emotions and will develop; that is to say, past feelings and volitions determine the nature of present feelings and will-acts as much as past ideas determine the nature of present ones.

In prejudice, on the other hand, there are instinctive, tendential, habitual, associational, emotional, and volitional ingredients which distort and vitiate the reason, and prevent a proper adjustment to a situation. Not a partial, erroneous judgment, therefore, due to limited experience, but a willful perversion of judgment because of interest and passion—love, hate, anger, jealousy, envy—is prejudice.

Again, in apperception resemblance is the great factor; in

prejudice it is difference. To see a resemblance between the anthropoid apes and man is normal apperception; to refuse to see it after it has been pointed out in detail and to magnify the points of difference is prejudice. Normal apperception leads to critical judgment and the discovery of scientific facts; the essence of prejudice is, as has been said, uncritical and biased judgment. Apperception appropriates the similar; prejudice rejects the different. Nay, it is the nature of prejudice to see difference where it does not exist, and to refuse to see resemblance when it does not suit its purpose. It is its strong emotional-volitional character which vitiates judgment and impels conduct that differentiates prejudice from apperception.

Let us now apply this criterion of excess and deficiency due to passion and will to each of the different types of prejudice and see how it works. Being a Caucasian I might personally be opposed to miscegenation, but if I should hold that miscegeny is bestial and a heinous crime I would be prejudiced for I would be deliberately overlooking all the resemblances between the colored and white races and be magnifying the differences out of all proportion. So, too, if my hatred of the negro were so intense that "I could not possibly imagine Othello as black" (so wrote a Southern authoress). "Frenchmen," Coleridge said, "are like grains of gunpowder: each by itself smutty and contemptible, but mass them together and they are terrible indeed!" Johnson referred to Americans as "a race of convicts who ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging." He was "willing to love all mankind, *except an American*." Is this faulty apperception or prejudice? My love for my relatives may lead me to consider them beautiful and brilliant and magnanimous; but I should be prejudiced if I insisted that no one else could possibly be as good, or if confronted with sufficient evidence of their guilt I should still believe them innocent. The same is true of matters pertaining to the self. I cannot be expected to take the same interest in others as in myself and mine, but if I think that I am the only person worthy of the name "man," or that the universe was created and moves for me alone, and will

not recognize the rights and merits of others, I am prejudiced. I may prefer to mingle with people in my own social class, but to refuse to associate with others because they belong to a higher or lower level of society, or to consider them "unclean," as is done in India, is to be prejudiced. "At a town called Buj Buj (India) a widow lost caste by falling in love with a man beneath her. As a loss of caste by one member of the family degrades the others also, her eldest son immediately swallowed poison and died, and his remaining brethren fled the country." In justice to the Indians it should be said that not all Brahmins live in Asia. According to the proverbs of the European peoples, woman is mentally inferior to man, deceptive, cunning, vain, conceited, quarrelsome, mischievous, dishonest, untruthful, garrulous, fickle, etc. The proverbs show prejudice in that they are all stated as universal propositions. My ideas of beauty and a Chinaman's do not coincide. He speaks with contempt of our white teeth, which remind him of a dog's, and our rosy color is like that of a potato flower. But I should be prejudiced if I said he had no conception of beauty. A cowboy or miner who condemns a man because of his starched collar is as prejudiced as he who looks with contempt upon them because of their flannel shirts and coarse boots. I may be a devout Christian and believe Christianity to be the highest and truest development of religion, but to maintain that all other religions are superstitious or works of the devil is to be prejudiced. About the middle of the seventeenth century, when the City Council of Halle in Wurtenberg gave some privileges to a Jewish physician on account of his admirable experience and skill, "the clergy of the city joined in a protest, declaring that 'it were better to die with Christ than to be cured by a Jew doctor aided by the devil.'" Personally, I may be opposed to divorce, but I must be prejudiced to maintain that divorces are immoral, or that marriage under civil law only is concubinage, as the Archbishop of Valencia has just said. Such prejudices easily lead to riots.

The case of Ingres, a classicist artist of the first half of the nineteenth century who excluded Shakespeare and Goethe from

the gathering of great men around the Father of Poetry because he suspected them of Romanticism, is paralleled in literature by the intense prejudice of Carlyle against Scott because of his florid and descriptive style.

I may be a Hegelian, but I should be prejudiced did I refuse to see the truth in Humanism or the other systems of philosophy. One of the best cases of scholastic prejudice is that of Agassiz, who to his dying day fought with all the strength of his learning the theory of evolution. A Westerner recently declined a nomination to an office because he could not, as he said, be a politician and a Christian at the same time, and he preferred to be the latter. He was prejudiced against politicians, and implied that no politician can be a Christian, which is manifestly false. A Southerner should be proud of the glorious history of his people, but if he dubs all Northerners "carpetbaggers," can see nothing good in them, and hates the very word "North," he is prejudiced. I may be a Democrat, but if my partisan spirit prevents me from listening to the arguments of a Republican, I am prejudiced. The small merchant or laborer who can see nothing but unmitigated evil in trusts is prejudiced, as are trusts when they fail to recognize the just claims of the former. I may respect the ancients, but if I hold that the modern world is in every respect inferior to the ancient I am as prejudiced as he who holds that there is nothing good in the ancients. Finally, he who would refuse his daughter in marriage to a tailor or a shoemaker because of his trade is prejudiced. Such a one should remember that, to mention only two, Jacob Boehme, the German Plato, was a shoemaker, and President Andrew Johnson a tailor.

To conclude, our study shows that apperception is a process of interpreting present experiences in the light of past ones, and that within the limits of one's experience it is true and logical. It shows also, in an indirect way, that truth is ever growing and developing, that it is dynamic and a matter of individual psycho-physics, *i. e.*, human. It may be only a partial truth, or true only for me, that I cannot help being but a fallible mortal. It satisfies my needs, and therefore I shall hold to it until I find something better. But I am not blind to

the fact that others may, because of their different minds and bodies, apperceive and react to the world in ways totally different from mine. Indeed, I believe that each one lives in a world of his own, in which there are truths not to be found in any other. I recognize with the poet that:

"There are nine and sixty ways
Of composing tribal lays
And every single one of them is right."

and I try to follow Tennyson's counsel, to "take for God's truth that which harmonizes with all the best you know and helps and strengthens you in nobility of life."

Furthermore, I realize with Bacon that "the human intellect is not of the nature of a dry light, but receives a tincture from the will and affections; which generates accordingly knowledge *ad quot vult* (according to its own wishes), for what a man would rather was true, that he more readily believes. And so it rejects what is difficult, being impatient of inquiry; what is sober, for it straightens hope; the deeper things of nature, for it is superstitious; the light of experience, for it is arrogant and proud, and fears lest the mind should seem to be employed on vile and floating subjects; paradoxes, because it dreads the opinion of the vulgar; finally, in innumerable ways, and those sometimes imperceptible, the affection tinges and affects the intellect."⁸

It is, indeed, natural to be prejudiced, and requires the highest mental and moral development to overcome the tendency, for it necessitates an elimination of the personal equation in matters frequently of the greatest importance and interest to us. But no one will deny that we should strive at least to attain this development. It is characteristic of those who are prejudiced the most that they not only lack high mental and moral development, but have little desire to attain it. They are self-complacent in their error and ignorance. For them, truth is something noumenal, absolute, static, which they and those like them alone possess; all others walk in darkness and

⁸ Bacon's "Novum Organum," translated by G. W. Kitchin, Oxford, 1855, p. 24.

sin. There can be nothing true for one age or individual or condition, and false for others. Truth is eternal, perfect, divine. It is an entity, as the soul was once thought to be; not a condition growing out of an individual's relationship to his social and physical environment. It is to be found not within the individual, but in the far-distant realms of space with the aid of an abstracting telescope which excludes from view everything else in the universe except that which it is seeking and is interested in.

Apperception is constantly correcting its errors, accommodating itself to new conditions, appropriating new facts, and so developing. Prejudice is perfect *a priori*, has no errors to correct, and therefore compels or attempts to compel new conditions and new facts to accommodate themselves to it. Apperception waits upon time and makes trial; prejudice annihilates time and denies trial. Apperception broadens and liberates; prejudice arrests, narrows, and enslaves. The difference between the two, in a word, is the difference between the true and the false, the good and the evil, the beautiful and the ugly.

Nothing has thus far been said of the age at which prejudice first shows itself, nor of the sexual differences with regard to it, for the reason that there is no data on these points. Of a somewhat similar feeling, jealously, it is known that it appears very early in the life of the child; some having seen manifestations of it in the third month, and many in the twelfth and fifteenth months.⁹ Perhaps organic prejudice, which the lower animals share with man, appears equally as early, but it is impossible that psychical prejudice should appear before the child has become self-conscious and capable of perceiving differences as well as resemblances, nor can it have obtained a high degree of development before adolescence. Prejudice requires for its existence a rather full development of the will and the emotions and not an inconsiderable development of the intellect. It is a psychical weed which crops out after the flowers have begun to blossom. In

⁹ See Arnold L. Gesell, "Jealousy," *Am. Jour. Psych.*, Oct., 1906, Vol. XVII, pp. 437-496.

our artificial and somewhat abnormal state of society, however, its seeds are planted very early by adults, as when wealthy parents refuse to allow their children to play with those of their poorer neighbors or with children of foreign birth or parentage. Becky and Irene were three-year-old playmates, constantly together. When Irene attended Sunday school for the first time, she heard the story of the Crucifixion of Christ and the part the Jews played in that tragedy. That afternoon, Becky went over as usual to play with her. "I shan't play with you any more," was Irene's angry greeting. "Why?" asked Becky, much astonished and hurt. "Because you killed my Christ." "I didn't kill him," protested Becky, frightened by the terrible charge. "Well, your mamma killed him." "No, my mamma didn't kill him, and I didn't kill him." "Well, I don't care, your boarder killed him," and with that she turned on her heels, leaving Becky to solve for herself as best she could the moral problem, why she should be held accountable for her mother's boarder's crime.

The aim of education, we say, is to develop broad and healthy-minded citizens, but how can this be done when parents and teachers poison the minds of the little ones as soon as they can understand and think? Child study is laying bare the developing soul of the child; the science of pedagogy is evolving new methods and offering new subjects of study, but it should never be forgotten that education is more than mere instruction; it is character-building, and to do this effectively we need an ethics for parents and teachers, a new decalogue perhaps, to be placed on every teacher's desk and over every child's crib. Here a pessimist might object that education, instead of being a remedy for prejudice, is the cause of it, pointing out that the higher animals, the child, and the savage have but few prejudices, while a civilized adult is capable of having every one of the prejudices just enumerated. There is a semblance of truth in this contention. But education is not the cause of prejudice, the latter is rather a by-product of the former. In the process of development an organism becomes increasingly more complex and differentiated, permitting in the highest stages of an almost infinite variety of combinations

of elements. This gives rise to a greater possibility of disharmonious relationship between the various elements, which in the last analysis is the cause of prejudice. Our voluntaristic psychology teaches us that consciousness is motor; that is, every state of consciousness is dynamic, and while we may not hope ever to be able to determine the value of each in some such terms as volts, ohms, and amperes of will and feeling, we know that they have them. Now it frequently happens that an idea or other state of consciousness has, because of frequent repetition, association, vividness, recency, or other circumstance, acquired more than its normal share of dynamic energy. Mental activity becomes polarized, as it were, around one or several ideas instead of being properly proportioned among all. In extreme cases—religious fanatics, ascetics, and mystics, for example—there is only one pole, and this condition is technically known as mono-idealism. Here lies the secret of the almost superhuman power wielded by fanatics and ascetics. They put all their concentrated energies behind one idea, whereas the well-rounded, liberal man has his energies dissipated among his very many ideas and is unable to generate sufficient enthusiasm for any one to make it prevail over the others. Arranging individuals according to a scale of ideas, we would have mono-, bi-, tri-idealists, etc., until, passing by imperceptible gradations from the abnormal to the normal, we should reach the extremely prejudiced, the moderately prejudiced, and finally the broad-minded, liberal, and critical, each of whose states of consciousness has its proper emotional-volitional value. These are the highest products of a sane, broad, and liberal education. We have then this condition: mere richness of contents of consciousness gives rise to a greater possibility for prejudices to lurk in the mind—the uncultured adult living in a civilized community has more and stronger prejudices than a savage—but richness combined with harmony precludes such a possibility. The harmonious subordination of the parts to the whole forming a well organized hierarchy, what the Greeks called "*sophrosune*," is the ideal mental condition and the necessary foundation for true morality. To be temperate and plastic, to develop and be able to

readily adapt one's self to new ideas and conditions, is to be all that the prejudiced individual, with his narrowness and one-sidedness, his mental crystallization, bigotry, fanaticism, and intolerance, is not. And what determines whether a man shall be the one or the other are heredity, home influences, education, and environment.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

EVERYDAY ETHICS. Ella Lyman Cabot. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1906. Pp. xiii, 439.

"My aim in this book," says Mrs. Cabot, "is to take up the living issues already present to girls and boys of thirteen to eighteen, and to work out thoroughly the problems which they themselves have begun to feel and discuss, but which they rarely carry far. I wish to connect these questions with aspects of their lives other than those of school. . . . I think the teacher of ethics has not been successful, unless the outlook of the students has markedly widened so that their interest in local and national politics, and their study of history and literature shine with light reflected from the class discussions."

The author's purpose of presenting in "Everyday Ethics" a systematic discussion of ethical principles and of moral problems which shall be adapted to the minds of youths and maidens in secondary schools has been singularly well realized. Ethical principles in their application to daily activities, and the various aspects of the moral question, are treated simply and lucidly, yet with a striking freedom from that superficiality so often manifest in books of this grade. Superficiality is avoided by the consideration of concrete instances rather than abstract rules, or better, by discussion of concrete applications instead of vague generalizations. Indeed, the distinctive feature of this book is the admirable treatment of specific instances selected, because they convey exactly the desired impression and further involve practical expression of those profound principles, the study of which is the field of the mature student of ethics. Familiar events and situations rather than hypothetical and purely imaginary instances are adduced throughout. This lends the entire argument a spontaneous charm, which serves not merely to hold the attention, but impresses also the intended lesson. The pages are warm with "human interest," teeming as they do with such well-known personages as Dewey and Socrates, Croker and Dante, Pat the office boy, and a multitude of his thoughtless brothers and careless sisters. Literature and art no less than history, especially current history, are freely drawn upon for illustrations which have an intrinsic as well as pedagogical value. The wealth of homely illustration not infrequently presents the

picturesque, but never the bizarre, for the picturesque is never attained at the expense of the probable and the appropriate. For this reason, if for no other, "Everyday Ethics" is an unusually wholesome book for those whose minds are in the formative stage.

These concrete studies in abstract principles surely have a mission. Theoretical ethics is by no means open to the secondary student—therein he could but flounder. Yet ethical theory comprises the discussion of questions which have the utmost import for those whose reflective powers are just awakening. This book reveals a theory of ethics at work, ethical rules in operation. Evidence of this is had from the chapter headings, *e. g.:* "Truth speaking as a fine art;" "Openmindedness and prejudice;" "Choice of interest;" "Use of time."

Notable also is the frequent use of apt simile, *e. g.:* "We may think of virtue as self-government, of sin as civil war, and of the non-moral life as anarchy," and again, "Courage is always the leap of reason vaulting over fear, because fear bars the way." A work thus replete with pointed and suggestive illustrations and concrete examples of the incidence of moral principles, though designed for beginners, will be read with interest by the advanced student who may well refer to it when in search of a pertinent illustration.

The author's central ethical doctrine, she informs us, "is that he who has found the vocation for which he is fitted has found his duty, and that without some inkling of a chosen work, duty is meaningless. Out of loyalty to our chosen work springs all moral life, for an enduring interest is a master who leads us to a joyous self-expression, and for that very reason to self-sacrifice, self-forgetfulness and self-surrender." Ethics is concisely defined as "the study of right choosing and well doing; . . . of what to do and how to do it." Our aim is "to be efficient," but in process we "develop what people call virtues . . . it is through activity and efficiency that goodness is reached, not through avoidance of actions that might possibly be dangerous or disturbing."

"The study of ethics clears up our confused thought on questions of conduct in three ways: It helps us to see what facts are really relevant; it helps us to clear away self-deceit; and it helps us to put in order our reasons, pro and con. . . ." The moral life is found to consist in "the life of purpose." "To have

a plan . . . is then the distinguishing mark of the moral realm and also the most characteristic trait of humanity." The realization of the plan or ideal is found to be closely related to the exercise of those powers which are peculiar to man. "There are pursuits characteristic of man as man. . . . Each takes thought, each takes imagination, each requires memory, self-control, and sacrifice."

These brief citations will serve to indicate the author's base of attack upon the ethical question. The familiar aspects of the conscious life, particularly with respect to concrete activities, are considered in their ethical significance and relations. Throughout, the spirit of the work is wholesome, the discussions helpfully suggestive. Particularly noteworthy is the avowed and fulfilled purpose of avoiding "sentimentalism" and the usual "sugar-coated moral stories." This intention has guided the choice of method and the selection of subject-matter.

The chapter on "The darkness of sin," with sub-divisions on cruelty, selfishness, cowardice, willfulness, and dishonesty, is typical of the practical nature of the book. These traits are not the subject of abtruse comment; they are embodied and expressed in trivial incidents, which, though trivial, nevertheless involve a general attitude of mind and underlying principles of action. Such chapter headings as Sympathy, Imagination, Memory, and Courage will further indicate the author's endeavor to maintain a close connection between the familiar aspects of mental life and the ethical significance of their exercise. In this connection, the chapter on "The choice of interests" should not be passed in silence. A man is said to be "essentially his interests." "The choice of interests is . . . as wide as the number of those who choose them, but all interests should be served with the spirit of devotion which will not tolerate blindness, thoughtlessness, or irresolution. . . . The choice should be made clearly, prayerfully, not by drifting into the work because it is near at hand."

There is perhaps no better or more characteristic chapter than that on "Truth," which emphasizes "the self-destroying nature of falsehood." The several sections take up with illuminating clearness and careful precision: careless or imaginative misstatements, lies of thoughtlessness, lies of shyness or embarrassment, lies of cowardice, and lies of kindliness and courtesy. Concrete instances are presented indicating the respective services of love

and of skill or tact, the relations of flattery and friendly criticism, the reception of misguided kindness and the treatment of impertinent questions. The perplexing theoretical problem of the "necessary lie" is here adroitly solved by suggestion of practical methods of avoidance.

Prejudice which "starves experience," and is defined as a misguided loyalty is discussed under the divisions, religious, political, and social, in such wise as to convict prejudice of its own partial and faulty attitude. Definite ways of achieving open-mindedness, *e. g.*, "Cultivation of sympathy," and "Search for truth," are helpfully discussed.

The uses of self-government, which is "the touchstone of the moral life," and the value of obedience are finely exemplified in allusions to the George Junior Republic—another instance of the timely interest of many of the examples. A final chapter upon "The use of time" defines time as "the raw material of all life. . . . It is not until our time is moulded and held together by a warm interest that it begins to be of value to us, and we get more out of time in proportion to the intensity, the width, and the loyalty of our interest."

Valuable as "Everyday Ethics" will prove to the youthful student, it will have also a peculiar value to the teacher, since it contains so many suggestions relative to the conducting of classes in ethics and so much auxiliary material. These are embodied in the appended "Teacher's Key," which contains a brief but instructive discussion of "Methods of Teaching," and much material aid for applying methods comprised in an elaborate series of "Questions for the class," "Notes," and "Additional illustrations." Mrs. Cabot urges the worth of the method of maieutic: "Essential to my plan is the method of teaching by questions which are answered by the pupils before a subject is discussed in class." As a basis for the application of this method there are presented groups of questions bearing upon the content of each chapter. These questions, the author assures us, have been carefully tested in actual work. Moreover, "Many of my questions are widereaching . . . first, because I want to enforce the truth that the principles of ethics are universal, and second, because directly personal applications are better brought up through class discussion than by written answers. . . . " "The questions cling to the students like winged seeds during the days in which they are pondering them" and

“will lead them into new experience. . . .” “I am quite aware that what I have called lessons in ethics might rather be called lessons in thinking. The study of ethics is essentially the effort to think out problems of conduct. . . .”

The aim of the series of questions, briefly stated, is:

“1. To cover without repetition the main issues of the coming topic of discussion.

“2. To bear on real experience.

“3. To call out interests already possessed by the pupil, but not fully thought out. . . .

“5. To develop the power of reasoning and to awaken imagination and sympathy.

“6. To bring out systematically the principles of ethics.”

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GUT UND BOESE: Wesen und Werden der Sittlichkeit. Von Emil Fuchs. Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1906. Pp. 308.

This work forms one of a series of volumes on “Lebensfragen” which is being issued in Germany under the general editorship of Professor Heinrich Weinel of Jena. Two of these volumes have already been translated into English. One of them, “Paul, the Man and His Work,” by the editor, is an admirable exposition of the character of Paul as exhibited in his writings and an equally luminous survey of the early developments of the Christian church and of ecclesiastical dogma. The other volume which has found an English translator is Professor Otto’s really valuable contribution to the controversy between naturalism and religion. In this volume “Naturalism and Religion,” published by Messrs. Williams and Norgate, Professor Otto shows a marvelous acquaintance with all the biological theories which have sprung up since the time of Darwin. He points out what a vast amount of what is often regarded as scientific fact is still only in the stage of theory, and he endeavors to prove that, even if the most thoroughgoing naturalistic premises are admitted, ample room is still left for a religious conception and interpretation of the world. It is a book to be read by all who want an answer to the hasty and immature generalizations of Professor Haeckel.

The object of Professor Weinel’s series as a whole is to help all those who are no longer satisfied with the old traditional outlook

upon the world and man. It is an attempt to introduce as much intellectual clearness as the state of knowledge will allow into every department of nature and life; and to give a deeper content and meaning to life itself. An object such as this inevitably brings into the foreground all the ultimate and perplexing problems of morality and religion, and these problems in turn cannot be studied apart from what modern science has to tell us of nature and of man. The spirit in which Professor Weinel's series is written is a spirit of complete scientific freedom combined with a temper of reverence. The results of religious, moral and sociological investigations are less generally known than the corresponding results of inorganic and biological research. Professor Weinel's aim is to make these results known in wider circles so that the great personalities of the past and the great movements in human thought and history may contribute to illuminate the perplexities of to-day. But these perplexities cannot be solved by light alone. We need courage, will, faith, confidence as well. An outlook upon things, to have any real value for humanity, must have inspiration in it. Professor Weinel realizes this and in his series of "Lebensfragen" his object is not merely to illuminate but also to inspire. It is a big program and he deserves our good wishes in his efforts to fulfill it.

The new volume of "Lebensfragen" by Emil Fuchs on "Good and Evil" is worthy of the series to which it belongs. The object which Herr Fuchs sets before himself is to exhibit the nature and development of morality in as simple and attractive a manner as is compatible with the nature of the subject. He opens up his point of view with an exposition and discussion of the standards of morality, showing how manifold they are and how they may be grouped and classified. He then proceeds to examine and discuss the sources from which the moral standards are derived and to point out the ultimate causes of the moral life. In this connection he refers to the impress which moral conceptions have from time to time received from great creative personalities—the prophets, as he calls them, of the moral world. The Christian type of morality is also considered in its relation to the origin of moral standards. The introduction of this topic naturally leads up to a discussion of the relations between morality and religion. In the course of this examination the points in common between religion and morality are first pointed out and dwelt upon. The separation of religion from morality is next referred to, and then

the reaction in the separation of morality from religion. A criticism of these problems is followed by an inquiry into the character of the new outlook upon the world which scientific thought has attempted to construct, and the effect of this new outlook in divorcing many minds from the religious ideals of the past. The first part of Herr Fuchs's book closes with a chapter on the religious aspect of the moral conception of the world.

The second part of "Good and Evil" is concerned with the formation of the moral life in the individual. This is divided into two sections, the first of which deals with the growth of the moral life and the conditions external and internal which nourish or retard it; the second deals with the moral life as an achievement of the individual. Herr Fuchs's ethical ideal is individualistic. He does not consider that it is the supreme object of morality to make the individual a useful member of society—a mere instrument of a larger and more imposing whole. He looks upon the individual as the supreme end and thinks that morality attains its highest end when it succeeds in creating great types of moral personality. Morality is first of all concerned with the production of higher types of manhood. It is from individuals, not from masses, that all forms of progress have sprung. Perhaps the author expresses his belief in ethical individualism is too one-sided a way. But his book is full of fine thought expressed with admirable insight and in excellent forms. It is a book to be read.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FREE THOUGHT. By John M. Robertson; second edition, rewritten and greatly enlarged in two volumes. London: Watts & Co. Pp. xvi, 480; xiii, 455.

Though still called a "Short History," the new edition of Mr. Robertson's work is more than twice the length of the first one. It has been expanded throughout, and especially in the chapters on the Renaissance and Reformation and on English free thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Still, it may be called "short" in comparison with the work that its author might have written upon the subject. For a history of free thought, as he conceives it, is in fact a history of philosophy and something more; since it must include an account of the popular and literary movements that contribute greatly to the enlightenment of the human

mind, but are not usually included in a history of philosophy. There are advantages in this plan: on the one hand, we find interesting discussions of the attitude of Æschylus, Boccaccio, Shakespeare, and learn how thought is diffused; on the other hand we read some account of the Petrobrussians and the Lollards, and are thus brought nearer to that obscure region of unanalyzed experience, the life of men in their daily occupations, which is a sort of marginal consciousness to literature and philosophy, out of which they arise, and which contains the materials that they convert into distinct images. The more clearly men perceive the processes by which their ends are attained, the less likely are they to attribute success to an unseen power. The greater regularity of town-work and finance (for example), their less dependence upon the weather in comparison with agriculture, produces a habit of mind tending to exclude belief in the miraculous and supernatural. That the sources of thought lie deeper than literature may be seen in this, that behind every conspicuous man others stand in shadow, and behind them numberless others whom only contemporaries ever know at all. Nevertheless, it is true that the results of thought are focused under a few great names; and when every one that can be remembered is mentioned in a history there is this drawback, that to the great names comparatively little space can be assigned, especially in modern times. No doubt the isolation in which same names appear in an ordinary history of philosophy produces a certain illusion of eminence; and Mr. Robertson may think that, in a work like his, a knowledge of the ordinary history should be presupposed. Still it may be doubted whether he has conveyed to the average reader an adequate impression of the influence, direct and indirect, of (for example) Descartes or Hume. There is no analysis of the many directions in which they affected speculation, and nothing of the kind could be given without a clearer statement of their doctrines.

Perhaps, for the sake of those who may not be acquainted with Mr. Robertson's first edition, I ought to say that his work is of the most comprehensive character, beginning with the anthropology of free-thinking, describing its progress in India, Egypt, China, Mexico and Israel, then passing to the Greeks, and tracing the development of heresy and schism down to Haeckel and Tolstoi. The huge mass of material is lucidly arranged and bears witness to immense and indefatigable industry.

As history approaches recent times and the men and books that

count for something grow more numerous, it becomes impossible within any reasonable compass to do much more than mention them and what they signify. Hence a good many pages in the second volume are little more than an index to the literature passed in review. But even then the work is useful in suggesting further research, and I have found it very instructive. Perhaps the author could not bear to fail in commemorating any one who contributed but a little to the liberty and enlightenment that we enjoy so cheaply: to forget any of the men who tried to speak as they thought amidst social calumny and political danger, often in hiding, often in prison, often tortured, drowned, hung, burned, horribly mutilated and destroyed. That is necessarily the other side of this book: the history of free-thought is the history of persecution. We forget these things too readily; for they happened not long ago.

Mr. Robertson has a scientific conception of history based on biology and sociology. "Free-thought is a conscious reaction against some phase or phases of conventional or traditional doctrine in religion" (I, 9). It may be considered as a variation, whose survival or failure depends upon the environment (I, 35); and the most important circumstances in the environment are the economic and political. The causes of variation he nowhere discusses at length, but in several places he indicates some of them: for example, "extreme ill-fortune tends to detach men from the cults that have failed to bring them succor;" and "foreign influences would chronically tend to promote doubt, especially where the foreigner was not a mere successful votary exalting his own God, but a sympathetic thinker questioning all the Godisms alike" (I, 115). As to the conditions of survival, any new movement to maintain itself must acquire some organization, and this requires economic sustenance; and, as this must be obtained from believers, there is a constant motive to compromise with popular ignorance (I, 59). Then, if a new movement becomes established with a regularly endowed priesthood, it has an enormous economic motive to resist all further movements that threaten the doctrines upon which its livelihood and power depend. Accordingly, it will try to persecute all heretics, and its success in this enterprise will depend upon enlisting the power or the greed of political potentates.

In Mr. Robertson's opinion the power of purely religious motives is much overrated. It was not religion that enabled the Saracens

to conquer their foes, but the prospects of booty, racial kinships and a warlike spirit (I, 257). The success of the Reformation was similarly determined. It prevailed wherever it gratified the greed of nobles and rulers who plundered the church: elsewhere it failed. He supports himself on the shoulder of Bishop Stubbs: "No truth is more certain than this, that the real motives of religious action do not work on men in masses; and that the enthusiasm which creates Crusades, Inquisitors, Hussites, Puritans, is not the result of conviction, but of passion provoked by oppression or resistance, maintained by self-will, or stimulated by the mere desire of victory" (I, 450). Such, with the desire of gain, were the causes of the success of the Reformation, not doctrinal enlightenment, least of all Teutonic "race."

That, when men in some religious cause act in masses, it is not religious motives that animate the whole mass, is certainly true; but it seems to me vain to press an argument which leads to the conclusion that religious motives have had no great power in the world. That "race" explains nothing in history, Mr. Robertson never misses an opportunity of urging; and I admit that those who rely much upon the influence of race often mean by it no more than an abstraction from the facts they pretend to explain. Still, as there are approximately constant anatomical differences in the peripheries of men of separated races, I do not see why there may not be differences in their central nervous systems, which, in similar circumstances, would determine different reactions. There is nothing in this contrary to free-thought; but we want more detailed knowledge.

On the whole this is an excellent book, and yet it has one characteristic—for the author perhaps, an unavoidable one—that may limit its usefulness. It is written with a purpose additional to the scientific recording and explaining of the facts, namely, to spread free-thought as above defined. In reading other histories that similarly have a secondary purposive character, especially when out of sympathy with the authors, I never feel satisfied that the secondary purpose has not been too strong for historical impartiality. In Mr. Robertson's work there seems to me to be no unfairness; but, then, I am generally in sympathy with him, and I cannot help fearing that those who are otherwise minded and perhaps in strong antipathy, may derive a different impression. However, this cannot be helped: Mr. Robertson's conviction is that no improvement can be made in the lot of mankind except upon what

he regards as a purely rational foundation, and to the clearing away of all rubbish he has devoted his life.

CARVETH READ.

LONDON.

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. By E. Barker. London: Methuen & Co., 1906. Pp. xxii, 559.

Mr. Barker's book is not only a particularly competent, but in every respect a masterly presentation of its subject. The student could not well desire a more comprehensive or a more penetrating review of Greek political thought. Mr. Barker would not himself lay claim to any particular novelty or distinction of view; on the other hand his treatise may be regarded as a systematization (though it is much more) of the best results reached by modern thought and scholarship. Mr. Barker is, indeed, singularly equipped for such an undertaking. He is equally competent and instructed on the philosophical as on the historical side of his subject. The result is that he has given us a work which is not only eminently solid and thorough, but admirable alike in substance and in perspective. He has, in fact, succeeded to quite an unusual degree in carrying out the somewhat full program he sets before himself. "While attempting to refer Aristotelian conceptions to their sources in past speculation, and to their basis in contemporary Greek politics, I have also attempted to discuss the value of these conceptions to-day, and the extent to which they can be applied to modern politics."

The only general criticism of the book as a whole which I feel disposed to offer is that it tends to be voluminous both in form and in matter—resulting in an undue amount of iteration, and also in a certain amount of uncertainty, or at any rate oscillation of view. Mr. Barker, indeed, seems to show a laudable anxiety to preserve a balanced judgment rather than to fix impressions; but it is a method which has the defect of its quality. The average student (for whom Mr. Barker is presumably writing) may fail at times to see the wood for the trees. The argument is not only of the nature of a see-saw, but is apt at times to remain there. Mr. Barker's method, in fact, seems to more than reproduce the fluidity and indeterminateness of the subject-matter itself. It is only right to add that this excess or redundancy of statement applies mainly to minor and incidental discussions;

but it is apt to blunt the edge of the larger and more central conceptions which are generally stated with admirable clearness and force. An occasional summary might perhaps have helped Mr. Barker to leave a more clearly cut impression. There are certain things that might have been said once for all; there are too many views left for the reader to put together—too many for him to correct and to modify. As a matter of fact, Mr. Barker is at his best when he is generalizing. Nothing, for instance, could be better for its purpose than the introduction; and it would be easy to cite equally fine specimens of the best kind of generalization. Nothing again could be better than the firmness and precision with which Mr. Barker handles philosophical conceptions. The student who desires not only an *apparatus criticus* but directions toward a constructive theory of "politics," will find a great quantity as well as a fine quality of material in Mr. Barker's book for his purpose. It is, as suggested, somewhat of the nature of a quarry, which the student will have to work for himself; but it is perhaps after all none the worse for that.

In a book which covers so much ground it is a little difficult to select points for criticism or comment. Mr. Barker "begins from the beginning," making the best use he can of the somewhat scanty and uncertain material at his disposal. He is inclined throughout to lay some stress on the influence of anthropology upon political thought in Greece, and on the extent to which previous opinion had furnished a "prelude and preparation" for some of the distinctive features of the "Republic." The treatment of the Sophists is perhaps more ambitious than precise. Like Plato himself, Mr. Barker is tempted to elevate what may well have been only an *obiter dictum* of Protagoras to the dignity of a philosophical tenet. But, according to Mr. Barker, "'Man is the measure of all things' was not meant to deny the possibility of knowledge, or to make it the play of man's subjectivity; it was intended, on the contrary, to widen the province of knowledge, and to show that it was not dry bones, but full of human life, and instinct with human reason." And again, as applied to the State—"measured' by man, it is found wanting. It does not satisfy his instinct for free expression and fulfilment. . . . The moral content of tradition and custom and institutions was opposed to the ideal code of morality suggested by the fundamental principle of human life."

Surely this is rather a modern development of what was after

all the main position of the Sophists for the purposes of Mr. Barker's history—to correct no doubt the one-sidedness of the view which took the State and its laws on trust; but to correct it by a general tendency to make the individual his own standard, and to refer all authority to convention. The Sophists doubtless fostered the spirit of self-assertion; but they were for the most part too conventional to raise it into a principle. In his account of Socrates, Mr. Barker perhaps fails to show that his "utilitarianism" was really another side of his "intellectualism," that is, of his tendency to make a rational purpose the criterion of good and evil; and has rather missed the significance of what is not very aptly described as "the whispers of a still, small voice (*τὸ δαυρόν*) to inspire his work." Does it not rather point to a hiatus in the Socratic theory of action? Socrates found himself taking, or rather refraining from, action when he could give no reason for so doing; and upon his view of action this phenomenon presented itself as something mysterious.

Mr. Barker's treatment of Plato is particularly careful and discerning. "Aristotle wrote the 'Politics,' but Plato is the great political thinker of Greece;" a hard saying, perhaps, in view of Mr. Barker's criticism of the "Republic," but it is one, nevertheless, which he succeeds in making good. But does not Mr. Barker lay more stress on the letter than on the spirit when he emphasizes the "separatism" in Plato's conception of the soul, and (by consequence) of the State? Plato specially guards himself against his "trichotomy" of the soul being taken for the whole truth. Regarded absolutely, the three "powers" of the soul have their specific functions, which cannot be confounded, but they can and do coöperate to form a unity—a unity which may be described as a certain rightness of relations; a unity, therefore, not of subjugation but of reconciliation. The suggestion that a "rigid separation" combined with a "rigid unification" is (or tends to be) the Platonic conception of ethics is one against which Plato himself may be cited as a witness in chief.

Mr. Barker's treatment of Plato's communism in general is just and pertinent. But is it not rather less than a half truth to suggest that modern socialism "demands an equal division of material goods for the sake of an equal division of material happiness?" Great as is the difference between the Platonic communism and modern socialism, the elements of affinity are at

least equally significant and instructive. Mr. Barker's attempt to trace savage and "barbarian" elements in the "Republic" is interesting, but the argument seems to be pushed to a point at which it becomes more fanciful than real. On the other hand, the discussions on Plato's conception of personality and on the nature and value of the Republic as an ideal are quite admirable. The remarks on the theory of punishment, however, seem hardly adequate either in themselves or in their relation to Plato; and more consideration might well have been given to Plato's conception of the bearing of an education in exact science on conduct and statesmanship. Taken as a whole, Mr. Barker's estimate of the value and of the limitation of Plato's political thought leaves little to be desired. The "staple of criticism," however, is not simply or solely that Plato was "too generously eager for the reign of pure truth and the realization of pure principle," but that he was too much oppressed with a sense of the evils about him; and perhaps more allowance might have been made in the case of Plato, as of Carlyle (with whom Mr. Barker likes to compare him), for the difficulty of reading humor, sarcasm and poetry for prose.

The account of Aristotle is very thorough and comprehensive, though in some respects less interesting and unfamiliar. A good deal of attention and criticism is directed to Aristotle's teleological method, and to very good purpose. It is, however, somewhat surprising that Mr. Barker should assert that "Aristotle differs from Plato in not believing in a single end, an idea of the good," more especially as he acknowledges that "the idea of God as the final cause, if pushed to its consequences, would involve the Platonic conception." The point of Aristotle's criticism of "the Idea of the Good" is not that such a conception is logically untenable—on the contrary, he is at some pains in the "Metaphysics" to establish such a conception himself—but that it must not be used in a way which would whittle away all differences; nor would Aristotle have regarded the Idea of the Good as used by Plato himself in the "Republic" as a "mere abstraction." It is, again, misleading to say that the conception of the unity of virtue is "attacked" by Aristotle in the "Ethics."

The treatment of the legal and economic ideas in Aristotle does not seem quite satisfactory. It is hardly sufficient to say that in Aristotle's theory, "value depends on demand, or felt utility," or again, that it is "determined by demand." All that Aristotle

ays is that without demand there would be no exchange. But the theory of value which he suggests is hardly expressed by the statement that "objects are measured against one another in terms of the amount of demand which they excite." The truth is that Aristotle is not concerned with the theory of value in the modern sense. The question he is considering is not "How is the value of products actually determined?" but "How ought it to be determined?" It is a question of justice. The answer he gives is not very clear, but it is at any rate more ethical than economic—and more akin to the socialistic than to the "commercial" theory of value. It hardly seems, again, as if Mr. Barker has done sufficient justice to the social and political ideas underlying (and to a certain extent justifying) Aristotle's distrust of the "trade-spirit." In remarking that Plato was more inclined to recognize the services of the middleman, Mr. Barker might have added an explicit passage from the "Laws." The chapter on Aristotle's conceptions of Law and Justice is admirable throughout, and is summed up in the paradox that "a liberty which is subjection, an equality which consists in inequality, are the guiding conceptions of Aristotle."

Space prevents me from raising further points. Attention, however, should be drawn to the Epilogue, in which Mr. Barker sketches the later history of the "Politics," as also to a chronological table of events bearing on the text. The appendices are devoted to a sketch of the later history of the "Republic" and to a curious account of a newspaper published in 1664 and entitled *Observations, Historical, Political and Philosophical, upon Aristotle's First Book of Political Government, together with a Narrative of State Affairs in England, Scotland and Ireland, etc.*

Not the least valuable part of Mr. Barker's book consists in a copious and relevant selection of modern parallels and applications. In particular, Mr. Barker has, as he tells us, taken Aristotle's conceptions of citizenship, of democracy, and of distributive justice, and used them to illustrate and illuminate the conditions of modern citizenship, the problems of modern democracy, and the distribution of political power in the modern State. Perhaps Mr. Barker might have gone further and compared, for instance, Aristotle's idea of law and of sovereignty with modern theories, if only to show how little they have in common; and the question of the ground of political obligation might have been explicitly treated. Mr. Barker, in fact, has

given the student so much that he may well be tempted to ask for more. As it is, Mr. Barker's book is much more than a contribution to an understanding of Greek political thought; it is an admirable text-book on political science, as well as an admirable popularization (in the best sense) of the best theory, both ancient and modern.

SIDNEY BALL.

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INDIVIDUELLE UND SOZIALE ETHIK. Vierzehn Vorträge. Von Dr. A. Dorner. Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1906.

This collection of fourteen lectures delivered in Königsberg, and printed by wish of those who heard them delivered, has for its object the analysis of current popular theories on ethical subjects, in the hope of reconciling (Frieden zu stiften) what the author regards as the extreme wings of the discussion, viz.: State socialism on the one hand, and the individualism which culminates in Nietzsche on the other. This reconciliation is effected by pointing out that the ethical culture of the individual is impossible apart from a community of persons, while, on the other hand, the life of the community is made up of the activities of individuals. "The intercourse of individuals, whether as free persons or as free organizations of persons, is the central ground of ethics." Individual differences in character, gift, and office, serve the public good and increase the richness of the public life, when these differences in the individual are held together and unified by a culture which is universal in character. The community which is thus enriched by the intercourse, the mutual service, and mutual "give and take" of cultured individuals, is not the State, but "die durch den Staat geordnete Gesamtheit aller ethischen Gemindschaften" (page 237).

In considering the widespread popular desire to free ethical theory from the authority of religion as well as from the tradition of the great philosophers and from metaphysical implications, Dr. Dorner maintains that while conduct is the result of natural gift and capacity in the individuals, the characteristic fact in human conduct is always that it is the activity of a self-conscious individual, and that this fact differentiates ethical law from the law of material nature, and is the ground of his ultimate position that "Auf sich allein kann nur eine Gesinnungsethik

stehen (page 240). If we are to find an "unbedingten Soll" anywhere in ethics "so weist die Ethik auch auf die letzten Gründe alles Lebens zurück" (page 240). Unfortunately Dr. Dorner does not tell us anywhere in his book how he conceives of this Ultimate. He disclaims in his preface the intention of being exhaustive in his treatment of his subject, but without being exhaustive, and while still maintaining its character of popular discourse, the treatment might with advantage have been more philosophic, might have emanated more obviously from an Ultimate. The analysis in that case would probably have been less elaborate but more profound. Common sense, however, and a vivid realization of the identical interest of the individual and society do much to make Dr. Dorner's book helpful in the ethical movement of thought which he describes, and which at present seems to be a *Verwirrung* rather than an *Aufklärung*.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY. By H. G. Wells. London: A. C. Field, 1906. Pp. 60.

The reader of Mr. Wells' books cannot but be interested in the personality revealed through them. He finds a lively constructive imagination mainly concerned with the externals of civilization, a keen critical faculty whose ultimate and most congenial field is the inner life of the social organism, a strenuous earnestness, an unhesitating frankness, and—what gives these things their literary value—a large power of effective expression. But there is another quality not the least attractive—and, to many of his readers, not the least persuasive—the kind of prolonged youthfulness which often accompanies the growth of unusual powers, a capacity for cherishing inconsistent ideals, a persistency in demanding more of the world and of the future than they can ever give. Most serious writers on social subjects have time to select and fix the ideas they are to stand for before they succeed in gaining the ear of the public. Mr. Wells has been able to invite us to share the growth of his mind. The invitation is a rare honor, to be accepted in the right spirit. And the right spirit is one of frank and friendly criticism.

This personal note is inevitable, if we are to do justice to the

brochure before us. The proposal which is its ostensible climax, that the State should render the mother economically independent by paying her wages for child-bearing, cannot be regarded—baldly put, as Mr. Wells puts it—as a permanent contribution to a great social problem. It would have to take a much more definite shape before it could be fitted into either an act of Parliament or a system of social philosophy; and until it has been carried much further in one or other of these directions any detailed criticism of it would be mere beating of the air. Moreover, Mr. Wells, as his ideas develop, will be his own most effective critic.

The ground on which the outside critic may most profitably enter is afforded by Mr. Wells' broader conceptions of Socialism and the State. It is here that the inconsistency of ideals already referred to becomes most manifest. Mr. Wells' eye is not single. He has one eye upon the new model of militant Fabianism, and the other on that far off divine event, his New Republic. His discontent with the limitations of the existing Socialist party organizations is natural enough, and (apart from a touch of acerbity) right enough in a social philosopher, but in a politician bent on immediate objects it is impracticable. Indeed, he seems half conscious of this himself. "I don't believe," he says, "that the Socialist idea is as yet nearly enough thought out and elaborated for very much of it to be realized of set intention now. Socialism is still essentially education, is study, is a renewal, a profound change in the circle of human thought and motive. . . . Socialism is the still incomplete, the still sketchy and sketchily indicative plan of a new life for the world, a new and better way of living, a change of spirit and substance from the narrow selfishness and immediacy and cowardly formalism, the chaotic life of individual accident that is human life to-day." Here is common ground on which all social idealists may meet, whether we call ourselves Socialists, Hegelians, Positivists, or Christians. Our common idealism is based on the conception of the spiritual nature of all real progress as a process that is an end in itself, to which all advances of material civilization cannot be more than a means and may prove a hindrance. Such a conception is the root of a new patience. "He that believeth will not make haste."

But Mr. Wells' possession of this point of view is not permanent. Presently there comes into that constructive imagination of his, an alluring vision of "beautiful and convenient homes,

splendid cities, noiseless, great highways, beautiful bridges, clean, swift electric railways." And these things seem so all important that he is filled with bitterness at the thought of waiting till "a clamorous popular government of workingmen," or "stupid little municipal authorities," will acquire intelligence enough to achieve these improvements for themselves. He turns with contempt from the bungling agencies of self-government and seeks salvation in the expert. He dreams of a Superman arising in the College of Science and of the spirit of the Samurai brooding over South Kensington. He offers a dictatorship to the professional classes, to the doctor, the teacher, the civil engineer. They are to be the State. Through their initiative and partly by means of the "beautiful and convenient homes," "the clean, swift and splendid electric railways," which they will make for us in our despite, we are to achieve that "profound change in the circle of human thought and motive" which is the essence of Socialism.

The social idealism, which places all its faith in a State manned by an inspired bureaucracy is as old as Plato. But much has happened since Plato wrote his "Republic." The State as the sole instrument of progress has been tried and found wanting. The story of Russia has the same moral as that of Rome, in spite of the late M. Pobiedonosteff's unshakable belief in the Platonic mission of his bureaucracy. The unquestioning confidence which Socialists repose in the State has only become possible because the power of the modern State is balanced by social forces, not always reckoned with by the social theorist—the semi-autonomous action of local government, the church, the free action of voluntary association and of public opinion. In England we are preparing to give the State a larger scope, because we trust, sometimes without realizing it, that the other social forces will also enlarge their scope and maintain the balance. In America other social forces have from the first overbalanced the State (*i. e.* the Federal Government). Mr. Wells' admirable book, "The Future in America," conveys a vivid impression of this fact—no doubt the central fact—of the situation in the United States; and it is with this impression foremost in his mind that Mr. Wells gives us his views on "Socialism and the Family." Let us hope he will extend his travels to Germany or Japan, where the State has more of a free hand. Another book of sincere and critical impressions would be of great service to his

many readers and to himself. We can afford to wait, and so can he, for the final formulation of his social philosophy. His danger is that he might "draw a circle premature."

GEORGE UNWIN.

LONDON.

THEORIE UND PRAXIS IN DER MORAL. Von Dr. Franz Walter,
Professor der Moraltheologie an der Universität München.
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1905. Pp. 122.

This work is an inaugural lecture delivered by the author upon his first appearance as Professor of Moral Theology at Munich. Moral Theology would seem to have no strict equivalent in Protestant places of learning; to judge from the contents of this little book, it would seem to combine certain aspects of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology. Since the days of Pascal, the pursuit of moral theology has often been identified by the learned Protestant laity, as for example, by Sir Henry Maine, with casuistical adaptations of too rigid moral demands. Against this danger the author of this work protests both expressly and by the whole spirit of his teaching. While remaining true to the fundamental principles of Catholic philosophy, he urges his audience, which evidently consists mainly of men preparing for the Catholic priesthood, to make itself scientifically acquainted with the economic and social circumstances in which the priest and his flock are compelled to live. He discusses especially the duty of the minister toward the problems of political economy, the education of the young, the artistic tendencies of the time, and the discoveries of modern psychology. As might be expected, no very novel theories are advanced, but the wide knowledge of every phase of German life and thought, the profound learning and firm grasp of philosophic principle make the book as delightful as it is instructive. Those who, regretting the separation between modern thought and the historic church of Western Europe, desire to become acquainted with the best orthodox thought of the time, could do worse than begin with this scholarly and unassuming little book.

W. J. ROBERTS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

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